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ABSTRACT 
AMERICAN JACOBINS: 
REVOLUTIONARY RADICALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 
 
FEBRUARY 2009 
 
JORDAN LEWIS REED, B.A., THE UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Daniel Gordon 
 
 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to portray the revolutionary character of the 
American Civil War through a comparative methodology utilizing the French Revolution 
as both point of influence and as a parallel example. Within this novel context, subtle 
trends in the ideological development of the Republican Party’s Radical wing undertake 
new meaning and an alternative revolutionary heritage takes shape around an idealization 
of the universalism of the French and Haitian Revolutions of the 1790s. The work argues 
that through a diffusion of ideas and knowledge of events from the streets of Paris into 
the fields of Haiti and onto the shores of the American coast, a small faction of militant 
abolitionists latched onto the ideal of the Haitian Revolution as their own legacy. 
By the late 1830s, this radical edge of the antislavery movement embarked onto 
two courses, both derived from and influenced by their newfound ideology. The first was 
towards violent direct action against slavery while the second aimed at legitimizing 
radical new legal theories and creating the political structure necessary to bring about 
their enforcement. While on the one hand John Brown and Gerrit Smith pursued militant 
action, on the other Alvan Stewart and Salmon P. Chase sought a political and legal 
v 
redefinition of American society through the Liberty and eventually Republican parties. 
With the coming of war in the 1860s, these two trends, violence and radical politics, 
converged in the Union war effort.  
In the midst of the Civil War and the early fight for Reconstruction, Radical 
Republicans and their allies in the Union Army displayed themselves as American 
Jacobins. Through a set of comparisons with French Revolutionary events and political 
debates, this thesis argues that the result of the ideological development between the 
American Revolution and the Civil War Era in the United States was the creation of a 
revolutionary ideology parallel to that of French Jacobinism. By the time of their fall 
from power, the Radical Republicans had seen their ideals both lambasted as the radical 
edge of politics and then transformed into the status quo, helping to prepare the nation for 
modernity. 
vi 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A FRENCH REVOLUTION IN AMERICA? 
 
Reconstructing Radical Heritage 
 
 
 
David Brion Davis has asserted that if historians would critically view the Civil 
War as a revolution, then “the United States, for all its alleged stability and continuity, 
would become the scene of the Western world’s bloodiest and most destructive 
revolution before the twentieth century.”1 Taking up the challenge Davis’s declaration 
connotes, this present work attempts to portray the revolutionary character of the 
American Civil War. Utilizing a comparative methodology with the French Revolution 
and its ideology as the point of reference, the Civil War and Reconstruction are placed in 
a new perspective. Within this novel context, subtle trends in the ideological development 
of the Republican Party’s Radical wing undertake new meaning and an alternative 
revolutionary heritage takes shape around an idealization of the universalism of the 
Haitian and French Revolutions. 
There are two keys to this conceptualization. First is the idea that the Civil War 
was driven by an ideology independently developed, but influenced by and in the end a 
parallel to French Revolutionary Jacobinism—that ideology most associated with the 
Terror and its mouthpiece, Maximilien Robespierre. The second key is a depiction of the 
war that began in 1861 as an analog to the French Revolution that commenced some 
seventy-two years earlier both in its driving forces and its physical manifestations. When 
                                                
1 David Brion Davis, Revolutions: Reflections on American Equality and Foreign 
Liberations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 10.  
2 
these precepts are taken into account, the destruction and violence witnessed in the late 
stages of the U.S. war and Radical Republican attempts to revolutionize Southern society 
during Reconstruction emerge as outgrowths of an American Jacobin ideology. 
The central questions of this thesis, then, are how did ideas commonly perceived 
as the hallmark of late eighteenth century France and an anathema to the American 
system appear in the mid-nineteenth century United States; and, were the actions inspired 
by these ideas comparable in breadth and scope to what historians generally contend was 
one of the most violent and self-destructive revolutions to ever occur. In answering these 
questions, this thesis adopts a transnational, comparative approach and looks for 
influences and parallels rather than direct connections or invocations of Jacobinism. It 
argues that through an idealization and domestication of the ideas and violence of the 
French and Haitian Revolutions as well as stateside slave conspiracies, American militant 
abolitionists developed a radical worldview on par with French Jacobinism. Largely 
marginalized until the drastic break of the Civil War and Reconstruction, these ideas 
flourished in the revolutionary moment and drove the conflict on a course analogous to 
that of the French Revolution. The congruent results of the war demonstrate that the 
ideology discussed earlier was thoroughly infused into wartime policies, legal arguments, 
and the Union drive to create new, regenerated societies. 
 
Before beginning, a few notes on perspective and methodology are necessary. 
This is a work covering four major fields of history, including the U.S. Civil War and 
Reconstruction, slavery and abolitionism, the revolutionary Caribbean, and the French 
Revolution, but it is largely a work of American history. The theoretical foundation of 
3 
this work, however, is wholly grounded in recent trends in French Revolutionary history, 
especially in the ideas and works of François Furet and his followers.2 Furet argued that 
the content of the revolution, its violence and excesses, could not be explained by the 
successes, failures, or problems of the Old Regime. Instead, it was a product of the 
revolutionary break itself and that once begun, the ideas thrust forward by it built upon 
themselves and drove events on a course unpredictable from pre-revolutionary indicators. 
In the same way, this thesis argues that the true radicalism of the Civil War era cannot be 
explained by looking only at the conventional precursors of study, but, like the French 
Revolution, resulted from the exigencies of the moment as revolutionary ideology took 
hold. This is not to say that in either case the ideology which became dominant did not 
preexist in some form, but that it was developed and influenced by groups largely 
overlooked or marginalized before the break occurred. 
In that same vein, then, this thesis is not arguing for the existence of a heretofore 
undiscovered direct ideological lineage between the Jacobins and the Radical 
Republicans. Rather, the argument is one of indirect influence and analogy between the 
two groups, that ideas developed by the Jacobins were interpreted, reinterpreted, and 
transformed by a series of actors, in many cases unwitting, with little knowledge of the 
heritage of the ideas they were professing and developing. In this way, the flow of ideas 
did not reproduce a Robespierre embodied in a Republican, but instead an Americanized 
parallel with the same general starting points, goals and motivations, and 
                                                
2 The major work which placed ideology at the center of the French Revolution was 
François Furet’s Penser la Révolution française (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), Translated by 
Elborg Forster as Interpreting the French Revolution (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981). 
 
4 
manifestations—all expressed in wholly American terms and structures. In other words, 
the ideological foundation of the Radical Republicans was not directly descended from 
the French Revolution, but nevertheless owed its development to it through a subtle chain 
of influence and transnational transference of ideas resulting in a new ideology that 
created a striking parallel to its namesake. 
In searching for evidence of this radical worldview, a focus is placed on language 
and ideology as a driving force of revolutionary events, another concept of Furet’s thus 
far largely ignored in U.S. history. In doing so, much weight is given to literal statements 
and proclamations as insights into the goals and motivations of the various actors. 
Though these accounts can sometimes be characterized as rhetorical excess, they also 
provide a window into the mindset of the speakers as they sought to sway those against 
whom they fought and whom they wished to ally. Whether or not they present an 
accurate depiction of reality, these words influenced and drove the larger revolutionary 
discourse which in turn catalyzed events and compelled the revolution forward. 
Additionally, the perspective presented of the American Civil War, as one harsh 
and punitive towards the South, is in no way tied to the neoconfederate school of 
scholarship. Far from arguing the ruthlessness imparted by the Union Army and Radical 
Republicans justified the post-Reconstruction Southern backlash against blacks, this work 
sees Northern tactics and beliefs as warranted by the unjust and inexcusable slave society 
Southerners had created and were determined to defend at all costs. Though the American 
Jacobins failed in the short term and a counterrevolution of sorts occurred, it does not 
denigrate the higher ideals and beliefs of the men who fought to regenerate the corrupt 
and decrepit socio-political world of the South. 
5 
Finally, because this work posits that the socio-political worldviews of French 
Jacobins and the Radical Republicans were distinctly different from those of the men of 
1776, the logical starting point is an exposition on the disparity between French and 
American revolutionaries’ belief systems. To that end, a brief overview of the Jacobins 
and their ideology will serve as the point of reference in the later discussion of the most 
ideologically pure form of militant abolitionism—that of the Radical Political Abolition 
Party in the 1850s. In the same way, an overview of the ideology of the American 
Revolution will represent the point of contrast from which the Radical Republicans 
rebelled. 
 
When the French Revolution exploded in 1789, the men who eventually 
populated the National Assembly were mostly political novices, and many turned to 
informal, after-hours debating societies to learn the craft of statesmanship. The Jacobin 
Club was at first one of these nameless debating associations attended by liberally-
minded deputies when not meeting officially in the Tuilleries Palace in central Paris. As 
their numbers grew, they soon needed a larger space in which to congregate, and among 
the possibilities were several abandoned monasteries. Due to its size and location, off 
Rue Saint Honoré just north of the palace, the deputies chose a former friary of the 
Dominican order, a group colloquially known in Paris as the “Jacobins” because their 
original convent had been on the Rue Saint Jacques in the Latin Quarter.3 
                                                
3 For an overview of who the Jacobins were and what they believed, see Patrice 
Higonnet, Goodness beyond Virtue: Jacobins during the French Revolution (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1998) and David P. Jordan, The Revolutionary Career of 
Maximilien Robespierre (New York: The Free Press, 1985); For an overview of the 
Revolution itself, the best and most thorough recent work covering the short term causes 
6 
In mid-1789 the Jacobin deputies were not so much of a single ideology as a 
collection of disparate, but generally like-minded men who valued natural law, justice, 
equality, and the concept of free laborthe belief that each man must earn his way 
through life with hard work, thrifty living, charity, morality, and civic virtue. They 
believed private property was the guarantor of liberty, that an individualistic capitalism 
would be a good replacement for the feudal, state- and guild-controlled economy of the 
monarchy, and that criminality, antisocial behaviors, debt, hoarding, speculation, 
drunkenness, and gambling were signs of an unvirtuous person. In addition, they saw the 
arrogant or assertive display of wealth or knowledge as vice, and presumed that the poor 
were virtuous and would excel under a regenerated society purged of the unmoral and 
unrepentant. As they evolved over the following five years, these ideas would continue to 
inform their outlook.4 
Shedding its more conservative and then moderate members as its political 
perspective solidified and shifted to the left, by 1791 the Jacobin Club encompassed 
many members outside the government itself. Within the Assembly, the Jacobin deputies 
became known as Montagnards and collectively as The Mountain—La Montagne—
                                                                                                                                            
as well as the long term aftermath is Francois Furet, Revolutionary France 1770-1880, 
Translated by Antonia Nevill (Malden: Blackwell, 1995); For a the classic view of the 
long-term causes of the Revolution, see Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the 
French Revolution, Translated by Stuart Gilbert (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955); An 
excellent political history of the Revolution is D.M.G. Sutherland, France 1789-1815: 
Revolution and Counterrevolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); For a 
more sensationalist take, see Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French 
Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1989); Finally, for a topically-organized point of 
reference, see François Furet and Mona Ozouf, Eds, A Critical Dictionary of the French 
Revolution, Translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1989). 
 
4 Higonnet, Goodness Beyond Virtue, 82-85, 87, 90-91, 112, 123, 185, 198-199, 245. 
 
7 
because they crowded onto the high bleachers on the extreme left end of the room—
giving rise to the modern political concepts of left, center, and right as they distinguished 
themselves from “the plain” of moderates in the center and conservatives on the right of 
the room. By 1793, Jacobinism had evolved from a liberal, natural rights doctrine into a 
belief system of absolutes: freedom, equality, higher law, justice, and social welfarean 
understanding that no virtuous man should live in poverty. Though many at the time and 
since have perceived this matured ideology as an example of radical extremism in its 
most pure form, it continued to reflect its liberal origins and could be better described as 
radical constitutional idealism.5 
The two facets of Jacobinism, the liberal and the radical, can be seen as a struggle 
of balance between private individualism and a greater sense of public universalism. 
Thus, Jacobinism manifested as both men imploring the need for legal processes and 
justice driven by what was both right and righteous as well as men driven to near-
genocidal rage against unbelievers. Their original liberal views of sacrosanct property 
rights, lassiez-faire commerce, and insistence on the rule of law persisted as a moderating 
force, creating a foundation which set the ground rules. Throughout the Revolution, these 
facets limited property confiscations and restrictions on commerce, insured that the 
Terror always functioned with the appearance of legal process through the Tribunals, 
even if these became virtual kangaroo courts, and in the provinces served to restrain the 
purges of legally-elected deputies at times. These foundational beliefs placed Jacobins 
                                                
5 A good look at the rise of the new political class in 1789-1790 is Timothy Tacket, 
Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National Assembly and the 
Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790) (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996). 
 
8 
well within the mainstream of their larger political culture, and continued to constrain 
their ideas and actions even at the height of their power under Robespierre’s Republic of 
Virtue from 1793 to 1794 during the Reign of Terror.6 
At the same time, however, Jacobins were idealists willing to bend the laws to 
encompass the spirit of their beliefs in social justice, equality, liberty, welfare, and the 
higher good; when in direct conflict with these socially radicals beliefs, their liberal 
bastion would shift to accommodate them, but only so far as necessary. Thus, for 
example, the right to property could be modified in order to allow the taking of Church 
and émigré property based on complex arguments of unlawful and unearned royal grants 
or to end slavery in the French Caribbean based on the idea of universal liberty. 
Additionally, when Jacobins imposed rationing to help control inflation and rampant 
price gouging, it was at a rate which still ensured a marginal profit for merchants. Such 
changes were not haphazard, but expressed in carefully-developed legal arguments to 
maintain the perception of oversight, even if at times they were just for show. Their 
ideology suggested that even a constitution, a state’s most basic legal document, could in 
exceptional circumstances be changed for a higher good. Overall, Jacobins abhorred 
communistic tendencies and were good bourgeoisie, believing in the necessity of a stable, 
virtuous, and law-based society.7 
                                                
6 Higonnet, Goodness Beyond Virtue, 44-45, 52-54. 
 
7 Patrice Higonnet has termed the Jacobin tendency to act outside of the law to achieve 
just and righteous ends as “legal illegality.” He notes that because of their extreme 
disdain for arbitrary action as harkening back to monarchical absolutism, their ideology 
forced them to cloak illegality in legalisms. Higonnet, Goodness Beyond Virtue, 129-132, 
155. 
9 
While their liberalism echoed the mainstream, their social radicalism very much 
set Jacobins apart from their moderate colleagues in the National Assembly. In full force 
by 1793, it was this idealism which, owing to their absolute morality and Manichean 
outlook, radicalized them, leading to purges of less zealous members and driving France 
towards total war and Terror. Jacobin radicalism demanded society guarantee to all 
citizens a minimal existence, universal liberty and equality, and absolute justice—ideas 
they believed were embodied in the spirit of the Declaration of the Rights of Mans and of 
the Citizen and the revolution itself—but not the equality of property. Through their role 
as the revolutionary moral authority, Jacobins pressured the government, from within and 
without, to pursue the course their ideology commanded. They defined their world in a 
continual state of war and revolution that required constant vigilance and action in order 
for the Republic to survive, mandating the preservation of the nation as one and 
indivisible. In order to purify the government and preserve the wholeness of the nation, 
they turned to revolutionary violence, urging their followers to action in order to prove 
themselves worthy and righteous. 
In Jacobin radical discourse, virtue, purity, and equality were central, and a deeply 
moral ideal of virtue became the measure of a man. It was portrayed, as most things 
during the French Revolution, in Manichean terms: either a man was virtuous and 
struggled on behalf of the Republic, or his conviction was a facade in order that he may 
harness the forces of revolution for his own benefit or that of the counterrevolution. With 
his active support of the Revolution, each man proved his virtue publicly and thereby 
garnered the rights of citizenship, liberty, and equality. From its vague origins, virtue 
became narrowly defined as action in the form of patriotism for the Republic. A citizen 
10 
was to prove himself equal and worthy by showing all he had personally done for the 
public good of the Revolution. By early 1793, Maximilien Robespierre, a provincial 
lawyer from Arras before 1789, had emerged as leader of the Jacobins and the authority 
on revolutionary morality as well as what defined a good and virtuous citizen.8 
The virtue of the Republic itself was similarly guarded through a sacrosanct creed 
of une volonté une—the unity of the nation under one sovereign will. According to 
Robespierre, 
 
What we need…is a single will [une volonté une]. It must be either republican or 
royalist. If it is to be republican, we must have republican ministers, republican 
newspapers, republican deputies, a republican government.…The body politic 
suffers from the Revolution and the diversion of wills. 
 
While phrased in secular terms, Robespierre never separated the spiritual from the state; 
rather, he made the Republic a spiritual entity to be worshipped and cleansed. To that 
end, the Jacobin Club of Paris and its affiliates across France became a unanimous force 
to purify the state.9 They became a civil army to protect the Republic’s virtue and 
ideological orthodoxy, but at the same time, they became its tribunal, delivering 
excommunications and denunciations to feed the Terror. The Club molded itself into a 
model for the Republic: a body of righteous, purified, and tested citizens who would 
                                                
8 For an in-depth discussion of the idea of revolutionary discourses and their driving the 
revolution, see Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution; and more recently, Keith 
Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in 
the Eighteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Higonnet, 
Goodness Beyond Virtue, 241-242. 
 
9 For an example of a local Jacobin club at work, see Colin Lucas, The Structure of the 
Terror: The Example of Javogues in the Loire (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1973). 
 
11 
never end their fight for the unity of France or the revolution until the Republic was 
secure.10 
Jacobins at first welcomed many into their fold out of pragmatism and openness 
for those who proclaimed their support for the Revolution and then the Republic. All 
were welcome until they proved themselves at odds with either of the core beliefs of 
liberalism and radicalism. Eventually Jacobins repudiated and removed any factions or 
individuals that threatened their conception of une volonté une. This was equally applied 
to the former nobility and other conservatives on the right when they resisted change, as 
well as to those on the extreme left such as the followers of Jacques Hébert and the 
Cordeliers or Jacques Roux and the Énrages who demanded the further radicalization the 
revolution.11 
In an example of their legalistic mentality, Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, 
Robespierre’s comrade-in-arms, proclaimed those deemed unvirtuous and a threat to the 
wholeness of the nation outside the body politic, not citizens, and possessing only a right 
to a swift execution. In 1793 and 1794, Jacobin-led forces crushed federalist Girondins in 
Lyons, decimated royalists in the Vendée, quieted the Énrages on the streets of Paris, and 
eliminated many of their Cordelier challengers in the National Assembly. Yet, they coded 
even these events in the discourse of morality: according to Robespierre, without virtue 
“a great revolution is nothing more than a startling crime that annihilates another crime.” 
                                                
10 E.B. Courtois, Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée de l’examen des papiers 
trouvés chez Robespierre et ses complices (Paris, 1795), 181; Jordan, Revolutionary 
Career of Maximilien Robespierre, 143. Jordan dates the idea of une volonté une from 
March 1793; Furet, “Jacobinism,” in Critical Dictionary, 709-710. 
 
11 For more information on the Hébertists and Énrages, see Denis Richet, “Énrages” and 
“Hébertists” in Critical Dictionary, 337 and 363. 
12 
When elections and legal government failed to regenerate the nation, the virtuous people, 
through their surrogates, the Jacobins, assumed “the right to purge the legislature 
lawlessly and continually,” though they would argue that an unvirtuous government was 
not legal in the first place. In the war against the unvirtuous, Terror would be wielded for 
the people by the peoples’ true representatives for the survival of the Republic.12 
Such abrasive language resulted from a belief that the Republic was in real danger 
from a counterrevolutionary “aristocratic plot,” that sought to derail the Revolution and 
break up the state. This fear manifested from early outbreaks of unorganized violence 
into a program of organized, legalized Terror. Saint-Just declared, “The republic will 
only be founded when the will of the sovereign will have curbed the monarchical 
minority and will reign over it by the right of conquest.…It is necessary to govern by iron 
those who cannot be governed by justice.” According to Robespierre, the goal of this 
revolutionary government was to found a sustainable Republic, protected from all of 
those who would seek out to destroy it. Thus defining themselves in a continuous state of 
revolution and war, the Republican motto became “the provisional government of France, 
revolutionary until peace.”
13
 
                                                
12 Maximilien Robespierre, Oeuvres complètes, 10 volumes (Paris, 1903-1968), X, 554; 
Jordan, Revolutionary Career of Maximilien Robespierre, 162, 171, 189; Furet, 
“Jacobinism,” 709; Higonnet, Goodness Beyond Virtue, 35, 40, 43. 
 
13 Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, Oeuvres choisies (Paris, 1968), 168; Robespierre, 
Oeuvres complètes, X, 274; Jordan, Revolutionary Career of Maximilien Robespierre, 
172-173. While the threat of the counterrevolution was the professed purpose of the 
crackdowns, François Furet has conclusively argued in Interpreting the French 
Revolution that the internal threat was actually a figment of the revolution, and its 
purpose, along with the Terror, was only to maintain the power of radical discourse over 
the Republic, its representatives, and an equally fictitious conceptualization of “the 
people.” The importance here, however, is the ideology of virtue and not the reality. As 
David Jordan contends, Robespierre believed what he said and his actions were not 
13 
As the Revolution progressed, the language of purity transformed into an idiom of 
spiritualism. With Robespierre leading the way, Jacobins framed the Revolution as a sort 
of “spiritual crusade” in which either good would triumph over evil or the Republic 
would be destroyed. The culmination of this “revolutionary deism” was the Cult of the 
Supreme Being, an attempt to sanctify the Republic itself as a religious force to further 
the virtuous regeneration of the people. The moralizing spiritualism of the deputy from 
Arras also acted as another unifying principle: if national wholeness could first be 
achieved in the spiritual realm exemplified by virtue, it could then be extended into the 
earthly world evidenced by liberty and equality. While the cult sought to purify society, 
however, the guillotine would eliminate those dubbed unvirtuous and unredeemable. It 
was no coincidence, therefore, that two days after the Festival of the Supreme Being, the 
laws of 22 Prairial—10 June 1794—accelerated and streamlined the machinery of the 
Terror, which Robespierre defined as “nothing but prompt, severe, and inflexible 
justice.”14  
                                                                                                                                            
calculated in order to maintain personal power, but to further the revolution; For a 
continued discussion of Revolutionary Government, see François Furet, “Revolutionary 
Government,” in Critical Dictionary, 548; See also Mona Ozouf, “Revolution,” in 
Critical Dictionary, 812-813; Jordan, Revolutionary Career of Maximilien Robespierre, 
172-173; and Reynald Secher, Le génocide franco-française: La Vendée-Vengé (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1986, Translated by George Holoch as A French 
Genocide: The Vendée (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 3. 
 
14 Robespierre, Oeuvres complètes, X, 357; Jordan, The Revolutionary Career of 
Maximilien Robespierre, 171, 192-193; Secher, Le génocide franco-française, 250; Mona 
Ozouf, “Revolutionary Religion,” in A Critical Dictionary, 566. Far from supporting the 
very vocal proponents of dechristianization, Robespierre proclaimed that a Jacobin 
“cannot be republican if he is not first and foremost moral and religious.” As 
dechristianizers attacked the Catholic Church, Robespierre attacked them; he did not 
want to Catholicize France, but he detested those without a sense of spiritualism or belief 
in a higher power, which, to him, was the source for justice and virtue. Jordan, The 
14 
While the bending to extremist radicalism in 1794 was definite—the laws of 22 
Prairial were a sort of legal suspension of the law allowing the swift execution of some 
20,000 victims in addition to the burning of Vendée and destruction of Lyons—the men 
who still claimed the Jacobin ideology as their own after the fall of Robespierre on 9 July 
1794 tried to strike a chord on their more liberal side. The survivors around Abbé Sieyès, 
though not using the term Jacobin any longer, sought to modernize France in line with 
their ideas under the Directory. They were forced to abandon many of the more reaching 
programs of the Republic of Virtue, such as universal public education and nationalized 
industry, but they managed to clean up the judicial system, codify conscription, and 
standardize weights and measures. The Constitution of 1795, drafted by Sieyès, dropped 
a right to insurrection in favor of a declaration of duties, responsibilities, and human 
rights. While not everything that pure Jacobinism would have wanted, it was the most 
plausible result that could be achieved in a state recovering from the excesses of the 
Terror. It was also the most Jacobinism the world would see for quite some time.15 
 
In contrast to the dualistic, radical-constitutionalist ideology that rapidly 
developed in France to fill the vacuum left by the fall of monarchism, pre-revolutionary 
American socio-political ideology was relatively stable. The colonials’ beliefs were 
undeniably derived from the Enlightenment-inspired liberalism of their British forbears, 
stressing individualism, restrictions upon the reach of government, property rights, and 
                                                                                                                                            
Revolutionary Career of Maximilien Robespierre, 198. Higonnet, Goodness Beyond 
Virtue, 129-131. 
 
15 Higonnet, Goodness Beyond Virtue, 52, 64-68. 
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civic virtue—they lacked the sense of social justice and far-reaching public universalism 
found in France. This Smithian belief system had existed in the political majority since 
before the American Revolution, and after independence, this majority quickly 
suppressed any elements that might have taken a path like that of the French or demanded 
a thorough imposition of the ideals of the Declaration of Independence.16 
The French had had to cope with a novel political class, whose job would be 
complicated by the creation of new political bodies, a completely restructured 
government, the sudden end of legalized noble privileges, and several decades of 
forward-thinking ideas for reform, some conflicting, that had never faced the test of 
implementation. American leaders, on the other hand, maintained an active hold on 
public safety and never faced an underclass decrying traitors, demanding bread, and 
threatening the day to day security of the nation, allowing them to focus on their own 
expedient needs. The major debates during the convention centered on the actual 
structure of the federal system, not liberty and equality. The question of slavery remained 
                                                
16 Higonnet, Goodness Beyond Virtue, 70, 114-115. While American socio-political 
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Interestingly, though, while he was too radical for the American Revolution, Paine 
proved not radical enough when he arrived in France in the midst of its revolution, barely 
escaping the guillotine before retiring to New York. For a comparative look at how 
American socio-political ideology differed from that of France at the time of the 
Revolution, see Patrice Higonnet, Sister Republics: The Origins of French and American 
Republicanism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989) and Anne Sa’adah, The 
Shaping of Liberal Politics in Revolutionary France: A Comparative Perspective 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
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largely tangential and its swift elimination, though proposed, was a nonstarter; even in 
the northern regions where it existed, slavery was eliminated through gradual processes.17 
There can be little doubt that a moderate, pragmatic, and generally pro-slavery 
sentiment ruled over the federal government from the creation of the Constitution until 
the Civil War.18 Despite the rhetoric of the founding fathers, there was little belief for 
most Americans, especially Southerners, that property rights would ever be wholly 
modified to exclude slaves; they were property and that was that. Americans feared such 
a change because it might lead to other exclusions beyond slaves, bringing down the 
entire economic and cultural structure of the state. To them, the definition of property 
must be absolute and unchangeable in order to stabilize the society upon which it rests. 
While slavery was untouchable as an issue, the prominent men who led the 
revolution saw control of their own destiny as fair game within their inherent rights as 
British subjects. They never intended to revolutionize the social order despite their use of 
broad and inclusive rhetoric which gained them the support of those below their own 
station. The Sons of Liberty and the members of the Stamp Act Congress were not 
‘radicals’ looking to gain power over the government from the outside. In many cases, 
these men were the authorities, and thus, wanted to ensure their own power and positions 
over the colonies by removing that of England. In other cases, the men were merchants 
                                                
17 Higonnet, Goodness Beyond Virtue, 323. 
 
18 For more on the Southern, slavery-fueled domination of the federal system, see Don E. 
Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s 
Relations to Slavery, Completed and Edited by Ward M. McAfee (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); and Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and 
Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000). 
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who saw the better profitability of smuggled Dutch goods, and thus, sought to circumvent 
England’s restrictive mercantilist laws. 
The political class of the colonies became the political class of the revolution and 
then assumed that role for the new government. As soon as the war was over, they began 
to entrench themselves against the expansion of the political revolution to the social 
order. Men like Thomas Paine, whose Common Sense was very useful in garnering 
support for the war effort, were quickly brushed aside when they suggested the ideals 
they had trumpeted actually be implemented. In the end, the breakdown of fundamental 
institutions was restricted only to those previously controlled by the king directly, such as 
the role and appointment of colonial governors. The colonists enjoyed and believed in the 
ideological system under which they lived, unlike the French Revolutionaries who sought 
to overthrow a failing monarchy with a wholly new system and its accompanying 
ideology. In the American colonies, the leaders only sought to claim the same rights as 
Englishmen against a distant Parliament which that same body had used to restrain the 
monarchy in the Glorious Revolution. 
These arguments driving the fight for independence in the American colonies 
solidified almost ten years before any fighting broke out. Though the colonies already 
had elected assemblies governing local affairs, in the early 1760s London began to eye 
the Crown’s overseas possessions as an untapped revenue stream. The old guard political 
elites quietly submitted to Parliament’s authority, while the new, younger generation of 
politicians railed against what they saw as illegal acts by England. In 1765, New York’s 
legislators questioned Parliament’s ability to tax unrepresented British citizens, and 
18 
Virginian Patrick Henry’s proposals declaring the new levies illegal on similar grounds 
were widely distributed and printed in all the colonies. 
As the rhetoric grew and spread, public protests turned violent and destructive. 
The most committed protesters organized themselves into the Sons of Liberty, a group 
known for harassing British troops and companies as well as taking part in the burning of 
the HMS Gaspee and the Boston Tea Party. In late 1765, the Stamp Act Congress was 
formed from nine colonial assemblies and it formally asserted Britain’s inability to tax 
them directly. Finally in 1768, Parliament moved to cut the crisis short by repealing most 
of the duties, but unfortunately for them, as John Adams noted in his diary, “The people, 
even to the lowest Ranks have become more attentive to their liberties, more inquisitive 
about them, and more determined to defend them.”
19
  
In spite of Parliament’s actions, Boston continued as a center of resistance in 
response to the remaining taxes and driven by ongoing attacks in colonial newspapers, 
raising the level of rhetoric. Bostonians mobbed customs officials, forcing them to 
abandon the town, and upon their return, citizens instigated an economic boycott, later 
expanded to all other colonies. Following the Boston Massacre in 1770, the Boston Tea 
Party in 1773, and London’s imposition of the punitive Coercive Acts, colonial leaders 
established the Articles of Association and then the Continental Congress. At the local 
level, the legitimate royal legislatures were replaced by revolutionary bodies assuming 
the functions of government—though many of the same people populated both bodies. 
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Volumes (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1962), I, 263. 
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Eventually the protests challenged the legitimacy of English rule itself. As 
fighting broke out in earnest in 1775, Paine argued in Common Sense that “reconciliation 
is now a fallacious dream,” and “a government of our own is a natural right.”
20
 As he and 
other writers won people to the cause, the reconvened Continental Congress looked 
towards independence. Thomas Jefferson was given the task of drafting a document 
expressing the colonies’ official grievances, intentions, and beliefs. Though some of 
Jefferson’s exaggerations were removed by the Congress, the document followed in 
Paine’s steps and represented one of the most far-reaching formations of idealist rhetoric 
to emerge out of American Revolution. Jefferson, an Enlightenment-inspired intellectual 
and follower of French philosophes, imbued the document with an ideology that far out-
paced that of his colleagues and bordered on moving towards the later French idea of 
social justice. 
After hostilities with England ended in 1781, however, the colonists looked to 
create their new state and such far-reaching ideals were left behind. They saw their 
revolution as a changing of the political guard and were not concerned with a 
reorganization of the social order or its dark corners. While they did discuss slavery and 
its conflict with liberty and equality, they eventually agreed that it was already too firmly 
embedded, fearing emancipation might upend the social order. It was a problem Jefferson 
                                                
20 Thomas Paine, “Common Sense,” in Major Problems in the Era of the American 
Revolution: Documents and Essays, Edited by Richard D. Brown (Lexington: D.C. Heath 
and Company, 1992), 159, 161. 
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would famously describe as having “the wolf by the ears,” though at the same time he 
feared that if left untouched, the issue might tear the country apart.
21
 
Following a turbulent and ineffective first draft of a government, in 1789 the 
states ratified a constitution which represented an about-face in language and rhetoric 
from the document which ceremonially separated the colonies from England. Gone were 
Jefferson’s ideological declarations of equality, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In 
their place was James Madison’s simple structure of a new government to guarantee 
peace, order, and defense. The language of equality was not only removed, its opposite 
was incorporated in such a way as to formalize, institutionalize, and give a constitutional 
blessing to a system over which many of the founding fathers had expressed grave 
concern. Ratification in 1789 thus marked a formal break with the higher ideals of 1776 
and the entrenchment of a well-to-do political class that was hardly ready to shake up the 
social system.22 
 
The system created under the Constitution did witness some upheavals and 
changes before 1850, including the expansion of suffrage to all white men and a series of 
                                                
21 Jefferson, “Declaration,” 238; Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to John Holmes, April 22, 
1820,” in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, Edited by Merrill D. Peterson (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1977), 568. 
 
22 For an in-depth look at the ideology behind the Constitution, see Forrest McDonald, 
Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1985). 
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political and moral crises over slavery.23 During that period, though, there were no 
serious challenges to the generally-liberal worldview the men of 1789 embedded until the 
Republican Party came to prominence in the 1850s with its Free Labor ideology. What 
had come before had represented evolutionary changes in a socio-political system that 
was designed to change slowly and through established processes. Free Labor as the 
Republicans would come to define it, on the other hand, was influenced not by the British 
tradition, but by a different set of men from 1789. This new ideology contained 
revolutionary potential, a potential only some Republicans fully understood. 
Like the Jacobins before them, Republican ideologues claimed that property was 
defined by society, and society could choose to exclude slaves from its definition if it saw 
fit. Though the party’s eventual majority embraced only a watered-down, general 
antislavery policy, its steadfast core, emerging from the abolitionist Liberty Party in the 
1840s, held a firm belief in full-fledged, Jacobin-esq Free Labor philosophy. The more 
fundamentalist wing of this group, those who would form the Radical Republican faction 
around Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner during the war, at times even advocated an 
Americanized version of Robespierrian social radicalism. They developed these un-
American ideas from the words, actions, and influence of a small band of antislavery 
militants and legal minds who, through their idealization of the Haitian Revolution had 
engendered and preserved a new radical heritage. With this legacy in hand, Radical 
Republicans transformed themselves into nothing less than American Jacobins, leading a 
righteous army towards the regeneration of entire segments of society. 
                                                
23 For more on the idea of the expanding democratic ideal from the rather non-democratic 
Revolution, see Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1992). 
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Such an ideological link between disparate times, places, and peoples may appear 
far-fetched, but upon further investigation, the possibilities of an ideational connection 
between French Jacobins and Radical Republicans become clear. The key is the 
underground flow of information that facilitated the transmission of radical and 
revolutionary ideas from Europe, across the Atlantic, throughout the Caribbean, and into 
North America. Through an extended network of abolitionists, self-hiring slaves, coastal 
watermen, deep-sea mariners, and general societal ne’er-do-wells, ideas from Europe and 
beyond found their way into and throughout the United States within the murky fringes of 
maritime society and the chattel system, sparking the development of a new radical 
tradition.24 These groups provided an undercurrent of news and information connecting 
the mainland, coastal regions, rebellious colonies, and distant states. With these links in 
mind, what appeared to be independent events in the French Caribbean and isolated 
conspiracies on the mainland become interdependent. And, what appeared to be merely a 
                                                
24 For sources discussing the transfer of ideas on the open sea and in the Caribbean, see 
Julius S. Scott, The Common Wind: Currents of Afro-American Communication in the 
Era of the Haitian Revolution (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1986); Laurent 
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Caribbean, 1789-1802 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1998); Peter 
Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, 
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militant form of evangelical abolitionism becomes intimately related to both the bloody 
fields of Saint Domingue and an unassuming Dominican monastery in Paris.25 
 
The two overarching themes of this work are the conflicting roles of revolutionary 
violence and legal justifications for what would otherwise be illegal acts. In tracing this 
dualistic nature, this present work takes a broad scope. The first chapter provides the 
building blocks upon which American Jacobinism is built and describes the transnational 
transference of ideas. Chapters two and three discuss the development of American 
Jacobinism up to and through the Civil War. Chapters four and five harness a 
comparative approach to contrast the similarities and differences between these American 
radicals and their French counterparts eighty years earlier. At the same time, chapters two 
and four focus on the theme of revolutionary violence both before and during the war as 
it progressed from illegal, extragovernmental action to the standing policy of the Union 
Army. Chapters three and five, on the other hand, concentrate on the theme of legalism as 
Congress was forced to justify patently unconstitutional actions. Taken together, then, 
this work highlights the dualist nature of Jacobin radical constitutional idealism as both 
the French and Americans attempted to revolutionize their world within the constraints of 
their ideology. 
Chapter one discusses the flow of revolutionary ideas between 1789 and the 
1840s. In that period, across the Caribbean as well as up and down the Atlantic coast a 
                                                
25 A note on names and places: I have tried to streamline the forms used by various 
historians into what have become the most common. For example, I choose to use 
Louverture, the form Toussaint himself used, instead of L’Ouverture; St. Domingue, 
Saint-Domingue, and Saint Domingo all become Saint Domingue, the proper French 
usage. Primary references, however, remain in their original forms. 
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barrage of slave rebellions and conspiracies erupted, following the opening salvos of 
what would become the Haitian Revolution. As slaves in the French colony of Saint 
Domingue appropriated the language and symbols of the French Revolution and its 
Jacobin social radicalism, enslaved Americans like Gabriel Prosser and Denmark Vesey 
were inspired by the news of events and conspired to free themselves. Some radical 
Northerners then combined the images of these American rebels with the historical 
legacy of their Haitian forbears, forging an ideal of a warrior slave that challenged all 
conceptions of black docility and fashioned a new revolutionary heritage for antislavery 
militancy. Rejecting more mainstream trends deriving from growing Anglo-American 
abolitionist interactions and the forceful arrival of William Lloyd Garrison and 
nonresistance in the 1830s, this small militant minority appropriated as their own the 
language and ideas which had driven their rebellious heroes. Armed with an alternative 
tradition to 1776, one of inclusion, virtue, and social justice, this imagined legacy served 
as inspiration for a novel generation of militants determined to end slavery through direct 
action.26 
                                                
26 Though the accepted wisdom states the abolition movement was overwhelmingly, if 
not completely, pacifist until perhaps the 1850s, this idea has begun to be broken down in 
recent years. Three excellent works which challenge it thus are Merton Lynn Dillon, 
Slavery Attacked: Southern Slaves and Their Allies, 1619-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1990); Stanley Harrold, The Abolitionists and the South, 1831-
1861 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1995); and John R. McKivigan and 
Stanley Harrold, Eds, Antislavery Violence: Sectional, Racial, and Cultural Conflict in 
Antebellum America (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1999). For a good, 
overall discussion of the historiography on antislavery violence, see McKivigan and 
Harrold, “Introduction,” in Antislavery Violence, 12-18. On Garrisonians’ relationship to 
slave rebellion, Merton Dillon argues that they and other pacifists disdained and would 
never encourage insurrection, but they always claimed that slaves would be in the right to 
act in such a way, Dillon, Slavery Attacked, 132, 150, 166. Richard S. Newman notes that 
the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, which promoted peaceful and legal means to the end 
of slavery, used Haiti as an example of how government nonintervention towards 
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Chapter two examines the dual rise of abolitionist political organization and direct 
action against slavery after 1840, the first, but not the last time that antislavery politics 
would become a militant creed. Building upon a slow movement towards engagement 
with the political world, a dedicated cohort of abolitionists rejected Garrisonian 
moralism. As the antislavery Liberty Party grew, its radical wing rose up around Gerrit 
Smith in upstate New York and became single-mindedly focused on creating a nation of 
virtue without slavery. As this faction refined their worldview further with legal and 
political arguments, they moved away from the pragmatic Liberty men to justify violence 
by and on behalf of slaves using the mythological image of black freedom and equality. 
Their ideological development culminated in the 1855 foundation of the Radical Political 
Abolition Party and its apolitical analog, the American Abolition Society, espousing a 
worldview demanding universal liberty and equality, social welfare, and justice. When 
they failed to achieve significant electoral success, Smith and men like Henry Highland 
Garnet, William Goodell, and James McCune Smith looked beyond politics to end 
slavery. Through rhetoric and philanthropy, they enacted a militant abolitionist 
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movement that served public denunciations and attacks such as John Brown’s raid on 
Harper’s Ferry.27 
Chapter three follows the path of the largest faction of the Liberty Party as they 
developed a moderate antislavery worldview that became Republicanism. When war 
came, however, they would return to radical abolitionists’ legal theories in their campaign 
to wage war and remake the South. Between 1840 and the early years of the Civil War, 
men like Salmon P. Chase abandoned the wild-eyed idealism of radicals like Smith; these 
pragmatic antislavery men repackaged their beliefs into a constitutionally-solid creed of 
non-expansion and denationalization. As the war erupted around them, both Abraham 
Lincoln and the Radical faction of the Republican Party sought legal justification for their 
actions, turning to the constitutional arguments developed and pushed by the Radical 
Political Abolitionists concerning presidential war powers and the constitutional 
guarantee of a republican form of government. Wielding these legal cudgels, Republicans 
drove the Union away from moderation towards total war and social reform while at the 
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same time sweeping away the traditional theory of the Constitution as a static, limiting 
charter and enacted a vast reconceptualization of constitutional law focused on the 
equality and justice found in the Declaration of Independence.28 
By 1864, Republican demands to bring the South to its knees, to utterly destroy its 
foundation and rebuild it from scratch were heard, and the Union army loosed campaigns 
of total warfare designed to make the Confederacy crumble—the cataclysm foreseen by 
Smith and his cohort. The level of violence and retribution unleashed was something 
unique in American history, and its study makes up chapter four. Philip H. Sheridan’s 
and William T. Sherman’s punitive missions to tear apart the heart of Southern society in 
the Shenandoah Valley and March to the Sea, as well as the ensuing low-grade guerrilla 
war, provide a point of comparison to similar events during the French Revolution. In 
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both proclaimed tactics and violence, as well as determination and strategy, their efforts 
paralleled those of the French Jacobins in the Vendée and Lyons, which witnessed brutal 
crackdowns and directed destruction. With the only goal to break the wills and means of 
their enemies to fight, these events represent the height of both American and French 
Jacobin military and ideological domination of their eras, providing the free reign of their 
political wills to transform their states. 
With a great victory in hand, Radical proposals for the next phase, 
Reconstruction, were met with obstructions at every turn. Chapter five, building upon the 
constitutional mindset in justifying the war, is a discussion of the legal, moderated side of 
the Jacobin mind in its attempts to reform their respective worlds. By comparing land 
reform policies and debates in France and the United States, it becomes clear that far 
from being maniacally driven by a thirst for the blood of their enemies, radicals in both 
nations were constrained by their own, similar ideologies. They were unwilling to throw 
away their foundational beliefs in the rule of law at times when such action could have 
achieved their goals for creating more just, free societies. The unwillingness to step just 
beyond their most basic beliefs to reach their goals, contrasts with the all-or-nothing 
willingness to wage war, but shows just how similarly restrained the two ideologies were. 
While they made some progress with the Freedman’s Bureau, Civil Rights Act, 
and the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, without the impetus of war 
driving a majority to their program, the Radical Republican coalition faltered and split 
just like their French forbears: their political world was overrun by their successes in the 
military realm. The epilogue will briefly look at what the French call the longue durée—
the long term. The American Jacobins would always be haunted by the dismal failure of 
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Reconstruction, the failure to achieve a new, virtuous world from the ashes of the Civil 
War. Instead, they were left with nearly 100 years of Jim Crow oppression in the South 
and an industrialization which took rampant advantage of the economic reforms imposed 
and the expansion of federal power. Similarly, though, with the fall of the Jacobin 
Republic in 1794, the goal of creating a republican nation in France was not achieved 
until the 1886 peaceful electoral victory of republicans over monarchists. 
 
The balance of this work tries to put the American Civil War into a greater 
context of European revolutionary radicalism. By reconstructing the heritage of the 
American Jacobins, the hope is to provide a new perspective in which to view the 
development of American socio-political ideology. As David Brion Davis suggested, in 
taking the premise that the Civil War was a revolutionary break with the past, it becomes 
something new and different; its causes and driving forces take on a new context and 
appear to have evolved from a legacy and tradition wholly un-American. The following is 
an attempt to discover the origins and development of this lineage and its impact upon 
nineteenth century America. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
ECHOES OF TOUSSAINT1 
 
The Haitian Revolution and the Legitimation of Militant Abolitionism 
 
 
 
As the 1850s approached in the United States, members of the abolition 
movement had become decidedly more militant than those of the previous generation. 
Many had abandoned the tactics of pacifism coupled with firebrand rhetoric that had 
burst into prominence with Bostonian William Lloyd Garrison in the early 1830s. To be 
sure, within ten years radical antislavery activists and the growing Republican coalition 
would revolutionize Northern society and openly confront the dominance of the Southern 
Slave Power with overwhelming force. This dramatic shift had many influences, but one 
common thread throughout this progression into militancy was images of the Haitian 
Revolution and its most famous patriot, Toussaint Louverture. 
As revolution broke out in France in 1789, its colonies were drawn into the fire of 
change both willingly and unwillingly. While whites and blacks in the French Caribbean 
                                                
1 The title of this chapter, “Echoes of Toussaint,” is a play on the title of James Redpath’s 
1860 work, James Redpath, Ed., Echoes of Harper's Ferry (Boston, 1860; Reprint: New 
York: Arno Press, 1969), a chronicle of Northern abolitionist reaction to and testimony of 
John Brown’s Harper’s Ferry Raid the previous year. Like Redpath’s collection, it 
concerns the historical memory of an important event in the abolition movement, and the 
ways in which those memories impacted the growing radical and militant tendencies 
amongst antislavery groups. A version of this chapter was presented at the International 
Conference on Haiti in Limón, Costa Rica in August 2004. I would like to thank Paul 
Lovejoy and all those who attended and provided useful comments. I would also like to 
thank Manisha Sinha, my committee member for whom this chapter was originally 
written as a research paper, as well as my fellow graduate students Jed Foland, Tom 
Rushford, and Megan Kennedy for proofreading numerous versions and giving much 
needed feedback and direction to the project. 
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each looked to improve their own positions and rights, the tiered social and deeply 
embedded slave systems directly clashed with many of the ideas emanating from Paris. 
As events progressed, whites’ reluctance towards real change butted up against free black 
and mulatto hopes of equality and advancement more forcefully, but the real upheaval 
began when a massive slave rebellion in Saint Domingue, the jewel of colonial France, 
merged with the Jacobin republicanism carried from the mainland by government 
commissioners and soldiers. 
Injected with the radical ideals of revolutionary justice and equality, the “Black 
Jacobins” of Saint Domingue transformed into revolutionary heroes for the downtrodden 
and their new state, Haiti, morphed into a slumbering volcano of radicalism in the 
Caribbean. Carried by mariners and coastal boatmen, the history and idea of the 
revolutionary French Caribbean inspired other enslaved men to strike for the their own 
freedom. In time, “French negroes” and “Haiti” became a call to arms for those denied 
freedom, producing a series of slave conspiracies in Louisiana and along the Eastern 
seaboard from the 1790s through the 1820s.2 
In contrast to the inspiration found by the underclasses in the ideals of the Haitian 
Revolution, the core white reaction to the Caribbean rebellion in the United States was 
widespread panic and paranoia. The same terms which inspired enslaved blacks became 
the watchwords of fear on the lips of every Southerner. As news of the uprising spread 
                                                
2 C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo 
Revolution, Revised Second Edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1963). 
 
  32 
throughout the Caribbean and Atlantic coasts on the wind, white Americans spoke of the 
coming onslaught of the “Horrors of Saint Domingue.”3 
There were exceptions, however, and while most white Americans feared a 
repetition of events in Saint Domingue, a few voiced support for the slave rebels. As 
early as 1791, Abraham Bishop, a white Connecticut abolitionist, had already declared, 
“The cause of the Blacks is just.” He continued, “Freedom from tyranny of men is to be 
had only at the price of blood,” and “I wish success to their arms, with all my heart, and 
lament, that it is not in my power to afford them effectual assistance. The Sword is drawn, 
blood must be shed, and freedom must be obtained.” Similarly, Theodore Dwight, a 
conservative, antislavery Federalist, argued in 1794 that the slave rebels, provoked by 
“wicked, and unprovoked outrages, committed against their peace, freedom, and 
existence,” were rightly driven to “unanimity and fanaticism” against their white 
overlords. For him, the “spread of desolation and blood over the face of the colony” was 
a justified retaliation.4 
                                                
3 “The Common Wind” is the term historian Julius S. Scott gives to the underground 
maritime communication networks crisscrossing the Caribbean and Atlantic seaways and 
coastlines, connecting blacks, seamen, and the underlings of society with each other. For 
more, see, Julius S. Scott, The Common Wind: Currents of Afro-American 
Communication in the Era of the Haitian Revolution (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke 
University, 1986). 
 
4 For Bishop’s complete editorials on the Haitian Revolution, see, Abraham Bishop, "The 
Rights of Black Men,” in “Abraham Bishop, ‘The Rights of Black Men,’ and the 
American Reaction to the Haitian Revolution,” Edited and with an Introduction by Tim 
Matthewson, Journal of Negro History 67 (Summer 1982): 150-153; See also David 
Brion Davis, Revolutions: Reflections on American Equality and Foreign Liberations 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 50; and David Brion Davis, “The Impact 
of the French and Haitian Revolutions,” in The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the 
Atlantic World, Edited by David Patrick Geggus (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2001), 4. For Dwight’s entire speech, see Theodore Dwight, An Oration, Spoken 
Before “The Connecticut Society, for the Promotion of Freedom and the Relief of 
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While Bishop and Dwight were certainly anomalies among whites, Northern 
blacks in the United States had always shared an affinity with their fighting brethren in 
the Caribbean, seeing the events in Saint Domingue as an alternative to the revolutionary 
tradition provided by that of 1776 which had left the South in chains. Though there was 
some vocal support during the Haitian Revolutionary era itself, by the 1820s northern 
black antislavery militants had reclaimed the images of Toussaint and black 
independence for themselves. They looked to the pariah state as a source of racial pride, 
achievement, and as an example of the universal liberty and equality which had been 
denied them in the American Revolution. As antislavery movements gained momentum, 
these black activists presented newspaper and pamphlet accounts painting Saint 
Domingue as a utopian vision of republican triumph forged by Louverture and his 
virtuous followers. They justified the bloodshed as a reaction to the treachery of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Persons Unlawfully Held in Bondage,” (Hartford, 1794), 10-12; Dwight, as a Federalist, 
is an anomaly for his remarks. Most Federalists disdained the violence of revolutions, 
especially in France, but at the same time many were members of abolition and 
manumission societies. On the other hand, support for the Jacobins came from 
Jeffersonian Republicans, who tended to be archly pro-slavery. See also David Brion 
Davis, Revolutions: Reflections on American Equality and Foreign Liberations 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 51-52; and Alfred N. Hunt, Haiti’s 
Influence on Antebellum America: Slumbering Volcano in the Caribbean (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 152-153. While these two men were outspoken 
for the time, Alfred Hunt notes that many white Americans, including southerners, 
cautiously praised Toussaint because, first, his actions had led to the American 
acquisition of the Louisiana Territory in 1804 after Napoleon’s plans for it were moot 
following his defeat on Saint Domingue. Secondly, Toussaint was perceived as restrained 
and able to reinstitute plantation productivity under a free labor system. While French 
officials tried to accuse Louverture of massacring whites, most American papers, North 
and South, would hear nothing of it. See Hunt, Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America, 
84-101. 
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French, rather than a result of emancipation, and argued that black governance was 
moral, righteous, and stable.5 
The stark contrast to white memories of and reactions to the Haitian Revolution 
that men of color developed was only the starting point. As black abolitionists continued 
to mythologize both contemporary Haiti and its foundation, their own constructed 
histories and images encouraged more antislavery militancy and swelled their ranks as 
others joined in the praise. Through a process of idealization leading to greater 
acceptance and eventual imitation, a “heroic embodiment” of the imagined course of 
events, militant black abolitionists in the 1820s and 1830s argued that since Haiti had, 
according to their own histories, become a utopia, then its foundation through revolution 
must have been just and righteous. In other words, they used the mythological image of 
                                                
5 Marixa Lasso has shown that free blacks and mulattos in the short-lived Republic of 
Cartagena on the Caribbean coast of Colombia similarly developed utopian, idealistic 
images of Haiti and used this mythology to inspire their own movements for civil rights 
and freedom. For more, see Marixa Lasso, “Haiti as an Image of Popular Republicanism 
in Caribbean Colombia: Cartagena Province (1811-1828),” in The Impact of the Haitian 
Revolution in the Atlantic World, Edited by David Patrick Geggus (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 2001), 176-192; Marixa Lasso, Race and Republicanism in the 
Age of Revolution, Cartagena, 1795-1831 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Florida, 
2002); and Marixa Lasso, “A Republican Myth of Racial Harmony: Race and Patriotism 
in Colombia, 1810-1812,” Historical Reflections/ Reflexions Historiques 29 (Spring 
2003): 43-63; Furthermore, the utopian image of Haiti is also found, to a lesser extent, in 
the work of James Sidbury. See James Sidbury, “Saint Domingue in Virginia: Ideology, 
Local Meanings, and Resistance to Slavery, 1790-1800,” in Journal of Southern History 
63 (1997): 534, 537, 551; and James Sidbury, Ploughshares into Swords: Race, 
Rebellion, and Identity in Gabriel’s Virginia, 1730-1810 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 39-40, 46. 
 
  35 
the Haitian Revolution they had created in their minds to legitimize the radical violence 
of the rebellion and its leaders, in a sense, domesticating the idea of revolution itself.6 
When militant abolitionists recalled the glory of Saint Domingue, the 
independence of Haiti, or the sainthood of Toussaint, they implicitly condoned the action 
and violence which had occurred, transforming images and justifications of the slaves’ 
successes into arguments for following in the violent footsteps of the black 
revolutionaries. Their heroic imagining of the revolution implicitly promoted the idea of 
violence and insurrection against slavery. When the next generation of American 
militants came of age in the 1840s and 1850s, they accepted the justifications of and 
precedents cited by their elders and were soon ready to enact their own Saint Domingue 
in the South.7 
 
The Revolutionary Caribbean 
Saint Domingue, Slave Rebellion, and the Common Wind 
 
When the French Revolution broke out on the streets of Paris, those who began 
rebuilding France only turned as an afterthought to the blatant ideological contradiction 
of the wealthy, slave-fueled colonies in the Caribbean. It was not that they were 
inherently racist, but for those in metropolitan France, the colonies and their servile 
                                                
6 For more on the idea of heroic embodiment and how it led to the legitimation of violent 
action, see Gary Alan Fine, “John Brown's Body: Elites, Heroic Embodiment, and the 
Legitimation of Political Violence,” Social Problems 46 (May 1999): 225-249. 
 
7 Fine argues that such a formulation also occurred amongst abolitionists after John 
Brown’s 1859 raid, legitimizing the idea of political violence for an even broader base 
within the antislavery movement. The glorification of Brown’s actions energized not only 
other abolitionists but also free soilers and other non-emancipationist antislavery 
proponents, helping to radicalize the Republican Party going into the Civil War. Fine, 
“John Brown's Body,” 225-249. 
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system was literally and figuratively a world away. The lack of questioning over the 
contrasting inequality of the French Caribbean with that of revolutionary Paris was only 
compounded by the representatives the colonies sent to sit in the new assemblies; nearly 
all of these men came from the grand blancs, the great, white plantation-owning segment 
of society. The others came from the petite blancs, whose status was lower as merchants 
and artisans, but just as dependent on the racially-tiered social system as their wealthy 
colleagues. In this way, people of color in the French Caribbean were wholly excluded 
from the Revolution in Paris. 
Looking to claim some piece of the revolution for themselves, noirs, the free 
blacks, and gens de couleur, the mulatto class, petitioned Paris for inclusion.8 
Unfortunately, most of these were redirected to the Colonial Committee, which was 
largely controlled by the grand blancs in the Assembly. Without a voice, noirs and gens 
de couleur were forced to rely upon intermediaries, but the group most supportive of their 
cause, the Parisian Société des Amis des Noirs did not demand an end to slavery. Instead, 
the Société sought the end of the slave trade and the inclusion of only affluent noirs and 
                                                
8 For the general course of events in the Haitian Revolution, the most recent, and best, 
short overview is David Geggus, “The Haitian Revolution,” in Haitian Revolutionary 
Studies, Blacks and the Diaspora, Edited By Darlene Clark Hine, et al. (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2002); for a more detailed account, try Robin Blackburn, The 
Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848 (New York: Verso, 1988); also still worth 
reading is C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San 
Domingo Revolution, Revised Second Edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1963); a good 
overview of the most recent historiography is Franklin W. Knight, “AHR Forum: The 
Haitian Revolution,” The American Historical Review 105 (2000): 103-115; The most 
recent narrative is Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian 
Revolution (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004); for a view 
from the perspective of the Republican administration in Saint Domingue throughout the 
revolution, see Robert L. Stein, Léger Félicité Sonthonax: The Lost Sentinel of the 
Republic (London: Associated University Presses, 1985). 
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gens de couleur in the ranks of active, voting citizens as a way to counter the reluctantly 
revolutionary grands blancs.9 
As the Revolution progressed and radicalized in France, petits blancs and gens de 
couleur imported Revolutionary discourse into Saint Domingue, opening a political 
attack on the traditional society of orders using the same egalitarian sentiments that were 
being heard in the halls of the Tuilleries and the novel political clubs. In 1790, the 
conflict between white planters and gens de couleur first came to a head when the white 
colonial militia brutally suppressed a mulatto rebellion under Vincent Ogé. The gens de 
couleur revolt, however, only distracted whites from growing unrest across the French 
half of the island, where planters routinely drove their slaves to early deaths. In mid-
August 1791, as many as 100,000 slaves in the northern provinces rebelled in what 
appeared to be a well-coordinated effort; a second wave of uprisings followed in the 
western provinces a few days later. As their revolt engrossed all of Saint Domingue, the 
enslaved masses quickly became the greatest power on the island.  
The moderate governments in Paris between 1789 and 1791 continued their 
reluctance to pursue rights for blacks, but the changing character of the Revolution 
                                                
9 For a broader look at the discussions of colonial question in Paris, see David Geggus, 
“Racial Equality, Slavery, and Colonial Secession during the Constituent Assembly,” in 
Haitian Revolutionary Studies, Blacks and the Diaspora, Edited By Darlene Clark Hine, 
et al (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), 157-170; The Jacobin-inspired petits 
blancs were attacking the grands blancs for more power within the colonial government, 
whereas the gens de couleur, maintaining a careful proslavery stance, were attacking both 
in order to gain a political voice for the first time. The split between whites opened the 
door for noirs and gens de couleur to push for their rights and full citizenship; Julius S. 
Scott, The Common Wind: Currents of Afro-American Communication in the Era of the 
Haitian Revolution (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1986), 41, 202-203; See also 
Alfred N. Hunt, Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America: Slumbering Volcano in the 
Caribbean (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 18-19. 
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almost ensured eventual progress. With the rising ideological tide, the very wealthy and 
formerly ennobled conservatives in government, including most of the grand blancs, 
began to either abandon their posts or flee the country. Following the advent of 
Republican supremacy in France in the late summer of 1792, the Jacobin-led National 
Convention took up their Caribbean contradiction and extended full political rights to 
many free men of color in the colonies.10 To ensure enforcement of the decree, Paris 
dispatched a Republican commission to take over governance of the colony led by the 
idealistic colonial novice, Léger Félicité Sonthonax. 
Upon the announcement of the rights decree in Saint Domingue, an overt struggle 
for power ensued between the now royalist grands blancs and Republican officials allied 
with petits blancs and gens de couleur; rebellious slaves by this time formed a third, 
independent power. When Republican hopes for regaining control of the island 
significantly decreased in mid-1793, Sonthonax, already an abolitionist with heavy 
Jacobin leanings before he arrived in Saint Domingue, declared general liberty for any 
rebel slaves who would fight for the Republic.11 The Convention in Paris retroactively 
                                                
10 The rights law declared that mulattos and blacks born to free parents were entitled to 
political rights, but even this restricted suffrage enraged whites. 
 
11 For Sonthonax’s early beliefs in the revolutionary regeneration of society and on the 
abolition of slavery, see Stein, Léger Félicité Sonthonax, 15-25, 41-42, 82-83; He 
brought Jacobin ideology in its most theoretical forms to his governance of the colony, 
both in his first stint (ending June 1794) and his second (ending August 1797); Sonthonax 
issued two proclamations on emancipation, the first, posted on 21 June 1793, gave 
freedom to the rebels in the north who chose to fight for the Republic, and the second, 
published on 29 August 1794, declared full emancipation for all slaves in all northern 
territories under Republican control. The other Republican commissioner, Etienne 
Polverel, declared general liberty in the rest of Saint Domingue on 21 September and 31 
October 1793. For more details on the two proclamations, see Stein, Léger Félicité 
Sonthonax, 75, 78-95; and Carolyn Fick, “The French Revolution in Saint Domingue: A 
Triumph or a Failure?” in A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater 
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approved this edict eight months later on 4 February 1794, official news of which 
reached the colony on 8 June 1794, nearly a year after the first Republican 
emancipations.12 Within a month of the official news, most rebellious blacks, including 
Toussaint Louverture, were fighting for the Republic which had initially forgotten them, 
inspired by the promises of radical Jacobinism.13 
                                                                                                                                            
Caribbean, Edited by David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus, Blacks and the 
Diaspora, Edited By Darlene Clark Hine, et al (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1997), 65-67; Sonthonax’s actions also had the affect of alienating many gens de couleur, 
who joined the grands blancs in calling upon the British to intervene. 
 
12 This was not only due to the two month travel time across the Atlantic, but also 
because of the British blockade which had prevented French ships from landing in Saint 
Domingue since May 1793; see Stein, Léger Félicité Sonthonax, 104. 
 
13 Scholars continue to dispute the degree to which Saint Domingan slaves were 
ideologically driven in their goals, and among many others weighing in over the last 
twenty-five years, three historians represent the breadth of the field. Marxist Eugene 
Genovese suggests that events and ideas in France inspired the slaves, but not directly, 
marking a turning point in history from slave rebellion to slave revolution when slaves 
began looking not to (re)establish their own separate communities, but to create a state on 
equal terms with Europe and a culture on equal terms with mulattos and whites. Eugene 
D. Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making 
of the New World (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), XIX-XX, 22, 82, 88, 93-95; David 
Geggus argues that it is difficult, if not impossible, to discover how slaves understood the 
ideals of the French Revolution, and that most likely the first spurts of revolt were 
independent of any ideological influence. If there had to be something, then he suggests 
rather that the international antislavery movement probably influenced the servile 
insurrection. However, he does suggest that revolutionary rhetoric greatly influenced free 
blacks and mulattos, even though their society, in which they too owned and sold slaves, 
was the complete negation of that rhetoric. Under this scenario, France’s main role in the 
colonial revolt was a political one, in which the events in Saint Domingue were 
“responsible for forcing the politicians in Paris belatedly to live up to their ideals.” The 
emancipation decree from Paris was not in response to the ideological demands of the 
slaves, but a reaction to those in the colony who questioned Sonthonax’s proclamation of 
general liberty as a war measure. See David Patrick Geggus, “The French and Haitian 
Revolutions, and Resistance to Slavery in the Americas: An Overview,” in Revue 
Française d’Histoire d’Outre-Mer: Explorations, Colonisations, Indépendances 76 
(1989): 107-124; Geggus, “Racial Equality, Slavery, and Colonial Secession,” 170; see 
also David Geggus, “Slavery, War, and Revolution in the Greater Caribbean, 1789-
1815,” in A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean, Edited 
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The slave rebels’ ideological drive, however, was nothing new. When widespread 
slave revolts broke out as early as 1791, insurgents demanded shorter work hours and 
time off; soon, they were calling for emancipation, the right to wear the tri-color as a 
symbol of the French Revolution, and for whites to give them the freedom already 
promised by the French “king.” At the same time, revolutionary symbols and the 
vocabulary of Republican citizenship became increasingly prominent amongst noirs, gens 
de couleur, and eventually many of the insurgents. Revolting to compel the enforcement 
of an emancipation that had not been decreed and using the language of the Revolution to 
do so, slave rebels caused a destabilization that forced Republicans, who were already 
predisposed to declare and enforce complete equal rights, to take greater control of the 
colony. The arrival of Republican troops from France, dispatched to quell the early news 
of violence, only helped to fuel the ideological transformation of the rebellion. These 
                                                                                                                                            
by David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus, Blacks and the Diaspora, Edited By 
Darlene Clark Hine, et al (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 8-11; Geggus’ 
view is echoed in, among others, Lester Langley, The Americas in the Age of Revolution 
1750-1850 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996); Most recently, Laurent Dubois 
has asserted that, in fact, the course of events in Saint Domingue and the rest of the 
French Caribbean bear out the slaves’ comprehension of Republican ideology. Laurent 
Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French 
Caribbean, 1787-1804 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 
though this work is focused on Martinique and Guadeloupe. Dubois’s dissertation 
(University of Michigan, 1998) of the same title combines into one work the whole of the 
French Caribbean including the Haitian Revolution (it was split roughly in two for 
publication); for his narrative history of the revolution in Saint Domingue with less of an 
analytical approach, see Dubois, Avengers of the New World. Carolyn Fick also agrees 
with Dubois’s overall position in Carolyn Fick, The Making of Haiti: The Saint 
Domingue Revolution From Below (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990); 
The most outspoken and seminal work within this group is Scott, The Common Wind; 
Scott proclaims bluntly that “Inspired by the ideas of ‘liberty, equality, and fraternity,’ 
sporadic uprisings of slaves occurred in the French islands as early as the fall of 1789” 
(1-2). 
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soldiers and sailors spread radical ideology freely to all who would listen, not having 
before experienced the tiered social system of the colonies.14 
While slaves had opened the debate by demanding emancipation in their own 
terms, Republican authorities did not declare it until they realized they needed help to 
defeat the anti-republican colonists. Sonthonax did not free slaves to raise an army, but 
declared general liberty in order to win over an insurgent army already standing, made of 
slaves that had taken their own freedom. Credit for the initial successes and the savior of 
Republican control must go to the slaves, as the new national army, but Sonthonax’ 
proclamation, coming from the Jacobin Republic’s chief administrator in the colony, 
radicalized the situation and insured that the debate was articulated fully in the language 
of the French Revolution. Though the rebellious slaves had always been fighting for 
                                                
14 Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, 28, 101; This and all future references to Dubois’s A 
Colony of Citizens is to the dissertation, which covers the whole French Caribbean, rather 
than his book, which excludes Haiti and focuses on Guadeloupe and Martinique; Scott, 
The Common Wind, 169; Caryn Cossé Bell, Revolution, Romanticism, and the Afro-
Creole Protest Tradition in Louisiana, 1718-1868 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1997), 21. As noted by many historians, Henri Christophe, André 
Rigaud, and many other affluent gens de couleur in Saint Domingue had been a part of 
the French Fontages Légion during the American Revolution, serving during the siege of 
Savannah in 1779; though an unsuccessful action, their unit was noted for having repelled 
a British counterattack and protecting the rest of the force. On the invocation of kings’ 
and royal authority by slaves, see Laurent Dubois, “’Our Three Colors:’ The King, the 
Republic, and the Political Culture of Slave Revolution in Saint-Domingue,” in 
Historical Reflections/ Reflexions Historiques 29 (Spring 2003): 83-102; while seemingly 
royalist, it is actually a common occurrence in liberations (it also appears in Hapsburg 
Austria in 1848 at the end of serfdom), and Dubois convincingly argues that we must 
read such statements in a colonial or peasant mindset, not in European terms. He suggests 
that “there was a coexistence, even interplay, between the two sets of symbols and 
ideologies” (85) of royalism and republicanism, and that the goal of the slaves was 
always clear: to gain an alliance with the reigning authority of mainland France against 
the colonists, their masters; Such a scenario was also accepted by contemporary French 
officials: Jean-Philippe Garran de Coulon, Rapport sur les troubles de Saint-Domingue... 
4 Vols, Paris: l'Imprimerie Nationale, 1797-1799. 
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revolutionary ideals, they had simply used different terminology. Moreover, these events 
in the colonies universalized the ideology of the French Revolution, and the expanded 
ideals, in turn, further pressured the Parisian assembly, which confirmed their 
representatives’ actions in February 1794 by ending slavery throughout the French 
Empire.15 
Emancipation transformed slaves into defenders of the Republic, a move that 
shocked and greatly threatened the ruling grands blancs who had become anxious over 
the radicalism in France. The army became a socially mobilizing force; both gens de 
couleur and ex-slaves rose through the ranks, and many of their leaders, most notably 
Jean Jacques Dessalines and Toussaint Louverture, also climbed the political ladder. 
Conversely, in the eyes of rebel slaves and Republican authorities, planters who had 
controlled the French islands only continued to discredit themselves because their actions 
were widely perceived as aristocratic, and therefore counterrevolutionary. As enemies of 
the French state, grands blancs, and by implication most whites, became targets of 
revolutionary justice. In one instance in the French colony of Guadeloupe, a band of rebel 
slaves slaughtered most of the whites of the town of Trois-Rivères, and then boldly 
announced to authorities that they had done what they had “to save the white patriots of 
the island and serve the Republic.”16  
                                                
15 Dubois, A Colony of Citizens, 180-186. 
 
16 Rebel slaves quoted in Laurent Dubois, “Troubled Water: Rebellion and 
Republicanism in the Revolutionary French Caribbean,” in The Revolution of 1800: 
Democracy, Race, and the New Republic, Edited by James Horn, Jan Ellen Lewis, and 
Peter S. Onuf (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002), 293, 295. 
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The British, Spanish, and Napoleonic armies that attempted to reconquer the 
French Caribbean between 1791 and 1804 soon realized that service in the Republican 
Army ideologically indoctrinated its soldiers, making them a continuing threat even after 
defeat. Following the French reconquest of Guadeloupe in 1802, military authorities 
understood the preservation of order in the colony depended upon the removal of all 
former slaves, gens de couleur, and noirs from the island who had served the Republic. 
One French commander ordered “over a thousand” veterans and other “dangerous” 
blacks exiled to New York or, failing there, any “unpopulated beaches” on the American 
coast. These prisoners, reportedly appearing along the Atlantic coast in the aftermath of 
Gabriel Prosser’s attempted slave revolt in Virginia only added to Southern fears and 
paranoia of the Caribbean troubles spilling onto their own shores.17 
White Southerners, known for their extreme paranoia when it came to the specter 
of servile insurrection, perhaps did have good reason to fear immigrants from Saint 
Domingue, but they also had a good reason to fear the flow of information and ideas from 
there as well. As it would turn out, the first proved much easier to regulate than the 
second, and it was the seeping of revolutionary ideas into the United States which proved 
the gravest threat to the South. The ways in which it was able to cross the Caribbean 
allowed it to wreak both imagined and real havoc. 
The key to the eruption-like spread of the neo-Jacobin, emancipationist image of 
the Haitian Revolution throughout the western hemisphere was the culture and society of 
deep-sea and coastal mariners. While refugees were similarly a great source of news, 
                                                
17 French general quoted in Dubois, “Troubled Water,” 302-303; for similar reports, see 
Hunt, Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America, 112. 
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sailors and tidewater boatmen had provided a steady flow of ideas and information long 
before the Haitian Revolution began, and would continue to provide it through “the 
common wind.” They were not only the springboards for a well of information from 
France to its colonies, but also from Saint Domingue to the rest of the Caribbean and 
Atlantic seaboard.18 
Sailors readily took up the ideas of the French Revolution and emancipation 
because it meshed with their own proto-revolutionary beliefs and culture. Maritime life 
afforded great egalitarianism and freedom, and sailors were the miscreants, drifters, and 
freebooters from all nations, readily accepting any ideology that challenged the old order 
of which they were not a part. In Caribbean ports especially, these masterless men met 
and exchanged ideas, news, and experiences; to a great degree, this port culture was 
responsible for the spread of revolutionary ideas into the rest of a society just as goods 
flowed out of the ports into the mainland.19 
Though blacks, slave and free, rarely held shipboard positions of authority, as 
early as 1740 black seamen established themselves as a significant part of this maritime 
                                                
18 For the pathbreaking work on this information network, see Scott, The Common Wind 
and also Julius S. Scott, “Crisscrossing Empires: Ships, Sailors, and Resistance in the 
Lesser Antilles in the Eighteenth Century,” in The Lesser Antilles in the Age of European 
Expansion, Edited by Robert Paquette and Stanley Engerman (Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida, 1996); Some other notable works on this topic are Hunt, Haiti’s 
Influence on Antebellum America; David Geggus, Ed, The Impact of the Haitian 
Revolution in the Atlantic World (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001); 
and Geggus, “Slavery, War, and Revolution in the Greater Caribbean;” Scott, The 
Common Wind, 5, 60, 105, 113. 
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society. Even if sailors were not completely colorblind, the degree of equality offered by 
maritime culture afforded blacks social and political space they were denied on land; 
enslaved sailors challenged racial etiquette and plantation discipline simply by their 
presence. Whereas plantations represented a society in chains, the sea was a world of 
freedom and mobility, and in many cases, especially so in the Caribbean, the two worlds 
were in constant view of one another. One slave, Olaudah Equiano, noted the possibilities 
within maritime society, gaining from the ocean an education in navigation and a new, 
global perspective, which allowed him to manage himself like any other free person. He 
guarded his acquired virtual freedom at sea jealously, refusing thereafter to “be imposed 
upon as other negroes were.”20  
The maritime world in which Equiano existed was one in which new political and 
economic opportunities abounded, and sailors’ choice of ship was in part guided by 
personal political beliefs. If a sailor supported the ideals of the Jacobin Republic he might 
join a French privateer, or he may wish to exist completely outside of imperial 
constraints. By 1795, so many sailors agreed with the ideology of the French Revolution 
that foreigners on French-owned privateers vastly outnumbered French-born sailors. 
These corsaires jacobin preyed on coastal plantations in order to restock their provisions, 
and proved willing to aid escaping slaves on shore who appealed to crews. Radically-
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minded mariners were ready and willing to spread and encourage Jacobin ideology, 
transporting revolutionary flags and cockades, as well as the men, white and black, who 
hoped to distribute them.21 
Black mariners especially understood the possibilities of the revolutionary 
Caribbean. They were one of the first groups to hear about events in Saint Domingue, and 
black jacks on ships flying the flag of any nation promptly realized they could take flight 
or even mutiny while in Haitian ports and be beyond the reach of any authority. To those 
mariners who took pride in the actions and successes of the black revolutionaries, the 
island “burned like a beacon” of freedom. As thousands of black seamen traveled to Haiti 
between 1790 and 1830, they passed on news and the hope embodied by the 
revolutionary black state, helping to foster antislavery movements as far away as London, 
Boston, and Philadelphia. One man, Newport Bowers, a free black dock worker living in 
Baltimore, upon hearing stories of the Haitian Revolution, even hopped a ship and made 
his way to Saint Domingue in 1793 to witness events for himself.22 
This communication network was also well known to whites on the mainland, and 
events in Saint Domingue, coupled with white fear that the revolution may spread to 
other shores, led governments throughout the Caribbean and along the Atlantic coast to 
place restrictions on black sailors coming into ports. Jamaican authorities in 1792 
declared black mariners coming from Saint Domingue agents provocateurs and ordered 
ports to keep track of all seamen of color. In the southern United States, authorities 
                                                
21 Scott, “Crisscrossing Empires,” 132, 137; Scott, “Newport Bowers,” 48-49. 
 
22 Black sailor quoted in Bolster, Black Jacks, 144-147, 149, 153; Scott, “Newport 
Bowers,” 39-40, 45. 
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developed new laws in the first half of the nineteenth century to restrict the movements 
and even appearance of black jacks in ports. In most cases, such as with South Carolina’s 
Negro Seamen Acts in the 1820s which required ships to check their black sailors into the 
local jail upon arrival, these laws had the inverse effect. They allowed news and 
information to spread more easily because black sailors were locked in cells with local 
free blacks and slaves, providing them with ample time to communicate whatever they 
wanted. After the appearance of David Walker’s revolutionary invective, Appeal to the 
Colored Citizens of the World, in 1829, laws mirroring the South Carolina Acts appeared 
throughout the rest of the South. These laws, while allowing new forms of contact 
between free and enslaved blacks, however did signal the decline of seamen of color on 
the high seas as owners disliked the loss of valuable manpower while in port.23 
In addition to black seafarers, there existed a more localized tidewater, coastal, 
and river-based culture that helped to spread information inland from port cities to 
plantations. As pilots, free and enslaved men of color gained their most prominent 
authority, over that of an entire crew, as they directed ships into harbors. As coastal 
traders, blacks were able to transport contraband goods, revolutionary or seditious 
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information, runaways, and even themselves from Southern ports into the North. Finally, 
fishermen and dockworkers were able to make contact with an outside world in which 
they tasted freedom and made their own money. Watermen of all sorts gained a modicum 
of personal independence that allowed them to exploit aspects of the Southern slave 
system from within. David Walker would take advantage of this culture in order to 
distribute his Appeal throughout the South at the same time that Southerners were 
clamping down their society. A decade later, future Radical Abolitionist Frederick 
Douglass fled the Baltimore wharves into the North though the same networks.24 
 In coastal North Carolina and other states, maritime culture and trade involved an 
elite, self-hiring caste of slaves and free blacks, some of whom espoused racial 
egalitarianism and antiauthoritarianism. Functioning semi-independently from their 
masters, many tidewater slaves worked autonomously for days or weeks on end, only 
paying a percentage to their owners. At the same time, they served as agents of resistance 
and carriers of antislavery ideas, traveling widely and dealing with black mariners who 
then linked them to far-flung events. On the Mississippi, black steamboat workers and 
watermen served in the same role, as conduits of information and trade, providing a link 
to the outside world for inland slaves. On the edge of freedom and slavery, tidewater and 
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river-based men of color worked as middlemen, influencing other slaves and helping 
organize insurrections, secure in their ability to escape northward if caught. In many 
cases they formed a continual chain down the coast, linking would-be rebels in Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia with the North.25 
Despite knowing the dangers this shadowy world created as early as 1725, whites 
were generally indisposed to break down the haven of militancy. These slaves and free 
blacks were the foremost pilots, boatmen, and fishermen, and drove the productivity of 
local ports and waterways. Even with crackdowns on blacks’ tidewater autonomy in the 
wake of Southern slave conspiracies linked to the Haitian Revolution, the revolutionary 
mindset engendered by this culture survived quietly on the periphery of slaveholding 
until it reemerged during the Civil War.26 
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Running simultaneously alongside these maritime communication networks, and 
proving only slightly easier to control, was the diffusion of refugees from the French 
colonies across the Caribbean and up the Atlantic coast. White colonists had fled from 
the beginning of the rebellion in Saint Domingue, but when they became specific targets 
of retribution by insurgents, their numbers swelled. Throughout the emigration from the 
future Haiti, most refugees landed in colonial New Orleans as it passed from Spanish, to 
French, to American hands. New French-language newspapers appeared, continuing 
debates over slavery, the Revolution, and the Republic of Virtue.27 
The number of émigrés grew as time passed, first in 1804 after the American 
purchase and then again in 1809 after the failed Aponte Rebellion in Cuba, to the point 
where French refugees outnumbered the original residents of New Orleans. Expatriate 
grands blancs easily attained Spanish or American citizenship and entered society thanks 
to their skills, education, and preexisting acculturation to a slave-based social system. 
Their royalist beliefs meshed well with royal government in Spanish Louisiana, as well as 
with Federalists in Charleston and Savannah where many also settled. Later refugees, 
among them petits blancs who had been affirmed Jacobins, faired well too, but came to 
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terms with the fact that revolutionary ideas were not welcome. Gens de couleur also 
carved out their own places in local cultures, rising to be leaders of their social group 
without giving up their own identities. Non-whites from Saint Domingue faired best in 
New Orleans where they earned distinction by serving in a militia unit under Andrew 
Jackson during the War of 1812. They did, however, become suspect for a time after 
revolts in 1795 and 1811.28 
Many enslaved and free black refugees did not remain quiet, spreading word of 
the Revolution and its ideology in both the South and the North. In Philadelphia, already 
a center of antislavery dissent, the levels of abolitionist rhetoric increased and leaders of 
the black elite became politically emboldened by the influx of “French negroes.” James 
Forten declared that Haiti was proof that slaves “could not always be detained in their 
present bondage,” and that the pariah state “would become a great nation.” Furthermore, 
in the mid-1790s, a body of “citizens of color of Philadelphia” wrote to the National 
Convention in Paris to thank them for the “immortal decree” which aided their brothers in 
bondage.29 
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Farther south, however, authorities in both the southern United States and Spanish 
Louisiana perceived any refugees who defended Jacobinism as menaces. While whites 
were extended the benefit of the doubt in most cases, “French negroes” both free and 
enslaved were threatened with expulsion. Mirroring their actions against black sailors, 
local governments promulgated laws in most coastal states and territories barring the 
entry of black or mulatto refugees altogether, as well as expelling those who had already 
entered, actions followed by the British and Spanish throughout the Caribbean. Refugee 
slaves were noted especially for spreading news that a major European power had 
declared emancipation.30 
To a great degree, whites understood well the threat of the black Revolution and 
its influence upon their slaves. Thomas Jefferson himself asserted “if something is not 
done & soon done” about the spreading contagion of liberty and freedom among slaves, 
“we shall be the murderers of our own children” when the “revolutionary storm, now 
sweeping the globe, will be upon us.” As the French Republic preyed on American 
shipping in the Caribbean out of Saint Domingan ports, attempted to organize 
sympathizers in Spanish Louisiana, and planned an invasion of the lower South by a 
black Republican army from the French Caribbean under General Theodore 
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Hédouville—a subordinate of General Louis-Marie Turreau during the pacification of the 
Vendée—the suggestion was not wholly without merit that refugee men of color, 
including former Haitian soldiers, might foment a stateside revolution on par with the one 
ongoing in the French Caribbean.31 
In tidewater Virginia, officials blamed the “example of the West Indies” for the 
tightening of the slave code and new restrictions against meetings of slaves. In New 
Orleans in 1793, officials accused “apothecaries, ship captains, and militia officers” of 
trying distribute a tract from the National Convention calling for “citizens of all nations 
[to resist] the tyrants united against the French Republic.” In Charleston, South Carolina 
in October 1793, copies of Sonthonax’s Proclamation of General Liberty appeared as 
newspapers noted the restlessness of the cities’ slave population. And, in 1794 in Bogotá, 
Colombia, a man was tried for “translating and secretly publishing” the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.32 
The clearest example of Haitian ideological influence finding its way to North 
American shores was the 1793 trial of pardo—free black—militiaman Pierre Bailly in 
Spanish New Orleans. Bailly was charged and tried by a military tribunal for inciting 
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rebellion as well as “having burst into tirades against the Spanish government and of 
being a manifest follower of the maxims of the French rebels.” When asked what he 
hoped to gain for his fellow pardos, he replied,  
 
The French are just; they have conceded men their rights.…A universal equality 
among men, us, people of color. We have on the Island of Saint-Domingue and 
other French islands the title ciudadano activo [active, full citizen]; we can speak 
openly, like any white persons and hold the same rank as they. Under our 
[Spanish] rule do we have this? No, sir, and it is unjust. All of us being men, there 
should be no difference. Only their method of thinkingnot colorshould 
differentiate men. 
 
According to witnesses, he was only awaiting word from Saint Domingue to begin his 
rebellion. The court agreed and sent him to prison in Cuba. Despite his condemnation, 
though, radical Jacobin influences from France continued to spread throughout New 
Orleans. Whites and blacks sang “La Marseillaise,” “Ça ira,” “Les aristocrats à la 
lantern,” and other French Revolutionary songs in the streets to celebrate the day they 
would be republicans; in one such song, revelers threatened to guillotine the governor. By 
1795, disorder was widespread in the colonial capital as houses burned nightly and unrest 
grew.33 
In addition to revolutionary fervor whites and free blacks engendered throughout 
the United States, however, enslaved Southerners also used the ideals and idea of the 
Haitian Revolution as a source of inspiration. Most major slave revolts and conspiracies 
from 1790 to 1822 in the South evidenced connections to the revolutionary tide 
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emanating from the Caribbean as Saint Domingue provided blacks free and enslaved a 
revolutionary precedent. And, using this image, they placed their hopes not on legislated 
freedom, but in violent insurrection. In pursuit of their goals, however, black Southerners 
struggled not only to end chattel slavery, but to find a way to equalize the newly freed 
with their former masters.34 
In Spanish and then American Louisiana, the 1795 Pointe Coupée revolt and the 
1811 German Coast Rebellion, as well as Gabriel Prosser’s failed conspiracy in 1800 in 
Richmond, Virginia and Denmark Vesey’s failed scheme of 1822 in Charleston, South 
Carolina all occurred under the shadow of the “slumbering volcano” in the Caribbean.35 
Though each revolutionary moment failed in the short term to end American slavery, 
their ideologies and leaders became part of the same mythological pantheon of 
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antislavery insurrectionism that was built upon the foundation of Saint Domingue. As 
their names were passed by word of mouth, becoming etched in the minds of other 
militant slaves as well as their Northern adherents, their actions served as new sources of 
inspiration alongside tales of the Haitian Revolution. 
As the Haitian Revolution continued to engulf the island of Hispanola, whites all 
along the Gulf of Mexico hunkered down for a coming storm. Though the widespread 
slave rebellion they expected never emerged, outside of New Orleans in 1795 Spanish 
officials uncovered a planned slave insurrection in Point Coupée. French agents 
provocateurs had promised slaves support from French soldiers and the corsaires jacobin 
if they would rise to imitate the Saint Domingue rebels and “do the same here as at Le 
Cap [François].” Authorities swarmed the area with military reinforcements, heading off 
the threat. Several white and free black conspirators, some from Saint Domingue, were 
banished from the colony, and two whites were sent to prison in Cuba for ten years’ hard 
labor. Thirty-two slaves were imprisoned and twenty-six others executed; officials placed 
the heads of the executed on pikes in surrounding districts to warn others of the fate of 
insurrection.36 
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In the aftermath of Point Coupée, the Spanish governor cracked down on French 
refugees from the Caribbean, banishing those found to be threats. In one case, authorities 
expelled a free black tailor from Louisiana. The governor explained, 
 
He is a native of the part of Saint Domingue that belongs to the French and is 
mixed up in all the intrigues and harassments of the French colony, besides being 
ungovernable and audacious. Having such a character around under the present 
circumstances in which I am placed, might produce bad results. 
 
Spanish authorities also halted the slave trade into Louisiana in 1796 and many slave 
owners followed suit by reducing the numbers of slaves they held. By 1800, however, the 
rise of sugar production to augment the barren fields of Saint Domingue encouraged 
officials to reopen importation, albeit begrudgingly, and only for slaves coming directly 
from Africa.37 
As Louisiana slaveholders greeted the American takeover in 1804, officials in 
New Orleans continued to report intermittent unrest among slaves and free blacks; in 
response, patrols were increased and the pardo militia was disbanded. Despite such 
precautions, Louisiana remained a crossroads and hideout for veterans of the French 
Republican army as well as Mexican insurgents, corsaires jacobin, and other would be 
revolutionaries. The two most influential of these insurgent groups were soldiers left over 
from the campaign in Saint Domingue and the privateer smugglers forced out of Cuba in 
1809, both of whom continued to espouse and actively support Republican idealism. In 
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addition, maroon communities and “outlyers” living in the impenetrable swamps and 
forests created a safe haven for runaways.38 
With so many troublemakers around to influence and indoctrinate the local slave 
population, it was no surprise that the largest slave insurrection in the history of the 
United States exploded in Louisiana. In January 1811 on the German Coast, thirty-five 
miles outside of New Orleans, a number of slaves led by Charles Deslondes, a free black 
Saint Domingan driver, killed several whites and wounded others. The insurgents fled to 
an arranged rendezvous with maroons and from there marched on New Orleans, burning 
plantations and gathering recruits as they swept the countryside. Fearing what one 
witness termed their own “miniature representation of the horrors of St. Domingo,” 
whites in the path of the rebels fled in terror.39 
When the eventual rebellion had grown to between 150 and 500 slaves, a small, 
quickly assembled militia unit counterattacked. Reports indicated the rebels had formed 
into tight military units, led by uniformed, mounted officers, and marshaled by flagmen 
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revolt, see Rodriguez, “Rebellion on the River Road,” 65-88; James H. Dormon, “The 
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American Negro Slave Revolts, 249; Bell, Revolution, Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole 
Protest Tradition, 46; and for the impact on gens de couleur and the recall of their militia, 
see Berlin, Slaves Without Masters, 125-126. 
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and drummers. Even though well organized, however, the slaves disbanded and fled 
when attacked. Two days after the insurrection began, regular army troops, dragoons, and 
militiamen from New Orleans and Baton Rouge handily defeated the slave band before 
indiscriminately massacring nearly one hundred blacks. Locals placed the heads of the 
dead rebels on pikes and with them lined the road from New Orleans to the plantation 
where the revolt began as a warning.40 
While whites in Louisiana were able to suppress the 1811 rebels before the 
situation was out of hand, successful revolutionary uprisings in Cartagena, Colombia and 
Barataria, Louisiana in the same year further excited whites’ fears, especially when 
representatives of the two new republics arrived in New Orleans to recruit men and 
privateers. To Louisianans’ relief, among those who sailed to Cartagena were a number 
of the corsaires jacobin based on the coast, but the threat Saint Domingue posed 
remained. Until the early 1820s, Haiti maintained vocal support for black revolutionaries 
throughout the Caribbean, and when Spanish forces counterattacked Cartagena on the 
South American coast, Haitian President Alexandre Pétion gave safe harbor to several 
vessels. Haitian aid was again given to Jacobin insurgents from Louisiana in 1816 as well 
as to Simon Bolivar in the 1820s.41 
                                                
40 Dormon, “The Persistent Spectre,” 396; Rodriguez, “Rebellion on the River Road,” 70, 
75, 82; “Summary of Trial Proceedings of Those Accused of Participating in the Slave 
Uprising of January 9, 1811,” Louisiana, St. Charles Parish, Original Acts, Book 41, 
1811, Number 2, 17-20, Reprint: Louisiana History XVIII (Fall 1977): 473; see also 
Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolution, 43; and Aptheker, American Negro Slave 
Revolts, 249. 
 
41 Bell, Revolution, Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition, 47, 61-62. 
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Though never as dramatic as events on the Gulf coast, those in the Atlantic states 
inspired similar fears of impending slave-led Armageddon.42 By 1793, countless white as 
well as “many hundreds” of black Saint Domingans had landed in Norfolk and 
Portsmouth, Virginia carrying firsthand news of the slave rebellion. While the black 
refugees engendered a sense of hope among local men of color, they created great anxiety 
for white Virginians. One Richmond man reported overhearing a group of blacks outside 
of his window remark they “were to kill the white people soon in this place” just as “the 
blacks has kill’d the whites in the French Island and took it a little while ago.” Such fears 
soon evolved into widespread chatter of a coming uprising from Virginia to South 
Carolina, a rumor bolstered in August 1793 when a Yorktown resident found a letter in 
the street from the “Secret Keeper, Richmond” to a colleague in Norfolk. Eventually 
passed to the governors of both South Carolina and Virginia, the letter claimed thousands 
of recruits and hundreds of guns were already acquired from a “friend in Charleston.” 
This friend was purportedly one Isaac Sasportas, a Caribbean-born French agent who the 
Spanish would execute in 1799 for inciting slaves to revolt by following the example of 
Saint Domingue.43 
                                                
42 Douglas Egerton notes a small and apparently poorly organized conspiracy in 1792 in 
Norfolk, Northampton, and Elizabeth City, Virginia by a slave named Caleb. The plot 
was found out and broken up before anything really happened, except for a stolen horse. 
After the initial alarm, six uncaptured plotters tried to go through with the plan with the 
same lack of success. Most apprehended conspirators were whipped and beaten, the three 
“most dangerous” were transported to Cuba, and three members of the “second wave” of 
attack were executed. See Egerton, “The Scenes Which Are Acted in St. Domingue,” 44-
47; Sidbury, “Saint Domingue in Virginia,” 539-540; see also Sidbury, Ploughshares into 
Swords, 42-48; Berlin, Slaves without Masters, 82. 
 
43 Conspirators and witnesses quoted in Robert Alderson, “Charleston’s Rumored Slave 
Revolt of 1793,” in The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World, Edited by 
David Patrick Geggus (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 93-94, 103; 
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With the militia on alert and nothing more discovered, the panic slowly died down 
from the “Secret Keepers,” but within five years another slave conspiracy seeing itself as 
a revolutionary successor to the Haitian example shook Richmond. In the late 1790s, 
enslaved, self-hiring blacksmith Gabriel Prosser began socializing with both white 
artisans and Haitian refugees, leading him to develop an ideology of freedom and 
equality. By 1800 he had decided to strike, overthrowing not just slavery, but white racial 
hegemony. To accomplish his goal, he sought to appropriate the symbols of white 
authority, turning scythes, the tools of subordination, into swords, the tools of revolution, 
and turning masters’ benevolent vision of Christianity into a revolutionary creed. 
Combining an intimate familiarity with the Richmond wharves and the news and 
information flowing through them and two Frenchmen who offered to help train his co-
conspirators, Gabriel possessed the precursors to organize, inspire, and lead slaves for a 
coming revolution.44 
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Believing “an impending civil war” was coming over the heated election of 1800 
between Thomas Jefferson and incumbent John Adams, Gabriel looked to take advantage 
and capture Richmond and its arsenal while whites were distracted. After slaves from 
neighboring areas killed their masters and secured the region, boatmen would then export 
the conspiracy to more distant counties, eventually leading to statewide success. He 
hoped that with a swift, successful offensive, the rebellion would draw followers, 
including white artisans because of their animosity for planters and the governing classes 
as well as their support for the French Revolution. Additionally, he gave strict 
instructions that poor, slaveless whites, Methodists, Quakers, and Frenchmen not be 
harmed. Weather delayed the appointed hour, however, and some conspirators confessed 
to the plot. As whites garnered the extent of the intended rebellion, they quickly found 
and executed the ringleaders, including Gabriel. One Richmonder remarked of those 
involved, “The accused have exhibited a spirit, which, if it becomes general, must deluge 
the Southern country in blood. They manifested a sense of their rights, and contempt of 
danger, and a thirst for revenge which portend the most unhappy consequences.” Some of 
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those who remained free tried to reorganize, but their effort failed within two years as 
well.45 
In the wake of Gabriel’s Rebellion, Virginia whites greatly restricted the 
autonomy of self-hiring bondsmen and the independence of watermen. At the same time, 
though, they played up the extent of the conspiracy and made the case well known 
throughout the country. For some Northern blacks, Gabriel became a symbol that 
Southern slaves remained ready to fight for their humanity and freedom. In 1822, such 
hopes were renewed again by Denmark Vesey in Charleston, South Carolina, where 
constraints on urban and maritime slaves remained relatively lax, especially as the 
passage of time lulled white fears of Saint Domingue. By the 1820s, Vesey had 
developed what abolitionist and Union army officer Thomas Wentworth Higginson 
would call “the most elaborate insurrectionary plot ever formed by American slaves.”46 
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46 Davis, Revolutions, 52; Sidbury, Ploughshares into Swords, 52, 259, 267; Egerton, 
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The Caribbean-born Vesey exemplified the type of slave of which whites were 
most afraid. A product of maritime life, self-hiring culture, and political consciousness, 
his experiences exemplified the threat of the revolutionary era. Vesey had toiled in the 
cane fields of colonial Saint Domingue, which, when compounded with freedom after 
winning a lottery in 1799, allowed him to see the most dire contrasts of the servile 
institution. After settling in South Carolina and both literate and bilingual in French and 
English, he met, conversed, and became close friends with many Haitian refugees. He 
could neither read nor hear enough about the Caribbean revolution, reportedly rejoicing 
in the news of blacks controlling the plantations of their former masters.47 
The ideal of Haiti remained in Vesey’s mind as he found constant rejection by the 
gens de couleur of Charleston. Instead, he found comfort and community with those who 
remained in chains as he pored over and read aloud “all the passages in the newspapers 
that related to St. Domingo, and apparently every pamphlet he could lay his hands on, 
that had any connection to slavery.” According to a coconspirator, Vesey preached to his 
enslaved friends: “We [are] deprived of our rights and privileges by the white 
people…and that it [is] time for us to seek for our rights…we [are] fully able to conquer 
the whites, if we [are] only unanimous and courageous, as the St. Domingo people were.” 
He cajoled and encouraged his enslaved friends to follow his example and was even 
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noted for “haranguing white strangers in taverns about the injustice of slavery.” Thus, 
like Gabriel, he had developed an ideology at odds with white hegemony. But, while the 
Richmond blacksmith followed Toussaint in believing whites might accept equality at the 
point of a bayonet, Vesey understood like Dessalines that they never would.48 
To that end, he and his captains would on 14 July 1822Bastille Day, the 
anniversary of the French Revolution as well as emancipation in Massachusettsraise an 
army of slaves, kill their masters, take the city armory, and “sweep the town with fire and 
sword, not permitting a single white soul to escape.” After securing the port and freeing 
as many slaves in the region as possible, he and his compatriots would immediately 
disembark for a new future in Haiti. According to another conspirator, “the people of San 
Domingo…would assist them in obtaining their liberty, if they only made the motion first 
themselves.” Infused with equal parts Biblical prophecy and jacobinical ideology, Vesey 
promised to deliver his flock out of their oppression.49 
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As in Gabriel’s plan before, however, a coconspirator exposed the scheme, 
forcing its leader into hiding, but he was quickly found and hanged. When authorities 
discovered the far-reaching implications of the plan, white fears in Charleston exploded. 
The editor of the Charleston Times exclaimed, “Our Negroes are truly the Jacobins of the 
country; that they are the anarchists and the domestic enemy; the common enemy of 
civilized society, and the barbarians who would, IF THEY COULD, become the 
DESTROYERS of our race.” With Vesey’s downfall, the threat of rebellion finally 
outgrew the convenience of self-hiring and autonomy across the South, leading to a 
crackdown. Officials passed laws to restrict slaves’ freedoms and restrain the movement 
of black watermen and mariners in port with the Negro Seamen Acts. Vesey’s attempted 
rebellion became the last eruption of the “slumbering volcano” in the southern United 
States, as whites’ increasingly vengeful reactions to slave insurrections proved successful 
in preventing future plots against slavery from within.50 
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Idols and Ideals 
The Construction of an Antislavery Revolutionary Heritage 
 
While Southern slaves took the Haitian Revolution as inspiration for their own 
insurrectionary plans, many Northern blacks came to see Saint Domingue as a symbol of 
hope and defiance for their race. In 1818, these ideas were expressed in print for the first 
time. Prince Saunders, a Vermont-born black and future Attorney General of Haiti, 
wanted to rebut arguments that men of color were inferior to whites and incapable of 
maintaining the rule of law on their own; his Haytian Papers, a collection of documents 
and memoirs, became the foundation of future black militant praise of the former colony. 
Saunders’s treatise stressed the strength of and respect for the laws in Saint 
Domingue, and argued that former revolutionary leader Henri Christophe had created an 
era of peace and prosperity unknown beforehand. Saunders succinctly blamed the 
violence and destruction of the civil wars not on emancipation or the slave rebels, but on 
Napoleon and the noirs and gens de couleur who sided against Toussaint. In his 
estimation, the Bonapartist traitors alone made “the blood of their fellow countrymen 
flow in torrents” by kidnapping the one man who “had reinstated, in full force, law, 
morals, religion, education, and industry.” Despite this treachery, however, the people of 
Haiti had overcome all obstacles; they drove out the French and, under Christophe, 
established an unprecedented level of order and civility, proving themselves a tribute to 
the greatness of their race.51 
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Though whites largely ignored Saunders’s excessively positive vision of Haiti, 
which was constructed in part to encourage immigration there, black Americans readily 
took it up in the 1820s, a period also marked by a popularity of celebrating Haitian 
independence day in Northern black communities. John Brown Russwurm, a student at 
Bowdoin College and developing militant, was among Saunders’ first ideological 
disciples and vociferously promoted the achievements of the Saint Domingue rebels, 
writing numerous term papers on the topic. In his commencement address in the summer 
of 1826, Russwurm took the occasion to herald not the fiftieth anniversary of the United 
States’ Declaration of Independence, but instead unexpectedly lauded the importance, 
impact, and success of revolution in Saint Domingue. His speech went so far as to 
imagine the patriots of Haiti and its revolution as black parallels to the American 
founders.52 
                                                                                                                                            
Convention for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and Improving the Condition of the 
African Race (Boston: Caleb Bingham and Co., 1818; Philadelphia: Rhistoric 
Publications, 1969), 117, 119, 121-122, 125-126, 142-145. 
 
52 For one example of Russwurm’s work, see John Brown Russwurm, “The Conditions 
and Prospects of Haiti,” manuscript in John Brown Russwurm Papers, Bowdoin College 
Library, Brunswick, ME; Davis, Revolutions, 53; On Russwurm’s address, see also Julius 
S. Scott, Julius Scott on John Brown Russwurm and the Haitian Revolution (Boston: 
WGBH Educational Foundation for PBS Online, 1998) [World Wide Web] available 
from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part3/3i3131.html; See also Genius of Universal 
Emancipation, IV (August 1825); for another 1820s example of using Haiti as both a 
praiseworthy event and a warning to whites, see Nathaniel Paul, “An Address on the 
Celebration of the Abolition of Slavery in the State of New York, July 5, 1827,” in Negro 
Orators and their Orations, Edited by Carter G. Woodson (Washington: Associated 
Publishers, 1925), 64-77; David Brion Davis, Revolutions: Reflections on American 
Equality and Foreign Liberations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 53; See 
also Ira Berlin, Slaves Without Masters: The Free Negro in the Antebellum South (New 
York: New Press, 1992), 315; and Hinks, To Awaken My Afflicted Brethren, 74. 
 
  69 
Following his graduation from Bowdoin, Russwurm’s New York-based 
newspaper Freedom’s Journal published numerous approbative pieces on the Revolution 
and Toussaint. These articles constructed the image of a revolution led by a man of the 
utmost honor and morality, depicted as the epitome of a just, virtuous European leader 
and “one of the most extraordinary men of his age.” One Journal contributor rendered the 
black Napoleon as a righteous and disciplinarian leader who 
 
preserved the strictest sobriety…was particularly attentive to the means of 
reforming the loose and licentious manners of the females; and…set about the 
restoring of the public finances with wonderful address.…The negroes were 
induced to return cheerfully to the labours of the field, and to submit to 
regulations under the black officers.…All appeared to be happy, and regarded 
Toussaint as their guardian angel. 
 
Even Louverture’s deputy Dessalines, deemed a bloodthirsty monster by most 
accounts—his battle cry was “Burn down houses, Cut off heads”—was praised in another 
article as “one of the most courageous, enterprising and skillful of all the negro 
generals.”53 
Beyond merely lauding the revolutionary generation, Freedom’s Journal 
presented contemporary Haiti as an idyllic isle of peace and prosperity where leaders had 
proven themselves equal to those in any state of Europe. One writer argued that during 
the revolution in Saint Domingue, 
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the negro character…burst upon us in all the splendor of native and original 
greatness: And the subsequent transactions in that Island have presented the most 
incontestible proofs, that the negro is not, in general, wanting in the higher 
qualifications of the mind; and that, with the same advantages of liberty, 
independence and education, as their white brethren of Europe and America, the 
race would not be found deficient in hearts pregnant with heroic energies, and 
hands capable of wielding the sword of war, or swaying the rod of empire. 
 
Northern blacks saw the Haitian government as constructed upon the most esteemed 
principles of republicanism, and still led by men of “considerable intellect and great 
energy” who guaranteed the rights of all its citizens, rich and poor. Given freedom and 
political rights, former slaves had not rampaged across the land raping and pillaging, but 
like Toussaint, they had come to see themselves as the equals to their former masters, 
having realized their own manhood in every respect.54 
As their praise continued unabated, Russwurm and his contributors, such as black 
agitator David Walker, began posing the example of the Caribbean state as a warning to 
Southern whites and as an omen of events to come for American slaves. Having 
successfully regenerated and domesticated the image of the revolution in their own 
minds, Northern black militants began to justify and threaten violent action, citing their 
imagined historical precedent. They declared that if the “national sin” in the United States 
was not quickly purged, “the horrors of the revolutionary scenes of St. Domingo, will be 
reacted before our eyes,” but that even those “will be but [an] infant's prattle by [the] 
side” of the coming onslaught. Southern slaves, oppressed and without knowledge of war 
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and weapons, would, like their brethren in Saint Domingue, be divinely inspired to rise 
up, inherently possessing unknown martial skills that would come out at the needed 
moment. The most explicit and alarming of these threats came from the Rev. O.P. Hoyt 
in an address delivered on American Independence Day in 1826: 
 
Let it be remembered that these negroes only need to know their strength and the 
unrighteous tenure by which they are held in bondage, together with an artful 
leader, and they would drench the whole continent from the Potomac to the gulf 
of Mexico, in the blood of the whites. It is vain to think of keeping them in 
ignorance.…Some of the free blacks are men of intelligence. Their influence is 
great.…They have heard of the scenes of St. Domingo. They see there a coloured 
population, intelligent and free and happy… You may build a wall to heaven 
around the island of the blacks and still you cannot resist it.Their example will 
be perpetually before the slaves and serve as a beacon to invite them to 
insurrection. It bids them to go forth to freedom or to death.…The day of 
vengeance is not far distant. The tempest is gathered on the mountain tops and 
threatens to sweep down into the plains below, desolating with its lightning and 
deafening with its thunder.…The arm of the slave may yet grasp the battle axe 
and the sword, and if not, we, our children, or our children's children may perish 
beneath the stroke…the rains of more than thirty years have scarcely yet bleached 
the soil [of Haiti] from the blood of the French.55 
 
Like Hoyt, David Walker also moved beyond mere praise of the Haitian example, 
and in his Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World advocated that American slaves 
actively follow in the footsteps of the Saint Domingan rebels, freeing themselves from 
the yoke of the “unjust, jealous, unmerciful, avaricious and blood-thirsty” master class by 
any means available. Many Northern blacks responded favorably to Walker’s 
revolutionary creed, designed to be Common Sense for slaves. The Bostonian demanded 
men of color put faith in themselves, dare to act, and take their rights back from their 
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masters because whites were unlikely to pity slaves’ wretchedness or yield to 
abolitionists’ moral suasion. He urged that slaves must recant their own consent to be 
oppressed, lead moral lives, and become educated, temperate, religious, and self-
regulated. One newspaper noted that those who had read the Appeal, or heard it read, 
“glory in its principles, as if it were a star in the east, guiding them to freedom and 
emancipation.” Amos Beman, a black minister in Connecticut, reported that the work was 
“read and re-read” aloud in groups “until [its] words were stamped in letters of fire upon 
our souls.”56 
Another militant, calling himself Nero, tried to threaten Southerners into 
submission. In 1831, one year after the Nat Turner rebellion, he dispatched a letter to 
Jerusalem, Virginia proclaiming that “as long as [oppression] exists, [revenge] is 
justifiable.” He lambasted shaken whites that Nat Turner only represented the first wave 
of a wide-reaching conspiracy hellbent on destroying slavery and restoring black dignity 
at all costs. The conspirators, black and white, were a revolutionary vanguard led by a 
“modern Leonidas,” who escaped to Haiti where he and his captains were “taking lessons 
from the venerable survivors of the Haytian Revolution…and the genius of Tousaint.” 
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When ready, they would strike and “not only make a blaze but scorch [whites’] very 
bones to a crisp.” Nero concluded, 
 
We shall be able to bring into the field three hundred thousand men who will be 
all willing to hazard their lives in defense of our common rights…men that can 
perform deeds of death and destruction that would have made a Cortes or Pizarro 
relent, a Red Jacket sympathize, or a Tecumseh weep.57 
 
In the end, though, the shift into militancy of Russwurm, Hoyt, Walker, Nero, and 
their colleagues failed to inspire anything more than a massive Southern backlash when 
combined with the revolt of Nat Turner in 1831. In a sense, it was too much, too soon, 
and the larger abolition movement was not ready for their particular brand of militancy. 
Following Walker’s death in 1830 and taking advantage of the general aversion to the 
increasingly militant tone of black abolitionism, moreover, the rise of William Lloyd 
Garrison’s Liberator and its accompanying nonresistance movement stymied whatever 
momentum towards violence had arisen in the black community.58 
As Garrison and his followers gained momentum, they appropriated black 
militants’ ideas of immediatism, anti-colonization, anti-racism, and equal rights, 
undercutting the earlier movement further, and taking the helm of radical abolitionism. 
While white radicals did not shy away from using images of the Haitian Revolution, they 
were more concerned with proving that abolition would not lead to the destruction of the 
South and that emancipated slaves would be able to integrate into a civil society. Thus, 
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they forced a return to the earlier themes and ideas presented by Prince Saunders in his 
Haytien Papers that focused squarely on the positive outcomes and not the violent means 
of the Saint Domingue rebellion. 
With whites firmly integrated into the movement, militant abolitionism became 
centered not on calls to action, but on a cautionary creed. Because slaves “would be 
justified in using retaliatory measures more than any people on the face of the earth,” 
Garrison argued that emancipation must come immediately and willingly to avoid the 
dangers of open rebellion, an anathema to the pacifist and something which would scare 
off many of the reluctantly reformist from his cause. He answered his detractors, “We do 
not preach rebellionno but submission and peace. Our enemies may accuse us of 
striving to stir up the slaves to revenge but their accusations are false.” Militancy and 
forced abolition would only make “blood…flow like waterthe blood of guilty men, and 
of innocent women and children. Then will be heard lamentations and weeping, such as 
will blot out the remembrance of the horrors of St. Domingo.”59  
                                                
59 Liberator, 8 January and 3 September 1831; Henry Mayer, All on fire: William Lloyd 
Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 115-116, 
284, 389; William Lloyd Garrison, “Address to the American Colonization Society, 4 
July 1829,” in William Lloyd Garrison and the Fight Against Slavery: Selections from 
The Liberator, Edited by William E. Cain (Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 
1995), 68. Though his radicalism was moderated compared to the black firebrands of the 
1820s, Garrison was accused by his Northern antislavery detractors of being a Jacobin. 
One of these enemies, Joseph Tracy, a pro-colonization minister from Vermont, attacked 
the radical foundations of Garrison’s abolitionism, seeing it based upon the same natural 
rights doctrine as the failed Republic of Virtue. He declared that ”immediate 
emancipation, founded on the naked doctrine of the equal rights of all men... This is not 
the American interpretation. It is that of French Jacobinism,” and the actions of those 
French radicals had “only deluged France in blood, and whelmed Europe in tears.” 
Moreover, Tracey is representative of those who did not buy into the idealization of Haiti. 
He notes that liberty under the Republic and Toussaint was conditioned and still a half-
free, controlled labor system in reality giving little freedom to former plantation slaves. 
See Joseph Tracy, Natural Equality: A Sermon Before the Vermont Colonization Society, 
  75 
In spite of their vows to reject physical violence, as Garrison’s movement 
progressed his followers’ language became more graphic, continuing the trend of 
domesticating revolutionary imagery. Amos A. Phelps of Massachusetts, an organizer of 
the American Anti-Slavery Society, pleaded in 1834 that “Slaveholders have but one 
alternative, either to emancipate their slaves voluntarily, and thus escape the danger they 
dread, or have the slaves emancipate themselves by force. Peaceable emancipation, or 
violent with all its horrors, will inevitably take place.” The problem was becoming more 
pressing each year as the slave population grew, and, he continued, they would become 
“a mass of physical strength that will not always sleep.” When the moment arrives, “it 
will be violent indeed…a vengeance lashed to fury by years of oppression and outrage; 
and that indeed, will be ‘uncapping a volcano,’ and pouring desolation over the land.”60  
While there was internal debate over the use of such strong language, when it 
came to praise for Haiti, Northern abolitionists of all persuasions eventually sounded the 
same. They used the example of Haiti and its founders as proof: first, that blacks could 
achieve great things if only they were removed from slavery; second, that slavery was an 
evil which itself led to the violence and bloodshed in the former colony; third, that whites 
themselves, not emancipation, were to blame for the greatest periods of destruction 
during the revolution; and finally, that the same events might transpire in the South 
unless all slaves were immediately and unconditionally liberated. Between 1831 and the 
early 1840s, abolitionists took each of these themes out of its historical context, and 
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developed them into a heroic and romantic illustration of the Haitian Revolution that all 
abolitionists could embrace. In this way, abolitionists began laying the foundation for an 
alternative revolutionary heritage to 1776 and the inequality enshrined in the 
Constitution.61 
Thus, on Toussaint, Garrison followed in the footsteps of Prince Saunders and 
portrayed him as a morally superior parallel to George Washington. Ralph Waldo 
Emerson would remark in the 1840s, referring to Toussaint and the heroes of Haiti, “here 
is the anti-slave: here is man: and if you have man, black or white is an insignificance.” 
Other white abolitionists continued this trend, removing Toussaint from the bloodshed of 
Saint Domingue and placing him in a hyperbolic sainthood.62 
In the early 1830s, white New England abolitionist David Lee Child argued that 
Louverture perfectly proved the potentialities his race, stressing the general’s lack of 
white blood to counter arguments that mulattos were the only men of color who could 
achieve greatness. In fact, depictions like that of Child lead readers to believe that 
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Louverture was a moral, temperate, and Christian New Englander, not a general who had 
bloodily fought his way to victory on a small Caribbean island. Furthermore, in hopes of 
allaying fears of the coming British emancipation in the West Indies, Child posed Haiti as 
a perfect example for “the sound policy, and superior safety of immediate emancipation.” 
The reformer acknowledged the violence of the revolution, but followed Saunders by 
blaming that violence on colonial whites and Napoleon’s treachery.63 
According to Child, the first outbreaks of the “horrors of Saint Domingue” 
occurred in 1790 after the executions of mulatto rebel leaders Vincent Ogé and Jean 
Baptiste Chavannes, and were the fault of colonial aristocrats: 
 
The mulattoes flew to arms, and they were soon joined by the slaves generally. 
Then, indeed, commenced a bloody revolution.…Great revolutions are usually 
bloody, but on whom is the guilt? Doubtless on those who withhold from men 
their just rightsnot on those who claim and vindicate them. It is the denial of 
rights that raises insurrections. It was not the granting, but the withholding of 
emancipation, which deluged St. Domingo with blood. 
 
He concluded, “It appears that the revolution of St. Domingo, in every stage of it, 
furnishes the most decisive proof of the dangers of slavery,” and the necessity of 
immediatism as argued by Garrison.64 
Child also faulted Napoleon for the greatest bloodletting and destruction. He 
asserted that after their emancipation, the slaves of Saint Domingue “were peaceable, 
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kind, orderly, and industrious.…For nearly eight years, peace, contentment and felicity, 
reigned.” Then, in 1802, Bonaparte’s expedition arrived to re-enslave the black 
population, which along with the capture of Toussaint, sparked the “bloody and 
perfidious” violence. The French 
 
trapped [the Haitian] leader by treachery, and murdered him. At length the 
Haytien rose in his wrath, and truly the genius of fire could not revel in its flames 
more familiarly than he. The fury swept over the island like a conflagration, and 
their weak-hearted enemies, the traitors to solemn leagues, were consumed from 
the surface of the glorious island. It is true, that the young and tender were not 
spared. But let white men endure four centuries of oppression, let them be blessed 
with the boon of liberty, let them hug it to their hearts and feel its warm and 
expansive influence; then let it be rudely snatched away, and daggers substituted 
in its place. 
 
Differing from many of his pacifist colleagues, Child did not disregard or shy away from 
the bloodiness of the revolution, but justified it as the right all men to liberty while also 
posing it as a warning of a future storm to southerners who maintain slavery.65 
Another abolitionist tract, written anonymously in 1839 in support of immediate 
emancipation, countered the charge that former slaves in Saint Domingue became 
bloodthirsty after emancipation, arguing “emancipation produced the most blessed 
effects.…No disasters whatever occurred in consequence of this step.” Everywhere “the 
negroes continued their labor” as if no revolution had occurred or their former masters 
were still present. In this telling of the rebellion, even grands blancs came to realize the 
benefits of the system because Toussaint was able to make the plantations produce for 
their owners once again, as though there had never been a revolution. The author 
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described Toussaint as though he were a capable and praiseworthy monarch, controlling 
every aspect of government personally: 
 
Toussaint L’Ouverture is the most active and indefatigable man, of whom it is 
possible to form an idea. He is always present whenever difficulty or danger 
makes his presence necessary. His great sobriety,the power of living without 
repose,the facility with which he resumes the affairs of the cabinet, after the 
most tiresome excursions,of answering daily a hundred letters,and of 
habitually tiring five secretariesrender him so superior to all around him, that 
their respect and submission almost amount to fanaticism.66 
 
Lydia Maria Child, the wife of David Child, also praised Toussaint in her works. 
She depicted him as moral and always searching for more knowledge, his greatness 
apparent well before events thrust him to power: in his studies, she supposed, he had read 
eighteenth century French humanist Abbé Raynal’s supposition that a great black chief 
would appear to lead his people out of bondage as Moses led the Israelites out of Egypt 
or Spartacus led Roman slaves into rebellion, and believed he was destined to be that 
leader. A nonresistant pacifist, Lydia Child’s Toussaint was thrust into the insurrection 
against his will, but turned to healing as a means of preserving his beliefs within the rebel 
army. When his time came to lead, to sacrifice his “personal feeling to the public good,” 
it was “never in a bloodthirsty spirit” and his motto for battle was always “no retaliation.” 
Even in the darkest hours he remained true to his virtue and morality, always a healer 
rather than a destroyer. Child concluded that the United States should “take pride in 
Toussaint Louverture, as the man who made an opening of freedom for his oppressed 
race, and the greatness of his character and achievements proved the capabilities of Black 
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Men.” She agreed with her husband’s image of the black general as the epitome of a New 
England pacifist forced into a rebellion against his own conscience, able to cope only 
because of the greatness of the endeavor.67 
Though the praise for Louverture was becoming increasingly exaggerated, it 
continued unabated. At the 1836 meeting of the New England Anti-Slavery Convention, 
Charles Stuart attested to the magnanimous character of Toussaint and the prospects that 
his image proved for the rest of his race by providing an example of greatness. He 
professed that during the Saint Domingan war with the British, an English officer, forced 
ashore by weather, was captured and brought before Christophe, who tried him as a spy 
and condemned him to death. Toussaint intervened, however, arguing the better course 
was to let the man sail back for England to order the crown to stop their war. Stuart 
argued that such benevolence towards a sworn enemy “was the act of a great man, of a 
great heart” who he, and every man, should acknowledge as a “MAN and a BROTHER.” 
Another abolitionist argued that “the world may be safely challenged to produce a nobler 
character than that of Toussaint, the George Washington of St. Domingo.” He had 
provided his countrymen with “union and a wise constitution,” and had run the island 
peacefully until the First Consul decided to reclaim it for his own; but, even then, the 
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black general “would neither break his word nor sell his country,” sacrificing himself 
instead of giving up the freedom of his people.68 
Moreover, Toussaint was not the only hero of the revolution who was transformed 
into hyperbole by abolitionists; black militant and Oberlin College graduate George B. 
Vashon, who had actually spent time in Haiti, later commemorated mulatto leader 
Vincent Ogé in verse: 
 
Thy coming fame, Oje! is sure 
Thy name with that of L’Ouverture 
And the noble souls that stood 
With both of you, in times of blood 
Will to be the tyrant’s fear 
Will live, the sinking soul to cheer! 
 
Others soon embraced refurbished images of Dessalines, Christophe, and other rebel 
commanders like André Rigaud. To many abolitionists, knowledge of their tales became 
second nature, and they often made passing references to them in newspapers and 
pamphlets in a testament to the domestication of the imagery.69 
Others were also influenced by the Anglo-American connection to British 
Emancipation. American antislavery leaders communicated with their colleagues in 
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England constantly, gave and received lecture tours from each other, and exchanged ideas 
and tactics. As black militants had celebrated Haitian Independence Day in the 1820s as a 
way of paying their respects to an alternative, colorblind revolutionary heritage, many 
abolitionists in the 1830s and 1840s celebrated Jamaican Independence Day as a way of 
commemorating the successes of peaceful emancipation. While a great majority of the 
abolition movement in the United States was willing to take both the British and Haitian 
examples to prove the necessity of immediate emancipation to avoid the violence of the 
French Caribbean and to show ease and relative peacefulness with which Jamaican slaves 
were freed, a small, radical, and increasingly militant faction focused solely on the 
Haitian Revolution. 
This minority group eventually produced the epitome of praise for the Haitian 
Revolution and its leading figures. Black abolitionist, Liberty Party member, and 
physician James McCune Smith delivered a lecture in 1841 at the Stuyvesant Institute in 
New York which signaled the capstone of the previous imagery as well as the beginning 
of a new strain, one which used the heroic images of Saint Domingue to justify the 
violence. His militancy emboldened by the recent Amistad and Creole mutinies in which 
slaves took over the ships transporting them, McCune Smith did not brush aside the 
bloodiness of the revolt in which whites were killed and wounded, but instead justified 
the slaves’ violence and revolutionary methods. He argued that revolution was “the 
legitimate fruit of slavery” and the “consequence of withholding from men their liberty.” 
However, the doctor depicted slave rebels as driven not by base desires, but by reason 
and controlled impulses, and therefore worthy of the rights of man for which they had 
struggled so valiantly: when Sonthonax and his co-administrator Étienne Polverel 
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pleaded to the army of slaves for aid against the royalist whites, they offered them liberty 
as well as the plunder of Cap François; “this offer of plunder was rejected by [rebel 
leaders] Jean François and Biassou.”70  
At the same time, though, McCune Smith did not proclaim the slaves or their 
commander were innocent of the “Horrors of Saint Domingue.” The more subtle point is 
that those horrors would have been much worse without a leader like Louverture to bring 
peace to the island: “whilst the orgies of the French revolution thrust forward a being 
whose path was by rivers of blood, the horrors of Saint Domingue produced one who was 
pre-eminently a peace-maker.” Contrasting Toussaint’s restraint, however, was the 
justified retaliation of Jean Jacques Dessalines, “the Robespierre of the island,” who 
punished two-faced whites with extermination for even considering the reimposition of 
slavery. Thus, “it was treachery towards Toussaint that caused the massacre of St. 
Domingo,” and, the future Radical Political Abolitionist warned, without change the 
same fate would come to whites in the United States.71 
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As the not-so-subtle threat levied by McCune Smith shows, what began as 
honorific and laudatory images of Toussaint and the Haitian Revolution became sharp 
rhetoric and justifications for violence that indirectly threatened Southern slaveholders. In 
the twenty years before McCune Smith’s address, the abolition movement as a whole 
progressed towards militancy and was well on the way to embracing open violence, 
thanks in part to the heroic imagery of violent revolution they had reclaimed as their own 
abolitionist heritage. As discourse on Haiti grew more vocal and incendiary, so too did 
the language of Southern slave resistance and rebellion. Instead of simply praising the 
ends of Haitian patriots, the growing American Jacobins reveled in their means, and some 
of them, in time, encouraged their imitation by Southern slaves. In the 1840s, many of 
these militants broke from Garrison and radicalized their rhetoric; a few even proclaimed 
a slave insurrection should be provoked by the faithful. 
Samuel E. Cornish’s newspaper, The Colored American, spoke out in more 
militant terms than most. He demanded “universal emancipation, and universal 
enfranchisement” even if by force, because “should we die in the pursuit, we will die 
virtuous martyrs in a holy cause.” Furthermore, with the ever-growing debate over 
Southern expansion into the Southwest, Cornish militantly declared that if 
 
the annexation of Texas should be brought up and legislated upon, it will be an act 
of reckless outrage upon the opinion and wishes of the people, and one that will 
merit, at their hand, an eternal oblivion for their representatives.…Should our 
national sin result in such a division, what consequences may not be 
expected?…From the Potomac to the extreme Southern boundaries of our 
government, throughout these regions of oppression and lawless aristocracy, 
where the slave and the honest white laborer alike, are oppressed and brutalized, 
would anarchy, bloodshed and rapine, delve and deluge the country. 
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Cornish plainly suggested that the righteous and virtuous would not stand for a Southern 
acquisition of Texas, and the result for those who pursued that course was an American 
version of the “Horrors of Saint Domingue.” Yet, Cornish’s threat of retaliation was only 
the tip of the iceberg.72 
In 1839, upstate New Yorker Jabez Delano Hammond wrote to reformer and 
future militant abolitionist Gerrit Smith to inform him of a plan for a Northern invasion 
of the South to destroy slavery, an idea very similar to that of the earlier Nero. 
Hammond, a Democratic judge and former congressman, had decided that voluntary 
emancipation and moral suasion alone were no longer enough. Antislavery forces needed 
to be proactive because “the only way in which slavery in the South can be abolished is 
by force.” He wanted to establish two military academies, one in Canada and one in 
Mexico, beyond the reach of the South or the federal government, where fugitive slaves 
would be trained as warriors and “dispatched to infiltrate the South.” These “most 
successful Southern missionaries” would blend into the slave population, incite sabotage, 
and foment insurrection. The culmination would be a large-scale slave rebellion led by 
this revolutionary vanguard of covert fugitives that would bring slaveholders to their 
knees and force the end of slavery.73 
Unable to gain Smith's support for his initial plans, Hammond continued to 
develop his ideas and made a more public appeal in 1847. The result was a fictionalized 
slave autobiography The Life and Opinions of Julius Melbourne, which proposed a 
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revised plan for invasion. The judge argued that black armies and military academies 
should be founded and funded by antislavery philanthropists, in lieu of holding 
abolitionist lectures in the North, where the unconverted were by then a lost cause. They 
would recruit, train, educate, and then release their troops upon the South. The existence 
of slavery itself would guarantee the success of an invasion: “what could [slaveholders] 
do to repel an invading force, when each man has a deadly enemy in his own house?” He 
imagined and wistfully hoped for the coming 
 
unmitigated and interminable…[and] exterminating war…when the rich rice and 
cotton fields of the south will be drenched with human gore, when the quiet 
retreats of the domestic circle will be stained with the blood of “wife, children, 
and friends,”and when the gorgeous palaces which now adorn the southern 
plantations will be enveloped in flames. 
 
Such images mirrored the most vividly described scenes of destruction in Saint 
Domingue, and suggest that an American Haiti is exactly what Hammond sought to 
achieve.74 
Though the views expressed by Hammond and Cornish were elusive in the 1830s, 
by the 1840s, the perpetual heroic embodiment of Louverture and the utopian ideal of the 
black pariah state had led to a growing acceptance of slave rebellion as a legitimate 
solution to American slavery. As militant abolitionists continued to legitimate and 
domesticate Saint Domingans’ revolutionary methods and jacobinical ideology, 
Hammond and Cornish became two extremists among many. Through continual exposure 
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and praise for the ends of what they saw as the heroic actions of their Haitian patriots, 
they only succeeded in legitimizing those methods for future imitators. As they moved 
closer to inciting rebellion directly, they accepted their imagined utopia’s foundation as 
their own revolutionary legacy; over time, American slave rebels were added into this 
mythology, creating a pantheon of insurgent heroes for them to invoke for inspiration.75 
By the mid-1840s, others were willing to join them in their declarations against 
the South. In January 1842 Gerrit Smith took a step beyond newspapers and pamphlets 
and purported to beseech slaves directly in his “Address to the Slaves of the United 
States” before the Liberty Party convention. While he had been reluctant to assist Judge 
Hammond’s plans for invading the South in the late 1830s, by 1842 his radicalism had 
matured. In his address, he advocated Northern aid of slaves’ escape from the South, as 
well as the active resistance by those slaves against their masters. The New York radical 
further declared that abolitionists were duty bound to enter the South and encourage 
escapes, and slaves were duty bound to flee. He pressed fugitives to become “advisors, 
comforters, and helpers” to their brethren still in bondage, and urged that bondsmen steal 
anything necessary for their flight. Smith did, however, caution against the use of overt 
                                                
75 Fine, “John Brown's Body,” 225-249. One very interesting development in 
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York: Arno Press, 1969). 
 
  88 
violence; he had only progressed to encouraging flight, not yet rebellion, still paying lip 
service to the pacifism of the greater abolition movement.76 
While Smith would continue to grow more radical, black militants were not far 
behind in their own rhetoric or actions. By 1843, Northern free men of color had proven 
themselves willing to vehemently defend themselves when challenged by bounty hunters 
and mobs.77 At a National Convention of Colored Citizens in Buffalo that year, speakers 
such as Reverend Samuel Davis associated their cause with revolutionary movements in 
Greece and Poland, as well as with the actions and acceptance of violence of the 
American revolutionary generation. Davis rejected Garrison’s pacifist, nonresistant God 
and instead appealed to the “God of armies.” He argued that American and European 
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was generally accepted as not a violation of pacifism. 
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volunteers joining Greek forces fighting the Turks in the 1820s only provided precedent 
for Northern blacks to head south to fight for the freedom of their race if a slave revolt 
broke out.78 
Following Davis’ exhortations, Henry Highland Garnet delivered his own 
“Address to the Slaves,” which the convention’s critics dubbed “war-like” and an 
encouragement to insurrection. The address returned to the fiery and incendiary language 
of David Walker’s Appeal, declaring that when revolutionary orators proclaimed 
“LIBERTY OR DEATH…it ran from soul to soul like electric fire, and nerved the arm of 
thousands to fight in the holy cause of Freedom.” The speech of the former mariner who 
had twice sailed to the Caribbean was intended to do just that for slaves. He lambasted 
docile and submissive slaves, urging that “they must strike the first blow,” for they “had 
far better all diedie immediately, than live as slaves.” By striking out against white 
Southerners, enslaved blacks would regain their manhood, and join “Denmark 
Veazie…on the same monument with Moses, Hampden, Tell, Bruce, and Wallace, 
Toussaint L’Overteur, Lafayette and Washington.” The coming struggle would test men, 
however, and Garnet proclaimed to his listeners that “there is not much hope of 
redemption without the shedding of blood [and] if you must bleed, let it all come at 
once.” He encouraged them, “arise, arise! Strike for your lives and liberties. Now is the 
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day and now is the hour…Let your motto be resistance! resistance! RESISTANCE! No 
oppressed people have ever secured their liberty without resistance.”79 
 
Though Garnet was rejected by the Buffalo convention, his oration was the 
culmination of a thirty year process of the heroic embodiment and domestication of the 
Haitian Revolution and creation of an ideological mythology providing American 
antislavery militants with a revolutionary heritage of their own. Its justified militancy was 
also the first general call to arms in the abolition movement, and marked the public 
renewal of Jacobin-esq radicalism that would only continue to grow as the years passed. 
During that time, the author of the Address held firm to his militant convictions as 
nonresistance and pacifism crumbed around him, and the abolition movement produced a 
new generation of radicals willing to strike against slavery with action rather than words. 
These American Jacobins launched a two-pronged assault against slavery, both 
anathemas just a few years earlier. Gerrit Smith and others helped direct the Liberty Party 
after 1840 as a political front, while simultaneously other antislavery militants became 
proactive in rescuing slaves from their Southern bondage.  
In the wake of Smith and his followers’ conversion to militancy and political 
action, what had been a small, tight-knit sect in the 1840s would see the ranks of 
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Garrison’s flock vastly diminish as theirs grew. While many notable abolitionists had 
reviled the gory details of the Haitian Revolution during the 1830s and 1840s, by the next 
decade they used their implicit acceptance of violence to warn the South. At the same 
time, men such as William Wells Brown, Wendell Philips, Frederick Douglass, and 
Martin Delany continued to laud the heroes of Saint Domingue and other revolutions 
with language that rivaled their 1820s counterparts. Others skipped the historical 
justifications and directly threatened action. 
By the late 1850s, nonresistants like Lydia Maria Child and even Garrison himself 
spoke of the coming storm in words and details that would have shocked themselves two 
decades before, in some cases speaking as though they had already disavowed pacifism. 
By the outbreak of the Civil War, virtually no hold-outs among abolitionists remained on 
the side of inaction, and throughout this sea-change in radical abolitionism, the deeds, 
ideas, and heroics of Toussaint Louverture and his black brothers-in-arms marked the 
path and engendered an American parallel to the ideology which had driven “the horrors 
of Saint Domingue.” Those who were swayed by the changing reality of the antislavery 
movement would demand that that ideology be followed by the government. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
“A LITTLE WHOLESOME SLAUGHTER, TO AROUSE THE CONSCIENCE 
OF THE PEOPLE”1 
 
The Rise and Fall of Radical Political Abolitionism 
 
 
 
In 1855, New York reformers Gerrit Smith and William Goodell began their latest 
foray into the extreme fringes of political abolitionism. Joined by a small cohort of close 
supporters, they formed the Radical Political Abolition Party as a Manichean alternative 
to the rising Republican Party. The duo’s first expedition from moralist abolitionism into 
the world of politics came with the rise of the Liberty Party in 1840, but imploded within 
eight years over the degree of ideological orthodoxy the party’s more politically savvy 
members were willing to heed. The successive minor parties the men fielded in the 
aftermath of the breakup, usually with Smith on the ticket and Goodell on the masthead, 
failed to achieve anything of note, but provided a forum for the continued development 
and radicalization of their beliefs. Their latest effort, profiting from fifteen years of 
progress in both their ideology and willingness to engage slavery with physical force, 
represented the most consolidated, fundamentalist, and uncompromising vision of 
political radicalism to exist since Maximilien Robespierre met the guillotine in the 
summer of 1794. 
In contrast to the pragmatic men of the Liberty Party like Salmon P. Chase who 
looked to moderated antislavery theories as a foundation to build a wider political 
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coalition, Smith and Goodell promoted equal rights, universal reform, and the immediate 
abolition of slavery everywhere. The beliefs of the Radical Political Abolition men were 
so ruthlessly single-minded and its leadership so determined to end slavery, that within 
the year they disbanded to work extrapolitically rather than accept the marginalization 
that their black militant abolitionist forbearers faced in the 1830s. Struggling against what 
they defined as an illegitimate and usurped government, Smith and his followers 
demanded worthy men take up the call of righteousness and violently impose the virtuous 
will of the people in terms posing an uncanny parallel to the extremism of French 
Jacobinism. The culmination of this eschewing of politics was their wholehearted 
embrace of John Brown and his plan to revolutionize and regenerate the nation on his 
own through an invasion of the South. 
In the aftermath of Brown’s folly in late 1859, many antislavery proponents 
decried it and its secret supporters for endangering the careful political balance the 
Republican Party was building, a stark contrast to twenty years earlier when many of the 
same men condemned the entire concept of political abolitionism. The dramatic 
transformation in the American antislavery movement from pacifist nonresistance to 
direct action between 1840 and 1860 developed from two components that continually 
compounded each other. The first was the acceptance of increasingly militant direct 
action against the chattel institution, resulting from a combination of black militants’ 
progressively more radical rhetoric of revolutionary heroism—their embodiment of the 
Haitian Revolution and its ideals as their own—and a growing belief in as well as 
dramatic proof of slaves’ willingness to strike out for their own freedom. The second 
component began with the breakdown of the Garrisonian abolitionist alliance of the 
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1830s and culminated in the rise of the antislavery Liberty Party. Matured from a petition 
movement and antislavery legal cases to greater political engagement and organization 
through the drive of a select group of abolitionists, the party by the early 1840s had a 
cultivated new coterie ready to end slavery through engagement with their world instead 
of through prayer from afar. 
When the current of militancy against slavery crossed paths with the nascent 
political movement in the early 1840s, it further radicalized already fervent antislavery 
men on the extremist fringe like Smith and Goodell and began their movement beyond 
the limits of what most Liberty men were willing to accept. Shipboard mutinies, daring 
escapes, new federal laws, and growing political impetus pushed the two currents of 
physical and electoral engagement continually against each other, leading to broader 
support for freedom raids and physical resistance against slaveholders by militants. By 
the late 1840s, Smith’s upstate New York legion severed themselves from the more 
pragmatic Liberty men in both the West and East and formed the insurgent Liberty 
League as their first radical antislavery soap box. From that foundation, they developed a 
jacobinical worldview that became Radical Political Abolitionism before following the 
logical course their ideology commanded: they abandoned politics in favor of covert 
support for militant strikes against the Slave Power. 
The following chapter explores this dual rise of antislavery direct and political 
action. Beginning with the rise of political engagement and the foundation of the Liberty 
Party, it traces the results of the continuous juxtaposition of abolitionist militancy and 
electioneering. Rather than following the development of the eventually successful and 
moderated branch of the Libertyites, the subject of the next chapter, the focus is placed 
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upon Gerrit Smith and his small contingent of devotees willing to risk obscurity for purity 
of soul and the acceleration of slavery’s demise by any means. In their quest for 
orthodoxy in the fight against the South, the regularly-marginalized faction went through 
several iterations with several names, but in the end developed and streamlined a series of 
legal and ideological justifications for destroying slavery before following their own 
words into a unilateral, ill-informed direct strike. 
 
One Idea, Two Courses 
The Parallel Rise of Political Abolitionism and Militant Action 
 
At the same time black militant abolitionists like David Walker and John 
Russwurm were preaching their firebrand rhetoric against slavery, New York social 
reformer Gerrit Smith acquired vast wealth through land speculation. Beginning in the 
1820s, he used these assets to support a variety of reform organizations ranging from 
temperance to antislavery, and though searching for an adamantine doctrine to follow, he 
nevertheless remained pragmatic in his patronage. As his focus narrowed to the fight 
against slavery, he provided funds to both Bostonian William Lloyd Garrison, who 
demanded immediate and complete abolition, as well as rival colonizationists who sought 
to transport freed blacks out of the United States altogether. By mid-1830s, however, 
Smith had rejected colonization as a racist and unjust solution, and looked instead to 
more dogmatic and uncompromising approaches. He moved firmly into Garrison’s fold at 
the American Anti-Slavery Society and began describing himself as a “fanatic” and 
“outlaw” against slavery.2 
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The most prominent and vocal persona of abolitionism since 1830 through his 
newspaper, the Liberator, Garrison taught his followers to eschew direct action in favor 
of pacifism and moral persuasion. He argued that until the minds of men were convinced 
of and saved from the sin of slavery, abolition was a dead letter. One of the first tactics 
adopted in this program of passive suasion was the mass mailing of antislavery literature 
to the South in the hope of converting slaveholders. In reaction, Southern postmasters 
refused delivery, invariably raising legal issues which several antislavery agitators 
pressed through complaints and petitions to Congress. Once they realized the great 
potential of petitioning Congress for emancipation as an extension of moral suasion, the 
number of appeals to Washington ballooned dramatically in the mid-1830s. 
Upon receipt of the documents, the House of Representatives reacted almost as 
irately as had the postmasters when Northern members like President-cum-Congressman 
John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts presented them on the floor. Southern ire led to a 
plan of tabling the motions in order to prevent their discussion, eventually to the point of 
a standing order disallowing them from being opened—the gag rule. Aghast at the 
dubious constitutionality of such obstructionism, but intrigued by the publicity from their 
actions, savvy abolitionists saw the possibilities of further direct action. While Garrison, 
Smith, and others remained wary of any dealings with the slave-supporting system lest 
abolitionism be sullied by the dirty world of political intrigue and compromise, other 
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Society members, buoyed by the success of their campaign, looked beyond the purely 
moralist approach of Garrisonian nonresistance towards the fringes of engagement.3 
Searching for their next tactic in the fight against slavery, these forward-looking 
abolitionists turned to legal challenges to ensure slaves escaping to the North were 
beyond the reach of their masters. To that end, former Alabama slaveholder turned Ohio-
based abolitionist lawyer James G. Birney theorized in his Philanthropist that the lack of 
“positive law” in Ohio made any slave who entered Ohio legally forever free. Birney 
based his argument on the 1772 British common law decision Somerset v. Stewart by 
William Murray, Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, the highest court in 
Britain. Mansfield, a conservative and disinclined towards abolitionists, nevertheless 
ruled that slavery, being so pernicious and “so odious” an institution, required “positive 
law” such as slave codes for establishment. In its absence, individual slaves’ status as 
such in slaveholding jurisdictions was unrecognizable in the British Isles. Somerset, in 
effect, barred slavery in England and freed slaves if brought there from the slaveholding 
colonies.4 
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Searching for a vulnerability to press their case, American abolitionists like 
Birney latched onto Lord Mansfield’s decision, arguing, first, that because it was decided 
before the American Revolution, it was binding common law in the former colonies. 
Second, taking liberty with the particulars of the case and successive rulings, they 
surmised that the lack of positive law supporting slavery in the North meant that slaves 
entering free states by choice or in service of their masters were immediately free. While 
beyond the scope of the 1772 decision and generally rejected by Northern state judges, 
antislavery lawyers as early as 1836, including Ohioan Salmon P. Chase, asserted this 
neo-Somerset doctrine in court to secure the freedom of fugitive slaves. In the wildly 
publicized case of Matilda Lawrence in Cincinnati, Ohio, Chase and Birney argued 
together that “slavery can have no existence beyond the territorial limits of the state 
which sanctions it….The moment a slave comes into [a free state] he acquires a legal 
right to freedom.” This reading of Somerset quickly became a cornerstone of antislavery 
politics as a legitimate method to attack the Slave Power. It was in turn combined with an 
argument that the founders had looked to the eventual containment and abolition of 
slavery in the framing of the Constitution, since they allowed the time-delayed banning of 
the African slave trade and went to such lengths to avoid the term itself.5 
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Combining the neo-Somerset and founder-centric arguments, Chase argued, “The 
Constitution found slavery and left it a State institution—the creature and dependent of 
State law—wholly local in its existence and character.” The Massachusetts Anti-Slavery 
Society, arguing for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, echoed Chase 
when it resolved, on a motion of Henry B. Stanton, that if “Congress has no right to 
meddle with slavery….It follows that that body had no right to accept of that which it 
could not constitutionally touch.” As far as the national government was concerned, 
Southern slaves were recognized as having the same basic rights and privileges as any 
Northerner or white Southerner, and thus the positive law argument was extended to 
federal property and territories. As a Senator, Chase later declared, 
 
The very moment a slaves passes beyond the jurisdiction of the state…he ceases 
to be a slave; not because any law or regulation of the state which he enters 
confers freedom upon him, but because he continues to be a man and leaves 
behind him the law of force, which made him a slave. 
 
In other words, abolitionists maintained that where established by positive law, slavery 
was repugnant but tolerated, and everywhere else was barred from existence. Birney, 
with Smith and Goodell, would later expand their reading of Somerset even further to 
argue that slavery was so unnatural and insidious that it could be nowhere legitimate, 
even when established by positive law, though this was a narrowly accepted position.6 
At the same time that antislavery lawyers were attacking the institution on legal 
grounds, by 1836 other abolitionists and reformers such as Samuel J. May in New York 
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and Elizur Wright in Massachusetts saw that politics could not be forsaken altogether. At 
the 1836 New England Anti-Slavery Convention, May declared it was the duty for all 
abolitionists to vote for Congressional candidates who supported the antislavery 
movement. The next year at the annual meeting of the American Anti-Slavery Society, 
still helmed by the apolitical Garrison, Wright and his sympathizers noted in the official 
report that since slavery and its problems “were politically created, and are politically 
sustained, they can only be politically broken….Political action there must be. Law must 
be brought back from its unnatural alliance with despotism, before freedom can be 
established.” The main fear among abolitionists continued to be that engaging in party 
politics would taint their righteousness, but also that choosing political sides could 
threaten the support of major party-supporting abolitionists.7 
Seeking a middle ground, in 1838 Joshua Leavitt encouraged the readers of his 
Emancipator to interrogate candidates on their beliefs on slavery and then cast votes for 
all candidates, irrespective of party, who supported or advocated abolitionist aims; he 
even provided tips on organizing interrogation groups, tactics for questioners, and sample 
questions. One set of such questions ranged from the abolition of the slave trade in the 
District of Columbia and barring slavery from the territories to refusing admission to any 
                                                
7 New England Anti-Slavery Convention, Proceedings of the New England Anti-Slavery 
Convention: Held in Boston, May 24, 25, 26, 1836 (Boston: Issac Knapp, 1836), 75; 
American Anti-Slavery Society, Fourth Annual Report of the American Anti-Slavery 
Society: with the Speeches Delivered at the Anniversary Meeting Held in the City of New 
York, on the 9th May, 1837: And the Minutes of the Meetings of the Society for Business 
(New York: American Anti-Slavery Society, 1837), 113-115; Bruce Laurie, Beyond 
Garrison: Antislavery and Social Reform (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 41; James Brewer Stewart, Abolitionist Politics and the Coming of the Civil War 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), 17; Richard H. Sewell, Ballots for 
Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States, 1837-1860 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), 45 
  101 
future slave states, three distinct points which would remain central to antislavery politics 
for decades to come as its denationalization policy. In Massachusetts, where a majority of 
votes was required for election, interrogation was successfully combined with vote 
scattering to prevent non-approved candidates from winning.8 
Garrison, while uneasy with encouraging his flock to vote for fear of usurping 
moral suasion as a viable tactic, acquiesced to the movement, though perhaps hoping it 
would fail so his flock would return. Among those abolitionists who looked towards 
increasing political action, however, there was a growing aversion to Garrison’s methods 
and beliefs. They feared that any antislavery political organization would be tainted by 
his outspoken image as a radical firebrand and instigator. Wright commented in 1837, 
“Garrison is doing more mischief than his neck is worth.” By the next year, Wright had 
decided that Garrison’s push for women’s equality as well as his religious zeal both 
merely turned the public off to the entire movement.9 
Pushing forward in spite of Boston editor’s reluctance, at the 1838 New England 
Anti-Slavery Society annual meeting New Yorker Alvan Stewart introduced and won 
unanimous assent on two resolutions proclaiming it the “solemn and imperative duty” of 
all abolitionists to vote for antislavery candidates. In reaction and drawing the indignation 
of the pro-engagement contingent, Garrison mustered the votes to see similar resolutions 
in the Massachusetts state society fail. In response, Wright and his allies officially 
severed their ties with the Boston radical and formed the Massachusetts Abolition Society 
to work independently towards their goals. While politically-minded abolitionists 
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continued to restrict themselves to questioning candidates and scattering votes when no 
approved candidates were running, Wright claimed they were becoming “feared as they 
never would have been had they remained in the quiescent land of abstractions.”10  
The progress Wright was so excited to see, however, was also driving a wedge 
further into the American Anti-Slavery Society. With a growing push for more concrete 
political action and increasing resistance from Garrisonian nonresistant stalwarts, in 1839 
the Society very publicly fractured. The breakaway faction, which included Alvan 
Stewart, Joshua Leavitt, and Elizur Wright—as well as a freshly converted Gerrit Smith 
in the first but not the last time he would shift away from pacifism—turned to what they 
termed “Bible politics” as a radical, yet engaged path to ending slavery.11 
In a meeting of worlds, the rise of this pro-politics movement and the eventual 
break in the national society occurred concurrently with two major catalyzing 
developments. First, militant black abolitionists’ were increasingly accepting the legacy 
of the Haitian Revolution as their own, justifying direct action and past violence. Second, 
abolitionists were confronted with vivid events forcing them to rethink their conceptions 
of Southern black docility and willingness to endure bondage. The confluence of these 
antislavery subcurrents created even more momentum for engagement, and as new 
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incidents pushed images of slaves willingly striking for their own freedom before 
Northern eyes, the two tracks built further upon each other. 
Just as the schism in abolitionism was reaching its zenith, the June 1839 mutiny 
aboard the Amistad proved to many that with or without outside encouragement, enslaved 
blacks were ready, willing, and able to fight for their freedom. As news of events aboard 
the Spanish-flagged slaver spread, it enflamed all sides of the abolitionist debate and gave 
a new sense of urgency to the movement. Believing that the American equivalent of and 
capstone to the Caribbean mythology they had adopted might be underway, militant 
radicals placed less focus on their rhetoric and redoubled their efforts and support for 
fugitives’ escapes. Other abolitionists entered the political and judicial fray, continuing to 
refine their arguments and furthering their beliefs that engagement was the right and 
proper course of action. In the deliberations that followed the cause célèbre, abolitionists 
romanticized the rebels as the latest heroic figures in a revolutionary antislavery 
mythology and pushed the abolition movement as whole in a new direction.12 
Transferred from a Portuguese slaver in Cuba and on a journey to an undisclosed 
market, the slaves, led by Joseph Cinqué, had managed to free themselves, kill most of 
the white crew, and take control of the ship. In an attempt to sail themselves back to their 
native Africa, however, the band of African slaves on board the Amistad ran aground in 
Long Island Sound where the United States Navy confiscated the ship and let local 
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authorities arrest the rebels on a litany of charges. As a long court battle ensued, 
abolitionists turned the saga of Cinqué and his followers into a public affair eventually 
reaching the United States Supreme Court with John Quincy Adams arguing on behalf of 
the Africans in front of the justices. In most of their speeches and writings, abolitionists 
stressed the mutiny as proof for the existence of black strength, leadership, and desire for 
freedom.13 
To abolitionists, the mutineers challenged both Southern slaveholders’ and many 
Northern whites’ foundational conceptions of blacks as docile and incapable of resistance 
without outside influence. Not surprisingly, American antislavery groups co-opted and 
publicized the affair within a week of the ship’s arrival in New London, Connecticut. It 
was abolitionists’ first major exposure to slave insurrection in nearly ten years, since Nat 
Turner’s failed revolt in Virginia, and one of the first which they could experience first-
hand; in this context, all abolitionists, not just the black militants, were not long in 
romanticizing Cinqué as a new Toussaint or a modern Othello.14 At the same time, 
however, the murders and mutiny aboard the ship forced pacifist abolitionists such as 
Lewis Tappan and Gerrit Smith to confront their abhorrence of violence. 
The revelation of Cinqué’s methods in his quest for freedom and return to Africa 
crystallized the burgeoning militancy and movement away from Garrisonian tactics for 
many abolitionists of the late 1830s. As these antislavery activists openly embraced 
slaves’ own rebellious initiative, they drew more followers away from Garrison’s cohort. 
                                                
13 There are many good works on the facts of the Amistad case. A good place to start is 
Howard Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad: The Saga of a Slave Revolt and Its Impact on 
American Abolition, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
 
14 Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad, 31, 42. 
  105 
Even for those as yet unwilling to abandon their alliances, the Amistad case proved that 
many abolitionists were willing to eschew theoretical nonresistance in support of Cinqué 
and his compatriots; though not condoning the active instigation of insurrection, they 
argued that revolts occurring “naturally” were acceptable, something unheard of just 
years earlier. Abolitionist William Jay declared that the deaths which had taken place 
during the mutiny were nothing more than “justifiable homicide,” because the slaves 
were fighting for “the recovery of personal liberty.” Others argued that the inherent 
violence of the slave system legitimized the use of force. These same equivocations over 
the Amistad were subsequently applied in other contexts, such as James McCune Smith’s 
justifications of violence and massacres in the Haitian Revolution.15 
The growing sentiments resulting from the Amistad affair, as well as the arrival of 
many more fugitive slaves escaping from the South without Northern provocation, sealed 
the finality of the breakup of the American Anti-Slavery Society. As news circulated, the 
nonresistant coalition hemorrhaged support, and when these events were combined with 
the growing political movement in abolitionist ranks, there was nothing Garrison could 
do to preserve the ideal of nonresistance for many forward-thinking reformers. When the 
first calls for political engagement had appeared in 1836 to the shock of Garrison, there 
was no way to foresee the twin storm of engagement and growing militancy that would 
erupt and energize the would-be politiques in the wake of the maritime incident. Within 
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half a decade of May’s first call for action, the numbers looking to politics swelled and a 
national antislavery party emerged. 
By the end of 1839, independent antislavery candidates began to appear in upstate 
New York and then in other states across the North. Eventually, more prominent 
antislavery leaders including Alvan Stewart, Myron Holley, Elizur Wright, and Joshua 
Leavitt saw the need for a more formal apparatus. On 13 and 14 November 1839, at the 
instigation of Holley, a meeting of 500 abolitionists in Warsaw, New York nominated 
Birney for the 1840 Presidential elections as an independent. With this concrete step, the 
push for political action reached a critical mass, as several of those who had wholly 
disavowed the idea just months before proclaimed approval for the action, including 
Gerrit Smith. With the success of the Warsaw meeting, Stewart, Holley, and Smith 
moved for a larger meeting the next spring in order to broaden their support. On 1 April 
1840 in Albany the most prominent men pushing for antislavery political action 
reaffirmed Birney’s nomination and assented to the creation of a third party—formally 
designated the Liberty Party in 1841 though delegates had been using that name since late 
1839.16 
In order to protect their novel organization from fracturing immediately, party 
founders developed the “one idea” platform, focusing only on the abolition of slavery 
rather than any other reform or traditional political issues. This doctrine ensured the party 
remained palatable in the short term to both sympathizing Whigs and Democrats, like 
Chase and his antislavery cadre in Ohio, by not offending them with the adoption of 
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positions on side issues partial to one or the other major party; at the same time, it 
prevented reformers like the increasingly doctrinaire Smith from taking the party down a 
path towards other reforms like women’s suffrage or prohibition which could marginalize 
it more than even antislavery. 
The Liberty men asserted they could turn the South’s dominance of federal 
power—the Slave Power—against them and use the Constitution for the antislavery 
cause rather than treat it as Garrison’s “contract with Hell.” To that end, they adopted 
Birney’s and Chase’s theory of positive law and Stewart’s developing constitutional ideas 
on the binding nature of the Declaration of Independence and the protections granted 
slaves under 5th Amendment due process. They further argued it was the right and duty of 
all free and righteous men to thwart the illegality of the government’s pro-slavery 
supporters at every turn, including aiding and protecting newly-arrived fugitives. Their 
ranks were also bolstered by former slaves who, having recently fled the brutality of the 
South, did not heed the merits of nonresistance and moral suasion as did the majority of 
white abolitionists. Even over the generation of fugitives before them, these new 
Northerners in the 1840s were more likely to defend their own freedom as well as that of 
their escaped colleagues with force, forming vigilance committees to watch for 
kidnappers and eventually the reach of the Fugitive Slave Act.17 
                                                
17 Dillon, Slavery Attacked, 206-208; McKivigan and Harrold, “Introduction,” 17; 
Harrold, The Abolitionists and the South, 7, 58, 60. Liberty Party supporters used the 
“Slave Power” metaphor as early as 1839, see Sewell, Ballots for Freedom, 102-103. For 
more on the reality of the theory, see Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: The Free 
North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 2000). 
 
  108 
With abolitionists moving towards engagement and action in response to the 
Amistad case, a second major shipboard mutiny further catalyzed the situation, creating 
additional momentum for both antislavery politics and militancy. In December 1841 
news reached American shores that a month earlier 135 slaves had commandeered the 
small coastal slaver Creole on its way from Virginia to Louisiana and sailed to the 
emancipated British Bahamas. The revolt was led by Madison Washington, a former 
slave and Canada-settled abolitionist recaptured trying to steal away his wife in the upper 
South. Despite the violent actions of Washington and his rebellious followers, British 
authorities freed and exonerated them for the murders that occurred during the 
insurrection. The Tyler administration demanded the British government reimburse the 
value of the lost property, but London simply pointed out that they had abolished slavery 
in their territories and their sovereignty would not be infringed upon. With its timing, the 
Creole mutiny—arguably the most successful slave insurrection in American history—
followed in the path of the Amistad by forcing nonresistants to confront slaves as self-
driven rebels rather than passive beings accepting their fates.18 
Spurred on by these two vivid examples of black rebelliousness and combined 
with the growing idealization of the Haitian Revolution, many Northern abolitionists, 
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especially the men of color among them, abandoned the image of slaves as a sleeping 
mass. A select few even turned to a renewed militancy with calls for more action within 
their movement. Some antislavery radicals emphasized the killing of whites onboard the 
Creole as the logical consequence of continued oppression of blacks in the South. Others 
emphasized the restraint shown by Washington in allowing several of the white crew to 
live, in order to show that slaves were not bloodthirsty monsters, but that, like Toussaint, 
they were capable of compassion and restraint even in the midst of violent rebellion.19 
The founders of the Liberty Party, in response to Madison Washington’s mutiny 
and looking in the past to the founding ideals of the nation rather than the Constitution, in 
December 1841 declared at their convention 
 
that the slaves of the brig Creole, who rose and took possession of said vessel, 
thereby regaining their natural rights and liberty, acted in accordance with the 
principles of the Declaration of Independence…and we trust that their noble 
example will be imitated by all in similar circumstances. 
 
Furthermore, the party paper, the Liberty Press, avowed, “It is our duty to encourage and 
aid slaves to rise and take their liberty; and if the master attempts to shoot or kill the slave 
for taking his liberty, that master must take the consequences of his folly; and if he loses 
his life, ‘he dies as a fool dieth.’” These statements, the first not only to justify violence 
but also encourage it, were openly derided and condemned by Lydia Maria Child and the 
executive committee of Garrison’s rump American Anti-Slavery Society.20 
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Overall, abolitionist rhetoric began to emphasize the universalism of blacks’ 
struggle for freedom and liberty. Joshua Leavitt declared, “Something besides modern 
abolitionism has a ‘tendency to excite discontent’ in the bosoms of enslaved men.” He 
continued, “It is THEIR MANHOOD, GOD-GIVEN, that stirs their pulses more rapidly 
at the thought of the wrongs the oppressor heaps upon them.” In a speech that would see 
him ejected from the House of Representatives only to be returned by his constituents 
anew, Ohio Congressman Joshua R. Giddings brazenly defied the gag rule and offered a 
series of resolutions based on the Creole incident in March 1842. Following what was by 
then a common antislavery meme, he argued that without the positive law required to 
sustain slavery, the rebels were free and beyond the reach of American authorities. He 
later asserted that it was natural for all men, free and enslaved, to seek freedom: “When 
one of the slave merchants attempted to reduce [the mutineers] to subjects, they laid him 
low in death…just as I would have done, and as any other man, who has the heart of a 
man, would have done.”21  
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In Smith’s hometown of Peterboro, New York, a meeting of 400 abolitionists 
debated Madison Washington’s actions and resolved,  
 
Whereas the insurgents on board the Creole, to save themselves and their children 
from the untold horrors of slavery, resorted to bloodshed; and whereas, out fathers 
did so rather than submit to the comparatively trifling grievance of unjust 
taxation.…Therefore, that it will be time enough for the South to charge guilt 
upon those insurgents, after she charged ten-thousand fold greater guilt on the 
heroes of the American Revolution.22 
 
The meeting thus declared that the mutineers were acting legitimately and perhaps more 
justifiably than the founding fathers; detractors could not impugn Madison Washington 
for his actions unless they were willing to impugn his namesake. Such calls to patriotism 
and protestations for the applicability of natural law to the enslaved forced many in the 
abolition movement that much closer to ending their nonresistant pledges as theoretical 
justifications began to look more practical and less like theory. 
Prominent free blacks like Frederick Douglass, Henry Highland Garnet, and 
William Wells Brown also struggled to find a middle ground between their professed 
pacifism and the new realities of slave insurrection. Exposed to the threats of slavery on 
many levels that whites would never understand, black abolitionists had always presumed 
the defense of black humanity demanded more action than moral suasion and 
nonresistance could ever permit. As the continual discussions in the abstract for the 
permissibility of slave revolts took place, the more radical abolitionists reconceptualized 
slave revolts in a romantic, literary, and heroic light; under this process, the “real” 
violence became secondary. In the same way the violence of the Haitian Revolution 
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became rejuvenated in the minds of militant abolitionists, the Amistad and Creole 
mutinies forced many abolitionists to see the necessity and permissibility of antislavery 
violence in a more local context rather than as decades-past events half a world away. In 
Philadelphia, for example, the images of self-reliance and resistance to oppression that 
the mutinies represented enchanted prominent and relatively conservative free blacks to 
hang portraits of Cinqué in their home and celebrate Washington’s exploits.23 
The sense of urgency that prompted the creation of the Liberty Party was 
heightened again in 1842 when the United States Supreme Court released its decision in 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania. The opinion opened the way for bounty hunters to recapture 
fugitive slaves privately, while at the same time removing Northern state officials from 
federal pressure to enforce the generally ineffective 1793 Fugitive Slave Law. As their 
personal freedom and safety came under this new threat, Northern blacks recognized the 
necessity of resistance in a world of decreasing protections. Although the case and its 
backlash among antislavery militants signaled an increasingly prominent color line 
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between abolitionists, the Liberty Party and an increasingly vocal section of its members 
including Gerrit Smith and William Goodell were among the few white Northerners 
supporting such militancy, active resistance, and sometimes violent self-defense. Their 
acceptance of violent measures to protect fugitives and, following soon thereafter, to end 
slavery, coincided with the development of a belief that the sin of slavery must be 
violently purged in order that a new sin-free era of virtue could emerge.24 
By 1843, many Northern free men of color saw the support that the Liberty Party 
was willing to extend to them and the National Convention of Colored Citizens in 
Buffalo that year declared “That it is the duty of every lover of liberty to vote the Liberty 
ticket so long as they are consistent to their principles.” A second motion challenged 
Garrison’s characterization of a eternally corrupt federal power, resolving, “That we 
believe that it is possible for human governments to be righteous as it is for human beings 
to be righteous, and that God-fearing men can make the government of our country well 
pleasing in His sight, and that slavery can be abolished by its instrumentality.” As 
progress was thus being made on the political front, the more radical fringe of the militant 
movement started to take initiative on their own to begin the end of slavery.25 
As early as 1841, reports appeared of men, radicalized by the growing militancy 
within the antislavery movement, crossing into the South or sailing into Southern ports 
and enticing slaves to escape with them. In 1844 in Baltimore, Maryland, radical Liberty 
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Party reporter Charles T. Torrey was arrested and imprisoned for manstealing after trying 
to help the families of Northern fugitives escape. He then attempted an ill-fated escape 
from own his confinement with the aid of armed associates, and in his more strict 
detention contracted and died of tuberculosis. In a similar incident in 1848 in 
Washington, D.C., another Liberty Party correspondent, William L. Chaplin, hired the 
schooner Pearl to transport some seventy-seven slaves into the North. With men tightly 
packed below deck, the ship set out only to be overtaken by a steamer. The owners, who 
had “deep abolitionist sympathies,” were arrested and jailed on fines totaling a massive 
$20,000. The Pearl case became a new cause celebré amongst abolitionists like Henry 
Highland Garnet who decried Southern savagery at the sentence. Chaplin, though 
suspected, was never charged and remained in the capital to plot more dashing escapes.26 
The one man who epitomized this movement towards action, and specifically 
violent confrontation, was John Brown. Beginning his antislavery career by running 
rescue raids into the South to steal blacks from bondage, Brown set himself apart from 
his predecessors and contemporaries by emphasizing personal bravery, armed raids, and 
the recruitment of a personal antislavery militia. Like Gerrit Smith, when personal and 
financial tragedy struck him in the late 1830s, he looked to the creation of a perfect world 
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as a solution to his own problems, and moved quickly from that idea to the perfection of 
the union through the destruction of slavery. Brown’s adventures against the chattel 
institution and his “railroad business” were eventually supported, funded, and organized 
with the help of Smith’s small inner circle of Libertyites in upstate New York, attesting to 
that branch’s true radicalism within the antislavery movement.27 
The militants who did support Brown justified their backing by constructing a 
worldview where slavery, by its very brutality, removed itself from the bounds of civil 
society and the social compact, giving them the right to become savages in their tactics 
against it. In their rejection of proper society’s acceptance of slavery, these men found 
equality, hope, strength, and courage in the “Great Spirit” of nature and embraced 
righteous violence in order to regenerate society. By 1847, Brown had even begun 
suggesting a military-esq raid on the South, a “general rising among the slaves, and a 
general slaughter of the slave masters,” to get the process of regeneration started. The 
implicit connection drawn by future Radical Political Abolitionists like Smith and Brown 
between virtue and violent purgation was the beginning of a dramatic reemergence of 
revolutionary ideology premised on the imagined historical precedents of Haiti and slave 
rebellion. Eventually, even Frederick Douglass, a last holdout to Garrison’s movement, 
fled the Boston firebrand and saw the possibilities in Smith’s and Brown’s ideas.28 
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At the same time, however, the Liberty Party was struggling to find its footing 
and maintain balance with the one idea platform. Though Birney’s presidential candidacy 
in 1840 and 1844 had failed to achieve any concrete results, the efforts managed to draw 
support from many abolitionists who had remained skeptical since the party’s formation, 
including prominent abolitionists Lewis Tappan and William Jay. More lackluster results 
in 1846, despite a net increase in votes, as well as continued shunning by the major 
parties, only led to a growing discouragement with the current party formulation. Birney 
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himself said in 1846 that “if we fail to incorporate in to our party-creed, that which 
interests the majority…we shall only make such advances as will alarm the timid and 
discourage even the boldest among us.” When it appeared that some Whigs hoped to steal 
Liberty planks and absorb the party on their terms, many party men agreed it was time to 
evolve the organization, but there was little consensus in what direction.29 
Smith pushed for a fully reformist, radical agenda repugnant to the moderate 
majority, while Chase led the charge for positioning the party to amalgamate with 
whichever major national organization would accept the core Liberty tenets of federal 
divorce from slavery and nonextension. The national leadership, headed by Stewart and 
Leavitt, however, was unwilling to see the dilution of one idea at that time, rebuffing the 
advances of both the pragmatic antislavery men from the West and the uncompromising, 
doctrinaire attitudes of Smith and his collective in Peterboro. When Birney and 
Michigander Theodore Foster, editor of the Signal of Liberty, proposed a slew of new 
planks to fill out the platform, they were overwhelmed by the voices calling for the 
continuation of one idea.30 
On the other hand, Smith’s cohort in New York, ready to abandon the idea of 
amalgamation with and reform of one of the major parties, pushed in 1847 for its own 
expansion of the platform. At an unsanctioned party convention in Macedon Lock, New 
York in June, a group led by Smith, Wright, and Goodell declared slavery “illegal, 
unconstitutional, and anti-republican.” This was the first solo appearance of the 
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ideologues who would later form the Radical Political Abolition party, and whose 
doctrine would be founded upon the idea, as William Goodell phrased it in 1852, that 
“slavery is so evidently contrary to the paramount law of nature, to justice, to 
fundamental morality, and the law of God, that it never was, and never can be legalized; 
and that no legislature nor monarch possesses the power to make it legal.”31 
The conventionnels also deplored the shifting of position to gain votes, a policy 
which they believed the majority of the Liberty men were then attempting to pursue. 
Frederick Douglass, summing up the group’s worldview, argued in 1852, “It has been 
said that we ought to take the position to gain the greatest number of voters. Numbers 
should not be looked at so much as right. The man who is right is a majority.” Taking on 
an uncompromisingly reformist platform, they advocated the dissolution of monopolies, 
the military, and secret societies, as well as calling for land for the landless and free trade. 
They concluded their meeting by nominating Smith for president and declaring 
themselves the Liberty League to complete the secession from their former organization. 
It was the first of Smith’s independent political parties, but would not be the last by any 
means.32 
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By 1848, Smith, his upstate New Yorkers, and other like-minded radicals had 
completely washed their hands of the Liberty Party, and their continued radicalization 
only further alarmed the moderate political men trying to salvage antislavery politics 
from obscurity. This pragmatic faction of the party finally folded the rump Liberty banner 
and met with antislavery Democrats in Buffalo, New York, christening themselves the 
Free Soil Party. Though the movement faltered in the short term, this wing of the former 
Liberty Party would form the core of the Radical faction of the Republican Party. While 
more moderate than Smith and his followers, they became the radicals within their new 
party and would maintain the Liberty Party’s foundational ideology. Unlike the League, 
though, they were seasoned politicians and understood the necessity of compromise and 
political maneuver rather than zealous adherence to a platform that drove away nearly all 
potential supporters. Smith’s radicals, doctrinaire and comprehensive in the beliefs, 
offended the sensibilities of too many former Liberty men to be effective—the same 
reasons they had all separated from Garrison. Showing their immediate marginalization, 
in the 1848 elections the League took in a dismal tally even when compared to the 
minuscule one of Free Soil.33 
Smith and the Leaguers, rather than retreat in the face of the Liberty split and 
electoral defeat, took a temporary break from politics to regroup and focus more intently 
on ending slavery through direct means. Instead of withering away in the absence of their 
larger party network, they were bolstered in their beliefs and support for virtuous action 
by news from Europe. In the early spring of 1848, revolutionaries from Paris to Prague 
had imposed progressive governments, emancipated slaves and serfs, and enshrined civil 
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and political rights in constitutions. As word of the revolutions reached the United States, 
it provided fuel to the abolitionist fire; many saw the movements of European peoples to 
regain their liberties from oppressive monarchies as parallel to their struggle against 
slavery. One Ohio convention declared, 
 
Never was there a time—never a period, when action on the part of American 
Colored Freemen, was as loudly called for as the present.…The world is in 
commotion—subjects are shaking down kingdoms, and asserting their rights as 
citizens—the right of self-government. Serfs are, with manly bearing, repelling 
the daring tyranny of their assumptive lordlings; and bondmen—yea, slaves, in 
the colonies of the Antillas, have risen up in the majesty of manhood, dashed into 
fragments the fragile remnants of that most foul, man-debasing and heaven-daring 
scourge and curse of the human family—slavery. 
 
As praise for the forty-eighters and their actions against despotism increased, so too did 
the militant rhetoric linking their causes to slavery and urging abolitionists as well as 
slaves to rise to arms.34 
Inspired by the springtime of the peoples in Europe, William Wells Brown 
asserted that a modern Hannibal or Moses would soon arise to lead his people out of 
bondage, the way European liberals and radicals had arisen from the people to strike 
down tyranny. Abolitionist Theodore Parker, in a speech to the American Anti-Slavery 
Society, praised the abolition of slavery and embrace of human brotherhood by the new 
French Republic. George Luther Stearns, a future member of the “secret six” who would 
fund John Brown’s 1859 raid, even hosted and funded Hungarian revolutionary leader 
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Lajos Kossuth’s American tour, a trek praised by James McCune Smith and other radical 
abolitionists.35 
As the images of 1848 became commonplace within the radical antislavery 
movement, some abolitionists latched onto the rhetoric as a vehicle for accepting violent 
means. Frederick Douglass asserted that in 1848, “a shout went up to heaven from 
countless thousands, echoing back to earth, ‘Liberty—Equality—Fraternity.’” The recent 
convert from Garrison did not deny that blood would be shed: “in demolishing the old 
frame-work of the Bastile of civil tyranny, and erecting on its ruins the beautiful temple 
of freedom, some lives may indeed be lost.” For Douglass, the end of slavery would 
greatly outweigh the consequences: “who so craven, when beholding the noble 
structure—its grand proportions, its magnificent domes, its splendid towers and its 
elegant turrets, all pointing upward to heaven, as to say, That glorious temple ought never 
to have been built.” The same way militant abolitionists justified and implicitly condoned 
the virtuous violence of the Haitian Revolution through praise of its ends, Douglass 
argued that violence in erecting a new era of liberty and perfected morality was equally 
permissible. For the future Radical Political Abolitionist, the forty-eighters were only the 
first wave of a worldwide liberation movement; soon “the grand conflict of the angel 
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Liberty with the monster Slavery” would erupt, and freedom would triumph as quickly as 
the kings of Europe fell to their subjects in the March Days. Once Northerners stopped 
criticizing stifled slave rebellions as foolhardy, and united against the power of the 
peculiar institution, all the “Madison Washingtons and Nathaniel Turners in the 
South…would assert their rights to liberty.”36  
 
Politics Not as Usual 
Radical Abolitionism and the Abandonment of Politics 
 
As the 1840s came to a close, many antislavery leaders had accepted justifications 
for direct action against slavery and the more radical among them were ready to accept 
violence. By 1850, the passage of a new Fugitive Slave Act requiring Northern citizens to 
participate in recaptures as well as eliminating judicial recourses like personal freedom 
and anti-kidnapping statues ignited new antislavery fervor throughout the North. Gerrit 
Smith, Frederick Douglass, William Goodell, and other Liberty Leaguers—retaking the 
defunct Liberty Party title in 1850—already a revolutionary vanguard and considered 
extremely radical by most other abolitionists, struck out anew against the Slave Power. 
They funded and organized a growing number of slave rescues, and rapidly progressed to 
a general acceptance of revolutionary tactics. Over the course of the 1850s, as the politics 
of Washington drove antislavery men of all colors to what would grow into the 
Republican fold, more abolitionist men of color left the nonresistance movement—which 
was itself becoming more militant—and joined Smith’s cohort in their efforts. A 
convention of Northern fugitives at Cazenovia, New York endorsed a letter from black 
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Liberty member Jermain Wesley Loguen promising slaves that if they made the first 
move, “the great mass of the colored men of the North…will be found by your 
side…with death-dealing weapons in their hands.”37  
As a few Northerners followed John Brown’s lead into the South to facilitate and 
lead slaves’ escapes, it represented a clear shift in morals, beliefs, and tactics. One 
notable participant of these raids and underground escape network was escaped slave 
Harriet Tubman, whom Brown would later call “General” Tubman for her efforts to lead 
men and women out of southern bondage. When caught and imprisoned, these activists 
wrote memoirs publicizing their virtuous and selfless aid to the poor and downtrodden. 
They became antislavery folk heroes, a connection Brown clearly understood: 
 
Nothing so charms the American people as personal bravery. Witness the case of 
Cinques, of everlasting memory, on board the “Amistad.” The trial for life of one 
bold and to some extent successful man, for defending his rights in good earnest, 
would arouse more sympathy throughout the nation than the accumulated 
sufferings of more than three millions of our submissive colored populations.  
 
The man who took inspiration for his insurrectionary plans from histories of the Haitian 
Revolution grasped that the same heroic embodiment that embraced Toussaint 
Louverture, would just as easily embrace those Northern antislavery militants willing to 
strike a blow to slavery.38 
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Brown and Smith did not have to look far for volunteers who shared their radical 
worldview. Abolitionist reporter James Redpath, after traveling through the South and 
secretly interviewing slaves, summed up the growing feelings of many like him in the 
abolition movement: “I am a peace man—and something more. I would fight and kill for 
the sake of peace.…I am a Non-Resistant—and something more. I would slay every man 
who attempted to resist the liberation of the slave.” Like Brown, Redpath felt “a little 
wholesome slaughter” was the best way to shock the people of the North to the side of 
the slaves.39 Frederick Douglass, seeing the benefit of violence in combination with a 
political aim, declared in 1852 that the “only way to make the Fugitive Slave Law a dead 
letter is to make half a dozen or more dead kidnappers.”40 
William Wells Brown also saw the tide turning against slavery, asking 
rhetorically, “who knows but that a Toussaint, a Christophe, a Rigaud, a Clervaux, and a 
Dessalines, may someday appear in the Southern States of this Union.” He declared that 
when that day arrived, 
 
the indignation of the slaves of the south would kindle a fire so hot that it would 
melt their chains, drop by drop, until not a single link would remain; and the 
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revolution that was commenced in 1776 would then be finished, and the glorious 
sentiments of the Declaration of Independence…would be realized. 
 
He concluded, “the day is not far distant when the revolution of St. Domingo will be 
reenacted in South Carolina and Louisiana.” These statements defined the new militant 
immediatism. These radicals sought not only to free the slaves, but to undo the injustices 
left behind by their forefathers at the end of the American Revolution; they hoped to see 
the universal ideal of liberty and equality, proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence 
and witnessed in Haiti, become reality.41 
While the conversions of pacifist abolitionists to militancy continued unabated 
throughout the 1850s, ideological impetus remained with Gerrit Smith and his upstate 
New York American Jacobins. His circle had been there when antislavery political action 
had begun in 1840, and despite the breakdown of the Liberty Party coalition, his cohort 
retained the initiative and remained the guardians of political abolitionist orthodoxy. 
When coupled with their extrapolitical activities supporting men like John Brown, 
Smith’s political worldview coalesced into something never before seen in American 
politics—a truly radical ideology that went against the foundational ideas of the state as a 
whole. In their doctrinaire beliefs, however, the membership of what would become the 
Radical Political Abolition Party were destined to remain on the political fringe in the 
face of the mounting Republican antislavery juggernaut. Though marginalized, Radical 
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Abolitionists did maintain contacts with future Radical Republicans and their legal and 
ideological doctrines would continue to inform the core of Republican Party free labor 
ideology.42 
By the time of the 1855 Radical Political Abolition Party convention, the 
antislavery radicalism of Smith and his followers had coalesced into a complete, ruthless, 
and logical socio-political ideology. As the beneficiaries of the long chain of transference 
from their French precursors, these neo-Jacobins bared the key hallmarks of 
Robespierre’s ideological doctrine in an Americanized reinterpretation. Beginning with 
the tenet that the Republican Free Soil platform was too weak a position and thereby 
threatened the righteousness of the nation, they asserted that the South’s stranglehold on 
national power had usurped the federal government, making it null and void. In response, 
they vowed to regenerate the Union with virtue, righteousness, and revolutionary justice 
in order to purge the country of its national sin.43 
This foundation alone was more radical than anything else at the time in the 
antislavery movement, and is comparable to the social radicalism of Robespierre’s 
Republic of Virtue during height of Jacobin rule in the French Revolution. On a 
theoretical level, French Jacobinism and Radical Abolitionism were two slightly different 
takes on the same extremist discourse. The greatest difference was that Jacobins reigned 
supreme during the most radical phase of the French Republic, while Radical Political 
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Abolitionists remained voices of righteousness outside of government. Though several of 
the Americans’ ideas—specifically some of their legal theories granting the executive 
and Congress the power to destroy slavery in the southern states—would eventually be 
taken up by a majority of Republicans in Congress at the height of the Civil War, in the 
mid-1850s they remained an extragovernmental force, eventually disbanding their party 
once again and issuing denunciations against the lack of righteous progress. They struck 
an extreme position, and then watched as within ten years the Union embraced much of 
it, including nearly their entire constitutional doctrine, and Radical Republicans like 
Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner both struggled to implement other parts to their 
last days.44 
Though the Radical Abolition Party was not consciously emulating Jacobin 
France, the ideologies of the two groups can be seen as analogs. Moreover, while most 
abolitionists, including Smith’s cohort, denigrated the violence of the French Revolution, 
they depicted the Haitian Revolution and its patriots in a positive light and justified the 
very violent actions. Thus, the Saint Domingue rebellion acted as the common 
ideological point of reference between French and American radicals. It’s racial struggle 
infused the French concepts of liberté, égalité, and fraternité with a universalism of 
which the men of Paris had not originally intended, but later professed as their own. The 
American militants had taken the events of the Caribbean revolution out of context as 
their own historical legacy and with it the universalist ideology which had formed there. 
With this inheritance and an infusion of homegrown elements like religious 
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millenarianism and an emphasis on militant abolitionism as well as more religiously-
tinged language—in the same way that slaves in Haiti claimed their freedom came from 
the French king—the Radical Abolitionists Americanized Robespierre’s Jacobinism into 
something that fit them and their fight against slavery, infusing it with elements from 
across the abolition movement of the last thirty years.45 
Much like the Jacobins, Smith and his Radical Abolitionists upheld justice, 
liberty, equality, and both personal as well as civic virtue as the highest ideals of man; 
they demanded the preservation of a sacrosanct nation as one and indivisible; they urged 
their followers to action in order to prove themselves worthy, righteous, and free of sin; 
they held the position of moral authority, pressuring the government, from within and 
without, to pursue the course their ideologies commanded; they defined their world in a 
continual state of war and revolution that required constant vigilance and action in order 
for the Republic to survive; finally, they turned to revolutionary violence in order to 
purify the government, the nation, and themselves. 
Emerging as it did from evangelical Christianity, the abolition movement as a 
whole was infused with protestant spiritualism. Radical Abolitionism, however, was a 
combination of non-denominational, “higher power” spiritualism from the ranks around 
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Smith and militant millenarianism drawn into the fold of its black activists. Smith’s 
Bible-inspired politics eventually developed into a belief in higher law doctrine that was 
less Christian-specific and more natural law spiritualist, very similar to Robespierre’s 
conception of a Supreme Being. At the same time, this structure was combined with 
militant invocations of God’s coming wrath and vengeance against those who refused to 
purify themselves of slavery and sin. The Radical Political Abolition Party thus sought to 
be the herald of the coming storm and vanguard of the revolution, preaching a nominally-
Christian higher law spiritualism with the threat of eternal destruction and apocalypse for 
the unbelievers.46 
Like the Jacobins, then, Radical Abolitionists, though more unambiguously 
Christian, merged the ideas of a spiritual savior and expulsion of the unworthy. They 
were unyielding in their “sink or swim, survive or perish” morality—a holdover no doubt 
from their early association with William Lloyd Garrison. They refused outright to 
compromise with the “pollution and crime” of slavery, declaring,  
 
We yield not one inch for the moment, nor in any conditions, to the control of the 
demon over any portion of our country, or over a single human being over whom 
floats our national flag. We are Americans knowing no North and no South, no 
slaves and no slave States. We are not only Americans, but men, and demand that, 
irrespective of race or complexion, all men shall be free.…[Furthermore,] our 
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political activities must meet the demands of our convictions. We can consent to 
nothing less. 
 
They deemed compromise “serpentine,” “slimy,” “demoralizing,” and “deceptive.” Either 
the people would destroy slavery along with all impurity or the Republic would destroy 
itself. In July 1856, Radical Abolitionist Frederick Douglass declared, “Liberty must 
either cut the throat of Slavery, or have its own cut by Slavery.” This Manichean outlook 
is one of the main reasons that the Western Liberty men split; they understood that it 
completely rejected the political system.47 
The strict black and white worldview on the fight against slaveholders, however, 
was only one battle in the virtuous recreation of American society. Only after they 
demolished slavery and devoured racism could the nation be pure, virtuous, and 
righteous. Radicals Political Abolitionists went beyond rhetoric and demanded that they 
themselves actively create equality in the minds of men. They asserted 
 
that, as Abolitionists, it is our duty to practice in our lives, what we profess with 
our lips; and therefore, we will, by our example, prove the vincibility of that 
prejudice against color, which, in this country, drives the colored man from the 
workshop, the counting-room, and the polls, making him a hissing and a by-word, 
a miserable outcast, the off-scouring of the earth. 
 
They rejected paternalism outright and saw Northern blacks and Southern slaves as true 
brothers who were equal to whites in every way. They could not bear each moment in 
which they had not acted to excise the sins of slavery or racism from the nation.48 
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While other antislavery agitators urged Northern secession in order to create a 
paradise of freedom outside the purview of the proslavery Constitution, a document 
Garrison termed a “contract with hell,” Radical Abolitionists repudiated disunionism, 
strongly believing in the wholeness and sacredness of a Union which predated even the 
Constitution. They argued that Northern secession as argued by Garrison as well as the 
non-extension policy followed by Free Soilists were only methods of putting slavery out 
of sight and out of mind instead of atoning for and purging the sin. Like Jacobins, they 
put unity in Manichean terms: union, North and South, or nothing. They believed that in 
the right hands—theirs and their compatriots—the Constitution and the Declaration of 
Independence, which they deemed its lawful predecessor, were more than enough to 
guarantee equality and freedom for all. 
They defined the nation as “holy ground; the ground of the true and of the right.” 
Anything less than the total destruction of slavery and absolute freedom everywhere 
within the nation’s borders would be, in their Bible-infused political minds “impious and 
offensive to a just God.” Slavery had been “sustained by the nation” and as “a national 
sin…nothing short of a national prohibition and suppression of it [would]…redeem 
[their] national character.” The party saw the Union as a heaven on earth that was 
unbreakable and eternal, and they would advocate almost anything in order to usher in 
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Christ’s advent and take their nation out from under the iron boot of slavery into a new 
utopia of peace and prosperity.49 
Moreover, like Robespierre and the French Revolutionary radicals, Radical 
Political Abolitionists believed that the righteousness and morality of civil government 
rested with “the people,” an imagined well of virtue and equality. But the people had to 
act: “While we believe in moral suasion, as persuading to efficient action, we also insist 
that, without such action, it loses its value.” In other words, if the federal government 
would not act against slavery, it was their duty, as representatives of the righteous and 
virtuous people, to take up the cause and purge the land, and themselves, with blood.50 
Their logic was simple. They defined slavery as an “unsurpassed crime,” and 
slaveholding as “the annihilation of human rights,” arguing that a just government would 
suppress the former and protect the latter. Therefore, they did “accordingly declare and 
maintain that there can be no legitimate civil government, rightfully claiming support and 
allegiance as such…that is not morally and politically bound to prohibit and suppress 
slaveholding.” Any government that failed to act was “incompetent,” led by “unrighteous 
intentions,” and “should be known, not as civil government, but only as a conspiracy, a 
usurpation.” If the slaveholders who controlled the national government, framed fittingly 
as the “Slave Power” conspiracy originally developed by Liberty men but mostly pushed 
by Salmon P. Chase for the Free Soil party, used its power to the benefit of slavery, it 
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became “the duty of honest men who may succeed them…to defeat such dishonest 
purposes and intentions.”51  
If the virtuous and righteous could reclaim federal power, Radical Abolitionists 
maintained that the government was fully empowered to intervene against Southern 
slavery rather than the mere divorce policy of the Republican Party. To that end, they 
developed and invoked a complex legal and moralistic argument. First, they accepted 
unquestioningly Alvan Stewart’s 5th Amendment due process arguments that since no 
federal court had passed judgment upon each and every slave, none of the millions held 
in bondage were actually enslaved. They also supported Stewart’s correlative arguments 
on the guarantee clause and republican government—that no government could be 
republican that allowed slavery and thus the guarantee allowed federal action against 
slavery. Second, they believed in the supremacy of natural law over those of man, 
specifically, that slavery so shocked the conscience, that no legal body on Earth could 
legalize it even with positive law. Finally, while promoting and taking parts of these ideas 
and other constitutional arguments developed by Stewart, they turned to a novel 
conception of the war power as the ultimate solution. 
First suggested in 1820 and developed completely in 1836 by John Quincy 
Adams, the war powers argument was placed center stage since Radical Abolitionists 
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assumed war was inevitable. The lifelong statesman, looking to stir dissension reacted to 
a Southern claim that the federal government could never, under any circumstances, 
interfere with slavery. He counterargued on the floor of the House on 25 May 1836 that if 
the South ever attempted rebellion, the Constitution’s war powers placed the laws of the 
state on hold and enacted the recognized laws of war. One of these was emancipation in 
order to accomplish the defeat of the enemy. He declared, “From the instant that [the] 
slaveholding States become the theater of war, civil, servile, or foreign, from that instant, 
the war powers of Congress extend to interference with the institution of slaver in every 
way by which it can be interfered with.” In other words, in time of war or rebellion, 
constitutional law ends and the laws of war and nations begin. These included the legal 
right to end slavery in order to disrupt the enemy’s social, military, and political systems 
as had occurred during both the American and Haitian Revolutions.52 
The Radical Abolitionists, however, diverged from Adams. They believed that 
“slavery is so evidently contrary to the paramount law of nature, to justice, to 
fundamental morality, and the law of God, that it never was, and never can be legalized; 
and that no legislature nor monarch possesses the power to make it legal.” And, since 
slavery exists anyway it is “an outrage on the slaves” who become “enemies to the nation 
that permits it.” In an open letter to slaves, Frederick Douglass advised them, “You are 
prisoners of war, in an enemy's countryof a war, too, that is unrivalled for its injustice, 
cruelty, meanness:and therefore, by all the rules of war, you have the fullest liberty to 
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plunder, burn, and kill, as you may have occasion to do to promote your escape.” 
Therefore, “until slavery is abolished, [the nation is] continually exposed to a state of 
war,” in the same way Robespierre maintained that a state of revolution existed until the 
unvirtuous were converted or eliminated. Since the government refused to act, the 
Radical Abolitionists saw it as their solemn and holy duty to act in its place and outside 
of its precepts. In other words, they claimed a legal right to act illegally.53 
At first, the party urged its members and the rest of society to sway the federal 
government to their side at the ballot box, but they feared that the Slave Power had 
already taken such a hold of Washington that the time for peaceful measures had come 
and gone. As the 1856 presidential nominee for the party, Gerrit Smith proclaimed, 
 
There was a time when slavery could have been ended by political action. But that 
time has gone byand, as I apprehend, forever. There was not virtue enough in 
the American people to bring slavery to a bloodless termination; and all that 
remains for them is to bring it to a bloody one. 
 
The pressure from the South had left room for only a few options: enslavement of the 
North, dissolution of the Union, abolition, or revolution. Radical Abolitionists chose 
revolution as the only recourse because they believed only revolutionary justice could 
end slavery in world where politics appeared to have failed completely. Smith and his 
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followers, from that time on, were only playing at politics as legitimate cover for 
spreading their revolutionary worldview.54 
At their nominating convention in May 1856, party member James C. Jackson 
declared that the true position of the North “is one of revolution…[and] that this 
revolution never stops until American Slavery is abolished.” He continued, “When 
Constitutions are violated for the purpose of throwing out of sight the rights of the 
people, the people will throw Constitutions out of sight, and bring the people into view.” 
Smith’s nomination address echoed these sentiments, proclaiming that whenever a 
government “proves itself to be incurably perverted to the infliction of unendurable 
wrongs, the whole human brotherhood is to be held finally responsible for its overthrow.” 
Smith and his compatriots very well understood that they were declaring a revolution 
which went well beyond the political sphere of the 1776 revolution. They were taking 
aim at the hearts and minds of men, a goal the likes of which had not been attempted 
since the Republic of Virtue crashed down around Robespierre in 1794.55 
Bolstered by their new revolutionary mentality, Radicals lost no time acting, 
arguing that the virtuous and righteous must strike immediately. In the struggle for 
Kansas Territory’s freedom from slavery, they urged members to send money, guns, and 
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even themselves to stop the influx of border ruffians swarming in from Missouri to 
illegally vote to for pro-slavery statehood. In July 1855, many Radical Abolitionists 
“responded in earnest” with sympathy when John Brown appealed to the group’s meeting 
for support in the defense of the embattled territory. At a Kansas Aid Convention in 
Buffalo, NY in July 1856, militant abolitionists resolved that “armed men must be sent to 
Kansas to conquer the armed men who come against her, and that justification for 
sending them is to be found in the refusal of the government to do it.” In acting thus, 
however, they realized they were not only attacking slaveholders, but also the 
government itself, which was “the great instigator and upholder of the oppression” in the 
western lands. Above all, in their pursuit for a virtuous utopia, Radical Abolitionists, like 
the Jacobins before them, looked to “righteous violence” in order to purge society of its 
sins themselves.56 
Kansas marked only the beginning of Radical Political Abolitionists’ 
abandonment of politics and emphasis of a direct fight against slavery. They refused to 
accept marginalization in the face of the rising Republican Party, which Gerrit Smith 
accused of having a bastard philosophy at best but which also continued to slog through 
the dearth of the American political system—and was ultimately successful in that 
endeavor. In his extreme ideological orthodoxy, Smith became convinced that the 
legislature was unwilling to act against slavery, and so he must lead “the people” out of 
sin. In other words, because Congress dawdled, it was an illegitimate institution and it 
was left to the righteous representatives of the people to act in their place. 
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To Smith and his followers, antislavery violence was no longer illegal; rather, the 
federal government was illegal and his militant strikes against slavery were the only 
lawful actions to be found; he was defining his world with the same legalized illegality 
which the Jacobins used to justify the Terror. With the support of many notable activists 
counted amongst their ranks, such as Frederick Douglass, James McCune Smith, Lewis 
Tappan, William Goodell, and John Brown, the Radicals were able to begin acting upon 
their ideology of virtuous violence and national renewal to purge the sin of slavery. By 
the end of the year, the Radical Abolition party disbanded and in its place created the 
American Abolition Society as an apolitical front from which to denounce slavery and 
carry out their revolution.57 
The first real opportunity to expand their endeavors beyond Brown’s “railroad 
business,” his small-scale freedom raids into the South, was the Kansas civil war that 
broke out in 1856. While the support network developed for Brown’s slave rescue raids 
in Missouri had brought Smith and his troupe hand in hand with “savage” and violent 
means, they proved only to be prequels and practice for the events in Kansas which 
would require a much larger and more public network of support and arms to successfully 
beat back Southerners invading the free territory. At the Radical Abolitionist convention 
Douglass, Smith, and McCune Smith had all urged violent action to stop slavery in 
Kansas, and Brown took their support and headed out to fight after making pleas for aid. 
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The raider would occasionally travel back east on fundraising trips, one of which in 1857 
netted $7,000 and 200 rifles for his latest cause.58 
In Kansas Brown established himself as a man who would willingly shed the 
blood of the United States in order to purify it. He and his sons recruited men to fight 
proslavery incursions. In retaliation for the May 1856 pro-slavery sacking of Lawrence, 
Brown and his sons brutally murdered five proslavery settlers at Pottawatamie Creek by 
splitting their heads open with broadswords. While he hoped the “radical retaliatory 
measure” would create “a restraining fear” amongst the Missourians, it only sparked a 
new escalation in the violence. When the first sketchy details of “Bleeding Kansas” 
reached the Northeast, many abolitionists and even some of his backers came to see 
Brown as more savage than the indians he was trying to imitate; yet, not knowing the full 
extent of his actions, they continued to support him as the fighting intensified into a full 
scale guerilla war with numerous skirmishes on either side into the fall of 1856. His 
deeds did, however, help the North to come to grips with what was happening in Kansas 
and focus on the problem of slavery.59 
As he had hoped, Brown and his Radical Political Abolitionist backers were not 
the only ones effected by this turmoil; the territorial wars heightened the tensions 
throughout the antislavery movement, even amongst avowed pacifists. Charles B. 
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Stearns, a settler and reporter for the Liberator and National Anti-Slavery Standard, had 
moved to Kansas a devout nonresistant. Yet, after having his claim jumped by 
Missourians, being robbed and beaten, and witnessing ten straight days of open war, he 
embraced violence. In December 1855, he wrote, “When I came to Kansas, little did I 
dream of ever becoming a soldier, but stern fate has driven me into the ranks of the Non-
Resistant corps de reserve, who are to fight at the last extremity.” Stearns came to see the 
border ruffians as less than human, therefore absolving himself of the sin of killing as 
many of them as he could find: 
 
I always believed it was right to kill a tiger, and our invaders are nothing but 
tigers.…These Missourians are not men.…After hearing the screams of the wife 
and mother of the murdered Barber, and witnessing his lifeless form locked in the 
cold embrace of death, for no other crime than because he was a Free State man, I 
made up my mind that our invaders were wild beasts, and it was my duty to aid in 
killing them off. When I live with men made in God’s image, I will never shoot 
them; but these pro-slavery Missourians are demons from the bottomless pit and 
may be shot with impunity. 
 
Kansas also revolutionized nonresistant Henry Ward Beecher, who declared, “You might 
just as well read the Bible to buffaloes.” He preached not passive Christianity, but instead 
the “moral agency” of Sharp’s rifles, soon to be known as “Beecher’s Bibles.”60  
The ranks of Radical Political Abolitionism grew stronger as the revolutionary 
alternative not only to Republicanism, but also to nonresistants who preached pacifism at 
any cost. Smith and Brown felt their cause was moral and just, and so they were 
determined to provoke a fight which God could only allow them to win. As their numbers 
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swelled, so too did the presence of American Jacobinism in the antislavery movement. In 
response to these events, James Redpath declared, “The Second American Revolution has 
begun. Kansas was its Lexington.…The South committed suicide when it compelled free 
squatters to resort to guerilla warfare.”61  
Giving their support to the idea of the coming wave of insurrections over the next 
year were a growing number of abolitionists. In 1858, nonresistant Theodore Parker 
warned, “Slavery must be put down politically, or else militarily. If not peacefully ended 
soon, it must be ended wrathfully by the sword. The negro won’t bear Slavery forever; if 
he would, the white man won’t.” In August of that same year, former Garrisonian Charles 
Remond declared that “If we recommend to the slaves of South Carolina to rise in 
rebellion, it would work greater things than we can imagine.” If such a course is 
followed, Remond suggested, then hopefully a man will rise up in the image of 
Toussaint: “If some Black Archimedes does not soon arise with his lever, there will 
spring up some Black William Wallace with his claymore, for the freedom of the black 
race.” That same year Lysander Spooner published a pamphlet encouraging the formation 
of “Leagues of Freedom” to provide military aid to slave rebellions. Like Gabriel Prosser 
before him, he hoped to separate the economically downtrodden petits blancs of the 
South from the planter class, before military forces entered the South from several points, 
gathering nonslaveholding whites as well as men of color to their standard. Also 
following the Radical Abolitionist lead, a convention of black Ohioans resolved that men 
of color were “absolved from all allegiance to a government which withdraws its 
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protection.” William Day, John Mercer Langston, and 1820s firebrand William Watkins 
jointly stated that it was “the right and duty of resistance by force of arms” by all black 
men in order to destroy slavery.62 
In taking up the calls for a debilitating strike against Southern slavery to start the 
coming storm, John Brown took his own advice on becoming an antislavery folk hero. 
His 1859 raid on the federal arsenal at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia marked the last step of 
radicalization of abolitionism as an extragovernmental movement; his struggle converted 
the whole antislavery movement to American Jacobinism, and, in a sense, his actions 
inaugurated the Civil War. Before the events of October 1859, James Redpath argued that 
the antislavery movement needed only a slight push to embrace war and end “the eternal 
hypocritical hubbub in Congress and the country.” According to the reporter, this general 
acceptance of antislavery violence could be best accomplished by recreating Kansas on a 
larger scale, by showing the North a little “civil and servile war.”63 This is exactly what 
Brown sought to deliver. 
In planning on and off for ten years, on the night of 16 October 1859, Brown and 
eighteen followers enacted what he considered ”BY FAR the most important undertaking 
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of my whole life.” Understanding that there was a very good chance of failure or even 
their own deaths, the small band took solace in the knowledge that their attempt might 
provoke a Southern response so harsh that Northerners took up the call to arms and 
marched on the South to purify it through fire. Thus confident in their very possible 
martyrdom, they descended upon Harper’s Ferry to capture the arsenal; after quickly 
securing the weapons and the buildings, the troupe seized a few prominent locals as 
hostages. The plan then called for the incitement of slaves in the region to their standard, 
amassing an army large enough to spark a general insurrection across Virginia. Placing 
grandiosity before common sense, however, Brown had chosen a location for his raid 
with few plantation slaves and failed to inform those who were in the area of the plan. 
When only a miniscule few heeded his call, locals were able to cut off the raiders’ escape 
and pin them down until the army arrived under the command of Robert E. Lee, who 
thoroughly routed Brown and his compatriots. The former Kansas fighter was taken alive, 
tried, and sentenced to hang for treason against Virginia.64 
Following the end of Brown’s debacle, a “Great Fear” of more insurrections 
swept across the South, and militant antislavery activists were forced to rebut 
condemnations of their rapidly shrinking group, as conservative abolitionists backed 
away from the controversy. Republicans, other non-immediatists, and Northern 
Democrats harshly criticized the raid, seeing it as the proof of the folly of abolitionism. 
Despite the cacophony of condemnation, those who remained faithful to Brown’s ideals 
were well placed to reconstruct his image as a martyred hero. While Brown sat in his 
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Virginia jail cell awaiting his sentence, these men created a mythic public image of 
Brown, transforming the memory of the raider from one of insanity into the terrestrial 
embodiment of abolitionism and a martyr for the cause. Henry Ward Beecher preached, 
“Let no man pray that Brown be spared. Let Virginia make him a martyr…a cord and a 
gibbet would redeem…Brown’s failure with a heroic success.” Brown, completely 
understanding the rewriting of his history, even aided in the molding of his own myth, 
asserting, “I am worth infinitely more to die than to live” and simply noted that Beecher’s 
sermon was “good.” With his willingness to be executed for his cause, his compatriots in 
the North would do the rest.65 
In his failure, his ideological backers elevated Brown to the level of an antislavery 
hero. The raid, in many ways doomed from the start as Frederick Douglass had feared 
when he first heard the plan twelve years earlier, became the symbolic end of peace and 
the opening of a new era. Wendell Phillips declared, “The lesson of the hour is 
insurrection.…Insurrection of thought always precedes the insurrection of arms.” 
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Abolitionists congealed around Brown’s memory, and like Toussaint Louverture before, 
praise of his actions led to a heroic embodiment that further legitimated political 
violence. Though the Radical Abolitionist cohort would not come to political power, like 
the Jacobin Club in Paris, they became the ever-watchful eye of the new administration 
of Abraham Lincoln and the impetus for the radicalization of the Republican Party as the 
war wore on, calling out those who stood in the way of a regeneration of society and 
giving freely of their ideas when needed.66 
James Redpath became a leader of the response in the Boston Atlas and Bee, and 
Osborne Perry Anderson and Charles Tidd, two raiders who had escaped successfully 
from Virginia soon joined his effort. Anderson spoke to Canadian crowds about the raid, 
and Tidd wrote a public letter to the New York Tribune in defense of Brown’s actions. 
Redpath, however, took the most proactive approach in his support of the martyred 
Brown; he understood that though the raid failed in its short-term goals, it would solidify 
and Jacobinize the entire antislavery movement: “Let cowards ridicule and denounce 
him; let snake-like journalists hiss at his holy failure—for, I do not hesitate to say that I 
love him, admire him, and defend him. GOD BLESS HIM!” His work to rejuvenate John 
Brown as his forbearers had done for Toussaint eventually became a biography of the 
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man and Echoes of Harper’s Ferry, a collection of articles and praise on the aftermath of 
the raid.67 
Other antislavery militants soon joined in the growing sacrilization and heroic 
embodiment of Brown. Henry C. Wright, a former Garrisonian who had become 
radicalized in the mid-1850s, declared in an open letter to the governor of Virginia that 
“the sin of the nation…is to be taken away, not by Christ, but by John Brown.…The 
nation is not to be saved by the blood of Christ…but by the blood of John Brown.” Long-
time Garrisonian Lydia Maria Child embraced Brown as a “saint” and a “hero” who had 
“done a noble deed.” In December 1860 in Boston, Frederick Douglass announced that 
he advocated ending slavery “the John Brown way.” Franklin Benjamin Sanborn, one of 
the secret six, also noted that though Brown failed, “his soul went marching on; and 
millions of his countrymen followed in his footsteps two years later” because of his 
actions. And, on 5 March 1860, the ninetieth anniversary of the Boston Massacre, 
abolitionist John S. Rock declared Brown the Crispus Attucks of the Second American 
Revolution.68 
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As time passed, the raid and its fallen leader also received international praise. 
Victor Hugo, who along with many other French revolutionary expatriates would present 
Brown’s widow with a honorific medal, wrote from exile that the chief raider “was an 
apostle and a hero; the gibbet has only increased his glory and made him a martyr.” He 
saw the man’s death as “an irrevocable mistake” that would “finally sunder the States.” It 
was “more shocking than Cain killing Abel,—it [was] Washington killing Spartacus.” 
Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Garibaldi placed the militant on a plane equal to the 
greatness of Jesus Christ, while at the same time, many of Brown’s associates saw in the 
raider a prematurely extinguished version of the Italian. Haitian president Fabre-Nicolas 
Geffrard ordered flags flown at half-mast for Brown on 20 January 1860, and across the 
small Caribbean nation, as many draped their homes in black, cities and towns held 
commemorative religious services. In Port au Prince, the black republic’s capital, over 
3,000 mourners, including the presidential family, crowded into the National Chapel for a 
high mass for the repose of Brown’s soul. As his image was mythologized, “John 
Brown’s Body” became the American “Marseillaise.”69  
 
* * * 
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In the months and years following Brown’s execution, Gerrit Smith and the 
ideologues of the American Abolition Society remained the vanguard of American 
Jacobinism, looking to purify the nation through violence in order to create a perfect 
Union. Though they continued to be overshadowed by the growing Republican Party, the 
group that had begun the 1840s by embracing the idea of dualistic political and direct 
resistance to slavery had within two decades accepted the necessity of revolutionary 
action. In doing so, these antislavery militants embarked on a course which would define 
one man as the epitome of their ideology, and at the same time provide a martyr around 
whom all abolitionists could gather. John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry may have 
failed, but as his quest to purge the nation of sin through blood ended in his execution, 
the image of a virtuous crusader against the institution of slavery drove countless 
abolitionists to take up his cause. As the war got well under way, many of these men 
joined the ranks of the Union army, a few rising high into the officer corps, and a good 
percentage of them, following in a direction of which Brown would have been proud, 
volunteered to recruit for and lead black regiments.70 
In New Orleans in 1862, black Creole intellectual and Union officer Henry Louis 
Rey urged free blacks to join the army and fight for “the rights of man” in the tradition of 
Saint Domingan revolutionary noir heroes. Praising Vincent Ogé and Jean-Baptiste 
Chavannes, who instigated the mulatto revolt in 1790 before being caught, tortured, and 
broken on the wheel, Rey declared, “CHAVANNE AND OGE did not wait to be aroused 
and to be made ashamed; they hurried unto death; they became martyrs here on earth and 
received on high the reward due to generous hearts.…Hasten all; our blood only is 
                                                
70 McKivigan, “His Soul Goes Marching On,” 288-289. 
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demanded.” During the Civil War, black Americans flocked to the Union cause with 
hopes of social reform in order to complete the ideals of the age of revolution; many 
outright demanded liberté, égalité, fraternité. They merged the ideals of the American, 
French, and Haitian Revolutions, developing a unique vision of an American Republic of 
Virtue, cherishing universal equality and freedom above all else. Over the course of the 
Civil War, these soldiers proved themselves willing to march to their deaths to found that 
republic.71 
                                                
71 Rey quoted in Bell, Revolution, Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition, 
2-3, 6, 8. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
“A SLEEPING GIANT IN THE CONSTITUTION, NEVER UNTIL THIS 
RECENT WAR AWAKENED”1 
 
The Republican Party and Radical Constitutionalism 
 
 
 
At the height of the American Civil War in July 1864, the Republican-led 
Congress sent Abraham Lincoln a bill on their plan to rebuild and readmit the state 
governments of the Confederacy as Union troops marched across the South. The act, 
shepherded through the legislature by its namesakes Benjamin Wade of Ohio in the 
Senate and Marylander Henry Winter Davis in the House, claimed authority for Congress 
well beyond any conception of federal power in the history of the nation. In response, the 
President surprised many of his Congressional allies by pocketing the Wade-Davis Bill in 
favor of his own plans for reconstruction. In justifying his actions, Lincoln did not 
disclaim the vastly expanded federal authority envisioned by the bill, but largely 
substituted himself as the executive in the leading role for reconstruction on different 
constitutional grounds. 
The redefinition of legislative and executive powers seen in the latter stages of the 
war represented a dramatic break with the campaign promises and ideological beliefs of 
the Republican Party from its early development out of the Liberty Party, throughout the 
1850s, and up to and including the decisive election of 1860. While the Republican 
coalition had grown exponentially from its Liberty roots, it had remained steadfastly 
                                                
1 James Redpath, The Roving Editor, or, Talks with Slaves in the Southern States, Edited 
by John R. McKivigan (New York: A.B. Burdick, 1859; University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1996), 119. 
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dedicated to a constitutional and legal belief in the denationalization of slavery—no 
slavery in the federally-administered Territories or District of Columbia, the admission of 
no more slave states, and the regulation if not outright halt of the interstate slave trade—
while declaring the institution untouchable in the extant southern states. With advent of 
secession, however, Lincoln and his Congressional colleagues were forced into uncharted 
legal and constitutional waters. The executive required the authority to wage a war before 
Congress met, and as the Confederacy dragged out the fight, the legalistic Republicans, 
with the Radical faction leading the charge, required justification to punish and rebuild 
the South during and then after the war finally ended. Once set and determined to act in 
pursuit of victory over the seceded states and eventually the death of slavery, Republicans 
enacted a reconstruction of federal power and constitutional law that rivaled their 
attempted reconstruction of the South in both thoroughness and longevity. 
After working through several theories and sources of authority to act against 
slavery, by 1864 Republicans had settled on two tracts to make their unconstitutional but 
necessary actions constitutional, one claimed by Lincoln and the other by Congress. 
Lincoln looked to an expansion of his role as Commander-in-Chief and his war powers 
under the law of nations, while Congress put forward a justification based upon Article 
IV, Section 4 of the Constitution: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government”—the guarantee clause. Benign but expansive 
enough to serve their purposes, these arguments gave the ideologically ill-prepared 
Republicans a ready-made legal and constitutional framework to wage and win the Civil 
War and begin Reconstruction. These constructions were not, however, creations of 
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Republicanism, but of that group from which Republicans had tried to disassociate 
themselves for more than two decades—the Radical Political Abolitionists. 
As early as 1837 future Liberty Party founder Alvan Stewart had suggested that 
slavery in the existing states was vulnerable to constitutional attack, a position 
immediately rejected by the majority of politically-minded abolitionists. Undeterred by 
the unpopularity of his theories, Stewart continued to press his case, and by the middle of 
the next decade he had developed a small following of adherents to his brand of radical 
constitutionalism including Gerrit Smith and William Goodell. When the Liberty banner 
split, the men of the Liberty League—Goodell chief among them—preserved and 
matured Stewart’s theories into a complex and multifaceted belief in a wholly antislavery 
Constitution. 
At the same time as the Radical Abolitionists were taking their ideological 
development beyond the pale of politics, Ohioan Salmon P. Chase and other pragmatic 
Liberty men took the majority of the movement in another direction. It was one which 
would lead to electoral success rather than marginalization, but also leave it unprepared 
for the coming storm. Turning to Free Soilism and combination to flex their growing 
position as holders of the political balance, Chase and others like Joshua Giddings and 
Benjamin Wade of Ohio, Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, and John P. Hale of New 
Hampshire created a platform and creed that demonized the South and its power founded 
upon slavery while appealing to the industrious men of the North. Their Free Labor 
ideology, firmly grounded in the denationalization of slavery, provided them the perfect 
political balance of abolitionism and moderation for the party to become a national force 
by the late 1850s. 
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While the right combination to prevail in the election of 1860, Free Labor’s 
antislavery position became moot with the secession winter. As soon as the crisis began it 
forced Lincoln to reach beyond all traditionally held conceptions of constitutional power. 
When Congress came into session in July, its membership similarly was forced to find 
new roles, responsibilities, and authorities for the federal government which had never 
previously existed. It was in this context as the tensions of war increased and intervention 
in states’ rights—slavery chief among them—became necessary that the executive and 
the legislature embraced the antislavery constitutional framework laid by the Radical 
Political Abolitionists over the previous twenty-five years. While conflicting with each 
other, the two theories independently raised the powers of the government to a nearly 
limitless level by the end of the war, setting the stage for Reconstruction both during and 
after the fall of the Confederacy. 
The following chapter looks at this sea-change in the Republican worldview and 
constitutional thinking from 1840 to the later stages of the Civil War. It discusses the 
development of antislavery constitutionalism in the late 1830s and 1840s and its rejection 
by the majority of Libertyites. It then traces the creation of Free Labor ideology as a 
moderate alternative and the subsequent growth of the Free Soil and Republican parties. 
From there, it investigates the Presidential and Congressional reactions to the war, 
beginning with Lincoln’s justifications for acting unilaterally and his expanding reading 
of the laws of war as a means to end slavery, and then looks at Congressional theories for 
intervention in the South and Republicans’ eventual focus on the guarantee clause. The 
chapter concludes with the conflict between the two theories as the war ends, Lincoln is 
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assassinated, and Congress rebuffs Andrew Johnson while taking control of 
Reconstruction. 
 
Reinterpreting the Contract with Hell 
Antislavery Constitutionalism and the Rise of the Republican Party 
 
In the late 1830s the movement towards engagement with the political system 
strained the abolitionist coalition led by the outspoken William Lloyd Garrison and the 
progression away from long-held beliefs increased exponentially. In 1836 in 
Massachusetts Samuel J. May and Elizur Wright pressed the case for voting, and within 
only a few years abolitionists moved from interrogation of candidates and vote scattering 
to the organization of an outright antislavery political party. In this atmosphere, it is not 
surprising, then, that some would contest the central tenets of nonintervention at the 
constitutional level as well. Such actions and ideas, however, challenged the most basic 
beliefs of many in the antislavery movement, including those who would later break 
completely with the Boston radical. 
Cemented into the founding charter of the American Anti-Slavery Society in 
December 1833, Garrisonians firmly held that “each State, in which Slavery exists, has, 
by the Constitution of the United States, the exclusive right to legislate in regard to its 
abolition in said State.” In other words, abolitionists vowed to let alone southern slavery 
unless they converted a majority of the population to abolitionism by pressing the 
immoral and sinful nature of slavery through mail and petition campaigns. At the same 
time, denationalization was seen as a legitimate and legal course of action. The Society 
declared it would 
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endeavor, in a constitutional way, to influence Congress to put an end to the 
domestic Slave trade, and to abolish Slavery in all those portions of our common 
country which come under its control, especially in the District of Columbia,—
and likewise to prevent the extension of it to any State that may be hereafter 
admitted to the Union.2 
 
Hoping to take the building momentum towards engagement to a new level, New 
York abolitionist and lawyer Alvan Stewart proposed at the 1838 annual meeting of the 
American Anti-Slavery Society to amend out the clause admitting that slavery was 
untouchable inside the southern states. Since at least September 1837 when he first 
presented his theory of constitutional due process as an attack on slavery to the New 
York Anti-Slavery Society, he had honed his arguments that the Constitution was at its 
heart an antislavery document. He believed that when it was taken in hand with its 
forbearer, the Declaration of Independence, federal courts could use the American charter 
to free every slave then existing within the boundaries of the nation by simply declaring 
none had been duly convicted or sentenced as required by the 5th Amendment. When his 
1838 amendment fell nine votes short, Stewart did not give in, but turned his attention to 
the founding and building of the Liberty Party with Joshua Leavitt and other political 
abolitionists.3 
                                                
2 American Anti-Slavery Society, The Constitution of the American Anti-Slavery Society: 
With the Declaration of the National Anti-Slavery Convention at Philadelphia, 
December, 1833, and the Address to the Public (Boston: American Anti-Slavery Society, 
1838). 
 
3 Richard H. Sewell, Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States, 1837-
1860 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 50-51; William M. Wiecek, The 
Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 155-
156. 
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During this time and despite the party not agreeing with some of his ideas—they 
were far from agreeing with Garrison that the Constitution was a “contract with hell,” but 
saw it as neutral at best on the federal government’s relationship to slavery—the New 
Yorker continued to develop and press his beliefs in antislavery constitutionalism through 
freedom suits and legal treatises. In the face of at least eight clauses in the Constitution 
which referenced or entrenched slavery, Stewart’s work pointed to, first, like Salmon P. 
Chase, the ambiguity and fact that the framers never used the word ‘slave.’ Second, he 
took a wider view of the American founding than previously understood, contending the 
Declaration encompassed the essence of the Union. Its ideals were binding, he argued, 
and were imbued into the American charter through the preamble, due process, and equal 
protection clauses. While most Libertyites would agree to some form of these theories, 
Stewart quickly moved into ground that they perceived as far too controversial and 
untested. 
In the late 1830s and early 1840s he fleshed out a series of arguments that, while 
suggested first by others, were taken to extremes the originators were unlikely to have 
imagined. Chief among these was one focused on the guarantee clause pledging to each 
state a republican form of government. In this short, virtually offhand line of text, Stewart 
saw a power that could give an antislavery national government the right to disestablish 
southern slavery everywhere. Stewart did not begin his quest of transforming the 
Constitution in a vacuum, however, and closely researched for precedents.4 
                                                
4 William Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 62-63. 
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In October 1836, the first major abolitionist critique of the Constitution came 
from Garrisonian minister Samuel May. He focused on the fact that the framers had very 
carefully avoided using the words “slave” or “slavery” in their text, using this as a 
starting point to deconstruct pro-slavery constitutional arguments. He concluded that “the 
Framers of our Constitution, finding they had not the power to abolish slavery, were 
determined to do the next best thing—not commit the national government to its 
support.” In the second part of his work published the following spring, he argued 
Congress, far from being barred from acting, could interfere with slavery using the 
commerce clause by regulating if not abolishing the interstate slave trade and preventing 
slaves from exiting the established slave states. He also noted that Congress was entitled 
to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia at will as the sole administrative body there. 
In early 1837 Nathaniel P. Rogers echoed May’s ideas, but suggested further tactics. He 
pointed to guarantee clause and due process as possible methods of attacking slavery, 
though he did not elaborate. A few years later, Stewart took these early arguments and 
infused them with another that challenged majority conceptions of the Union itself.5 
The New Yorker took to heart the position of abolitionist clergyman John Parrish 
who argued in 1806 that “there is no just law to support [slavery]; it is against the 
essence” of the Declaration of Independence. Moving beyond Parrish, Stewart, and 
increasing number of future political abolitionists, contended Thomas Jefferson’s 
                                                
5 Samuel J. May, “Slavery and the Constitution [Part 1],” Quarterly Anti-Slavery 
Magazine 2 (October 1836), 89; Samuel J. May, “Slavery and the Constitution [Part 2],” 
Quarterly Anti-Slavery Magazine 2 (April 1837), 226-238; Nathaniel P. Rogers, “The 
Constitution,” Quarterly Anti-Slavery Magazine 2 (January 1837), 145-153; Gerrit Smith 
later published a similar tract in 1844, see Gerrit Smith, Gerrit Smith's Constitutional 
Argument, Against American Slavery (Utica: Jackson & Chaplin, 1844). 
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idealized vision was from its creation in 1776 until the Articles of Confederation came 
into force, the governing document of the former colonies. Both the Articles and the 
Constitution were created to form “a more perfect” version of a Union that already 
existed. As William Goodell would later express it, these compacts were “the mere 
outward form, the minutely detailed provisions” of the principles enshrined in the 
Declaration. In Stewart’s estimation, natural law and natural rights, expressed as they 
were in it, were of a legally-binding nature and could, of their own accord, lead to 
abolition throughout the states. For support, he and his compatriots pointed to William 
Blackstone’s 1765 declaration that “this law of nature…dictated by God himself, is of 
course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, 
and at all times: no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this.” In other words, 
since slavery was contrary to natural law, it must be invalid everywhere.6 
With his theory building, Stewart then borrowed ideas from reformer Elizur 
Wright and abolitionist minister Theodore Weld, who emphasized due process to attack 
slavery. Wright had argued in 1837 that the Fugitive Slave Act was a violation of blacks’ 
due process rights, and in 1838 Weld claimed that in areas of the federal government’s 
sole jurisdiction, such as the District of Columbia, the clause applied. Since in the case of 
slaves in such places self-ownership was taken without compensation or judgment, 
                                                
6 Parrish quoted in Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism, 252; William 
Goodell, Views of American Constitutional Law in Its Bearing Upon American Slavery 
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Southerners had violated both the substantive and procedural rights of those slaves they 
brought into the district or territories. Neither Wright nor Weld, however, foresaw 
Stewart’s reading. In a September 1837 speech to the New York State Anti-Slavery 
Society, he argued that the 5th Amendment empowered Congress to abolish slavery 
everywhere in the United States because the language of ‘persons’ used in the due 
process clause matched the carefully-chosen euphemisms for ‘slave’ in other parts of the 
document. Far from a limited application to the federal district, Stewart proclaimed the 
Constitution an entirely antislavery document that commanded the complete abolition of 
slavery. It was after the publication of his speech and on its merits that he pushed the 
American Anti-Slavery Society to amend their charter.7 
Despite his failure to convince a majority of his fellow abolitionists on the 
unconstitutionality of slavery, Stewart did manage to persuade them on many of his lesser 
arguments which became embedded as central ideas of what would become Republican 
catechism—Chase and others made much use of the due process, equal protection, and 
Declaration arguments. The New York lawyer’s failures also did not stop him from 
continuing his journey onto the bleeding edge of constitutional theory, though much of 
the time he was preoccupied with building up the Liberty organization and focusing on 
common ground upon which all party devotees could agree—what became the “one idea” 
                                                
7 Theodore Dwight Weld, “The Power of Congress over Slavery in the District of 
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platform. It was in this context that he began to push his most ambitious, but least 
developed, argument: the guarantee clause. He saw the powers of the clause as defined 
broadly since there was no established definition or law behind it. Stewart maintained 
that the simple, almost throw-away line held the potential to destroy slavery everywhere 
within the borders of the nation and each and every state. And, as with his other 
arguments, Stewart built upon his forbearers.8 
During the 1820 debates over Missouri’s admission as a state and whether 
Congress could place conditions on it, the first suggestions that the guarantee clause 
might be used to attack slavery emerged. Representative Timothy Fuller of Massachusetts 
first broached the “fundamental principle” of the clause, calling slavery anywhere “a 
departure from republican principles.” He pointed to Jefferson’s language to argue a pure 
republic would not tolerate slavery and all men would be free and enjoy equal rights. 
Without further guidance from the framers on the meaning of “republican form of 
government,” Fuller said the Declaration’s definition should stand. He caveated, 
however, that the same idea “cannot, without violence, be applied” to the existing slave 
states. Senator David L. Morril of New Hampshire similarly argued that slavery was 
incompatible with “pure democracy,” contaminates a republic, and leaves only 
“aristocracy, monarchy, and, perhaps, despotism itself.” The Northern men, however, 
                                                
8 For the most comprehensive look at the origins and use of the guarantee clause, see 
Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause. For the idea that it was meant as a vague ill-defined 
power, see Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause, 71-72. 
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were quickly shouted down by Southerners who, realizing the danger the clause posed to 
their interests, decried any efforts to suggest its use again.9 
The clause reared its head again in 1833 in a Senate debate on nullification. In 
reply to a Northern counterpart, John C. Calhoun of South Carolina charged that “if not 
rigidly restricted…[the guarantee] is destined to be a pretext to interfere with our political 
affairs and domestic institutions in a manner infinitely more dangerous than any other 
power which has ever been exercised on the part of the General government.” Calhoun, 
seeing the threat the clause posed to the South, tried to stamp out all suggestions of its 
use. And, while to Southerners’ relief the clause did not appear again in legislative 
debates, abolitionists like Stewart had begun to investigate its potential within five 
years.10 
In 1839, nascent politique Gerrit Smith wrote to Congressman Henry Clay, the 
author of the Missouri Compromise, to question the disparity between the guarantee and 
slavery. He wrote, “You do not attempt to show how the multiplication of slave states can 
consist with the constitutional duty of the ‘United States to guarantee to every state in the 
Union a republican form of government.’” Smith wondered how “a government is 
republican under which one half of the people are lawfully engaged in buying and selling 
the other half.” Other abolitionists similarly probed for answers to the conundrum. At the 
height of the gag rule controversy in the House, constituents of John Quincy Adams’s 
                                                
9 Annals of Congress, 15th Congress, 2nd Session, 1180-1182; 16th Congress, 1st Session, 
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Massachusetts district even presented him with a petition to abolish slavery because it 
denied a republican form of government.11 
Even abolitionists who did not agree with Alvan Stewart’s ideas admitted that the 
guarantee clause held vast potential. James G. Birney, future Liberty Party presidential 
candidate and a harsh critic of Stewart’s challenges on due process grounds, nevertheless 
remarked in early 1837 that the clause, “if literally carried out, would extinguish the 
entire system of slavery.” Birney, like others, argued that southern states did not have 
republican governments under slavery, but challenged Stewart on the actual implications 
of such an argument. Most abolitionists followed Birney’s beliefs which ironically 
paralleled those of the southern Congressmen before them: the clause was too dangerous 
in its potential to even suggest its use.12 
Stewart, though, latched onto the potentials of the guarantee clause and carried 
them to the logical extremes that Calhoun and other Southerners feared. He developed a 
small following in the next few years, and in addition to his own works, William Goodell 
and Lysander Spooner both wrote explications on radical constitutionalism using the due 
process, equal protection, natural law, and guarantee arguments. Between them, they 
fleshed out a multifaceted strategy for the federal government to uproot slavery from the 
existing states. Goodell and Spooner’s works became widely published and read in 
abolitionist communities, helping to spread the doctrine further. After Stewart’s 1849 
death, Goodell would become the primary exponent of the guarantee clause argument, 
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citing it in his justifications of private action against slavery under the American 
Abolition Society in the late 1850s.13 
When looking to the clause to attack slavery, the theorists’ first hurdle was the 
definition of “a republican form of government.” Goodell pointed to James Madison’s 
Federalist 39, where the author of the Constitution noted a republic was, “a government 
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people…not 
from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it.” The future Radical 
Abolitionist then cited Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws in arguing all members of a 
republic must be republican or the state will fall into oligarchy or despotism. Goodell 
later told the emerging Liberty League at Macedon Lock in 1847 that slavery was “illegal 
and unconstitutional” and that the federal government was “bound to secure its abolition 
by the guaranty, to every state in this Union, of a republican form of government.” For 
his part, Spooner noted that under any logical definition, “It is impossible…that a 
government, under which any considerable number of people…are disenfranchised and 
enslaved, can be a republic. A slave government is an oligarchy; and one too of the most 
arbitrary and criminal character.” He concluded that the guarantee clause “is not idle 
verbiage. It is full of meaning. And that meaning is…fatal to slavery itself.”14  
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Stewart, in turn, suggested, like Fuller before him, that a republican government 
must be one which followed the dictums of the Declaration. In 1844, he expressed his 
position in a case challenging New Jersey’s gradual emancipation acts in light of a new 
state constitution. He argued, “When we enacted that Article…we knew the old and true 
meaning of a republican form of government to be one in which the government was 
made by and for the benefit of the governed.” Under such a system, “each person…was 
born free and equal, and entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Then, 
moving beyond the pale for most abolitionists and especially Southerners like Calhoun, 
he concluded, “The force of this provision…if faithfully honored, [would] blot out 
slavery from every State constitution….It would cut up slavery, root and branch, in the 
old States.”15 
As Stewart and his supporters took these theories to extremes, however, they were 
progressively more unacceptable to the majority of Liberty Party supporters. As the 
faction led by Chase found increasing success in imposing more moderate views on the 
antislavery party, Stewart’s ideas were pushed aside as too heretical. And, while Goodell, 
Stewart, and Gerrit Smith were more than willing to carry the torch for radical antislavery 
constitutionalism, by leaving the party in 1847 they marginalized themselves and stood 
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raving on the sidelines as the Republican Party rose before them. It would take secession 
and a war before even the Radical Republicans would consider raising the validity of 
Stewart’s theories in subduing the South. Once broached, however, Republicans 
wholeheartedly embraced the legal theories they had shunned nearly out of existence 
twenty-five years earlier.16 
 
From the foundation of the Liberty Party in 1840, its leadership used the “one 
idea” platform to ensure the body remained more moderate than even founders like 
Stewart would have liked; the policy also prevented the dilution of antislavery with other 
traditional political or reform issues. The party organ, the Signal of Liberty, expressed 
“one idea” as embracing “the preservation of the liberties of the free States, the interests 
of the free colored population, of two and a half million slaves, and of the non-
slaveholders of the slave States all of whom are oppressed and harassed by the Slave 
Power which we oppose.” With a single-minded focus on ending slavery, though with 
copious attacks on the Slave Power and support for Free Labor in the North, Libertyites 
ensured that if a major party wanted to absorb their coalition, there would be no other 
impediments in the party program. At the same time, the position allowed the 
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abolitionists of the party to publish and promote the end of slavery and use the structure 
for propaganda without getting too entangled in politics.17 
Even within the restricted limits of “one idea,” however, there were quickly 
disagreements. Western party supporters in Ohio like James Birney’s protégé Gamaliel 
Bailey and, after 1841, Salmon Chase pushed the idea of denationalization which 
contrasted directly with Stewart’s developing antislavery constitutionalism. Building 
upon his earlier legal work, Chase defined the policy as “the absolute and unconditional 
divorce of the Government from slavery.” To these men, the goal of the party should 
have largely followed the questions Joshua Leavitt had proposed years earlier and were 
enshrined in the American Anti-Slavery Society charter: containing slavery in the South 
where it existed, preventing new slave states, banning slavery from the territories and the 
District of Columbia, as well as cracking down on the interstate slave trade and denying 
use of the militia to put down slave insurrections. Chase feared that anything beyond this 
platform would cause potential adherents to turn away by making the party appear too 
radical and untenable.18 
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The Ohioan, pressing his case, argued party members should stop using the word 
“abolitionist” so as not to carry its stigma. Chase wrote to future Radical Republican 
Thaddeus Stevens in 1842 that, “Abolition seeks to abolish slavery everywhere. The 
means which it employs…are of a moral nature” and thus “cannot be effected by political 
power.” But, he continued, “while abolition is not properly speaking a political object, 
antislavery is” because it looks to the elimination of slavery where political power has the 
ability to reach and act. Chase, an abolitionist and religious man at heart, saw the 
necessity of working within accepted legal and political means to take slavery apart 
where possible and leave the rest to die on its own or risk seeing his movement ignored. 
Whig Congressman Joshua R. Giddings echoed this sentiment when he wrote to Chase in 
1848, 
 
I would say nothing about the abolition of slavery. This is misunderstood and 
frightens many. I would go for the separation of the federal government from all 
interference with that institution. This in its effect and consequences is abolition, 
but in a much more acceptable form than the other. 
 
The ultimate goal was still total abolition—and with the same basic caveats and 
provisions of the American Anti-Slavery Society—but in a legal way using established 
doctrines rather than the moralism of a Garrison or the untested constitutionalism of a 
Stewart.19 
While the more pragmatic men succeeded in pushing the Liberty adoption of their 
denationalization platform, there were concessions. The radicals achieved a declaration in 
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1843 at the national meeting that the Fugitive Slave Law was contrary to natural law and 
thus “utterly null and void.” But despite some contention, the party solidified and 
developed the seeds of what would eventually coalesce into Free Labor ideology and 
form the intellectual underpinnings of antislavery politics through the Civil War. As each 
of the leaders of the party contributed their part, they focused on not only the moral 
failure of slave society, but also the economy of slavery as it effected the entire country, 
the socio-political power of the institution, and the hardworking, independent alternative 
offered by the North.20 
While many of their ideas were drawn from the abolition movement of the 1830s, 
the Liberty men were determined to redefine and separate themselves from Garrison’s 
universal reformism and overarching morality. Leavitt, in an 1841 speech that was later 
widely publicized, opened the development of party thinking by arguing that slavery was 
the root cause of the northern economic crash of the late 1830s. By 1846 he was arguing 
that Southerners would never stop their encroachments until Northern workers were held 
in the same legal and social regard as black slaves. In contrast to the image of “wage 
slavery” hurled by Southerners at the Northern plight, he argued that wage earners would 
eventually save enough to move west and become independent property owners and 
employers in their own right.21 
The Liberty founder also spoke out against the growing greed and overt 
luxuriousness in American society, a view shared by many others and one which 
                                                
20 Party platform quoted in Sewell, Ballots for Freedom, 92-95; Foner, Free Soil, Free 
Labor, Free Men, 79. 
 
21 Laurie, Beyond Garrison, 65, 135. 
 
  169 
eventually manifested as a general distrust of concentrated wealth. William Goodell, as 
editor of the Emancipationist, criticized the growing immorality and luxuriousness in 
American society, but also deplored those mired in and unwilling to work their way out 
of poverty. Thaddeus Stevens would later lay out the ideal position of free men in the 
nation: a “republic must be feeble” if it does not find a correct balance, marked by “an 
intelligent and industrious yeomanry, equally removed from luxury and from poverty.” 
Similarly, Elizur Wright pushed the party towards acceptance of the middling laborers of 
the North as a new base of the party in contrast to the poor and what were perceived as 
their wealthy instigators. Tying the strands of their developing ideology together in 1844, 
the Liberty organ American Freedman wrote, “Slavery is, inherently, the parent of 
idleness and contempt for free labor, of luxury and lavish expenditure, of bad economy, 
both individual and social.”22 
Such declarations were increasingly common as political abolitionists crowed that 
Southerners used and abused slavery to expand their influence and control of the federal 
government—the Slave Power thesis. While Chase was its major promoter, its seeds had 
existed since the Missouri debates of 1820 and had found a voice among Liberty men in 
1839 who declared, “the Slave Power is now waging a deliberate and determined war 
against the liberties of the free states.” Within a few months, party papers were 
synonymously using the terms “slaveocracy” and Slave Power. By 1848, Leavitt saw the 
Slave Power as so successful a tactic to rally antislavery men to their cause, that he wrote 
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Chase, “The incessant use of the term will do much to open the eyes and arose the 
energies of the people….Let it appear that it is the Slave Power which we wish to restrict 
and curtail; that it is the Slave Power whose demands we resist, whose growth we will 
put down.”23 
Part and parcel of this idea were the legal arguments Chase, Birney, and others 
had developed in the 1830s as the solution. Chase sought to contain the Slave Power by 
labeling slavery a purely local institution which the federal government, once the Slave 
Power was dislodged from Washington, could restrict to the South. In this way, Chase 
positioned the party for the future and wider acceptance, and situated himself in contrast 
to Stewart and Goodell as a bulwark of conservatism, harkening back to the founders’ 
original antislavery intentions as opposed to both Stewart’s abolitionist extremism and 
John C. Calhoun’s compact theory of the founding that looked to entrench slavery further 
throughout the nation and territories, a position framed as gaining ground and threatening 
the North with slavery.24 
While “one idea” and the focus on the Slave Power kept the peace among factions 
and allowed the maturation of a larger ideology for antislavery politics in the short term, 
over time it was untenable as outside pressure and militancy pushed some members 
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further towards radicalism and the lack of electoral success pressed others to search for 
new tactics. The men of upstate New York, with Smith and Goodell in the lead, pushed 
harder for the adoption of a more universally reformist platform. Conversely, Western 
men like Chase and Bailey saw the potential of drawing antislavery men out of the major 
parties if the Liberty bar was only slightly lower.25 
With the party entente slowly crumbling, national events spurred a dramatic shift. 
The push to war in Texas in 1846 enraged many Northern Whigs and Democrats. The 
failure of New York Democratic Congressman David Wilmot’s “Proviso” that any lands 
acquired from the war be free of slavery only bolstered their feelings, and in the 
aftermath of the loss, antislavery politicians found a new rallying cry. As the heated 
situation continued into 1847, the barriers blocking any potential Liberty Party coalition 
began to wilt, beginning with the abdication of the radicals to form the Liberty League in 
June 1847. In one swift move, the pragmatic men seized the opportunity to reorganize the 
national apparatus to their liking with Chase as the driving force to the effort. 
The Liberty men looked to antislavery, or “conscience,” Whigs and Proviso 
Democrats to unite on common ground. Despite calls to shutter the Liberty banner in 
favor of combining with the Wilmot men, Chase remained steadfast that any new party 
continue strict adherence to federal divorce from slavery in addition to the Proviso. He 
assured Lewis Tappan that any new party would maintain that “Congress can neither 
create nor continue slavery anywhere, & in all places under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
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Congress slavery is constitutionally impossible.” Without the pressure from the radicals 
of the party, though, he dropped the equal rights position of the Liberty Party and 
consigned the term ‘abolitionist’ to the dustbin. In further recognition of the pragmatists’ 
control, the October 1847 Liberty convention called only for the repeal of the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1793, revoking the previous declaration of it as unconstitutional on Stewart-
esq grounds.26 
When the mainline New York Democratic Party snubbed their antislavery 
contingent’s position at their state convention, the Wilmot faction walked out. Sensing an 
opportunity, Chase called for a national convention in late summer 1848 in Buffalo, New 
York and used his correspondence relationships with conscience Whigs to entice their 
attendance. His efforts at amalgamation into what was being called the Free Soil 
movement, though, did not reduce his commitment to federal divorce from slavery. He 
wrote to Democrat John Van Buren, brother of the former president, 
 
The Free Territory question…must bring up the whole slavery question 
inevitably. Our contest is with the Slave Power, and it will break us down unless 
we break it down. The People will not stop with the exclusion of slavery from 
territories: they will demand its complete denationalization.27 
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When the Free Soil convention opened in August, Chase achieved what he had 
been pursuing for the last half-decade, a coalition of antislavery men from all parties 
willing to caucus together on firm antislavery ground. The party platform, largely shaped 
by the Ohioan, reflected the Liberty stance of denationalization, as well as positions on 
the rest of the major political issues of the day including postage, the tariff, and internal 
improvements. In exchange for accepting their position on slavery, the former Libertyites 
agreed to back former President Van Buren for the nomination; conscience Whig Charles 
Francis Adams, son of John Quincy Adams, balanced out the ticket. As the new party 
solidified, Joshua Leavitt declared, “The Liberty party is not dead, but translated.”28  
Despite protests that the party had abandoned the moral high ground for political 
gain, denationalization, the original platform of both the American Anti-Slavery Society 
and the Liberty Party, remained firmly ensconced. Massachusetts Free Soil editor Henry 
Wilson explained that the new party 
 
would have the National Government pass an organic law, that should forever 
preserve all the territories to freedom; we would have it abolish slavery and the 
slave trade in the District of Columbia—forbid the interstate slave trade—repeal 
the [fugitive slave] law of 1793 and all other acts that in any way make the people 
of the Free States responsible for the existence of slavery—exercise all its 
constitutional power to discourage, localize, and destroy slavery—and use its 
patronage and influence to sustain the friends of emancipation in all lawful, 
constitutional, and just means. 
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Abolitionist Sherman Booth, a sometimes ally of Gerrit Smith noted approvingly of the 
platform, “This is all the Liberty party, as such, ever demanded.” Owen Lovejoy, whose 
brother was murdered by an anti-abolitionist mob in 1837, declared of Free Soil, “The 
principles of Liberty are in this movement, undergird and surround it.” Even so much a 
stalwart against political engagement as William Lloyd Garrison himself expressed 
optimism in the new group, saying that though imperfect, it represented the “beginning of 
the end” of the institution.29 
The dropping of equal rights in the transition from Liberty to Free Soil, however, 
was a fallback from Liberty, but organizers defended the move as a political tactic to 
draw those willing to see slavery destroyed and uprooted yet unready for equality. This 
ploy made sense in a world where most whites accepted white supremacy and 
paternalism out of hand. In place of equal rights, Free Soilers pushed the Slave Power 
conspiracy, avoiding the race issue and focusing instead on southern domination of 
Northern white workers. And, while there was an uptick in racist rhetoric by many 
members of the new party, they continued to defend the basic civil rights of blacks; 
outside of former Democratic haunts in New York, moreover, Free Soil declarations 
resembled the equal rights language of the Liberty Party. In Wisconsin, the party made a 
push for universal suffrage, and in Ohio, they even managed to repeal the state’s harsh 
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Black Laws. In spite of its shortcomings on race, most blacks voiced support. One black 
citizens’ group in Boston declared, “In this movement, we see the beginning, the end of 
which will witness abolition of American slavery….Even now it is causing slave holders 
at their homes to tremble, as the northern breezes bear to their ears the earliest sound of 
the buffalo’s horn.”30  
The Free Soil movement was full of hope as it emerged from Buffalo, but its 
shoddy organization and lack of funds in part led to a poor showing in the 1848 
presidential canvas; on other levels, though, the party found a degree of success. Free 
Soilers managed to send a dozen antislavery men to Congress from its ranks in 1848, and 
in the following two years, leveraged a position as the swing vote in state legislatures: 
Ohio put Chase in the United States Senate and Massachusetts did the same for Charles 
Sumner. These successes also led to a growing acceptance of antislavery politics 
throughout the North, drawing in many of those who had to that point shunned 
engagement with the system. The election of Whig Zachary Taylor to the oval office on a 
platform that avoided the slavery issue altogether further helped drive Whigs like Joshua 
R. Giddings to the Free Soil fold. Events in 1850, however, simultaneously split the party 
and reenergized the movement.31 
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Hoping to silence the slavery issue forever, Kentucky Whig Henry Clay crafted 
the Compromise of 1850. In one omnibus bill, Congress admitted California as a free 
state, opened New Mexico Territory to popular sovereignty—allowing residents to 
declare their preference for slavery by vote—and enacted a new, draconian Fugitive 
Slave Law that required Northerners to participate in slave recaptures as well as stripped 
accused blacks of all legal remedies. The series of laws was cheered by many antislavery 
Democrats as a final solution to the issue, leading many of them to abandon Free Soil for 
their former colleagues.32 
For the dedicated antislavery men, in contrast, the Compromise and specifically 
the Fugitive Slave Law was an anathema. Chase remarked of the 1850 bill, “The question 
of slavery in the territories has been avoided. It has not been settled.” Senator John P. 
Hale of New Hampshire said of the compromise, “Gentlemen flatter themselves that they 
have done a great deal of peace for the country.” After the fracturing, the rump 
membership of Free Soil, now loosely allied as Free or Independent Democrats, largely 
stuck to the 1848 Buffalo platform. In 1851, however, they added a vigorous 
denunciation of the new Fugitive Slave Act, a call for diplomatic recognition of Haiti, 
and a moral condemnation of slavery.33 
The Compromise proved so unpopular in the North that according to New York 
Whig Senator William Henry Seward it “brought on a demoralization over the whole 
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country.” It also brought a new sense of urgency to the antislavery movement and enticed 
more radical declarations. Most dramatically, Seward declared that if the “higher law 
than the Constitution” continued to be ignored and the expansion of slavery not halted, 
“the Union shall be dissolved and civil war ensue.” Sounding the same alarm, Lincoln’s 
future Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, decried the Fugitive Slave Law in 1851, but 
noted that the tables could turn: 
 
The South will themselves be convinced at no distant day, that the result of this 
amplification of the powers of the general government will be fatal to themselves, 
for if that government can override the state jurisdictions and seize persons in the 
free states to carry into slavery, that same government will under the auspices 
stretch its power into slave states for the purposes of emancipation.34 
 
Two years later Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas raised the proposition of 
extending the Compromise premise of popular sovereignty to all territories, and 
antislavery men of all colors coalesced into a unified front. With the 1852 collapse of the 
Whig party and publications like Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin drawing 
new recruits, that front was much larger than ever before. In reaction to Douglas, Chase, 
Giddings, and Benjamin Wade, with the assistance of Gerrit Smith, published in January 
1854 the “Appeal of the Independent Democrats in Congress to the People of the United 
States” as a new call to arms on the day the final Kansas-Nebraska bill was presented. 
With additional support from Sumner and Seward, the group declared the measure “part 
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and parcel of an atrocious plot” to undermine the Missouri Compromise and convert all 
territories “into a dreary region of despotism, inhabited by masters and slaves.” Within a 
short time, the “Appeal” became the vision statement of the future Republicans, and 
served to propagandize their movement to an ever-widening audience.35 
The anger of the anti-Nebraska movement recharged the remnants of the Free Soil 
party. Antislavery papers were quick to suggest that with Kansas potentially open to 
slavery, it would not be long before Southerners looked as far west as Oregon. Whig and 
future Republican William Pitt Fessenden, newly elected to the Senate from Maine, 
reacted to the bill by exclaiming, “The thing is a terrible outrage and the more I look at it 
the more enraged I become. It needs but little to make me an out & out abolitionist.” 
Former Whig James Duncan of Massachusetts avowed he “had little sympathy for 
abolitionists” in 1850, “but the repeal of the Missouri Compromise…was too much to 
bear. I now advocate the freedom of Kansas under all circumstances and at all hazards, 
and the prohibition of slavery in all territory now free.” In the same vein, the 
Poughkeepsie Eagle proclaimed the proponents of popular sovereignty “have rejected 
peace and chosen war; and now on their guilty heads be the consequences.” It then 
endorsed the full scope of the 1848 Buffalo platform as the solution. Chase and his cohort 
only had to watch as Kansas-Nebraska seemingly proved the Slave Power an aggressive, 
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expanding fact; and, unless Northerners took a stand, it appeared it would succumb the 
entire nation.36 
When the time came to organize the masses of anti-Nebraska and antislavery men 
into a larger whole, activists saw the need for a new organization. Fessenden 
correspondent Austin Willey wrote to the Maine Senator, “This war with slavery is too 
radical, too difficult, too long, too big for success without a power constructed especially 
for it. Cromwell needed a better army and so we.” Willey’s suggestion was taken to heart 
as his fellow politicos gathered in new state parties. In arming their novel creations, 
however, the rising coalition took the core of the 1848 and 1852 Free Soil platforms: 
denationalization, repeal of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, and a moral denunciation of 
slavery itself. Antislavery Democrats and former Whigs also left their alliances in droves, 
realizing that slavery finally trumped all other issues which had bound their former 
parties. In Ripon, Wisconsin on 28 February 1854, one local coalition declared 
themselves the “Republican” party. By May, this new moniker had spread to Washington 
as thirty antislavery Congressmen officially adopted the label.37 
Despite its rapid rise and solid backing, the emerging Republican Party almost 
immediately faced stiff competition from the upstart anti-immigrant American, or Know-
Nothing, Party which also rose from the ashes of the Whigs. While the nativists forced 
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Republicans to compete for votes, in many states they successfully worked together to 
elect antislavery men to state or national office. Within two years, such coalitions made 
Chase governor of Ohio, returned Seward to the Senate, and elected Nathanial Banks as 
Speaker of the House of Representatives. By 1856, they had managed to swing most 
nativist support in their direction without compromising their core issues or bowing to 
what Republicans like George Julian considered an “accursed heresy.” Even with the 
addition of more conservative and moderate palates on slavery, the dedicated antislavery 
men of the 1840s ensured denationalization and a moral condemnation of slavery 
remained the central party positions. And, while there was at times talk of watering down 
the position, the new men of the party understood that the Radical Republicans, as they 
were being heralded, would bolt and re-form anew if the platform slipped from their 
hands. By the mid-1850s, the Republican Party looked as if it could be the first 
antislavery party to ever present a national challenge.38 
Sparked to action for the 1856 elections by the caning of Charles Sumner on the 
Senate floor and with California adventurer John C. Frémont on the ticket, even radicals 
like Gerrit Smith, Frederick Douglass, and several of Garrison’s following, including the 
Boston editor himself, admitted the potentials of the party. Smith went so far as to donate 
$500 to the campaign despite running in opposition on his own ticket. Nonresistant 
Samuel J. May declared, “If you will have free soil, a free press, free speech, and be 
yourselves free men—then go vote for Frémont.” Douglass, moreover, dropped his 
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support for Smith and the Radical Abolitionists temporarily and urged his readers of the 
Republicans, “Their election will…give ascendancy to Northern civilization over the 
bludgeon and bloodhound civilization of the South, and [put] the mark of national 
condemnation on Slavery…and inaugurate a higher and purer standard of Politics and 
Government.”39 
With this hope around him, Frémont campaigned solidly into the fall, but the 
firmly entrenched Democrats benefitted from their national reach, while the Republican 
Party was limited to the North. Even in defeat, however, the party carried momentum 
away from 1856, as they continued to push their antislavery agenda and rail against the 
encroachments of the Slave Power. The next year the Dred Scott decision and the 
struggle over the new Kansas state constitution only invigorated the party further, 
bringing more Northerners into their fold. Extending their attacks, Republicans used 
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s decision and news of the depredations by pro-slavery 
“border ruffians” in Kansas to suggest the ultimate goal of the South was the forced 
nationalization of slavery. When combined with images of expansionist Southerners 
attempting conquests of Cuba, Baja California, Mexico, and throughout Central America, 
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this placed the party in direct contrast with the Slave Power as the bulwark of 
denationalization.40 
As the conflict continued to build and the North presented an increasingly united 
antislavery front to the South in national politics, Republican language became sharper. 
Senator William Seward, recalling the images of his 1850 “higher law” speech, declared 
the struggle between free and slave states “an irrepressible conflict between opposing and 
enduring forces” that must eventually result in either an “entirely a slaveholding nation, 
or entirely a free-labor nation.” Rising party star Abraham Lincoln similarly argued, “The 
United States cannot endure, permanently, half slave and half free.…It will become all 
one thing, or all the other.” Utilizing such fatalistic tones and continually pressing the 
moralistic disapproval of slavery helped ensure the party’s core principles would never be 
compromised. By the time of Lincoln’s election two years later, Radicals—Chase, 
Seward, Sumner, Julian, Stevens, and others—had clearly won the struggle for control of 
party dogma over the new conservatives and become its guardians of orthodoxy.41 
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Lincoln, considered one of the moderates in the party, held firm on 
denationalization in the weeks following his election, but in private he showed 
willingness to compromise on some tenets save no slavery in the territories. To assuage 
the southern fears, the party even offered amendments and other protections to ensure 
“inviolate the rights of the states” in regards to slavery. The Radicals, however, helped 
see such measures fail; they still largely followed the belief Free Soiler editor E.S. 
Hamlin expressed to Chase in 1850: the ultimate “mission is to overthrow slavery in the 
states.” They would first “make war upon the institution of slavery itself wherever it 
exists” outside of the states. Then, “When we have strength to legislate for its overthrow 
in the States, I think we shall find Constitutional powers through which to exert that 
strength.” It would take southern secession and war to force Republicans to adopt a new 
outlook on states' rights, but once those occurred and Republicans rallied together, the 
destruction of slavery in the states became only a matter of time.42 
Understanding the fundamental goals of the Northern party and its ideological 
inability to compromise its beliefs, southern state governments chose disunion to protect 
slavery. In the course of the secession winter, striking images recalled the French 
Revolution across the South. In Charleston and New Orleans, Confederates donned 
cockades and marched through the streets singing “The Southern Marseillaise;” in a 
fitting turn, however, the cockades were blue, the color of the Bourbon monarchy. In 
Virginia, former governor Henry Wise, later termed the “Danton of the Secession 
Movement” suggested the creation of a committee of public safety, and one Georgia 
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resident warned opponents of secession that the righteous will “chop off your heads.” As 
the tensions rose, Radical Republicans understood that with war, restrictions on acting 
against slavery in the southern states were relics of the past. When, in turn, they needed 
justifications for such actions, they turned back to their own origins in the Liberty Party 
and the torch carried on by the Radical Political Abolitionists. And, as war came, it was 
the Republicans who would in the end become the real American Jacobins.43 
 
Radical Constitutionalism 
The Civil War and the Reinterpretation of the American Founding 
 
In the wake of Abraham Lincoln’s 1860 victory, the shock of disunion spread 
across the South. In December and January the seven states of the lower south formed the 
Confederate States of America, and the upper south joined them after the firing on Fort 
Sumter the following April. Overlooking vast, uncharted legal waters and with Congress 
not entering into session until July, Lincoln sought legitimate means to end the crisis, but 
was confronted with his party’s own ideology: Republicans held a steadfast belief in the 
sanctity of the law writ large, but seemingly unconstitutional actions were vital for the 
defense of the nation. In order to move within these restraints and do what was necessary 
to protect and preserve the Union within the confines of the Constitution, Lincoln 
advanced a series of legal arguments which would develop over the course of the war 
into a creed that just months earlier would have been derided as constitutional blasphemy 
in both the North as well as the South. 
                                                
43 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 240-241; Perkal, “American Abolition Society,” 
66. 
 
  185 
The crisis forced Lincoln into unknown legal territory, as he faced an obvious 
rebellion, but he was hampered by constitutional strictures requiring action by a 
legislature not yet seated. He desperately needed to raise troops and dispense funds, but 
Congress would normally approve such measures. Looking for grounding, his advisors 
pushed what they termed “adequate constitutionalism” as the source for new presidential 
powers. This position, developed by abolitionist and legal scholar Timothy Farrar, argued 
that the Constitution was not only the list of restrictions for which most Americans had 
taken it for the last eighty years, but instead it also included positive requirements for the 
government to maintain and safeguard the Union when endangered. In Farrar’s 
estimation, this duty included not only the traditional war powers and those to put down 
insurrection, but also the guarantee clause and protecting the general welfare—all 
eventually used by Lincoln to justify his actions.44 
Lincoln, understanding that the South would look to the intervention of foreign 
governments trying to ensure a supply of cotton, wanted to avoid giving in to the 
Confederate case for belligerency. To do so would open the way for legal recognition of 
the seceded states as an independent nation and allow European aide and comfort to flow 
in, and so he was especially careful not to base the entirety of his authority in the law of 
war. Despite his efforts, however, it was obvious to most observers that Lincoln was 
going to have to fight the war as a war, including the eventual call up of a naval blockade 
of southern ports. And, while he would eventually receive support from the Supreme 
Court on the legal ambiguities of the situation, in the early days of the conflict he was 
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forced to fight with words. His greatest effort was in vociferously denying the fact or 
even the possibility of secession, in support of which he pointed to the unbreakable whole 
of the Union as it was enshrined from the founding.45 
Lincoln’s argument came directly from the origins of the Liberty Party and its 
early legal scholars who saw the Declaration and the 1774 Articles of Association as the 
central and founding documents of the Union. Like them, he believed that the 
Constitution was a mere outward manifestation of that Union, aimed only to create “a 
more perfect” version of it. Therefore, he argued, that since un-ratifying the federal 
charter would not end the Union, secession was not only illegal, but impossible. He 
maintained throughout the war, “The States have their status IN the Union, and they have 
no other legal status….The Union is older than any of the States; and, in fact, it created 
them as States.” In his estimation, all that was before him in the Confederacy was an 
insurrection against central authority. This is the point from which all of his other actions 
and theories advanced—the states only had an existence in the Union and it was the goal 
of the federal government to place loyal men back in control of them.46 
The firing on the federal garrison at Sumter from the shores of Charleston, South 
Carolina forced Lincoln to put these untested constitutional powers and theories into 
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action. Like an Indiana newspaper, though, he did not want to “subjugate the South,” but 
saw the need for drastic action. To that end, he unilaterally called up troops to protect the 
capital, appropriated all necessary funds, and authorized generals to suspend habeas 
corpus and arrest dissidents who obstructed federal supply lines to the capital. All of 
these actions fell squarely within Congressional prerogative, but Lincoln was satisfied 
that under the adequacy theory, such normally unconstitutional actions were tolerated in 
the midst of a crisis. Slavery and the treatment of slaves within army lines, however, 
raised new issues and were points on which Lincoln’s beliefs would evolve over the first 
years of the war.47 
While Lincoln was slow to act against slavery, he was pushed and prodded by 
abolitionists and Republicans in and out of government on using his war powers to end 
slavery from the first moments of the war. When he learned of Fort Sumter, Senator 
Charles Sumner remembered the proposals of John Quincy Adams that were taken up by 
the Radical Political Abolitionists, and concluded the actions of the Carolinians “rang out 
the death knell of slavery.” In a visit to the White House soon thereafter, he told Lincoln 
that from that moment forward, “I was with him now, heart and soul” and impressed 
upon him “that under the war power the right had come to him to emancipate the slaves." 
John P. Hale of New Hampshire argued similarly in the Senate that, even though 
emancipation was not an aim of the war, “There may be something in the suggestion that 
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was made by the late Mr. Adams, of Massachusetts, on the floor of the House of 
Representatives many years ago.” Frederick Douglass of the Radical Abolitionists argued 
to his readers, “The very stomach of this rebellion is the negro in the form of a slave. 
Arrest that hoe in the hands of the negro, and you smite the rebellion in the very seat of 
its life.” In other words, since slavery was such a great benefit to the Confederacy, 
allowing them to send men to battle while leaving behind slaves to tend crops, build 
fortifications, and manufacture weapons, it needed to be dismantled.48 
While in Washington these arguments remained on the theoretical level, some 
Union commanders took it upon themselves to force the issue. In May 1861, a 
Confederate colonel entered federal lines at Fortress Monroe, Virginia under truce to 
demand the return of three slaves who had fled to Union base. In response, Radical 
Republican-cum-general Benjamin Butler disregarded the still-applicable Fugitive Slave 
Act, declared the slaves ‘contraband of war,’ and put the three to work. By July, some 
1,000 slaves—commonly called ‘contrabands’—had entered Fortress Monroe with the 
tacit, yet legally undefined approval of the administration.49 
Pushing the issue further, 1856 presidential candidate and newly appointed 
general, John C. Frémont used emancipation to try to save his fortunes in Missouri. As 
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his military reputation suffered from defeat throughout 1861 to Confederate regulars as 
well as partisans, in late summer he made a last ditch effort to turn the tide in his favor. 
On 30 August, he issued a proclamation instituting martial law and declaring slaves of 
Confederates “hereby…freemen.” Lincoln, not yet ready to raise the issue of slavery, 
privately urged the Californian adventurer to follow established doctrine. When Frémont 
refused, Lincoln countermanded the order and relieved him of command. When in 
October 1861 Secretary of War Simon Cameron endorsed the freeing and arming of 
slaves, like Frémont, he was soon without a job.50 
When Radicals Republicans protested these actions, the President, understanding 
the need for slow progress and preparation on the issue of emancipation, reportedly 
replied, 
 
It would do no good to go ahead any faster than the country would follow….You 
would upset our applecart altogether if you had your way. We’ll fetch ‘em, just 
give us a little time. We didn’t go into the war to put down slavery, but to put the 
flag back, and to act differently at this moment, would, I have no doubt, not only 
weaken our cause, but smack of bad faith….No, we must wait until every other 
means have been exhausted. This thunderbolt will keep. 
 
Lincoln, while not completely unsympathetic to Frémont’s actions, did not yet 
completely believe the freeing of slaves was within his powers, but he was certainly not 
going to delegate such authority even if it was. He was moving ahead carefully and 
cautiously as his foremost concern was keeping the border states within the Union, but he 
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was progressing on the issue. Radical attacks on Lincoln’s slow maneuvering, moreover, 
helped make him appear more conservative than he was, garnering him greater 
acceptance among the majority of the party.51 
In May of the next year, General David Hunter went so far as to declare martial 
law and full abolition in the South Carolina Sea Islands that were his foothold in the deep 
South. Lincoln only learned of the orders in the newspaper, and he was quick override 
and reprimand the general. Showing his progress over the previously year, however, he 
argued that such acts must be orchestrated above the level of a field commander. While 
Chase, serving as Secretary of the Treasury, counseled Lincoln to approve Hunter’s 
actions, the President replied that he reserved the decision to escalate the fight to that 
level to himself alone, if and when it happened. By July 1862, Lincoln had made that 
decision, though held off for a significant victory so it did not look like a last ditch 
effort.52 
One of the greatest influences on Lincoln concerning his power to emancipate 
slaves were arguments from one of the foremost experts in the world on the laws of 
nations and war, William Whiting. He served as the solicitor for the War Department—
its chief legal counsel—from 1862 to 1864 and therefore as one of Lincoln’s closest 
advisors on his authorities and powers in the war. He was also a member of Gerrit 
Smith’s and William Goodell’s American Abolition Society, and was heavily influenced 
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by and contributed to the radical antislavery constitutionalism preached by the 
organization. 
Many Radical Republicans saw Whiting as an “oracle,” and according to Sumner 
he had been “in the full confidence of the President” even before his appointment, likely 
pushing Lincoln to adopt a radical constitutionalist position on slavery and his war 
powers from the outbreak of hostilities. In an example of the influence he supposedly 
wielded, Democratic Congressman Samuel S. Cox of Ohio referred to him as the 
“reservoir of all the Republican heresy and legislation” of the war. In 1862, the 
government lawyer put his ideas into a more concrete form as a lengthy treatise on the 
war’s implications for emancipation and reconstruction based on historical precedents 
and constitutional law.53 
Whiting attacked the peculiar institution on grounds familiar to Radical 
Abolitionists. Beginning with the assumption slavery was “practically irreconcilable with 
republican institutions” and the “chief obstacle to the restoration of the Union,” he 
argued, “the republic can only triumph by overthrowing slavery.” He continued that since 
Southerners had an “abhorrence of republican institutions” and a preference for 
oligarchy, the only solution was “that this ‘privileged class’ must be abolished.” In 
pursuit of this goal, though not the intention, it would be “necessary and lawful” to “lay 
waste, burn, sink, destroy, blockade, wound, capture, and kill…the ordinary results and 
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incidents of war.” To that end, it would also be within the rules of war to liberate, 
employ, and arm slaves for the “certain, speedy, and effectual overthrow of the enemy.”54 
For support, the War Department advisor focused on two constitutional 
provisions, war powers and the guarantee clause. First, from a broad perspective, he saw 
the stipulations to provide a common defense and promote the general welfare as carte 
blanche for virtually unlimited war powers. This included, in the absence of any express 
prohibition, the unilateral abolition of slavery as a war measure by the executive as an 
appropriation of private property for the war effort, deriving directly from the laws of war 
and nations. Supporting Lincoln’s careful balance on belligerency, he also contended that 
under “the law of nations and by modern usage…no formal declaration of war…is made 
or deemed necessary” to invoke the federal war powers. Rather, “War exists wherever 
and whenever the army and navy is in active service against a public enemy.” In the 
current situation, Whiting believed the Constitution granted to the Union all the rights of 
war against the Confederacy whether or not it was recognized as a foreign power.55 
Whiting continued that confiscation of real and other property was wholly 
legitimate, including the taking of slaves and using them for the Union effort. And, if 
putting slaves “to the aid and service of the United States” was justifiable in reducing an 
enemy’s ability to wage war, then “the ordinary way of depriving the enemy of slaves is 
by declaring emancipation.” Emancipation was therefore “a belligerent right” exclusively 
of the President as Commander-in-Chief and would be “binding forever.” To support this 
point, Whiting looked to historical examples including the British in the American 
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Revolution and War of 1812 promising freedom to slaves who came to their side, but the 
brunt of his argument rested upon two sources. First, he pointed to the 1836 and 1842 
speeches by John Quincy Adams in Congress on the possibility of emancipation via war 
powers and, second, to the example of French commissioners Léger Félicité Sonthonax 
and Étienne Polverel in the Haitian Revolution declaring freedom to slaves to win the 
rebel blacks and Toussaint Louverture to the side of the Republicans. In this way, 
Whiting brought the dualist trends of radical abolitionism to bear in the Civil War, 
invoking the precedent of Saint Domingue and Goodell’s and Stewart’s radical 
constitutionalism.56 
Just before the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation was made public, on 13 
September 1862 a Chicago minister asked Lincoln if the President could end slavery 
unilaterally as Radicals had been demanding. Showing the influence of Whiting’s 
arguments, he coyly answered, “as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, in time of 
war, I suppose I have the right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy” 
though giving no indication that he had made such a decision two months earlier. After 
the document was released on 22 September after the battle of Antietam, Lincoln wrote a 
public letter to those displeased with his actions. He said, 
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You dislike the emancipation proclamation….You say it is unconstitutional—I 
think differently. I think the constitution invests its commander-in-chief, with the 
law of war, in time of war….Has there ever been…any question that by law of 
war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? 
 
He had already defied constitutional mandate by raising an army, procuring funds for a 
war, and suspending habeas corpus, and taking the next step in using his war powers to 
destroy slavery as a tactic to fight the insurgency was a logical step.57 
Nearly a year after the Proclamation went into effect, Lincoln provided a 
summary of the current fight and an explanation of how the ideology driving the war was 
the same one that produced the nation eighty-seven years before. At Gettysburg, he 
suggested the founders’ experiment had erred and the purpose of the war was to correct 
that error, to bring the promises of the Declaration back to the forefront of the nation. In 
1854 he had declared, “Our republican robe is soiled, and trailed in the dust. Let us 
repurify it. Let us turn and wash it white, in the spirit, if not the blood, of the 
Revolution.” One decade and three hard years of war later, he was faced with the blood 
of a new revolution, and it was time to re-instill permanently the Jeffersonian ideals 
which political abolitionists had taken to heart since the founding of the Liberty Party in 
1840. As soon as he moved to begin rebuilding the South, however, Congress asserted its 
own authorities derived from the war to challenge Lincoln.58 
 
* * * 
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In contrast to Lincoln, the vocal minority of Radical Republicans in Congress 
pushed for an expansion of the war’s aims from early on. Pennsylvanian Thaddeus 
Stevens, later described as “the Robespierre, Danton, and Marat of America, all rolled 
into one,” declared, “Free every slave—slay every traitor—burn every rebel mansion, if 
these things be necessary to preserve this temple of freedom.” In his estimation, the war 
demanded to be treated as a “radical revolution” in which the government must “remodel 
our institutions.” Representative George Julian of Indiana argued, 
 
When I say that this rebellion has its source and life in slavery, I only repeat a 
simple truism.…If we fight at all, we must fight slavery as the grand rebel.…[It] 
is the grand weapon which the rebels have placed in our hands, and we should use 
it.…They cannot be neutral. As laborers, if not as soldiers, they will be the allies 
of the rebels or the Union. Count all the slaves on the side of treason, and we are 
eighteen millions against twelve millions. Count them on the loyal side and we 
are twenty-two millions against eight. How shall this black power be 
wielded?…They should be used in the necessary and appropriate work of 
weakening the power of their owners.59 
 
While not prepared to go as far as Stevens, Julian, and the Radicals, after it 
convened in July 1861 Congress passed the Confiscation Act the next month and 
retroactively approved Lincoln’s actions from before they came into session. In March 
1862, Republicans then codified and expanded Butler’s contraband policy by barring the 
return of fugitive slaves who crossed into Union lines, regardless of their master’s loyalty 
to the Union. As the war dragged on, they also approved the suspensions of habeas 
corpus as well as emancipation as a war tactic, which even moderate and conservative 
Republicans supported. At Lincoln’s behest they then moved on slavery directly and 
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passed an offer to the border states of monetary compensation for gradual emancipation 
and in the summer a second Confiscation Act.60 
Though Congress made a substantial effort to support Lincoln’s war policies, 
many within its membership believed that it was a wholly legislative prerogative to 
determine conditions for post-war reconstruction and readmission of the southern states, 
even while the war was still raging in other places. Like Lincoln, however, they were 
constrained by their ideology and it forced them to devise theoretical justifications for 
constitutional means to dismantle and modify state law. The various theories proposed to 
do this—territorialization, state suicide, conquered provinces, and, finally, the guarantee 
of republican government—sought to define the states legally out of their former 
constitutional status and relationship with the government in order to allow 
Congressional authority and oversight akin to federal power in the District or the 
Territories. This would allow the creation of friendly, antislavery interim governments or 
new state structures that would abolish slavery before full readmission and return of 
states rights.61 
One of the first Congressional propositions for Reconstruction came from anti-
secessionist stalwart, Tennessee Senator, and future President Andrew Johnson—
showing a meeting of the minds in the intent to destroy the southern aristocracy even 
though he did not subscribe to Radical beliefs on antislavery. He argued in December 
1860 as Louisiana was debating secession, that if the resolution was adopted, the Gulf 
state would “pass back into the condition in which she was before we admitted her to the 
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Union.” This idea was further developed as ‘territorialization’ the following summer. 
Oregon Senator Edward D. Baker contended that since the seceded state governments 
had abdicated all authority, Congress could rule over the former states as any other 
federal jurisdiction. He declared, “We will not let them out of the Union….If they will 
not govern themselves in Congress, we will govern for them….We will govern them as 
Territories, and govern them a great deal better than they will govern themselves.” 
Charles Sumner then contended secession meant “a practical abdication by the State of 
all rights under the Constitution.” Since the former governments were thus in abeyance, 
“Congress must have jurisdiction over every portion of the United States where there is 
no other government.”62 
When challenged on the extent of Congressional authority under such a theory, 
Radicals like John Bingham of Ohio replied that it was virtually unlimited, deriving from 
the absolute Congressional power over federal territories and the right to impose 
conditions on the admission of states. He maintained, like Sumner, that their actions 
constituted “an absolute forfeiture of all their powers and rights as States.” Such rights 
would be suspended until Congressional approval for readmission as a state. In addition, 
the former state boundaries would not necessarily be recognized and maintained at the 
end of the war, as federal oversight also extended to redefinition of each territory and its 
bounds.63 
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By the end of 1861, the arguments for territorialization had swayed many 
Republicans and several Democrats. John Gurley of Ohio introduced a bill that applied 
the theory of territorialization and set abolition as a necessary condition of readmission. 
Another bill from Republican James Ashley of Ohio declared secession “terminated…the 
legal existence of said State governments,” and directed the President to establish 
temporary governments regardless of past boundaries and institutions until Southerners 
“obtain admission into the Union as States.” Many moderates and most conservatives, 
however, continued to argue against any federal control of the states if and when the 
rebellion was subdued. There was also an uneasiness over the fine line the theory walked. 
Though advocates asserted secession was illegal in line with Lincoln’s directive, the 
attempt to place the Confederate states into a punitive position to ensure they could not 
return without redemption appeared to give some credence to the possibility of separation 
from the Union. In recognition of this problem, some Republicans tried to further polish 
their theory.64 
In February 1862 Sumner presented his refined argument which he termed “state 
suicide.” He argued that in the “territory once occupied by certain states,” the former 
states through secession had abdicated all rights and powers, and it was left to Congress 
to rule over and rebuild the Confederate lands back into states with republican 
governments. While very similar to territorialization, Sumner avoided the idea that the 
states, and their former boundaries, ceased to exist completely. This new construction 
appealed to many Republicans unwilling to agree to a more radical course, and skirted 
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the fact that the original southern states had never existed as federal lands. Instead, the 
southern states fell into a grey area between state and Territory, where after republican 
government—as defined by Congress—was restored, the states would similarly be 
restored completely to their former rights and status in the Union. Sumner’s efforts, 
however, did not manage to sway more support to the Radicals’ side.65 
Thaddeus Stevens, in contrast to all those around him, disregarded all attempts to 
deny the legality of secession. He turned to a theory he termed ‘conquered provinces’ in 
order to justify “a radical reorganization of Southern institutions, habits, and manners…to 
revolutionize their principles and feelings.” Under it he would later demand, “The 
foundation of their institutions, both political, municipal, social, must be broken up and 
relaid….This can only be done by holding them as a conquered people. As conquered 
territory, Congress would have full power to legislate for them.” Indiana Radical Julian 
agreed, declaring, “Let us convert the rebel States into conquered provinces…governing 
them as such in our discretion.”66 
Largely expressed in a bill he presented to the House on 11 January 1864, 
Stevens’s proposal admitted full belligerent status to what he saw as the wholly severed 
and now foreign government of the Confederacy. This placed the physical territory 
conquered in the course of war as that of an alien power, and giving the United States 
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free reign to reorganize and redistribute all assets as it saw fit through the laws of war and 
nations. In other words, it allowed the government to preserve the Constitution by use of 
legal, but extra- or unconstitutional means. There would be no requirements to respect 
property law, deeds, or any other forms of former ownership. Within this context, 
Congress would consider applications for new states from such regions only after they 
accepted their fate and passed laws forever outlawing slavery. If they failed to act, the 
legislature could hold the former states in limbo as long as they saw fit. Despite the 
succinctness and pragmatism that his theory connoted, his proposal was far too radical for 
most Republicans, including most Radicals whose chose to follow Lincoln’s general 
directives regarding the Union. It would be the first, but not that last time Republicans 
proved unwilling to move as far as Stevens in the bending of the law to accomplish their 
ideological goals.67 
As these debates over the status of the rebel states were ongoing in Congress, the 
prosecution of the war allowed Lincoln to solve many of the issues for Congress before it 
could on its own. In late February 1862, Confederate forces evacuated Nashville, leaving 
the entire state of Tennessee in control of the Union and forcing the issue of its status. 
Lincoln quickly imposed a military government led by Andrew Johnson, recently 
confirmed as a brigadier general, in order to block legislative authority over the region as 
a Territory. The creation of the new structure in Tennessee, and Lincoln’s apparent 
distaste for the theory of territorialization, forced Congressional Republicans to 
reevaluate their options. In the end, support for the territory option, which in lieu of 
                                                
67 Bills and Resolutions, 38th Congress, H.R. 118, 11 January 1864; Belz, Reconstructing 
the Union, 193-194; Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens, 152. 
 
  201 
Lincoln’s actions took on a much more radical air, collapsed. With other administrations 
created in Arkansas and North Carolina in the following months, a compromise was 
subtly worked out for support for the military governments in the short term in exchange 
for more radical action against slavery.68 
When executive support for more radical measures appeared in jeopardy or when 
the new governments took decidedly conservative steps, however, Republicans in 
Congress were prepared to step in. In North Carolina, the newly appointed military 
governor, Edward Stanley, allowed those citizens willing to swear allegiance to the 
Union to recover their confiscated slaves. He then closed down a school for emancipated 
slaves in New Bern on the grounds that preexisting state law, which he was supposed to 
follow, disallowed black education. These actions raised the ire of many Republicans, 
some of whom began to challenge the constitutional basis for such administrations. 
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois declared, “The President can no more make a 
Government of North Carolina than the Senator from Connecticut….It is wholly without 
constitutional authority.”69 
Using Stanley’s actions as an excuse to reestablish their authority, Congressional 
Republicans sought new proposals for reconstruction of the Confederate states in the 
summer of 1862. Senator Ira Harris of New York proposed to replace the military 
regimes with interim civil governments with full legislative authority, an idea supported 
by Trumbull. Harris argued, “A military government implies that the provinces governed 
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are conquered provinces…are in some sort prisoners of war, and we hold them as 
conquered States, as prisoners, and undertake to govern them by arbitrary government of 
military law.” He explicitly rejected both Stevens’s idea and that of territorialization and 
instead substituted the guarantee of a republican form of government as the source of 
Congressional authority. The New Yorker believed the clause  
 
contemplates that all the States are in the Union, that they are to be governed in 
the Union, and that the General Government are to see that they remain in the 
Union, and that they are governed by a republican form of government. All that is 
clearly implied in this provision of the Constitution. 
 
Despite the growing tensions with Lincoln’s appointees, conservative Republicans felt 
Harris’s bill went too far and refused to support it. At the same time, however, his use of 
the guarantee clause marked a turn away from earlier theories and it would remain the 
central tenet of all viable Republican proposals in the future.70 
While Stevens continued to press the case for conquered territory, others like 
Sumner would completely drop their pet theories in favor of the guarantee clause 
argument. Once it was broached, Republicans realized the unassuming Article IV, section 
4 verbiage was exactly the powerful weapon Alvan Stewart had recognized it as twenty-
five years earlier. It was, as Sumner would eventually term it, “a sleeping giant in the 
Constitution, never until this recent war awakened.” Firmly convinced of the new idea, 
the Massachusetts Senator argued the clause provided Congress the power to evaluate 
and judge state governments and constitutions on their republican character. If found 
wanting, Congress could deny federal representation and administer states directly until 
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they were remade into the Congressional mold and vision of republicanism—a shifting 
definition, but by 1863 defined as the abolition of slavery and the guarantee of basic civil 
rights for blacks. In the interim, federal legislative authority in the states would be 
absolute and exclusive to the point of creating a de facto status virtually identical to 
territories.71 
Republicans would eventually use the clause to enforce all of their Reconstruction 
policies, some of questionable legitimacy, but all of absolute necessity. For Congress, the 
guarantee clause was the coequal to Lincoln’s war powers. One of the major reasons for 
the shift was a growing perception that many of the other theories gave away too much to 
the idea of secession and Southern rhetoric. Following Lincoln’s lead, Congress found in 
the clause a right to remake the South completely while denying absolutely the 
Confederacy’s raison d’etre, a position also supported by Whiting at the War 
Department. It allowed them to have the power of territorialization, without having to 
strain to disallow the right to secession. This fit in well with the moderates of the party 
who had long been wary of the territory idea, though it was still a bitter pill for many 
conservatives and Democrats.72 
In February 1863, Harris submitted a modified version of the proposal from the 
previous summer, now titled “A Bill to guarantee in certain States a republican form of 
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government.” Authority in the bill remained enshrined in the guarantee clause, but 
instead of purely interim governments, the new bill looked to the organization of 
conventions to rewrite state constitutions for resubmission to Congress. With the growing 
de facto existence of interim military governments in each reconquered Confederate state, 
the New York Senator and his colleagues no longer needed any arguments for or 
legislative structures taken from the territories, but to avoid the issues seen in North 
Carolina, the plan barred the enforcement of any old laws related to slavery. When 
Congress agreed to the provisions of the new constitutions, the states would be 
readmitted for representation with all rights of an extant state. And, though Harris failed 
to muster the necessary votes for his bill, the concepts and authorities found there lived 
on.73 
In the House at the end of the same year, James Ashley presented a modified 
version of his earlier territorialization bill that took into account the reality of presidential 
actions and the essence of Harris’s plan. In his revised proposal, the states were presented 
as insoluble institutions, though through rebellion “the said States, have renounced their 
allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, and abrogated the Republican form of 
Government.” Ashley’s revised bill explicitly enshrined emancipation as the definition of 
the guarantee: 
 
Slavery is incompatible with a Republican form of government….The existence 
of slavery in the insurrectionary States has caused and maintained the rebellion 
therein, and the Emancipation of said slaves and a constitutional guarantee of 
their perpetual freedom is essential to the permanent restoration of State 
governments, Republican in form. 
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Additionally, the Ohio Republican sought to bar former Confederates from all political 
rights as well as a repudiation of debts incurred from their rebellion. Failure to meet these 
conditions, as certified by the President, would mean continued Congressional oversight. 
While Ashley’s bill also failed, like Harris’s plan, its parts and pieces would become 
integrated into the next Republican proposal.74 
Like his colleague from Ohio, Radical Republican Henry Winter Davis saw the 
guarantee clause as the Congressional key to both the war and Reconstruction, but 
challenged Lincoln’s authority to act in a post-war setting. The Marylander took into 
account the 1849 Supreme Court case Luther v. Borden that resulted from the 1842 Dorr 
Rebellion in Rhode Island and was the only real decision to rest upon the guarantee, 
ruling it a political issue beyond the purview of the Court. Using Chief Justice Taney’s 
language, Davis argued that any and all restoration of the South was “the exclusive 
prerogative of Congress” since it was that body which had the sole authority to admit a 
state or recognize it’s government’s legitimacy. He maintained, 
 
That clause vests in the Congress of the United States a plenary, supreme, 
unlimited political jurisdiction, paramount over the courts, subject only to the 
judgment of the people of the United States, embracing within its scope every 
legislative measure necessary and proper to make it effectual; and what is 
necessary and proper the Constitution refers in the first place to our judgment, 
subject to no revision but that of the people. 
 
Davis’s colleague Nathanial Smithers similarly contended that the powers connoted by 
the clause “are undefinable, the authority conferred is equally incapable of limitation, and 
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rests in the sound discretion of Congress applying its own will and employing its own 
judgment in the enforcement of its own guarantee.” Radical Republicans were clearly 
defining the clause to be as powerful as territorialization without crossing Lincoln’s 
belief in the impossibility of secession. But they were challenging his authority and right 
to create interim state governments or set conditions for readmission.75 
By early 1864, Davis saw an opportunity to challenge the President directly as 
Republican unity on reconstruction—and acquiescence to the executive—began to break 
down after Lincoln’s appointed governor in Louisiana, Nathaniel P. Banks, recognized 
the old, pro-slavery state constitution as a foundation for his interim administration. In 
response, the Maryland representative introduced his plan for reconstruction, largely 
modeled on Ashley’s December 1863 proposal, but at the same time more radical and 
more conservative. It provided for temporary civil administrations to replace the military 
governors, and while guaranteeing the end of slavery, it provided freedmen access to 
federal courts as a new form of redress against recalcitrant masters. At the same time, 
initial elections would be white only, though all voters for the constitutional conventions 
would be required to swear the “ironclad” oath required of all Union officers and 
government members. Later amendments altered the requirements for participation in 
voting for convention members from Lincoln’s favored ten percent to an absolute 
majority of pre-war voters, in effect guaranteeing no elections could be held until after 
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the war ended, though it did allow Confederates below the rank of colonel to vote 
provided they could swear the oath.76 
Davis gained support in the Senate from Benjamin Wade of Ohio and in February 
1864 they introduced the Wade-Davis Bill, Congress’s first complete and extensive plan 
for Reconstruction to muster the votes to pass. While taking into account some of the 
more radical theories of Congressional power over the states, Davis argued that it did not 
“exercise a revolutionary authority” but that it was only “an execution of the Constitution 
of the United States” and the “duty of guarantying to every State in this Union a 
republican form of government.” He went so far as to declare on one occasion, “I utterly 
deny that the States may lose their organization, may lose their rights as States…I hold 
that once a State of this Union, always a State.” The subtitle for the plan, “A bill to 
guarantee to certain States whose governments have been usurped or overthrown, a 
republican form of government,” made clear that its basis was not territorialization. 
Instead, it saw temporary disablement requiring Congressional oversight to bring the 
Confederate states back into good and correct standing. That good standing required that 
“no law…whereby any person was…held in involuntary servitude shall be recognized” 
and “all persons held to involuntary servitude or labor in the States…are hereby 
emancipated…and they…shall be forever free.” Thus, it enshrined the ideas of both 
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Ashley’s and Harris’s earlier proposals, and its passage in the summer represented the 
majority acceptance and triumph of radical constitutionalism and the ideas of Stewart.77 
 
Congress sent Wade-Davis to the President on 2 July 1864, who surprised many 
by letting the measure expire. The pocket veto, however, was not a rebuke of all 
Congressional authority over Reconstruction. Far from that, Lincoln, in his hat as 
Commander-in-Chief, used Presidential Reconstruction and his “ten percent” plan not 
necessarily to reconstruct defeated Confederate states, but as a war tactic to entice 
defections from the remaining rebellious governments. He was unwilling to commit 
himself to a single plan, directed by Congress, at a time when the war required fluidity 
and a multitude of options, or as he put it, he was “unprepared, by a formal approval of 
this Bill, to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration.” In his mind, until 
the war was settled and over, Reconstruction was not about regenerating society, but 
speeding the end of the conflict. For the same reason, Lincoln stressed the preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation provision that it only applied to those areas still amidst 
rebellion as of 1 January 1863.78 
The real conflict between Lincoln and Congress, then, was not that one had 
authority for the Reconstruction of the South and one did not. Lincoln’s plan was driven 
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by his role as head of the military and the goal of ending the war. He saw the ten percent 
plan as a means to an end, though still imperfect in many ways, and would later admit of 
his reconstruction of Louisiana, “My promise is out [but] as bad promises are better 
broken than kept, I shall treat this as a bad promise, and break it, whenever I shall be 
convinced that keeping it is adverse to the public interest.” Congress, on the other hand, 
was exercising an authority that would come into its own after the war was over, when 
there were no more quick victories to be won and the hard fight for reform and rebuilding 
had begun. The Wade-Davis Bill was Congress’s plan not for ending the war, but for 
rebuilding the Union in its aftermath, to ensure that quick victory would not come at the 
price of no repentance.79 
Congressional Republicans, however, did not fully grasp these nuances of 
Lincoln’s ideas on Reconstruction and sought to challenge his authority frontally. Sumner 
and Jacob Howard of Michigan challenged the credentials of the Senator-elect from 
presidentially-reconstructed Arkansas on the grounds that the government which he 
purported to represent was not republican since it was based on a minority of white 
voters. This opposition to the readmission of Arkansas showed the evolving nature of 
what was “republican” during and after the Civil War. What had been originally a tactic 
to destroy slavery, slowly became a tool for expanded civil and then political rights and 
equal protection. As long as Lincoln was alive and the war ongoing, Radical Republicans 
could not find the continual majorities necessary to challenge presidential prerogative. 
                                                
79 Lincoln, Collected Works, VIII, 403-404; Belz, Reconstructing the Union, 241-242, 
284; 301; Striner, Father Abraham, 220. 
 
  210 
But, as the war ended at Appomattox, Lincoln was assassinated, and the post-war 
situation worsened, the majorities would eventually swing their way.80 
In the wake of Booth’s folly and Johnson’s dismal first summer of victory, 
Republicans in Congress saw the need for a more strict regime in the defeated South. In 
July 1865, Benjamin Butler wrote to Wade, “The most vivid hope I have is that the rebels 
will behave so outrageously as to awaken the Government and the North once more out 
of the dream of brotherly union where brotherly love is not.” As Republicans on all sides 
were aghast at the unwillingness of former Confederates to accept their defeat and its 
consequences under Johnson’s lenient policies, they were all pushed towards more 
radical positions just as Butler had hoped. Gideon Welles noted the increasingly 
“arrogant and dictatorial” attitudes of Southerners towards the victorious Union as if they 
had not lost the war. In this situation, it was not long before Republicans reasserted their 
claims of jurisdiction. As Johnson entered onto a path of pure obstructionism because he 
did not understand the nuances of Lincoln’s wartime arguments, the growing struggle and 
continued obstinacy in the South only increased Radical power and position.81 
In 1866, Sumner’s ideas on the guarantee clause and the necessity of civil rights 
for blacks gained momentum. Representative William Lawrence of Ohio declared, “A 
state which denies to half its citizens not only all political but their essential civil rights, 
recognized and confirmed by the Constitution…has ceased to be republican in form, and 
the Constitution has made it the duty of Congress to ‘guarantee’ such form of 
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government.” Within a few weeks, more moderate Republicans like William Pitt 
Fessenden found a way around all the pet theories surrounding secession and the status of 
the states. Focusing on the guarantee clause and the reality of the situation in the South 
and the rights of the federal government, he wrote in a report of the Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction: 
 
By withdrawing their representatives in Congress, by renouncing the privilege of 
representation, by organizing a separate government, and by levying war against 
the United States, they destroyed their state constitutions in respect to the vital 
principle which connected their respective states to the Union and secured their 
federal relations; and nothing of those constitutions was left of which the United 
States were bound to take notice.82 
 
In 1867 Congress turned to the Military Reconstruction Acts, wholly grounded on 
the guarantee clause, as the solution to Johnson’s infectiveness and the rise in Southern 
recalcitrance. Democratic Senator Elijah Hise of Kentucky pointed out where the logic of 
Republican interpretations of the guarantee led: 
 
You now assume the right and claim the authority, whenever a majority of the 
Congress of the United States may decide that there is some law or some 
provision of the constitution of a State, or some line of domestic policy…in 
opposition to you party views, to say that the form of government of that state is 
not republican. 
 
Republicans, however, ignored Hise for the time being and forced the Military Acts over 
Johnson’s veto. After this high-point in post-war intervention, however, Congress slowed 
its reliance on the guarantee as the justification of authority over the South. Just as the 
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pressure of the war had sped the radicalization of the Republican Party, its end 
highlighted the absence of necessity for many Republicans. Though some members like 
Sumner continued to push the guarantee as a source of power, the lack of emergency left 
many of his calls on deaf ears. Republicans, even former Radicals, in time saw the 
dangers in using the clause too frequently, conceding Hise’s argument that Congress 
cannot go around forcing states to their will over every disagreement.83 
 
The guarantee clause and the war powers were in many ways opposites of each 
other, but both contained an essential commonality. The granted to the holder of each 
vast authority never before conceived of under the Constitution—absolute federal 
dominance and the power to meddle in and override states’ rights and laws. Congress 
claimed the guarantee as its right to reconstruct a defeated Confederacy, while Lincoln 
held fast that his war powers gave him carte blanche in waging war. In the end, they were 
both right, but the variability of the war and the need to rebuild before it ended made the 
situation complex and ensured clashes would occur. Lincoln understood that Congress 
had a right to assert its authority over the readmission of states, but at the same time, for 
Lincoln, Presidential Reconstruction was a part and parcel of the war effort itself. 
In finding these new powers, both Lincoln and the Radicals were forced to violate 
the long-held Republican Party dogma of moderate antislavery politics spearheaded by 
Chase and recall ideas they had rejected as heretical two and half decades earlier. Despite 
the marginalization of their ideas—and in many cases of themselves—men like Alvan 
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Stewart, William Goodell, Gerrit Smith, and William Whiting became a major source of 
Union victory. Without their contributions to and redefinition of constitutional law, 
Republicans and the North would have had a much more difficult time justifying 
necessary actions to subdue the South and destroy the spark of rebellion—slavery. 
Pointing to the success of their case, moreover, they would have their ideals enshrined in 
the very document they sought to reinterpret.84 
As he made clear in the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln’s objective for the nation 
had changed from one of conservative preservation of the Union to a realignment 
American society on the original, unqualified ideals proclaimed in the Declaration of 
Independence. In pursuit of that goal, and to ensure the survival of the very men and 
women they waged a war to free, Republicans looked to guarantee that if and when they 
lost their power, their work could not be undone. To that end, they studiously worked 
towards the passage of each of the three post-war amendments. 
The 13th Amendment, first proposed in 1863, was based upon the natural law 
conception of the Constitution first developed in the 1830s that sought to extend the 
protection of the laws over southern slaves. It additionally granted Congress the power of 
any necessary action for enforcement, as its authors originally conceived of it broadly and 
granting full civil rights and protections to freedmen. When that power was questioned 
and freedmen under white siege, Radicals returned with the 14th Amendment in order to 
set their understanding of the 13th in concrete terms, including the repudiation of 
Confederate debt and stripping of high ranking officers and officials of political rights—
provisions taken directly from the failed Wade-Davis Bill. With the 14th, moreover, 
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Congress placed into the Constitution the very ideas with which Stewart had begun his 
fight: due process and equal protection.85 When the 15th Amendment was passed in 1870, 
the radical antislavery Constitution that Stewart had imagined in 1838 was finally a 
reality. 
 
                                                
85 tenBroek, Equal Under Law, 89, 116-131, 158, 168, 173, 201. 
 
  215 
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
“A LITTLE SALT SHOULD BE SOWN”1 
 
Total War and Terror in the French Revolution and the American Civil War 
 
 
 
Pennsylvania Congressman and Radical Republican Thaddeus Stevens routinely 
lashed out at the lack of zealousness in the federal government, but the inauguration of 
the rebellious Confederate States of America provided his words new focus and purpose. 
In one such exchange over property confiscation on 2 August 1861, he declared, 
 
War is a grievous thing at best, and civil war more than any other.…If their whole 
country must be laid waste, and made a desert, in order to save this Union from 
destruction, so let it be. I would rather, sir, reduce them to a condition where their 
whole country is to be repeopled by a band of freemen than to see them perpetrate 
the destruction of this people through our agency.…It is not a question with me of 
policy, but a question of principle.…That is my doctrine, and that will be the 
doctrine of the whole free people of the North before two years roll around, if this 
war continues.2 
 
While at the time his words were derided as rhetorical excess, within three years—he was 
one year off—the Civil War would evolve much as Stevens predicted, in ways that few 
others foresaw in that early, confused summer. 
                                                
1 Army Chief of Staff Henry W. Halleck to Major General William T. Sherman, 18 
December 1864 in United States War Department, The War of Rebellion: A Compilation 
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 Vols (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1880-1901) Series 1, Vol. XLIV, 741; William Tecumseh 
Sherman, Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman (Reprint: New York: Literary Classics of 
the United States, 1990), 700. 
 
2 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 1st Session, 415. 
 
  216 
By mid-1864, the results of the radicalization of the war were stark and apparent; 
the character of the war had fully transformed. As a clear indication of the new direction 
into which the war was heading, the Union commander, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. 
Grant, mired in the middle of a long, hard struggle to encircle Confederate General 
Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, dispatched some 45,000 troops to the nearby 
Shenandoah Valley. Knowing the enemy had used it before for attacks and that it was a 
major center of supply, Grant ordered, with a certain jacobinical flair, that the army raze 
the Valley to the point that “crows flying over it for the balance of the season will have to 
carry their provender with them.” The army “should make all of the Valley...a desert as 
high as possible,” so much so that it will “remain a barren waste.”3 This campaign to 
destroy the Valley represented but one example of the revolutionary struggle the war had 
become, one in which armies increasingly recognized the civilian population as 
combatants and the accepted forms of warfare approached totality. 
It was within this new context that Stevens was joined by his fellow 
Congressman—a meeting of minds in the goal to destroy southern aristocracy as the 
source of Southern power and recalcitrance rather than for the freedom of blacks that 
motivated the Radicals. Former Union General and future President James A. Garfield 
declared, “If you would not inaugurate an exterminating warfare…the leaders of this 
rebellion must be executed or banished from the republic.…This is a struggle for 
existence,—a terrible fight of flint with flint, bayonet with bayonet, blood with blood.” 
Michigan Senator Zachary Chandler exclaimed that rebels had only “the constitutional 
right to be hanged and the divine right to be damned.” In the House, John Hickman of 
                                                
3 Official Records, Series 1, Vol. XXXVII, Part 2, 300-301, 329; Vol. XLIII, Part 1, 916. 
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Pennsylvania cried out, “If we shall eventually be forced to bring them into 
subjection…it will be necessary…to have the track of the chariot wheels of war so deep 
on the southern soil that a century may not obliterate it.” And, Ohioan Benjamin Wade 
reportedly chimed, “The scenes witnessed in the French Revolution were nothing in 
comparison to what we should see here.”4 
Outside the halls of government, soldiers sang the same refrain. One infantryman, 
writing home after storming the works at Resaca, Georgia said that after his unit broke 
through, “twenty-three of the rebs surrendered but the boys…killed all of them. When 
there is no officer with us, we take no prisoners.…We want revenge.…We want to kill 
them all off and cleanse the country.” Another soldier noted, “The time has come to 
march through this nest of vipers with fire and sword.” The colonel of the 54th Ohio 
similarly declared, “We [must] teach these ingrates that we can punish with a rod of iron, 
that we can not only meet and vanquish them on the field but that we have the nerve and 
the will to sweep them & all they hold dear clear off from the face of the earth.” And, 
Captain Robert Shaw, before he was picked to lead the 54th Massachusetts, “longed[ed] 
for the day when we shall attack the Rebels with an overwhelming force and annihilate 
them. May I live long enough to see them running before us hacked to little pieces.”5 
                                                
4 James A. Garfield, The Works of James Abram Garfield, 2 Volumes, Edited by Burke 
A. Hinsdale (Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1882), 13-14, 17; Chandler quoted 
in Fawn M. Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge of the South (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, Inc., 1959), 241; Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 1st Session, 96; 
Belz, Reconstructing the Union, 23; Wade quoted in George Washington Julian, Political 
Recollections, 1840 to 1872 (Chicago: Jansen, McClurg, and Company, 1884), 220; 
James M. McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 4-5; Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens, 167. 
 
5 Infantryman quoted in James M. McPherson, What They Fought For, 1861-1865 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 40; Soldier quoted in McPherson, What 
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Far from the relative calmness with which American politics was usually 
conducted, the violence and destruction of the Civil War in general and in 1864 and 1865 
in particular stand out as a glaring, systemic breakdown. The radicalism that reigned 
during that period was a specter from another time and place. It eventually drove generals 
and leading politicians in directions running counter to the most basic foundational 
beliefs that had guided the previous eighty years. In Georgia and the Carolinas, William 
Tecumseh Sherman led a sixty-thousand man army on a trek to consume and destroy all 
within his reach. In the Shenandoah, Philip H. Sheridan systematically burned some 
ninety-two miles of the Valley. Finally, in both of these regions, as well as others, 
guerrilla warfare by Confederate partisans led to the wholesale breakdown in distinctions 
between civilians and combatants. In scope, destructiveness, and ideological fanaticism, 
one of the only events analogous to the final stages of the U.S. Civil War was exactly that 
one which Wade thought incomparable—the darker side of the Terror during the French 
Revolution.6 
                                                                                                                                            
They Fought For, 60; Colonel quoted in James M. McPherson, For Cause and 
Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 120; Shaw quoted in McPherson, For Cause and Comrades, 153. 
 
6 Few historians have compared the military campaigns of the French Revolution and the 
American Civil War. In two articles, Raymond Jonas argues that the war in the Vendée 
was on a completely different level than that of the Civil War in general and even the 
more destructive phase such as Sherman’s March to the Sea. See Raymond Jonas, “La 
colonne Sherman, la guerre de Sécession, et l’image de la Vendée dans l’imaginaire 
americain,” in Guerre et repression: La Vendée et le monde, Edited by Jean-Clément 
Martin (Nantes: Ouest Editions, 1993), 139-147; and “Le Prix de la paix: un regard 
vendéen sur la guerre de Sécession,” in Annales de Bretagne des Pays de l’Ouest 104 
(1997): 89-98. While Jonas makes a good argument, he does not address the more violent 
phases of the American Civil War, limiting himself to Sherman’s March to the Sea 
through Georgia and not broaching the subject of his subsequent move into the Carolinas. 
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An ocean and two generations away, but with socio-political and ideological traits 
in common with their American brethren, in 1792 French Jacobins opened a new phase 
of their revolution. With the foundation of the First Republic the remnants of the 
monarchy were swept away, but the war against the rest of Europe threatened its 
existence. As events spiraled out of their control, Parisian Jacobins were faced with 
insurrection against their authority on several fronts. In Lyons, federalists overthrew the 
Jacobin-led government and in the Vendée peasants revolted against the draft beginning 
both open, conventional warfare as well as guerrilla combat. Parisian efforts to regain 
ground rose to a new level of viciousness even for the Terror. The subjugation of Lyons 
by three vengeance-minded Jacobins, Louis-Marie Turreau’s destruction of the rural 
Vendée, as well as the ongoing struggle against partisans in the Vendée and its leading 
city, Nantes, saw not only the largest death toll in the revolution but accounted for the 
lion’s share of the Terror’s toll as well. 
Basic similarities aside, however, there is a general perception that the violence of 
the French Revolution—and especially the horror show witnessed in the western regions 
making up the Vendée where a civil war occurred within the revolution—was at a level 
over and above that seen throughout the nineteenth century. Contemporaries and many 
historians have portrayed the Jacobins as bloodthirsty terrorists hellbent on destroying 
every last person standing in opposition to them. And, while the American Civil War had 
a few instances of widespread destruction, so the conventional wisdom goes, their battles 
were on the whole fought within ‘the rules of war.’7 When those ‘exceptions’ are studied 
                                                
7 See Mark E. Neely, “Was the Civil War a Total War?” Civil War History 50 (December 
2004): 434-458. 
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more closely and in comparison to events like the French Revolution, though, a new 
paradigm emerges. Driven by parallel, Manichean ideologies, both became something 
unforeseen. Within their contexts, the French and American events each signified a 
dramatic break with the past and the emergence of aggression and ferocity on a scale 
never before seen within their borders. The political and philosophical realities in which 
they found themselves—in conflict with an unrelenting, diametrically opposed other—
compelled politicians and generals towards annunciating policies of total warfare as the 
only solution. 
While the French example may appear at first glance to be the more bloody, more 
destructive, and leading to a greater loss of life, this is not necessarily the case. In many 
instances the reports, edicts, and accounts of the destruction and violence in the Vendée 
and Lyons were exaggerations that typified the rhetorical flourish of the Revolution. The 
same can be said of American military and Radical Republican declarations, orders, and 
passion-filled first-hand remembrances. Even with this caveat taken into account, though, 
the images of violence and total war seen in the French Revolution are remarkably 
similar to those emanating from the Carolinas and the Shenandoah Valley. It is this 
dramatic flair, much of the time bereft of a base in reality, which best renders the 
vindictive side of Jacobin ideology—their language represents their beliefs and desires, 
even if those are well beyond the possibility of implementation. They are in this way 
similar to their impossibly broad idealizations of a renewed, virtuous world. 
In order to portray this perspective of total war, this chapter explores three sets of 
cases, Lyons and South Carolina, the Vendée and the Shenandoah, and unrestricted 
guerrilla warfare. Each set of events targeted a civilian population, largely after opposing 
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forces were defeated or in their general absence, and meted out a punishment several 
steps beyond what the rules of war might have allowed. In Lyons and the Carolinas, the 
state vengefully subjected what they saw as the heart of a rebellious population to a 
localized, yet thorough destruction. In the Vendée and the Shenandoah Valley, the 
respective militaries undertook a widespread, systematic burning and obliteration of 
private and public property in attempts to eliminate the ability of rebellious peoples and 
armies to subsist. Finally, in the Vendée and both the Valley and March to the Sea, 
commanders unleashed their harshest methods, including summary executions of 
civilians, in response to the depredations of those they termed, respectively, brigands and 
bushwhackers. 
In all of these events, commanders understood their actions to be preventative in 
nature. They saw them as expediencies to ending the conflicts by acting harshly in the 
short term to stem a lengthening fight. Beyond that, though, they were meant as 
punishment for supporting rebellion in the first place, and geared specifically to 
annihilate morale by serving as examples of what awaited any population that refused 
submission. To that end, reports and published accounts depicted them in the most brutal 
and damning light. And, while Turreau’s and Grant’s actions are often decried as barbaric 
and genocidal, prefiguring the worst of twentieth century warfare, comparing them side 
by side places them both in a new perspective. Gone are the visions of uniqueness and 
claimed singularity in the events; the harshest demonstrations of ruthlessness and single-
minded ideological zeal take on a cruel ubiquity. This spotlight into the French and 
American Jacobin mindset, moreover, reveals that rhetorical excess was the norm and 
while total, the warfare was far from unrestrained. The final hope is that the French 
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Revolution is no longer seen as the singular example of ideological bloodletting before 
the last century and the American Civil War is placed into the greater context of 
ideological revolution. 
 
Radical Republicans and a Republic of Radicals 
Jacobin Rule in France and the Radicalization of the Civil War 
 
When the first French Republic was inaugurated in late September 1792, the 
insurrectionist city government of Paris had been directing the doomed Legislative 
Assembly for over a month. In that time they had forced the Assembly to institute 
policies which foreshadowed the Terror, such as surveillance committees, searches, and 
arrests of suspects. When the new assembly, the National Convention, convened on 21 
September the most radical faction of the Jacobins were firmly in control. The opposition 
depleted and in many cases frightened into silence, Jacobin ideology heavily determined 
the path of France for the next two years. Anyone questioning the increasingly radical 
program was immediately suspect, and between early 1793 and mid-1794 they 
systematically implemented the measures collectively known as “the Terror” to eliminate 
internal threats and dissidents. The new government used its authority to do what the 
previous two revolutionary assemblies had been unwilling or unable to do: change 
society in order to inaugurate a new era of virtue and equality—by force if necessary. 
The first actions of the Republic were to officially abolish monarchy and create a 
new calendar, symbolically making 1792 and the foundation of the Republic Year I. The 
second, following closely thereafter, was the trial and conviction of the former king, 
charged simply as Louis Capet. With his execution on 21 January 1793, the revolution 
was sealed; there was no reversal which would not brand the governing regicides 
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criminals. And, while a victory at Valmy by the volunteer French republican army 
against the united monarchs of Central Europe staved off their end in the fall, the death of 
Louis XVI brought Britain, Spain, the Pope, and numerous additional German and Italian 
princes into the coalition against the French. 
The fears of a larger war against most of Europe engendered new fears for the 
survival of the Revolution, and rightly so as the anti-French forces began peeling back 
the revolutionaries’ extraterritorial gains one by one until they stood again at the borders 
of France. In this moment of reversal, towns and regions across France saw an 
opportunity in Parisian and Jacobin weakness to wrest back some measure of local 
control from the jaws of the revolution. In Lyons and Marseilles, members of the Gironde 
who hoped to negotiate a more federalized system of government for the new state, took 
control through insurrection. In the Vendée, peasants upset at the new levée en masse to 
support the necessarily larger army threw off Parisian power through rebellion. In both 
cases, the Jacobins in the capital were caught off guard and found their system of 
Revolutionary Government unable to cope with the simultaneous internal and external 
challenges. 
In response to these growing threats, in April 1793 the Convention took drastic 
measures. It created and dispatched représentants en mission with plenipotentiary powers 
to the armies and rebellious regions.8 It set up the Revolutionary Tribunal to prosecute 
the Terror. And, it inaugurated two new committees to administer the government, the 
                                                
8 For more on the représentants en mission, see Colin Lucas, The Structure of the Terror: 
The Example of Javogues in the Loire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 259; 
Mona Ozouf, “Federalism,” in A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution, Edited by 
François Furet and Mona Ozouf, Translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 1989), 60. 
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lesser Committee of General Security and the de facto executive of the government, the 
Comité de salut public—the Committee of Public Safety. Both were populated with men 
from the assembly, reconfirmed each month, but the Public Safety men had near limitless 
power. 
A July 1793 reshuffling saw the elevation of Maximilien Robespierre to the 
membership of the great committee. This moment marked the beginning of a Jacobin 
resurgence, with supporters of the lawyer from Arras virtually controlling Paris, the 
Convention, and now the national executive. With his colleagues Louis Marie de Saint-
Just and Georges Couthon in tow, Robespierre became the keystone of control between 
the three centers of power. He would use this position to implement his vision of virtue 
on the one hand and the Terror on the other; a major element of this would be the fight to 
subdue the rebellious towns and regions in France. 
In some ways the functioning of the Terror predated this new Republic of Virtue. 
Between 2 and 5 September 1792, organized mobs ransacked the prisons of Paris, killing 
nearly 1,500 people in senseless violence. The following two years of Jacobin rule, 
however, institutionalized that lawlessness and saw thousands marched to the guillotine 
with thousands more arrested and languishing in prison as suspects awaiting their turn at 
the Revolutionary Tribunal. By the time of the death of Robespierre in July 1794, the 
Terror proper had consumed 2,600 people in Paris and 14,000 more across France.9 In 
addition to those singled out for sham trials and quick deaths, in the Department of the 
Vendée and the city of Lyons those who rebelled and those who supported that rebellion 
                                                
9 For statistics on the Terror, see Donald Greer, The Incidence of the Terror During the 
French Revolution: A Statistical Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1935). 
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were systematically rooted out, saw their homes, towns, and fields burned, and were 
lucky if they themselves were not executed on the spot if they had been branded 
guerrillas. Not only were these calculated military tactics, but acts of direct reprisal for 
rebellion. It is this dual war against rebellion and ideological struggle against the 
unvirtuous which gave the French Revolution its bloody reputation, but also that which 
makes it an excellent case for comparison to the American Civil War. 
 
Like the French inaugurating their first Republic in 1792, the 1860 presidential 
election provided Northern antislavery militants and reformists the opportunity to 
transform their world in line with the socio-political ideology they had developed and 
engendered since the 1820s. The broad coalition the Republican Party had formed in the 
1850s provided enough support to sweep the elections in the North and put Abraham 
Lincoln into office. South Carolina quickly responded with secession, eventually 
followed by ten more states in order to protect slavery avoid what they saw as a 
guaranteed social revolution. While Radical Republicans understood the South was an 
enemy ideologically opposed to the party’s goals, the rhetoric of most Republicans 
shifted to unity. Lincoln was steadfast that the army sought only to preserve the Union, 
lest he lose the support of the border states. He declared in his first annual message to 
Congress in December 1861, 
 
In considering the policy to be adopted for suppressing the insurrection, I have 
been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict for this purpose shall not 
degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle. We should not 
be in haste to determine that radical and extreme measures…are indispensable. 
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These words were a stark contrast to the war men like Thaddeus Stevens and his 
colleagues envisioned.10 
As the conflict dragged on, moderates became more brazen and accepted that the 
status quo ante bellum was in the past and could never be reclaimed. Northern rhetoric, 
driven by the Radicals, became more ideological and increasingly centered on slavery 
and Southern society. In this context, Lincoln himself saw the necessity of expanding the 
scope of the war as a tactic to win it. He expanded arrests and detentions of dissenters and 
appointed military commissions to try the suspects. Eventually, he accepted that slavery 
could and must be destroyed through his war powers. The Emancipation Proclamation, 
given after the Union victory at Antietam, was the result. Announced 22 September 1862 
and imposed 1 January 1863 under Lincoln’s power as Commander-in-Chief, the 
Proclamation revolutionized the war, turning it into a completely ideological one. No 
longer was the fighting to reign in the southern states, it was for a greater cause: to reform 
a corrupt, aristocratic culture, and free a people in bondage. 
When some questioned his determination and steering of the war, Lincoln spoke 
loudly through his second inaugural address that he would follow this new policy “until 
all the wealth piled by the bond-man’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil 
shall be sunk, and every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another 
drawn with the sword.” To those who said he was going too far in destroying the entire 
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southern world, he replied, “Broken eggs cannot be mended” and the faster the South 
gave up, “the smaller…the amount of that which will be beyond mending.” Within a 
short time, even conservative Republicans saw the usefulness of emancipation in the war 
effort to destroy southern power and backed the measure. The quintessential pragmatist 
and politician, Lincoln balanced the threats of the Radicals with the moderates and 
conservatives, and when the opportunity arose, he pushed forward an increasingly 
Radical-founded program.11 
By 1864, this evolution of Lincoln and the median line of the Republican Party 
had produced a determination equal to that which Stevens pronounced in 1861. The 
President, in consultation with Grant, his new commanding general who had cut his teeth 
in the rough and mobile western theater, resolved to make life so miserable for the people 
of the Confederacy that they would willfully abandon their caustic ideas and accept the 
political and ideological will of Washington. Before the battle of Shiloh in 1862, Grant 
had believed that a solid victory over the Confederacy in any theater would bring 
southerners back into the fold and end the crisis. After the pyrrhic victory in Tennessee, 
he was forced to reevaluate his strategy. He “gave up all idea of saving the Union except 
by complete conquest” and decided that in order to win he must “consume everything 
that could be used to support or supply armies.” From that time forward, he sought out all 
forage and stores as contraband of war, including that which was purely for civilian use; 
when compelled to move forward, he destroyed what could not be carried away for use 
                                                
11 Lincoln, Collected Works, VIII, 333; V, 346, 350; Lincoln quoted in McPherson, 
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by his own forces. This new tactic represented the beginnings of an expansion of the rules 
of warfare, and once in overall command, Grant convinced Lincoln of its efficacy.12 
In this new quest to consume the South into submission, Grant’s longtime 
lieutenants Sherman and Sheridan readily joined him. When the late summer and early 
fall of 1864 provided two opportunities, these Federal triumvirs were ready and willing to 
strike the hearts of Southerners. While Grant kept Lee pinned down at Petersburg, 
Virginia, Sherman slashed through Georgia and the Carolinas and Sheridan thrashed the 
Shenandoah Valley. With the advent of these campaigns, the Radical Republicans in 
Congress finally had men in place willing to break down and crush the Confederacy so 
that they could then step in to rebuild it in their own image. The generals may not have 
been fighting for the same reasons as the Radicals, but their willingness to destroy the 
South served the purposes of the men in Congress who required a subjugated 
Confederacy before they could act on reform. 
With 60,000 soldiers marching across the deep South and 45,000 Federals 
sweeping up the valleys of western Virginia, the two Union commanders squeezed the 
Confederacy to death. Sherman’s men attacked and decimated an entire swath of South 
Carolina including its capital, Columbia, in a fit of rage aimed squarely at the birthplace 
of secession. In the Shenandoah, Sheridan’s troopers inflicted a more thorough and 
systematic devastation. They burned and wrecked the valley so that those who remained 
were barely able to sustain themselves, much less a Confederate army. In both places, 
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partisan warfare raised the intensity of the fighting to a new level as Union soldiers 
blurred the line between civilians and combatants in their reprisals. These campaigns in 
the fall of 1864 and spring of 1865 were complements to each other, exemplifying the 
shift towards total war to bring the Confederacy to its knees. 
 
Localized Vengeance 
The Destruction of Lyons and Sherman’s March to the Sea 
 
The path to Lyons’s fated destruction began in earnest in October 1792, when on 
the 28th Joseph Chalier, the leader of the local Jacobin club, took charge of the municipal 
government with the aid of the working poor and inflated charges against the 
legitimately-elected, moderate mayor.13 Within months, however, the Lyonnais Jacobin 
coalition began to deteriorate as food prices continued to rise—rumored the result of 
counterrevolutionary machinations, news of the growing revolt in the Vendée, the 
imposition of the same levee en masse which had led to the Vendée rebellion, fear that 
the war in Europe would spread to the nearby border region, and the increased use of the 
Terror against dissidents in town. By March 1793, the popular revolutionaries and their 
poor followers had abandoned Chalier and his failure to deliver on his promises.14 
                                                
13 There are few detailed descriptions of the events in Lyons in 1792-1793 in English, 
and most general histories offer only a brief overview. For a good summary of Lyons as 
well as federalism in other cities, see Ozouf, “Federalism,” 54-64; The now-classic study 
of the Revolution and Terror in the region is Lucas, The Structure of the Terror, though 
Lyons is only on the periphery. A good summary of the devastation wrought upon the 
city can be found in Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1989). In French, the classic study is Edouard Herriot, Lyon 
n’est plus, 4 Volumes (Paris, 1937-1940). 
 
14 Lucas, The Structure of the Terror, 35-36; Higonnet, Goodness Beyond Virtue, 267-
268. 
 
  230 
In May 1793, the growing crisis came to a head when the local représentants en 
mission ordered the creation of an armée révolutionaire in Lyons made up of the poor 
and ordered it to disarm the largely middle class National Guard. Within weeks the 
turmoil this move generated caused the government of Chalier to fall in the wake of 
uncontrolled food riots and bourgeois resistance. The moderates who took control were 
still revolutionaries and devoted republicans, but believed Chalier’s government failed to 
protect property, people, the rights and liberties of citizens, or uphold the rule of law. At 
the same time, though, they were also the more wealthy citizens of the area and generally 
disliked both the moralizing of the local Jacobins and the centralizing predations of Paris, 
both legally and through the Jacobin Clubs. Due to this later belief, they became known 
as the federalists for wanting a power-sharing system between the regional and national 
governments. 
While they were initially concerned with their local issues, the federalists in 
Lyons quickly progressed to a regional and then national stance, putting them at odds 
with Paris. They began corresponding with other moderate-controlled municipalities, 
before suggesting and creating the Commission Populaire, a rival assembly to the 
Jacobin-dominated one in the capital. They even went so far as to arrest the Convention’s 
members, though in line with their rule of law mindset, they informed the Convention of 
these actions. The final tipping point, however, was the execution of Chalier on 16 July in 
contradiction to two edicts from Paris. The execution turned the local, municipal revolt 
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into an anti-Jacobin rebellion, and within weeks of Chalier’s death the federalists had 
formally broken with the capital.15 
Faced with rebellions breaking out across France, Parisian Jacobins remained 
unwilling to accept any rebuke of their authority. In their mind, the Lyonnais had 
overthrown a legal government, despite the fact that the new one had much more popular 
support than the failing Jacobin coalition which itself had usurped the legally elected 
mayor. Fearing the spread of such a movement to unilaterally overthrow Jacobinism, on 
12 and 14 July 1793 Paris declared Lyons to be in open revolt, dissolved the government, 
and ordered the Army of the Alps to march on the city. The Lyonnais position was not 
helped by the dissolution of much of their regional support due to a surge in government 
support in response to the plebiscite on the Constitution and the représentants en mission 
persuading other departmental governments to back the central authorities. Lyons became 
increasingly isolated as a pocket of resistance in southeastern France. 
Though the city National Guard held out for some time, and even expanded their 
control to a few outlying towns to secure arms and supplies in August, their defeat was 
certain. On 9 October 1793, the Republican army marched triumphant into the city. 
Under the direction of représentant en mission Claude Javogues the central government 
began their punishment of the city, including a general proclamation ordering the 
confiscation of all property and goods within the city. When suggestions of mercy 
towards the town were made, Robespierre in Paris declared the fallen Jacobins, “must be 
avenged and these monsters unmasked and exterminated.” Lyons became the focal point 
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of a concerted Jacobin effort to make an example of what awaited others who considered 
standing in the way of the Jacobin Revolution.16 
In the aftermath of the defeat, Georges Couthon, appointed as another 
représentant en mission, executed the leaders of the federalists, and then turned his rage 
to their bourgeois status which he perceived as the foundation for their federalism. On 12 
October, he announced his plan to wipe the memory of Lyons and its revolt from the 
Republic, beginning with a rechristening as Commune Affranchie—Emancipated City. 
He decreed the houses of the rich or rebellious demolished and suggested depopulation 
and resettlement by the virtuous. Beginning on 26 October, he employed some fifteen 
thousand out of work townspeople in tearing down 1,600 houses in the city, partially 
clearing a path for a new direct road to Paris, as well as destroying the city’s medieval 
fortifications.17 
Though some Montagnards in Paris questioned the attack on property, Couthon’s 
policy continued until his replacements, Joseph Fouché and Jean-Marie Collot d’Herbois, 
arrived and lashed out with the Republic’s vengeance against the rest of the people of 
Lyons. Through the Temporary Commission of Republican Surveillance, the two 
proconsuls created a system of fear and repression fed by denunciations which sent the 
guillotine into overdrive. When it failed to keep pace with the verdicts, other methods 
were sought. On 4 December 1793 sixty men were chained together and killed by 
artillery fire; 211 were killed similarly the next day, including two policemen standing 
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too close to the prisoners. Those found merely injured were finished with sabers. One 
witness reported to the Convention that the unvirtuous “would expiate their crimes with 
fire and shot.” Unable to cope with the gruesomeness of the scene, on 6 December, 
soldiers were allowed to return using to simple firing squads and the guillotine.18 
When the dust had settled, the repression had claimed almost two thousand 
Lyonnais, including most of the remaining nobles, merchants, tradesmen, and the 
affluent. In the middle of town, the Jacobins erected a column bearing the inscription, 
“Lyon fit la guerre à la liberté / Lyon n’est plus”—“Lyons made war on liberty, Lyons is 
no more.” While the devastation of the city was thorough and complete, it was localized 
to the city alone; the army and proconsuls largely spared surrounding areas. The example 
set in Lyons, the center of the federalist movement, had its desired effect and quashed 
such dissent against the centralization of Paris in other towns for the remainder of the 
Republic of Virtue.19 
 
As early as October 1862, Major General William Sherman had expressed a 
desire to expand the scope of the Civil War.20 He wrote Grant that while “we cannot 
                                                
18 Witness quoted in Schama, Citizens, 783. 
 
19 Higonnet, Goodness Beyond Virtue, 269; Schama, Citizens, 779-784. 
 
20 Sherman’s March to the Sea from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia and then northward 
through the Carolinas is one of the most studied campaigns of the war. A few good takes 
on the events are Burke Davis, Sherman's March (New York: Random House, 1980) and 
Joseph T. Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman's Troops in the 
Savannah and Carolinas Campaigns (New York: New York University Press, 1985). For 
a comparative perspective there is “La colonne Sherman,” a comparison of the Vendée 
and Sherman’s campaign by Raymond Jonas. He argues that the March only targeted 
property of military necessity, but focuses only on the period in Georgia, not the more 
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change the hearts” of Southerners, “we can make war so terrible” that if continued 
unabated, it will reduce the South “to a state of absolute ruin” with “all the terrors by 
which we can surround such acts of vandalism.” In response to those who might question 
the tactics necessary for this kind of fight, Sherman succinctly replied, “If the people 
raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war.…If they want 
peace, they and their relatives must stop the war.” His mind set, all that remained was the 
right opportunity.21 
When Grant moved east to head the Army of the Potomac, Sherman took control 
of the Union forces in the West. After a hard slog to capture Atlanta, Georgia in the 
summer of 1864, Sherman realized that the size of his force and his tenuous supply lines 
provided an opportunity to inflict a great blow to the heart of the Confederacy. He 
proposed the bold step of breaking his lines and marching his 62,000 troops to the Union 
foothold on the Georgia coast. Army Chief of Staff Henry W. Halleck approved of the 
                                                                                                                                            
expansive, slower trek through the Carolinas where destruction was more widespread. 
James McPherson also follows this general argument, noting that after Shiloh, Sherman 
became determined to use maneuver warfare to avoid prolonged fights and that this led to 
quick movements and attacks on anything of military value rather than systematic 
destruction of civilian property. McPherson, though, does note that South Carolina was 
an exception. See McPherson, This Mighty Scourge, 116-119. Mark Neely takes this 
argument a little further and denies altogether that Sherman was engaging in total 
warfare. For him, all evidence is to the contrary and Sherman was wholly focused on 
military necessity and showing the South its own vulnerability; any extracurricular 
destruction was under the control of his subordinates. Neely, “Was the Civil War a Total 
War?” Also worth reading are Sherman’s Memoirs as well as some of his numerous 
biographies, of which Lee B. Kennett, Sherman: A Soldier's Life (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2001) and Lloyd Lewis, Sherman: Fighting Prophet (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1932; Reprint: Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1993) are quite good. 
 
21 Official Records, Series 1, Vol. XVII, Part 2, 261, 273; Part 1, 145; Vol. XXXVIII, 
Part 5, 794; Sherman, Memoirs, 585; Davis, Sherman's March, 17, 21; Kennett, Sherman, 
228-229, 235; McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 755. 
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plan and suggested that he “destroy every mill and factory within reach.” Sherman 
agreed, and on 9 October, he informed Grant that while “smashing things generally,” he 
would seek the “utter destruction” of Georgia’s “roads, houses, and people.” He 
concluded, “I can make the march, and make Georgia howl.”22  
On the evening of their departure on 15 November 1864, Sherman’s troops set 
fire to the largely depopulated city of Atlanta so its industrial sections could be of no 
military use. On the outskirts of town, the massive Union army prepared to open its sixty-
mile wide front in its dash to Savannah. Moving without supply lines, it supported itself 
with “bummers” who were sent to “forage liberally” in towns and farms on the periphery 
while anything of military value—railroads, factories, and mills—was systematically 
destroyed by the main columns. When local resistance to the columns occurred, Sherman 
allowed commanders wide latitude to “enforce a devastation more or less relentless 
according to the measure of such hostility.” When Southerners attempted to burn 
provisions to prevent foraging, Sherman gave orders to burn the offenders’ houses.23 
Though there was little organized opposition to Sherman’s forces, local partisans 
and a few units of Confederate cavalry intermittently harassed them, but the low-scale 
guerrilla war could not stand up to the massive force; the Federal army reached Savannah 
on 10 December before a successful, week-long siege of the city. While the most 
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dramatic and innovative phase of the campaign, the march to the Georgia coast was on 
the whole orderly and focused on military necessity, with few excesses. And, while 
thorough in their destruction, the Union troops did not linger in any one place long 
enough to desolate them completely, having to cover in twenty-five days some 300 miles 
untouched to that point by the war.24 
Once rested and resupplied, Sherman turned his attention to a second March. 
While Grant had initially urged the entire force to transit to Virginia by ship to reinforce 
the cordon on Lee, Sherman pushed instead to march into South Carolina “and devastate 
that state.” Realizing the potential of his newfound tactic, he set his sights on the 
birthplace of the Confederacy, writing, “The whole army is crazy to be turned loose in 
Carolina; and with the experience of the past thirty days, I judge that a month’s sojourn in 
South Carolina would make her less bellicose.” Learning of the plan and understanding 
the potential to crush Southern morale, Halleck cabled Sherman, “Should you capture 
Charleston, I hope that by some accident the place may be destroyed, and, if a little salt 
should be sown upon its site, it may prevent the growth future of crops of nullification 
and secession.” Sherman replied that the coastal city was outside of his plans and that he 
did not think “salt would be necessary.” He noted, however, that the army possessed such 
an “insatiable desire to wreak vengeance” upon the state that “I almost tremble at her 
fate.” Far from the pace which marked his stroll to Savannah, this new adventure would 
be a slow, deliberate, and perfected version of what the good people of Georgia had seen. 
                                                
24 Glatthaar, The March to the Sea, 130; Jonas, “La colonne Sherman,” 139-147; Davis, 
Sherman's March, 121. 
 
  237 
Much like the Jacobin destruction of Lyons, South Carolina would suffer as a vivid 
example to the rest of the Confederacy what continued rebellion would bring.25 
Underway in late January 1865, the entire Union camp understood the rules 
against pillaging, property destruction, and general mayhem were suspended. Crossing 
the bridge over the Savannah River into the palmetto state, a member of the 14th Corps at 
the head of the column turned and shouted, “Boys, this is old South Carolina, lets give 
her hell.” Not to be outdone, men of the 15th Corps proclaimed, “Here is where treason 
began, and, by God, here is where it shall end!” As the campaign began in earnest, an 
Ohio sergeant wrote, “Every house, barn, fence and cotton gin gets an application of the 
torch.” Another Ohioan declared, “No man ever looked forward to any event with more 
joy than did our boys to have a chance to meet the sons of the mother of traitors, ‘South 
Carolina.’” A soldier from Iowa wrote, “South Carolina cried out the first for war.…She 
sowed the Wind. She will soon reap the Whirlwind.” Finally, one local woman recalled 
soldiers saying simply, “South Carolina must be destroyed.”26 
As they moved through the swamplands inland of the Carolina coast, the Union 
forces corduroyed roads at a breakneck pace and built bridges faster than the retreating 
Confederates could burn them. When confronted with the unstoppable forward 
movement of Sherman’s columns, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston proclaimed, 
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“I made up my mind that there had been no such army in existence since the days of 
Julius Caesar.” As they entered towns, with Roman resolve they left little standing. An 
officer noted, “In Georgia few houses were burned, here few escaped.” In Barnwell, 
Union troops spared little, and one witness reported the soldiers “behaved more like 
enraged tigers than human beings, running all over the town, kicking down fences, 
breaking in doors and smashing glasses, also stealing and tearing up clothing.” Following 
the ravaging of the town, Sherman’s cavalry commander, General Hugh Judson 
Kilpatrick put it to the torch, reporting to his superior, “We have changed the name of 
Barnwell to Burnwell,” eerily reminiscent of Jacobin rechristening in the advent of 
victory.27 
On 17 February 1865, Union troops moved into Columbia, and Sherman tacitly 
professed that the state capital would be saved from burning. In spite of the assurances, 
however, even Sherman’s staff understood what was likely in store for the city. Major 
Thomas Fitzgibbon told a citizen, “This is a doomed city. The whole army knows it. I 
doubt a house will be left standing.” By evening, half of Sherman’s forces were in or near 
the city, and the small fires set by the retreating Confederate troops that had marked the 
day were spread and encouraged until the city was overwhelmed. The troops ordered to 
fight the fires could not keep up with other soldiers setting them, and amidst the flames, 
infantrymen pillaged and uplifted anything of value, especially the stores of liquor found 
in a local distillery. Major General John A. Logan reported, “the citizens had received our 
                                                
27 Johnston quoted in McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 828; Officer quoted in 
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 826; Barnwell witness quoted in Davis, Sherman's 
March, 149; Kilpatrick quoted in Davis, Sherman's March, 149; Davis, Sherman's 
March, 147; Glatthaar, The March to the Sea, 15; McPherson, This Mighty Scourge, 119. 
 
  239 
soldiers with bucketfuls of liquor…and for a while all control was lost over the 
disorganized mass.” Other soldiers and officers, however, remarked that even without the 
alcohol, Columbia would have burned anyway because it was seen as the birthplace of 
the Confederacy.28 
As the fires raged throughout the night and the next morning, the scenes of the 
inferno created a dramatic backdrop. One local wrote, 
 
Imagine night turning into noonday, only with a blazing, scorching glare that was 
horrible—a copper-colored sky across which swept columns of black rolling 
smoke glittering with sparks and flying embers.…Everywhere the palpitating 
blaze walling the streets as far as the eye could reach—filling the air with its 
terrible roar.…Every instant came the crashing of timbers and the thunder of 
falling buildings. A quivering molten ocean seemed to fill the air and sky. The 
Library building opposite us seemed framed by the gushing flames and smoke, 
while through the windows gleamed the liquid fire. 
 
Even with renewed efforts to douse the flames, it was not until a change in the wind in 
the late afternoon on 18 February that soldiers finally brought the firestorm under control. 
Viewing the decimation of the city in the daylight, an infantryman wrote home that “her 
black ruins will stand as a warning of more terrible things to come” should the war 
continue. Sherman’s quartermaster, Colonel Michael C. Garber later remembered, “The 
fire was terrible, the scenes too horrible to describe.…My estimate is that forty blocks 
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were burned.” His estimate was close: the army razed some 366 acres, including most 
houses, storefronts, and other buildings.29 
Though disturbed by the reports of the extent of his men’s plundering, Sherman 
later noted, “I would have pardoned them for anything short of treason.” The havoc 
wreaked upon Columbia reinforced his belief that “the more awful you can make war, the 
sooner it will be over.…War is hell, at the best.” And, while the level of destruction 
likely surprised even Sherman, he eventually argued the ruination of the city “hastened 
what we all fought for, the end of the war.”30 
On 20 February, Sherman’s columns left the ruins of Columbia behind them and 
continued their march across the cradle of the rebellion. Back in the countryside, the 
bummers returned to foraging liberally and the rest of the army set about to destroy 
whatever they found. As their intentionally slow campaign dragged on, not only was the 
slackening train of supplies reaching Lee in Virginia apparent, but as news of the Union 
depredations reached Confederate soldiers in the trenches, it led to desertions as they left 
to tend their ruined farms and homes. By the time the columns reached North Carolina, 
one Union lieutenant wrote, “South Carolina may have been the cause of this whole 
thing, but she has had an awful punishment.” Another Federal declared of their sojourn in 
the state, “our army did not feel bound by the ordinary restraints of human warfare.” 
Finally, a major from Ohio noted, “The country behind us is left a howling wilderness, an 
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utter desolation” with at least eighteen towns or cities nearly burned out of existence as if 
the army was practicing a sort of cruel purification ritual.31 
As they marched out of the state, commanders reissued orders for restraint to 
reign in the more egregious acts tolerated in the home of secession. North Carolina, home 
of a large Unionist minority and the last state to secede, faced the same fate as Georgia, 
with one Ohio soldier remarking, “Our troops are not plundering near as much as they did 
in South Carolina, there being many loyal people in this state.” An officer noted after two 
days in the tarheel state, “Not a single column of fire or smoke which a few days ago 
marked the positions of heads of column, can be seen on the horizon. Not a house was 
burned, and the army gave to the people more than it took from them.” South Carolina 
faced a unique fate in the Civil War as Lyons had in the French Revolution. Soldiers’ 
perception of the state’s anti-federal tradition reaching back decades marked it for special 
consideration as the view of Lyons as the home of French federalism set it apart. In both 
cases, their marring resulted from the confluence of an evolution of total war mentality, 
vengeance, and the desire to set an example for the remaining rebellious regions.32 
While Sherman’s March to the Sea was a major blow to the confederacy, it was 
but one part of a larger effort by Grant to unleash total war on the Confederate States of 
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America. Though the destruction was great, the brunt was localized to the borders of 
South Carolina generally and Columbia and a few other towns specifically. The events 
there paled in comparison to the totality that Philip Sheridan’s Army of the Shenandoah 
would wreak over the same period of time in the fertile western reaches of Virginia. 
Though he had half the number of troops, Sheridan’s men trampled and desolated an 80 
mile swath systematically in the same amount of time Sherman’s men covered 900 miles 
of mountains, swamps, and plains. Taken together, however, they destroyed the South’s 
ability to support an army, and pressured the last major force standing, the Army of 
Northern Virginia. 
 
Systematic Terror 
The Vendée and the Shenandoah Valley 
 
Far beyond the localized destruction in Lyons, the intensity of violence erupting 
in the civil war in the Vendée eclipsed anything else in the French Revolution.33 Within 
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the same small region in western France, a rebel army rose and fell, a guerrilla war 
emerged, and a massive, battle-hardened army was dispatched to “pacify” the territory. In 
the midst of this conflagration, the excesses of the Terror occasionally present in other 
parts of France flourished to a never before seen level, and the sheer brutality of the 
repression was enough to shock even many Jacobins in Paris. In this context, the 
systematic destruction of the Vendée and its people is one of the most glaring examples 
of total war before the twentieth century. 
The turmoil in the Vendée began with both the burden of victory in the war with 
Austria and worsened with the subsequent reversals. As French armies moved beyond 
their own borders before shrinking back in defeat, their manpower had become strained 
and conscription was the only option. In February 1793, the Convention approved a levée 
en masse which led to revolts all over France, but the most organized and problematic 
area was the Department of the Vendée on the southern side of the River Loire. 
The Vendée Militaire, as the region became known, was rooted in traditions and 
jealous of its autonomy, like most of the rural provinces, but not morally opposed to the 
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Revolution in 1789. In a place where education was nominal and the day to day activities 
of the largely peasant population had changed little over the last century, the political 
world of Paris was simply not of concern. They were willing to support actions directly 
benefiting their daily lives, such as the end of feudal dues and the tithe, but unwilling to 
have their livelihood placed in jeopardy by fighting a foreign war. This was compounded 
within a few years by the organizational turmoil of the Revolution: the people of the 
provinces felt local authority had been lost in the new structures and began to 
mythologize the old days, selectively remembering how peaceful and quiet it had been. 
Vendeans continued to protest the revolutionary government over administrative 
redistricting and the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, both issues which directly 
interfered with their autonomy and unusually strong faith. The appearance of conscription 
officers to enforce the levée, however, ignited a spark among an already restive 
population. In an area largely made up of farmers, exemption from such laws had ranked 
high among their original protests against the Ancien Régime since unattended fields 
could not produce. Vendeans believed the new government, by ignoring such issues, 
crossed the line and entrenched growing rebellious attitudes even further. In addition, the 
military officers evoked memories of tax farmers and the hated Intendants of the kings, 
who had functioned much like the revolutionary représentants en mission; their presence 
pushed the Vendeans over the edge, with one peasant reporting, “We’ve been led like 
sheep, we’re going to become like lions.” Clandestine meetings between dissenting local 
authorities and inhabitants grew, sometimes overflowing into riots. What began as simple 
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revolts, within a few months became large-scale military engagements between the army 
of the Republic and a peasant army under the banner of the Church and King.34 
The initial outbreaks of revolt were small and contained. On 6 and 7 March 1793 
implementation orders for the levée arrived as well as orders for the National Guard to 
close churches and chapels served by recalcitrant priests. In response, peasants and 
weavers in the village of Cholet killed the commander of the local Guard, also a 
prominent manufacturer. Several days later the town of Machecoul was invaded by the 
peasant rebels who brutally killed several hundred more pro-government townspeople, 
including the tax assessor, and burned the municipal buildings, the tax books, and the 
flags of the Guards. The same week Saint-Florent-le-Vieil on the Loire was overrun and 
captured by the now better organized peasant bands. Republican troops in the region 
totaled about 1,600 ill-equipped and poorly trained soldiers and as affluent Vendeans fled 
to Orleans and Blois, their reports of the growing unrest began reaching authorities. 
As news of the revolts spread, so did the revolts themselves. Villagers fortified 
their hamlets along the Loire River with men and cannon, and fired upon the Republican 
forces on the opposite banks. After interviewing a rebel leader, a Republican officer 
ominously reported, “They are determined to fight to the death; nothing will be able to 
defeat them but fire and sword.” Eventually, enough peasants massed to warrant larger 
action, and on 19 March they ambushed a Republican garrison of 3,000 men. The same 
day, the Convention, pushed by fears of an ‘aristocratic plot,’ issued a decree “providing 
for execution within twenty-four hours of any person caught [in the Vendée] with 
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weapons or wearing the white cockade.” Much like the later tactics of the Union army, 
the Republican forces proposed “burning the woods into which the brigands…retreat 
when pursued [and] demolition of all the mills set up in occupied territory that we 
traverse without being able to hold.”35 
The army of peasants, under the loose banner of the “Catholic and Royal Army,” 
easily outmatched and outnumbered the remaining Republican units. The rural army, 
numbering at times between 25,000 and 40,000 ‘regulars,’ was mostly led by retired 
nobles who had served in the royal army, which confirmed in the minds of the Jacobins 
the presence of an aristocratic counterrevolutionary plot against the Revolution. They 
were far from a rag-tag band of partisans, however, and showed themselves capable of 
victory in battle formations against professional soldiers. In the spring and summer of 
1793, the rebels were unmatched and continued to expand their territory until 
Republicans successfully repelled their 24 June assault on Nantes, though they were 
unable to reclaim any lost ground. 
Following the siege, the Republican response was one of containment and 
preparation. Authorities dissolved local governmental councils, began manufacturing and 
collecting weapons and ammunition, established tribunals, and approved the immediate 
execution of the condemned. Without sufficient troops to quell the area, available units 
focused on keeping the rebellion from spreading beyond the Vendée. The rebel defeat at 
Nantes had also allowed the army to regroup and reorganize: the military staff was 
replaced with career officers and the Republican forces were supplemented with both 
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new recruits and nearly 20,000 veterans. As new supplies and equipment flooded in, loyal 
citizens flocked to recruitment posts to fill the ranks.36 
The National Convention in Paris was determined to destroy the rebels and 
protect the gains of the Revolution, especially as other regions of France like Lyons were 
amidst insurrection. When their debate began in July 1793, Committee of Public Safety 
member and Jacobin Bertrand Barère placed the Vendée at the center of the Revolution’s 
success. He argued, 
 
The inexplicable Vendée…threatens to become a dangerous volcano.…The 
Vendée is the hope of external enemies and the rallying point for internal 
enemies…That is the target that must be struck to strike them with the same blow. 
Destroy the Vendée! Valenciennes and Condé will no longer be under the control 
of the Austrians; the English will no longer trouble Dunkirk; the Rhine will be 
freed from the Prussians; Spain will be taken apart…Destroy the Vendée! And 
Lyons will no longer exist, Toulon will revolt against the Spanish and the English, 
and the spirit of Marseille will rise again to the heights of the Republican 
revolution.…The Vendée…is where we must strike.…We must bring desolation 
to their very endurance.”37 
 
Following Barère’s lead, Jacobins in the Convention moved to mobilize the forces of the 
Revolution against the rebels. Their solution was to be swift, sure, and total. 
On 1 August 1793, the Committee of Public Safety introduced a bill of fifteen 
articles in the Convention, quickly passed, decreeing the “destruction” of the Vendée. 
The bill ordered battle-hardened troops to the Vendée fresh from the siege in Mainz. 
Article 6 directed the Minister of War to begin sending “combustible materials of all 
kinds” in order “to burn the woods, thickets, and gardens” in the insurgent region. Article 
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7 ordered the army to “cut down the forests, raze the houses of rebels, destroy crops and 
harvests, and seize livestock.” Article 14 declared that all property belonging to the rebels 
confiscated by the Republic and redistributed as compensation to patriots. It concluded, 
“women, children, and the aged are to be evacuated to the interior,” and commanders 
would be held responsible for excesses. As the new, energized forces began to chase 
down the rebel army, they applied these tactics at every turn.38 
When military action resumed in force in September 1793, a tried and 
experienced Republican army attacked with ferocity. Two représentants en mission in the 
region wrote to the Convention, “fire and sword are the only weapon we use” in fighting 
the rebels. Radiating out from the city of Nantes, by 17 October Republican forces had 
captured the rebel stronghold of Cholet, and the Vendean army and people pulled out of 
their home territory. They crossed the Loire and headed north to assault the city of 
Granville on the coast in a desperate attempt to elicit English support. As with Nantes, 
though, they were unable to assault a major town and turned back to face the oncoming 
Republican army.39 
On 16 December, the insurgent army was crushed at Le Mans, where ten 
thousand were left dead, and those who struggled on were cut down in pursuit before 
Christmas. After the battle, Division General François Séverin Marceau wrote, “Our 
soldiers butchered them horribly in town and pursued them so relentlessly on the road 
                                                
38 Savary, Guerres des Vendéens, 1:424-430; Decree quoted in Martin, La Vendée, 196; 
Mayer, The Furies, 336-337; Schama, Citizens, 789; Furet, Revolutionary France, 139; 
Furet, “Vendée,” 167; Martin, La Vendée, 195-196; Secher, Le génocide franco-
française, 104, 115-117. 
 
39 Representatives quoted in Secher, Le génocide franco-française, 118; Furet, “Vendée,” 
167. 
  249 
that they soon overtook not a few stragglers but the entire rear guard.…Soon the whole 
road was covered with the dead.…they showed the fighters no mercy.” Assessing their 
toll, he concluded, “I evaluate their losses for the day as at least seven thousand men of 
their best troops.…Ours amounted to no more than twenty dead.” This brutality, 
however, marked only the beginning of the destruction of the Vendée. What followed the 
defeat of the rebel army was, if at all possible, more brutal. By late December, 
Republican soldiers had repressed the rebellion, and Paris demanded the enforcement of 
the punitive August decree south of the Loire. To that end, the army under General 
Louis-Marie Turreau planned a systematic decimation of the countryside.40 
While the Republican army was organizing itself for the coming repression, 
Vendean peasants rose again in rebellion in January 1794. In spite of proclamations 
promising amnesty, they refused to surrender because the previous fall government 
troops massacred those who laid down arms. In response, Republicans debated how to 
destroy the rebels once and for all. General Charles-Philippe Ronsin suggested mass 
deportations to Madagascar and others suggested using poisons and toxins to kill en 
masse. In the end, however, they settled on Turreau’s plan for implementing the 1 August 
edict. The 20,000 battle hardened soldiers would be joined by some 83,000 more troops. 
This hundred thousand-strong Armée de l’Ouest would feature a core of 30,000-40,000 
soldiers divided into the twelve colonnes infernales and cris-cross the entire region 
burning and destroying all in their paths. The représentants en mission further 
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supplemented these actions by traversing the region behind the infernal columns, 
confiscating property for eventual sale.41 
Realizing the extreme harshness that would be required for this campaign against 
all citizens in the Vendée regardless of the cautions against harming women and children 
in the August edict, Turreau sought direct and explicit orders. Writing to the Committee 
in mid-January 1794 to secure himself against future recriminations, he asked for 
“express authorization or a decree to burn all the towns, villages, and hamlets of the 
Vendée that are not on the side of the Revolution and that constantly supply new support 
for fanaticism and the monarchy.” When he did not receive a reply Turreau wrote again: 
 
This great measure must be prescribed by you.…I am merely the passive agent of 
the legislature’s will; you must decide in advance the fate of women and children 
I will meet in the revolting country. If they must all be put to the sword, I cannot 
carry out such a measure without a decree covering my responsibility. 
 
Turreau well understood the breech in the traditional rules of war that the 1 August 
decree connoted, and he wanted to be certain that the Convention understood what they 
were asking.42 
Finally, Committee member Lazare Carnot replied, “Exterminate the brigands to 
the last, that is your duty.” The same day Paris also communicated its approval to a 
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représentant en mission in the region: “Kill the brigands instead of burning the 
farms…totally crush the horrible Vendée…[and] the entirety of that race of brigands.” 
Under the heading “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, or Death,” Turreau publicly proclaimed 
his orders: 
 
All the brigands found with weapons, or convicted of having taken up arms…put 
to the bayonet. The same thing will be done to women and children.…Nor will 
persons who are merely suspect be spared. All the villages, towns, woods, and 
everything that can be burned will be consigned to the flames. 
 
Regardless of the holocaust his words implied, however, Turreau understood that while 
his campaign would be brutal, these published orders were more for effect and warning 
than implementation—certain lines would not be crossed. In practice, he would remove 
women, children, and the aged from the area and focus his attacks on partisans and 
rebels, though anyone remaining was subject to the harshest punishments.43 
Turreau’s eventual orders to his forces, moreover, were much more limited than 
his proclamation: all remaining rebel army prisoners regardless of age or sex would be 
subject to summary execution; villages and all that was within their limits would be 
burned to the ground; “beasts, grain, and objects of subsistence” would be removed or 
destroyed; all works and fortifications would be demolished, repairs to destroyed 
property would be halted, and any other resources found would be eliminated. He further 
ordered his men to entrench their positions on the borders of the region and disarm all 
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towns and villages. His plan set, Turreau organized his massive force and began the 
“pacification” of the Vendée in late January 1794. For the next four months until 15 May, 
his colonnes infernales trampled the Vendée with flame and sword, creating a 
“devastated circle where an epidemic of cruelty, a death of subsistence, and the iron 
vengeance of republicans” in the region.44 
During the four long months of the pacification, Turreau’s lieutenants reported 
daily of their efforts. General Caffin wrote, “For the good of the Republic, Les 
Echaubrognes is no more; there is not a single house left. Nothing escaped from the 
national vengeance.” General Grignon declared, “I am still continuing to have provisions 
removed, to burn and kill all who bore arms against us.” General Cordelier reported, “My 
orders have been promptly executed and, at this moment, forty farms are illuminating the 
countryside.” On 6 May 1794 when his troops ended their march through the Vendée, 
Turreau wrote to the Committee, “The Republic has been entirely purged of the villains,” 
and while his and his officer’s reports suggest as much, the reality was a far less thorough 
devastation.45 
Regardless of the rhetoric during the campaign suggesting the entire western side 
of France was a wasteland of flame and blood, the pacification largely followed 
Turreau’s plan. One observer put the totality of the destruction in perspective, writing of 
the army, 
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They have burned all the villages and cottages, massacred some of the remaining 
peasants, burned wheat and grasses in the barns and on the threshing fields; killed 
or devoured a countless number of ewes, sheep, and cattle; carried off or 
destroyed all the horses and mules; consumed in flames all the wool, linen, and 
flax, and all the furniture. 
 
A lack of accurate accounting hinders any comprehensive totals of the destruction, but as 
many as 117,000 Vendeans disappeared between the 1792 and 1802 census, though it is 
unlikely all perished in the 1793 war and 1794 pacification. While many fell during the 
war proper and others were, in fact, massacred during the post-war rise in partisan 
warfare, birth rates during the period fell and many people removed by force or 
circumstance never returned. In addition, only around 10,000 houses, twenty percent of 
the pre-revolutionary total, were burned despite 100,000 soldiers marauding for four 
months in an area roughly the size of Massachusetts.46 
While the destruction of the Vendée was far from total, the strategy of the 
campaign can only be described by that word. Though incapable of actually destroying 
everything, Turreau’s pacification was a systematic and concerted effort to subject an 
entire region to what Lyons had suffered, in the process blurring the distinction between 
civilian and combatant. While he hoped that his actions would prevent any further 
insurrections in France, others feared his tactics would only re-incite the people to 
rebellion. In time and in the tradition of revolutionary blame, however, he was attacked 
for not being brutal enough. 
 
* * * 
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Like the Vendée, the Shenandoah Valley on the northwesternmost edge of 
Virginia after West Virginia seceded was a distinctive region in the Confederacy.47 At 
the time of the Civil War, the Valley was one of the most fertile areas of the South, one 
that a Union soldier described as still “a perfect paradise on earth” when he saw it in 
Spring 1864.48 It was responsible for most of the wheat and grain going to Robert E. 
Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, and the majority of its people were committed to the 
rebellion. In addition, from early in the war the Valley’s use as an attack corridor was 
noted by both sides. Beginning in 1862, Lee used Stonewall Jackson in the valley to feign 
attacks on the North to relieve pressure on his own army. Lee himself had used the valley 
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in 1862 and 1863 for moving many of his troops into and out of the North for the battles 
of Antietam and Gettysburg. The Union army had simply never been able to spare 
enough troops to overwhelm their adversaries more accustomed to the terrain in the 
Shenandoah. This situation changed in 1864 when Grant and Lee were entrenched at 
Petersburg and the Union had surplus units for other endeavors. 
Grant’s attempt to reign in the usefulness of the Shenandoah began poorly in late 
Spring 1864 as an attempt to distract Lee, but a change in tactics and command brought a 
fresh spark. Rather than drive the Confederate army out once again, Grant ordered the 
“utter destruction” of the Valley’s resources. General David Hunter, who had lost his 
command when he freed slaves in South Carolina in 1862 to the ire of Lincoln, was given 
an army of 18,000 men to “eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they go.” The 
devastation of the region was to be so thorough that “crows flying over it for the balance 
of this season will have to carry their provender with them.” Grant demanded that 
Hunter’s army “make all the Valley…a desert as high as possible…and the people 
notified to move out.” The experienced subordinate understood and was prepared to 
follow Grant’s total war strategy.49 
After some initial gains in May 1864, Hunter decided to march on Lynchburg and 
destroy the railroad there. On 10 June, however, retreating Confederate cavalry burned a 
bridge and forced his army to stop at Lexington. When locals fired upon the Federals 
from buildings on the Virginia Military Institute campus, Hunter ordered the retaliatory 
burning of the school. When he then found former Virginia governor John Letcher’s 
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pamphlet “inciting the population of the country to rise and wage a guerrilla warfare on 
my troops,” he ordered the Southerner’s estate burned for violating his 24 May orders 
against promoting “unlawful and uncivilized warfare.” Similarly, when a local was 
accused of “feeding and harboring guerrillas,” Hunter’s men burned all of her 
possessions and marched her six miles by foot to a detention camp.50 
One southern paper declared Hunter’s depredations in the Valley “the most 
wanton and barbaric acts of the war.” Such exaggerated reports of Union actions pushed 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis to send reinforcements to the Valley rather than 
for the defense of Atlanta, paving the way for Sherman’s capture and occupation of the 
city a few months later. In July 1864, Jubal Early and a corps of 13,000 men arrived to 
face Hunter and quickly pushed him into West Virginia, before trying to relieve pressure 
on Lee. As Jackson before him, Early used the Valley as a corridor for invasion, from 
where he threatened Washington and burned the city of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania 
after the citizens refused to cowl to his extortive demands.51 
Early’s excursion into the North received Grant’s attention, but did not force the 
hoped-for withdrawal from the trenches. Grant reinforced Washington, but Early slipped 
back into Virginia without capture. Incensed by the escape and pushed by Lincoln, Grant 
created the Army of the Shenandoah to replace Hunter’s forces and assigned career 
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horseman Major General Philip H. Sheridan with the command. Grant ordered his 
longtime subordinate to fight his way “south of the enemy and follow him to his death,” a 
direct and aggressive approach which Lincoln thought “exactly right.”52 
On 6 August 1864, five days and seventy-one years after the Convention issued 
its punitive orders on the Vendée, Sheridan took his new command and received Grant’s 
expectations for the coming campaign: “It is desirable that nothing should be left to invite 
the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your 
command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy.” He continued with a word of caution, 
“It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed…but the people should be 
informed that so long as an army can subsist among them recurrences of these raids must 
be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.” To accomplish these 
goals, Sheridan was provided nearly 8,000 cavalry and 35,000 infantry, the highest 
infantry-to-cavalry ratio of the entire war and providing him great mobility and 
flexibility.53 
The Army of the Shenandoah was ready for a fight, understanding the necessity of 
the campaign. They saw that even four years into the war, the Valley was in the words of 
one soldier “the richest country we have ever campaigned in,” providing plentiful forage. 
Another wrote of the Southerners facing them, “I wish we could Ketch them Some place 
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and Kill; every Son of the Bitch the[y] are nothing but Regular Raiders and Thieves.” On 
26 August, while Sheridan was waiting for the opportunity to strike, Grant re-emphasized 
his desires: “Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all 
descriptions, and negroes, so as to prevent further planting.” He continued in harsher 
language, “If the war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a 
barren waste.” Sheridan put his men to work burning crops, grain, and barns and driving 
off all livestock around Winchester. This would mark only the beginning of such 
action.54 
Following a series of defensive moves designed to make Early think he was 
reluctant to fight, Sheridan received news on 16 September that Lee was withdrawing 
units from Early’s command to reinforce at Petersburg. Within hours, Sheridan’s army 
began to lighten itself, preparing for a fast-moving campaign. Units abandoned all but the 
essentials, leaving regimental wagons, baggage, and those unable to fight in their camps. 
They would move forward with only a minimal train to ensure speed and take whatever 
they needed through foraging.55 
Sheridan’s forces met Early just outside of Winchester, and within a short time, 
Early fled south in defeat. At Fisher’s Hill the next day, Early’s army, barely reorganized 
from the previous defeat, was overrun again and retreated all the way to Charlottesville. 
This left the Shenandoah Valley empty save for Sheridan’s forces. At the turn of events, a 
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Pennsylvania sergeant remarked, “The Rebels are scarce in the Shenandoah Valley just 
now.” It was in this period where there was no large opposition in front of him and after 
sweeping down the Valley some eighty miles from the Potomac to Harrisonburg that 
Sheridan reorganized to carry out Grant’s 14 July 1864 order to “eat out Virginia” and 
make the Valley a “barren waste.”56 
After establishing his command at Harrisonburg, Sheridan decided, like Sherman, 
that “it was time to bring the war home to a people engaged in raising crops to feed the 
country’s enemies.” While “death is popularly considered the maximum punishment in 
war,” he mused, “reduction to poverty bring prayers for peace more surely and more 
quickly than does the destruction of human life.” Sheridan proposed to remain at 
Harrisonburg a few days longer, and then “go on and clean out the Valley.” He would 
send his troopers eight to ten miles south to Staunton where they would lay waste to 
everything in front of them before beginning a mass retrograde withdrawal down the 
valley with torches. Sheridan, fearing a counterattack despite his victories, believed that 
“the best policy will be to let the burning of crops of the Valley be the end of this 
campaign,” which would deliver “a terrible blow” to the ability of the Valley to support 
an army. He concluded, “When this is completed the Valley, from Winchester up to 
Staunton, ninety-two miles, will have but little in it for man or beast.”57 
                                                
56 Henry Kaiser quoted in Wert, From Winchester to Cedar Creek, 134; Official Records, 
Series 1, XXXVII, Part 2, 300-301, Vol. XLIII, Part 1, 822, 917; Wert, From Winchester 
to Cedar Creek, 140. For detailed descriptions of the Battles of 3rd Winchester and 
Fisher’s Hill, see Wert, From Winchester to Cedar Creek, 47-134; McPherson, Battle Cry 
of Freedom, 777-778. 
 
57 Sheridan, Memoirs, 266-267; Official Records, Series 1, XLIII, Part 1, 31, Part 2, 209-
210, 249; Pond, The Shenandoah Valley in 1864, 194-195; Wert, From Winchester to 
  260 
Between 26 September and 6 October 1864, Sheridan’s troopers operated south of 
his command post with orders to “destroy all the mills, forage, and provisions, and to 
retreat, leaving behind us a country incapable of supporting an army.” The destruction 
was not total, but comprehensive: houses were burned with strong cause; all barns and 
farming implements found were torched; all mills, foundries, or any other productive 
works were decimated; all livestock was driven off with the infantry column or killed; all 
fields burned; and all grain confiscated or destroyed. If provisions were found in excess, 
soldiers were allowed to carry away what they could and the rest would be burned. Even 
Unionist property was targeted; the only exception was for widows.58 
For the most part, the troops and their officers refrained from looting, but there 
were those who took advantage of the situation by demanding payment for sparing 
something from the fire, only to have it burned by another unit an hour later. At other 
times, soldiers entered areas, piling everything of value into one area, taking what they 
wanted to keep, and burning the rest. A Federal from Rhode Island remarked that during 
the ten days spent south of Harrisonburg “the fire demon reigned supreme.” Another 
Union soldier noted, “The whole country is wrapped in flames” and “the heavens are 
aglow.” Similarly, after seeing the devastation firsthand a few days later, a Confederate 
soldier wrote home, “The enemy have desolated this country burnt nearly all the ground 
& barns. It is horrible. I have never seen anything equal to it. I do not known what will 
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become of the people. They must suffer. We can’t subsist in this Valley this winter.” 
Coming to this same realization and fearing the starvation of the people, Sheridan posted 
notice he would grant safe passage through his lines to the rear, eventually sending some 
400 wagons of refugees north.59 
Once the Union cavalry had made their way back to Harrisonburg, Sheridan 
reported to Grant, “I have devastated the Valley from Staunton down to Mount Crawford 
and will continue. The destruction of mills, grain, forage, foundries, &c., is very great.” 
He noted that, “The people here are getting sick of the war; heretofore they have had no 
reason to complain because they have been living in great abundance.” His words were 
echoed by his men. A private wrote of the Confederates, “They have tasted the bitter fruit 
of secession, and have had enough of it. They find that it does not satisfy, that it was a 
poor remedy for their imaginary grievances.” An army chaplain from New York wrote, 
“War is terrible in its effects, but the Rebels should have anticipated this before they 
ventured to test its scathing scourages.” While Sheridan felt his actions were producing 
the intended effect, he had no intention of stopping.60 
On 6 October, Sheridan began his withdrawal en masse. He divided his 43,000 
men into four columns of cavalry with torches, creating a broad rear guard from the 
river’s banks to the mountain chains on either side, and a fifth column of infantry, 
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supplies, and refugees in the middle. As they marched northward, they overwhelmed the 
whole of the Shenandoah. A New Yorker from the infantry reported, 
 
The cavalry swept across the whole breadth of the valley of the 
Shenandoah.…The order to transform the valley into a barren waste and leave 
nothing which would tempt the enemy to return was carried out with unsparing 
severity. Before the army was a fertile region filled with stores of an abundant 
harvest just gathered; behind was a devastated region. 
 
With the objective to strip bare all ground behind them, the American colonnes infernales 
were determined to “wipe out the stain the Valley” from all usefulness to the 
Confederacy.61 
In their grim task the cavalry proved quite efficient, creating a dramatic and 
terrible scene. A Michigan cavalryman noted, “Clouds of smoke marked the passage of 
the Federal army.” To a Pennsylvania footsoldier, “the blackened face of the 
country…bore frightful testimony to fire and sword.” An Ohio trooper noted, “A heavy 
cloud of smoke hung over the whole valley like a pall.” Members of Sheridan’s own staff 
were even struck by the devastation they were causing. Major Benjamin W. 
Crowninshield reported, “Nobody who was one of that army will ever forget the scenes 
of our retreat. By day the smoke obscured the sun; by night a lurid sky reflected the glare 
of burning barns and stacks of grain and hay for twice twenty-four hours.” General 
Wesley Merritt later wrote that “the cavalry was…burning, destroying, or taking away 
everything of value, or likely to become of value, to the enemy. It was a severe 
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measure…but it was necessary as a measure of war.” Other soldiers had similar reactions. 
A Connecticut infantryman wrote of the scene, “It was a woeful sight for civilized eyes; 
but as a warlike measure it was very effective.”62 
Confederates also took note of Sheridan’s actions. One Southern soldier angrily 
wrote, “On every side, from mountain to mountain the flames from all the barns, mills, 
grain and hay stacks, and in very many instances dwellings too, were blazing skyward, 
leaving a smoky trail of desolation to mark the footsteps of the devil’s inspector-general.” 
Another simply remarked that the Valley was “almost literally reduced to ashes” by the 
Union progression. Remembering the scenes after the war, a Richmond newspaperman 
roared, “The horror and crime of this devastation was remarkable even in Yankee 
warfare. They impoverished a whole population; they reduced women and children to 
beggary and starvation; they left the black monuments of Yankee atrocity” everywhere.63 
The burning ended on 9 October 1864 when Sheridan’s forces reached Strasburg, 
Virginia. They had left an area ninety-two miles long and twenty-five miles wide as close 
to a desert as was possible. Estimates were that each day his reincarnated infernal 
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columns destroyed enough wheat to subsist the Confederate army for a year in addition to 
roughly 2,000 barns and several hundred houses burned, 4,000 to 5,000 heads of 
livestock confiscated, and just as many killed. Union cavalry commander General W. H. 
Powell reported that the area left behind on his route was “left in such a condition as to 
barely leave subsistence for the inhabitants.”64 
Despite these bleak predictions and numerous claims of causing millions of 
dollars in damages, much like the Vendée, the resources of the Valley were far from 
decimated. When compared to pre-war numbers, the tallies provided by the Army of the 
Shenandoah, even when the four years of war are considered, reach only around seven to 
eight percent of some crops. As in western France in 1794, the burning was widespread 
and dramatic, but not total. Moreover, while distinctions between military and civilian 
property was blurred more than in other campaigns during the Civil War, the line 
between solider and noncombatant only failed when the specter of partisan warfare 
emerged. While casualties from the battles before, during, and after the burning reached 
some 10,000 Confederates regulars, the toll from guerrilla ambushes and reprisals 
represented only a small addition. When the line was crossed, however, Union forces 
could act with a ferocity reminiscent of their French forbearers.65 
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Of Brigands and Bushwhackers 
Guerrilla Warfare in the Vendée and the American Civil War 
 
The war in the Vendée was a two-sided event. While the Republican Army was 
charged with and succeeded in defeating the peasant and noble “Catholic and Royal” 
army, the fight devolved into a brutish insurgent war well before the battle at Le Mans on 
16 December 1793. In their typical revolutionary zeal and rhetorical flair, French 
commanders routinely referred to the Vendean rebels as “brigands,” in an attempt to 
dehumanize them. Their representation, however, did have a basis in truth, as the 
Vendeans proved on numerous occasions willing to massacre surrendering Republican 
troops, pro-Paris townspeople, and anyone associated with the government at any level. 
It was in this environment that French troops broke away from the commonly 
held rules of war and instead chose to give no quarter to captured or fallen rebels. In the 
words of one general, “It is a war of brigands, and we must all be brigands. At this 
moment we must forget military rules, we must fall in a mass on these scoundrels and 
pursue them without mercy.”66 In such a world and mindset, it is not difficult to imagine 
the atrocities committed by both sides. 
As early as April 1793 when the Republican presence in the Vendée was at its 
lowest, not taking prisoners, especially in light of rebel actions, was easy to justify. One 
unit, reduced from 1,200 to 500 soldiers after garrisoning reconquered towns, stopped 
taking prisoners, choosing instead to use the bayonet and ad hoc military tribunals. 
Adjutant General Jean Michel Beysser saw the usefulness of such tactics, and further 
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allowed his troops to pillage seized property and burn houses. When rebels fired upon his 
men from church windows, he ordered return fire by cannon in retaliation. And, in one 
“terrible example,” his troops beheaded a rebel captured for murder with an axe against a 
cannon barrel, which Beysser noted “inspired salutary terror and contributed a good deal 
to peace.” This idea is key, since Beysser intended many of these acts as graphic 
examples to horrify the rebels into submission, whether or not they merely provoked a 
new round of retribution in a spiral of violence.67 
Despite the brutality against civilians and the constant back and forth of reprisals, 
Beysser’s tactics were standardized and approved under new legislation and new 
leadership under the assumption that if they had not fled or were not an active part of the 
rebellion, the remaining people of the Vendée tacitly supported or encouraged it. It must 
be noted, however, that after their initial defeats, such retaliatory actions were restricted 
to the outskirts of the Vendée until the larger army arrived to retake the department as a 
whole. When that army did arrive, and especially after it had defeated the rebel army on 
the field, the willingness to engage in ruthlessness could hardly be expected to stop. 
In one such attack on 28 December 1793, after Republican forces had cut down 
the main faction of the Vendean army at Le Mans, General François Joseph Westermann, 
later labeled the “butcher of the Vendée,” attacked Ancenis. When confronted with a 
defeated enemy, he “dreadfully butchered the brigands” and “massacred them all.” In the 
aftermath of his ‘victory’ he reported to the Committee of Public Safety in the language 
of a true revolutionary: 
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There is no more Vendée, Republican citizens. It died beneath our free sword, 
with its women and children. I have just buried it in the swamps and 
woods.…Following the order you gave me, I crushed the children beneath the 
horses’ hooves, massacred the women who, at the least, will bear no more 
brigands. I have not a single prisoner to reproach myself with. I exterminated 
them all. 
 
When the people of the Vendée attempted to rise again the next month, Westermann 
proposed lacing a wagonload of brandy with arsenic and allowing it to be captured. He 
was not alone in his ideas, as représentant en mission Jean-Baptiste Carrier suggested 
tainting the wells of the region with the same toxin and others advised using chemicals to 
“destroy, put to sleep, [and] asphyxiate” the rebels.68 
With the end of the war proper and the beginning of the “destruction” of the 
Vendée in January 1794, the reprisals against “brigands” took on a new centrality to the 
pacification campaign. Without an army to oppose them, the revolutionary forces struck 
out at anyone who might be, have been, or might become a rebel. In Nantes, Carrier 
established a Revolutionary Tribunal to prosecute suspects captured in the rebellion and 
its aftermath. In the rural areas, Turreau’s colonnes infernales swept through villages and 
hamlets shredding any people in their way with fire and sword. 
Carrier ordered the roundup of rebel stragglers as well as any Vendeans in 
possession of weapons based on the Convention’s 19 March 1793 decree. Republicans 
who had fled in the summer also flooded back to their homes, leading the military to 
hideouts and pointing out those rebels who tried to reintegrate into society. The first 
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roundups in early December were so large and “holy mother guillotine” so slow that 
Carrier authorized summary execution by bayonet without trial. When that did not clear 
the backlog, Carrier resorted to mass executions in order to empty the prisons. In one 
terrible innovation, rebels and suspects were bound and drowned in the Loire. One citizen 
reported to a friend in the Convention, 
 
My friend, I inform you with pleasure that the brigands are thoroughly 
destroyed.…Because shooting them takes too long and would use up powder and 
bullets, we’ve decided to put a certain number in large ships, to take them to the 
middle of the river…and to sink the ship. This operation is carried out daily. 
 
Carrier alternatively termed the method “vertical deportation in the national bathtub” and 
“patriotic baptism,” and on 10 December coolly remarked, “What a revolutionary torrent 
the Loire is!” Carrier’s enthusiasm for his work, however, failed to produce results, 
providing Vendeans fodder for vengeance and eventually leading to his own trial and 
execution.69 
In the countryside, renamed Vendée Vengé—Vendée Avenged—Turreau took 
command of the Armée de l’Ouest in January 1794, and at the time he agreed that the 
Vendean revolt must be repressed for the security of the Revolution. He did not, 
however, agree with the tactics and zeal of Westermann and took a more pragmatic tact. 
He wrote to the Committee of Public Safety with a proposal of amnesty for laying down 
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arms in order to entice desertions from the Vendean ranks; the only reply was a 
reiteration of the August decree. With explicit orders to carry out the destruction in the 
extreme and faced with the intensifying guerrilla war, he followed much the same path as 
the men who came before, but on a grander scale with his columns of fire.70 
In this most destructive and ruthless phase of the civil war in the Vendée, the 
reports from Turreau’s subordinates speak for themselves. One wrote, “As I am writing, I 
am having fourteen women who were denounced to me shot.” Another, “It is going well, 
we are killing more than a hundred a day.…I know that there are patriots in this country. 
No matter, we have to sacrifice all.” His men unleashed, the general began to believe in 
his own tactics.71 
Turreau later justified this viciousness with which he imbued his colonnes 
infernales, arguing that in a war led by illegal “parasites bringing forth anarchy” to 
destroy the legitimate government, actions must be met with equal force under the “law 
of reprisals.” He believed the “most ingenious barbarians” had “under the name of the 
Catholic religion and Louis XVII…tortured, mutilated, torn to pieces…burned…and 
hanged [Republicans] from trees by their feet” as well as executed prisoners of war and 
loyal citizens. In retaliation, Turreau ordered his men to hunt down the rebels to the last, 
and his soldiers “persecuted without respite and exterminated without quarter.”72 
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Turreau eventually declared that in the middle of this “most horrible civil war,” he 
could not stop fighting until he had “exterminated the last brigand.” In his mind, “the 
Vendée must become a national cemetery” or France would be faced with an unending 
conflict in its heartland. In a world where “violent measures were ordered, and ordered 
again, by the National Convention, its committees, and its deputies on mission in the 
West,” he saw the total and utter destruction of the Vendée and its people as the only 
solution that could ever result in peace. His chosen tool, the infernal columns, did 
manage to quell the guerrilla war in the short term, but when the government in Paris fell 
just three months after his campaign ended, tensions in the region flared again.73 
As the problems in the Vendée continued well into Napoleon’s reign, General 
Lazare Hoche noted that the Vendée was merely “a contained volcano, but it is still 
smoldering and new lava can erupt.” He suggested that the government use a carrot and 
stick approach: concede religious toleration and more local authority in order to prevent a 
renewed uprising, in exchange for taxes and conscripts. In the end, Hoche had returned to 
Turreau’s original suggestion.74 
While partisan warfare in the Vendée is difficult to separate out from the rest of 
the conflict, it largely accounted for the brutality of the Republican response. With the 
two conflicts running parallel and in tandem, they fed off of one another, creating a cycle 
of escalation and reprisals which grew beyond all measure. This spiral of violence helps 
account for Carrier’s ferocity in Nantes as well as the deaths on the battlefields and in the 
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towns under the infernal columns. In the “inexplicable” Vendée, the confluence of 
“brigand” warfare with an army campaign changed the nature of the civil war in 
horrifying ways. In the American Civil War, while the line was never quite as blurred, the 
specter of “bushwhackers” hiding and sniping around every corner drove the Union 
Army to new degrees of retaliation against noncombatants in their search for partisans. 
On some occasions they brought forth scenes which would not have been out of place in 
Turreau’s pacification. 
 
The rag-tag nature of the rebellion in the Vendée—an army without a defined 
government, solid command structure, or any real guiding principles beyond stopping 
Parisian predation—only aided in increasing the confusion between combatants and 
civilians. Republican forces had no way of distinguishing members of the defeated rebel 
army from villagers, and thus, the line between the two was for the most part erased in 
the attempt to root out insurrection. In the American South, however, the Confederacy 
and its armed forces had distinct boundaries, and despite their rebellious foundation, tried 
to act and comport themselves as state entities would. In this situation, partisans became 
the catalyst for increasingly harsh and retaliatory measures meted out to civilians; when 
army fought army, the traditional rules of war applied, but when guerrillas preyed upon 
Union troops, the army responded by attacking the people hiding and supporting those 
men. When the North turned to tactics of destroying Southerners’ means of survival, it 
further provoked partisans to act, creating a cycle of escalation as the Union took an 
increasingly more harsh stance in the war. 
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The most volatile region for this type of warfare was Missouri, a border state 
which never seceded, but whose population was split in loyalty. This composition placed 
the state in a special category of its own civil war inside the larger struggle because the 
bulk of the partisan warfare was civilian against civilian, as opposed to when Union 
armies invaded the South proper and the depredations were Southern partisans against 
Federal troops. The rangers of William Clarke Quantrill and “Bloody Bill” Anderson 
wreaked havoc against the people who had kept the state out of the Confederacy. In many 
ways, their campaign was a continuation of the “Bleeding Kansas” wars of the mid-
1850s, though when the Union garrison troops arrived, it crystallized the already ruthless 
campaign. In response, on 30 August 1861, Union General John C. Frémont declared 
“anyone found with weapons would be tried and shot if found guilty” in addition to 
losing their property and slaves. Frémont’s orders would set the tone of Union response 
to guerrilla warfare for the rest of the war, though they were criticized as oppressive and 
dictatorial at the time.75 
Grant was one of the first to escalate the fight against “bushwhackers” outside of 
Missouri. On 11 January 1862 following the discovery of the bodies of four Union 
soldiers, he ordered that if 
 
the assassins were citizens, not regularly organized in the rebel Army, the whole 
country should be cleaned out, for six miles around, and word given that all 
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citizens making their appearance within those limits are liable to be shot.…This 
applies to all classes and conditions, Age and Sex. 
 
He continued that all civilians in the area should be collected at the Union camp, placed 
under guard, and held on pain of death until relieved. Hs subordinate replied, “I shall find 
out who shot the pickets and when I do I shall shoot the guilty parties on very short 
notice.” At the time, however, Grant cautioned that a military commission was preferable 
to summary execution.76 
Six months later while Grant operated on the Mississippi River, Halleck cabled 
that to prevent partisan attacks he should, “take up all active sympathizers, and either 
hold them as prisoners or put them beyond our lines. Handle that class without gloves…it 
is time that they should begin to feel the presence of war.” While Grant and Halleck were 
rhetorically ready to strike at partisans, though, it was Union General John McNeil at 
Palmyra, Missouri who took one of the first serious stands against the problem of 
guerrillas. When a local Unionist disappeared in September 1862, McNeil ordered ten 
Confederate partisans previously captured to be held as hostages for the man’s safe 
return. When the deadline passed, he ordered the executions of the guerrillas. As tensions 
mounted, soldiers expressed their willingness to expand the scope of the war. One 
Indiana sergeant wrote, “I am like the fellow that got his house burned by the 
                                                
76 Official Records, Series 1, Vol. III, 494-495; Brig. Gen. Eleazer A. Paine quoted in 
Neely, The Fate of Liberty, 38; Neely, The Fate of Liberty, 38-39. 
 
  274 
guerrillas…He was in for emancipation subjugation extermination and hell and 
damnation. We are in war and anything to beat the South.”77 
William Sherman progressed towards a punitive guerrilla policy with the others. 
Early in the war he had demanded his troops treat Southerners in a respectful manner, 
admonishing and harshly punishing any soldiers who so much as took foodstuffs in 
towns. Eventually, however, he heeded Grant’s advice on the rough handling of civilians 
in the Mississippi campaigns, and his beliefs on pressuring civilians and rooting out 
partisans grew with his awareness of the tactical advantage of living off the land. 
Highlighting the evolution of his thinking on partisans, in early 1864 Sherman 
wrote to his brother, Ohio Republican Senator John Sherman in cool and rational terms, 
 
So long as non-combatants remain in their houses and keep to their accustomed 
peaceful business, their opinions and prejudices can in no way influence the war, 
and therefore should not be noticed; but if anyone comes out into the public 
streets and creates disorder, he or she should be punished, restrained, or 
banished.…If the people, or any of them, keep up a correspondence with parties 
in hostility, they are spies, and can be punished according to the law with death or 
minor punishment. These are well-established principles of war, and the people of 
the South…have appealed to war, and must abide by its rules. 
 
While restrained in the rhetoric that helped make him famous, Sherman’s words imply 
even those writing to loved ones in the Confederate Army are fair game to be declared 
spies. In less uncertain terms in same month he wrote,  
 
Next year their lands will be taken, for in war we can take them, and rightfully, 
too, and in another year they may beg in vain for their lives…Many, many 
peoples with less pertinacity have been wiped out of national existence.…To 
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those who submit to the rightful law and authority all gentleness and forbearance; 
but to the petulant and persistent secessionists, why, death is mercy, and the 
quicker he or she is disposed of the better. 
 
The message is clear, continued resistance would only breed disaster and destruction for 
the South, its people, and its resources. He was prepared to expand the war to virtually 
any civilians in the South, man or woman, and if they continued, he suggested a 
wholesale depopulation of the South and colonization by the loyal.78 
When his army began their March in late 1864, Sherman put these principles to 
work. He made clear he would rather not have to deal with holding and trying partisans, 
delegating the powers of summary judgment to his generals, and later noted that his men 
had learned a habit of “losing prisoners in the swamp.” When Southerners were caught in 
the act of bushwhacking, Union retaliation was quick and brutal. In one case following 
the death of a trooper, the shooter was gunned down in return before the entire 
neighborhood was set alight. In another incident, when his men found crude landmines in 
their path, Sherman responded by having prisoners clear them ahead of the troops. When 
they protested, he declared to the captured Confederates, “Your people put ‘em there to 
assassinate our men. Is that humanity?...I don’t care a damn if you’re blown up. I’ll not 
have my own men killed like this.” In response to continued harassment—at least 173 of 
his soldiers suffered gruesome deaths at the hands of partisans during his campaign—
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Sherman eventually authorized his commanders to execute a prisoner for each of his 
soldiers killed by partisans.79 
While Sherman’s men were constantly harassed in their march, the opposition 
was never very organized. In contrast, in the Shenandoah Valley the Virginia Rangers of 
Colonel John Mosby hassled and marauded Union troops without relent. No matter how 
thoroughly they defeated Southern armies in the Valley, Federals could never hold the 
ground because too many troops were required to police supply lines and detachments 
against bushwhackers, leading General Wesley Merritt to term the Valley “a paradise of 
bushwhackers and guerrillas.” In response, Philip Sheridan, like his colleague in the 
Carolinas, was prepared to deal harshly with partisans. It was their attacks which greatly 
expanded the war into the realm of noncombatants more than anything else.80 
The attacks began almost as soon as Sheridan arrived; on 9 August 1864 the 
Rangers attempted to kidnap Sheridan himself from his headquarters camp, and daily 
they attacked wagon trains and isolated units. Sheridan reported, “Since I came into the 
Valley…every train, every small party, and every straggler has been bushwhacked.” As a 
solution, Grant suggested that since “the families of most of Mosby’s men are known” 
they can be arrested and taken as hostages “for the good conduct” of his men. But for the 
bushwhackers themselves, if “any of Mosby’s men are caught hang them without trial.” 
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He further wrote that if “all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms” are 
taken prisoner, then “you will get many of Mosby’s men.” Noting the direction the war of 
attrition was heading, Grant continued, “All male citizens under fifty can fairly be held as 
prisoners of war, and not as citizen prisoners. If they are not already soldiers, they will be 
made so the moment the rebel army gets hold of them.”81 
As the crisis escalated, Sheridan took more direct action. On 17 August, he wrote 
to Grant, “We hung one and shot six of his men yesterday.” Two days later the horseman 
issued a general order that “All able-bodied male citizens under the age of fifty who may 
be suspected of aiding, assisting, or belonging to guerrilla bands now infesting the 
country will be immediately arrested…as prisoners of war, to be confined in Fort 
McHenry, MD.” His men were also beginning to see the changes in accepted forms of 
warfare. One officer wrote, “The people are honest farmers during the day, but at night 
they arm themselves and mounting their homes are guerrillas and fire upon our pickets 
and destroy our wagon trains if they can overpower the guards.” An Ohio captain 
declared, “It is to be a war of extermination.…It is life or death.” And, a sergeant wrote, 
“Those that are left of us are determined to visit a terrible vengeance upon their murder. 
We are to take no prisoners after this.”82 
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While unable to commit the number of men needed to root Mosby out of his 
homeland, estimated at ten troopers for each raider, Sheridan resolved to make “a scape-
goat out of him for the destruction of private rights. Now there is going to be an intense 
hatred of him in that portion of the Valley which is nearly a desert.”83 He continued that 
his plans for the Valley would “Let them know there is a God in Israel…the people are 
beginning to see that he does not injure me a great deal, but causes a loss to them of all 
that they have spent their lives accumulating.”84 He exclaimed, “I know of no way to 
exterminate [guerrillas] except to burn out the whole country and let people go North or 
South.”85 And so the systematic burning of the Shenandoah Valley began. 
But, as the bushwhacking continued, Union commanders began to respond with 
greater force. On 3 October 1864 one Sheridan’s staff officers was shot in the head in an 
attack, which the lone survivor reported as a guerrilla ambush. In retaliation, Sheridan 
decided “to teach a lesson to these abettors of the foul deed.” He “ordered all the houses 
within an area of five miles to be burned” in what was described by one victim as “a 
holocaust of fire.” Though Sheridan later spared the nearby town of Dayton, the area 
became known to Valley residents as the “Burnt District.” One Union officer noted of the 
area, “As our boys expressed it, ‘we burned out the hornets.’” When looking upon this 
area that night, a Federal brigade commander wrote, “The whole North and East, far and 
near, [was] lighted up by burning barns and houses.” He continued, “If it would help end 
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bushwhacking…I would cheerfully assist making this whole Valley a desert from 
Staunton northward.” As guerrilla attacks continued, he would get his chance.86 
Sheridan eventually issued an edict stating that “in retaliation” for the murder of 
Federal troops, the commanders will “hang or shoot until dead two (2) Confederate 
soldiers” held as prisoners of war, as well as “destroy all property belonging to these 
parties, now engaged as ‘bushwhackers’ wherever found.” When a Union soldier’s body 
was found with his throat cut “ear to ear” on 4 October, two prisoners were “shot to death 
in retaliation” on orders of the General Powell. Later, Powell also ordered a previously-
captured member of Mosby’s Rangers executed for the murder of another soldier and the 
houses and all other property of the two guerrillas actually responsible burned and 
destroyed.87 
On 5 October, Union troopers clashed with a unit of Mosby’s men outside of 
Front Royal and in the skirmish, one Federal appeared to have been shot in the head after 
he surrendered. The remaining troopers raced down and captured six of the guerrillas, 
leading them back to Front Royal where the rumors of the action had caused a frenzy. 
With the consent of Division commander General Alfred Torbert, Merritt ordered the 
prisoners immediately executed. Four were shot soon thereafter, and the remaining two 
were hung after they refused to answer questions during interrogation. In another 
                                                
86 Official Records, Series 1, XLIII, Part 1, 30; Sheridan quoted in Wert, From 
Winchester to Cedar Creek, 145; Sheridan, Memoirs, 308; Burnt District resident quoted 
in Wert, From Winchester to Cedar Creek, 145; Officer quoted in McPherson, Battle Cry 
of Freedom, 779; Colonel Charles Lowell quoted in Heatwole, The Burning, 106; 
Heatwole, The Burning, 104-106. 
 
87 Official Records, Series 1, Vol. XLIII, Part 1, 508-509; Wert, From Winchester to 
Cedar Creek, 154; Heatwole, The Burning, 120. 
 
  280 
incident, General George Custer’s troopers detained a man in the woods with a rifle. 
Despite prostrations from neighbors as to the man’s lack of ill intentions, Custer ordered 
the man’s execution.88 
As the partisan barrage continued into the winter after the end of the formal 
campaign, Union resolve against the civilians who supported the bushwhackers remained 
steadfast. When Valley citizens pleaded for aid and supplies for the winter on 
humanitarian grounds, Halleck rebuffed them from Washington: 
 
No authority can be given for the subsistence of rebel families outside of our 
lines, nor even within.…The disloyal people of the Shenandoah…have been and 
are now at full liberty to join friends in the rebel service.…The disloyal within our 
lines should be sent South to feed upon the enemy.…While the men of Virginia 
are either serving in the rebel ranks, or as bushwhackers are waylaying or 
murdering our soldiers, our Government must decline to support their wives and 
children. 
 
He did note, however, in true Free Labor fashion, that “loyal refugees should be 
temporarily assisted and sent North, where they can earn a livelihood.”89 
In an attempt to end finally the problem of partisans in the Valley after the 
burning was completed, Sheridan dispatched his entire cavalry under Merritt into the far 
reaches of the region. Between 28 November and 3 December, Merritt sought to 
“consume and destroy all forage and subsistence, burn all barns and mills and their 
contents, and drive off all stock” in all areas left untouched by or unreachable during the 
larger campaign. Sheridan also suggested that anyone in civilian clothes caught with a 
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weapon be summarily executed: “If you have arrested spies, hang them; if you are in 
doubt, hang them anyway. The sooner such characters are killed off the better it will be 
for the community.” Despite these expanded and exclusive efforts, however, Mosby 
outlasted Lee’s surrender before hanging up his saber.90 
The treatment meted out to bushwhackers by the Federals is singular in the 
brutality of directed, official policy, but less sanctioned forms of harsh retribution also 
occurred. As in the Vendée where a ‘take no prisoners’ attitude prevailed as Republican 
generals and politicians dehumanized the Vendeans, at times Union forces dehumanized 
Confederates; Sherman even referred to them as of a different race. At other times, 
Federal soldiers took it upon themselves to lighten the load of transporting and guarding 
legitimate Confederate prisoners of war or never returned to camp with captured 
guerrillas. The nature of the war against the bushwhackers led to spirals of violence and 
retaliations from both sides as the lines between civilian and soldier were distorted. 
Despite their aggression towards guerrillas though, Union troops were not the 
ones to indiscriminately kill survivors and captives once the battle was over. Southern 
armies instituted an official policy of not taking black soldiers prisoner, most vividly seen 
at the Fort Pillow massacre on 12 April 1864 when Confederate troops killed all 
remaining soldiers from African-American units. Understandably enraged, black units 
followed through with their own personal retaliations against captured whites. One 
northern black, writing in response to Fort Pillow, declared Union troops must fight 
“until they have made a rebel bite the dust for every hair of those…of our brethren 
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massacred at Fort Pillow.…Give no quarter; take no prisoners; make it dangerous to take 
the life of a black soldier by these barbarians.” Even Lincoln backed this policy to a 
degree, issuing an order to the effect, 
 
if the enemy shall sell or enslave anyone because of his color, the offense shall be 
punished by retaliation upon the enemy’s prisoners in our possession….For every 
soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier 
shall be executed; and for every one enslaved by the enemy or sold into slavery, a 
rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor. 
 
The true brutality witnessed in the American Civil War, in the end, can be squarely laid at 
the feet of Southerners and the Confederacy, as the culture and society they were fighting 
to maintain was one wholly founded on ruthlessness and dehumanization while the 
Federals were waging a war in order to humanize an entire race of people.91 
 
In the American Civil War, Philip Sheridan’s systematic destruction of the 
Shenandoah Valley and William Sherman’s march through South Carolina starved the 
Confederacy and took the war to their untouched, interior homelands. When these two 
campaigns are coupled with Ulysses S. Grant’s menacing fight to exact the greatest losses 
possible on the manpower of the Southern armies while preventing them from reinforcing 
against Sherman and Sheridan, the Union acceptance of total war is frighteningly 
apparent. The South lost the ability to wage war, in both food and men, which was 
exactly Lincoln’s intention when he agreed to the campaigns. Grant, Sherman, and 
Sheridan understood the true nature of revolutionary warfare, that the struggle was 
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between two ideologically-entrenched peoples rather than between two armies that left 
their blood and destruction on the battlefield. By mid-1864 they had decided to wage a 
terrible war on the Confederacy and the three celebrated Union generals each did their 
part to make war, and life, hell for the southerners.92 
There are counterarguments that the Civil War did not reach the level of violence 
and destruction seen in World War II or other modern revolutions and thus does not rise 
to the modern conception of “total war.” Southern civilians were not targeted or 
exterminated systematically; only select areas were singled out for total destruction, and 
soldiers on both sides generally respected the lives of civilians they crossed. Despite 
these reservations, in each category, there are numerous examples of both Union and 
Confederate armies breaking the strictures of “civilized” warfare and targeting civilians 
and non-military assets explicitly. The question then becomes one of degree, and defining 
the tipping point. As can be seen, if the Union’s fight is excluded, so must much of the 
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French Jacobins. Even in the mass wars of the twentieth century, distinctions between 
combatants and civilians never completely broke down. As in all modern warfare since 
the French Revolution, there were examples in the extremes, but just as many, if not more 
counterexamples of that wall standing strong.93 
When compared side by side with the ideology-driven violence and fanatical 
rhetoric of the French Revolution, which most modern observers rate in the ranks of total 
war, the American Civil War does not appear as any less extremist, any less fierce, or any 
less jacobinical in its leaders’ pursuit of victory. While the argument can be made for 
both cases that the official rhetoric was mere hyperbole on the part of generals and 
politicians and the reality was much less fervent, bloody, and charred, the language is a 
key to participants’ state of mind. Both the Jacobins and the Radical Republicans called 
upon the specters of revolutionary justice and played upon the fears of their people with a 
large dose of paranoia. In both cases, the military, career and political, followed the 
course directed by the central governments with ruthless efficiency. When their early 
attempts to subdue their enemies failed, their strategy and tactics became increasingly 
more violent and repressive. While they began wars to break the backs of small 
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movements, within years, if not months, the intensity and ferocity spiraled higher until 
the goal was the total destruction of the rebellious regions and peoples. 
There can be no determination of which example, the French Revolution or the 
American Civil War, was in the end the more brutal in its blind pursuit of victory for its 
ideology. The war in the Vendée was a civil war inside a revolution fighting a larger 
external war for survival. By the outbreak of violence in the French countryside, the 
Jacobins had long before turned to revolutionary forms of violence and justice, and in its 
context, the levels of violence were not unexpected. Whether or not valid, Jacobins feared 
for their own survival and were fighting their perceived enemies in their own heartland. 
On the other hand, after a meager start, the Union Army leadership made a conscious, 
calculated decision to inflict the maximum toll possible on a rebellious region and 
destroy its peoples’ very ability to subsist. The political leadership in the North convinced 
themselves that if left undefeated the South would not only rise again, but rise to enslave 
the North. To that end, Radical Republicans determined that the military had to destroy 
the Confederacy, its manpower, and its infrastructure so thoroughly that it would have to 
be rebuilt from its ashes. 
Historians have accused the French in the Vendée of prefiguring the mass 
genocides and warfare of the twentieth century, and while the final toll makes the former 
argument difficult to sustain, the total war nature of the Vendée does suggest modern 
war. At the same time, the American Civil War has its own links to the great violence 
witnessed in the twentieth century. Lee entered the war with Napoleonic conceptions of 
warfare, marching column after column of men into walls of minie balls. But, Grant’s 
development of attrition and mass-scale trench warfare seen during the year-long siege of 
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Petersburg, as well as his earlier movements against Vicksburg, however, eerily suggest 
the ghastly images of World War I. At the same time, the movements of Sherman 
through Georgia and the Carolinas suggests the maneuver and armored warfare of World 
War II and Sheridan’s 10,000-strong cavalry flying down the Shenandoah Valley 
represents a sort of horse-drawn blitzkrieg. Finally, in both cases, the Vendée and the 
Civil War, the long-running partisan war conjures images of modern insurgency 
movements.94 
In terms of death and the final toll, there is little comparison. In the Vendée there 
was an army of some 50,000 rebels who were cut down in retreat as well as those caught 
by the following colonnes infernales, reaching a total of as many as 117,000 victims. In 
the whole of the Terror, perhaps another 50,000 can be added. The Civil War, on the 
other hand, was over and above more deadly. Bursting forth from a society for which 
political violence in any form was anathema, the Union Army progressed in a very short 
amount of time, with the help of a European-bred radical ideology, to extreme forms of 
warfare and brutality. With some 2.1 million northerners under arms, the war eventually 
led to the deaths of some 620,000 soldiers from both sides, as well as an estimated 50,000 
civilians. The mortality rate Federal troops inflicted upon the South were higher than any 
nation in World War I and nearly all of World War II.95 
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In the end, Jacobins in both France and the United States unleashed internal total 
war on a massive scale, attempted to burn and destroy entire regions, fought a ruthless 
guerrilla war, and saw the countless deaths of their own citizens. Placed in this context, 
the two events are exceedingly similar. In a fight to impose their ideals and beliefs on a 
diametrically opposed society, and locked into a mindset convinced that in failure their 
own annihilation awaited, it is not surprising how far the war went. With their enemies 
defeated, all that remained for the French and American radicals was to rebuild their 
societies into the Republics of Virtue they had constructed in their minds. In that struggle, 
they would face an entirely different type of enemy, one which could not be defeated on 
the battlefield. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
THE GHOST OF THE GRACCHI 
 
Confiscation, Redistribution, and the Threat of Agrarianism1 
 
 
 
During a debate on a 160 acre homestead proposal before Congress in 1852, Whig 
representative Richard Bowie of Maryland proclaimed, 
 
From the hour this bill becomes law…other minds and other men, more generous 
and benevolent than thesedearer friends of the peoplewill rise up and offer a 
larger boon for the public favor and public gratitude. I regret to say, Mr. 
Chairman, that the only precedent to be found for this legislation, is to be found in 
the decay of the Roman Republic, and there we find it staring us in the face in its 
most formidable and revolting features. Yes, this bill is in principle a repetition of 
that agrarian law which was reenacted by Gaius Gracchus. 
 
Bowie traced the successive laws that the Gracchi family pushed through in their power 
as Tribunes of the People and how they led to the eventual downfall of Rome. With such 
disastrous calamities awaiting those who had before attempted to provide land for the 
landless, he concluded, “Let us not fail to be instructed by history.” In response, Joseph 
Chandler of Pennsylvania replied, “Sir, let me say that this cry of ‘agrarian laws’ are 
inapposite. By agrarian laws, people are led to understand a legislative attempt forcibly to 
equalize the possession of lands. Sir, no such attempt is made in this bill.…Gaius 
Gracchus only undertook to divide the public lands.”2 
                                                
1 A version of this chapter was presented at the 2008 Organization of American 
Historians annual meeting in New York City. I would like to thank David Prior and 
Alison Effords for organizing the panel, Barbara Krauthamer for her introduction, and 
David Quigley for his excellent and helpful comments. 
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Nearly two thousand years after Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus met their deaths, 
the ideas they proposed continued to haunt the political halls of the Western world. They 
had sought to implement a social welfare system for the destitute, a system which would 
ensure that the lowest common denominator in society would live with a modicum of 
dignity. Since that time, elites have played upon the ghost of the Gracchi, that is, 
widespread land reform and redistribution, as the most radical form of power 
realignment, one which threatened the very nature and fabric of society. Compounding 
these fears, every modern revolution has had to contend with cries for the implementation 
of Gracchian proposals for distribution of land to the destitute. 
Both French and American Jacobins had to address these concerns during their 
land reform debates. Their opponents accused them time and again that what they were 
attempting was so radical that it marked a revolutionary break with the very revolutions 
themselves. These two cases, however, illustrate the opposite: in contrast to the violent 
reformation Jacobin radicalism wrought through its total war mentality, its ideological 
conceptualization of land reform displayed moderation. If terror and total war were 
radical revolution gone awry, land reform was the domain of bourgeois liberalism and 
legal restraint. Nowhere else were the moderating forces of either European or North 
American Jacobins so apparent. 
Contemporaries and historians have accused both the Jacobin Club in France and 
the Radical faction of the Republican Party in the United States of attacking the rich, 
pandering to the poor, and demanding the outright equalization of property. The large 
majority within both the Radicals and Montagnards, however, though relatively small 
groups themselves, were ideologically far afield from any fringes among them that 
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proposed agrarianism. In fact, extreme, proto-communistic proposals for widespread 
confiscation and the equal redistribution of wealth were rarely, if ever, proposed, let 
alone forced into law. Their rhetoric aside, the revolutionaries in both Europe and North 
America were high-minded and doctrinaire reformers, but they were also legalistic, 
bourgeois liberals when it came to property. They were willing to implement social 
justice and welfare when and where necessary, but unwilling to attack the overall 
sacrosanctity of property rights or act completely outside existing legal dictums—things 
which to them defined society itself. 
Thus, while American reformers proved willing to redefine property rights to 
exclude slaves, they would be unwilling to further whittle away at the concept to take 
away landed or other forms of property from rebellious Southerners without a legal 
process. In the same sense, French revolutionaries would justify stripping nobles of their 
inherited, unearned property but would keep that of the bourgeoisie sacrosanct. The 
confiscation of property proceeded, then, within tight legal bounds and only applied to 
those who were in direct conflict with “the will of the people,” as defined by the 
legislature, and still then only under specific circumstances. Similarly, redistribution was 
never designed to be a handout to the poor, but a system of sales and auctions crafted to 
prevent land monopolies, ensure low prices, and fill the state coffers. The much-feared 
ghost of the Gracchi was little more than a shadow over men trying to find a means of 
ensuring justice, equality, and a democratic society in a world increasingly dominated by 
the rich and powerful. 
This chapter explores these radicals’ legislative proposals and debates concerning 
land reform within their respective representative bodies at the height of their 
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revolutionary moments. The first section describes the ideology of virtue and free 
laborfirst of the Jacobins and then the Republicansas it relates to property rights and 
the idea of land as the basis for freedom. This discussion is intended to show that the two 
groups had shared hopes and aspirations. Above all, they believed in the rule of law and 
were obsessed with notions of legality, wholly unwilling to contravene certain precepts 
without finding legal justifications or reinterpreting statutes to create them; they had to 
make their proposals fit within both of their existing belief structures of liberalism and 
radicalism. 
The second section applies the ideology of free labor and virtue described above 
as a baseline to examine the specific French and American debates and legislation on the 
confiscation of private property and the ways it was and was not the anti-capitalist ghost 
of Gracchian agrarianism. Beginning with the French conversion of Catholic Church and 
royal lands into bien nationaux (national properties), this debate leads into further 
deliberations on confiscation by Maximilien Robespierre and the Jacobins, ending with 
Louis Antoine de Saint-Just’s construction of treason that stripped traitors of all rights of 
citizenship, including that of private property. In the United States, the debate began with 
the early confiscation measures, including the direct tax, and then moved on to the more 
extreme policies of Thaddeus Stevens and George Julian that were very similar to what 
Louis Antoine de Saint-Just had proposed seventy years earlier. These measures, 
however, failed to become law because of Abraham Lincoln’s theoretical construction of 
the war and denial of Confederate belligerency. 
The final part concerns the debates and laws on the redistribution of confiscated 
land, focusing on the restrictions placed upon sales, auctions, and free land, as well as the 
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failure of many of these projects. In France, prices were driven up by rising inflation and 
a rush on the available lands, so those intended to benefit from them were unable to 
purchase tracts even at bargain prices. In the U.S., the assassination of Lincoln and the 
opening months of Andrew Johnson’s administration ended whatever meaningful chance 
had existed for land reform in favor of freedmen. In both cases, though, there were many 
who did not have land before that found a way to acquire it, and, in France especially, 
purchases of confiscated land tied buyers to the revolution itself by giving them an 
investment in its future. 
Though the content of the debates varied and leaders came to different 
conclusions, the context, driving forces, and general discourse of the land reform debates 
in both Paris and Washington can be viewed as essentially the same: how to punish a 
rebellious class of citizens, whether émigrés or Confederates, in order to ensure that their 
previous grip on power would be severely diluted, while at the same time raising finances 
for the central government and providing the landless the prospect for a better life. 
 
Ideology and the Gracchi 
Free Labor and Property Rights 
 
In both France and the United States, the concept of “free labor,” in its 
relationship to land reform, developed to mean generally the same thing. It was an idea 
that revered the life of the small freeholder and middling farmer as the path to true 
independence. Once a man acquired a modest amount of wealth through trade, wage 
labor, or other means, he would buy a tract of land and use that purchase to guarantee his 
future livelihood. As an independent freeholder, he would be removed from the yoke of 
subjecting himself to the economic rule of another. From that point, though, the concept 
  293 
diverged on the different sides of the Atlantic. In France, the major roadblock in free 
labor ideology was access to land itself, while in the United States, where western lands 
were plentiful, the idea had to contend with unfree labor. 
The idea of “free labor” during the era of the French Revolution became 
intimately tied to a novel construction of property rights espoused by many who would 
serve as deputies of the Third Estate in the Estates General, the National Assembly, and 
succeeding revolutionary legislatures. In the decade before the Revolution erupted in 
1789, these men tried to theorize a way to free up land for sale in a state in which the 
nobility and Church laid claim to the bulk of arable soil and grazing lands. As early as 
1782, future deputies of the Gironde argued that property must be redefined from a 
natural right to a social right. 
These future revolutionaries argued that aristocratic patents on land were 
illegitimate because nobles had not earned the lands they held. Instead, they had acquired 
them through generations of inheritance, beginning with royal grants and ancient rights, 
and protected through a natural rights conception of property that was absolute and 
unalterable. Under their reconceptualization, the prospective Girondins maintained, first, 
that society had the right to redefine property rights as it saw fit; specifically, they 
suggested only hard work and diligent effort could guarantee the right to property. Thus, 
the government could justly and legally force the landed nobility, who had not worked 
for their wealth, to sell their property, if not strip it from their hands outright, so that 
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members of the bourgeoisie could purchase it through funds earned by hard work and 
thrifty living.3 
At the same time they argued for the dismantling of noble property rights, they 
bolstered their own claims to the right to property. They contended that while ennobled 
properties could fall through ideological technicalities in the law, those of the bourgeoisie 
could not because they were duly earned. Their theories, then, were grounded in both 
liberal economic, free labor ideology as well as law that rested upon novel 
interpretations. When the Revolution exploded in 1789, the theoretical duality the future 
federalists had developed for the right to property would come into fruition and define the 
Revolution itself as the revolutionaries struggled to find a balance between social and 
political rights, between revolutionary justice and legality. 
These revolutionaries’ preoccupation with the law, moreover, was demonstrated 
by their chosen professions: lawyers, magistrates, and judges made up the single largest 
group among the deputies of the Third Estate, where roughly two thirds had some legal 
training. In fact, legal scholars were the most eminent of the parliamentary leaders who 
emerged in the first year of what would become the National Assembly, more so than 
even the men of letters. They gave the early Revolution a juridical character, both in 
culture and mode of thought, and the Revolution never shed its legalist shroud even as 
those deputies who created it were devoured by it.4 
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Even among those considered the most extreme radicals in the government, 
legality remained a paramount issue. Jacobin conceptions of social justice might have 
been more advanced than those to their right, but they continued to restrain themselves 
within the legalistic web constructed by their predecessors. Robespierre and his followers 
believed that governments existed not only to provide a legal foundation to societies by 
regulating commerce, providing protection, and setting the rules and duties of citizenship, 
but also to ensure men were not stuck in poverty and dependence. Jacobins, along with 
the rest of the revolutionaries, saw freedom as independence and self-sufficiency, and 
they would use government and law to create that independence if necessary. Following 
the Girondin lead, Robespierre argued that property was a social rather than a natural 
right: while private property was guaranteed by law, it would henceforth be limited “by 
the obligation to respect the rights of others” and must never conflict with “the liberty, 
the existence, or the property of our fellow men.” Acting outside of these new limits was 
“illegal and immoral.”5 
Despite such talk, Robespierre was no agrarien, nor a compatriot to the wily 
radical Gracchus Babeuf, née François-Noël Babeuf, who hoped to confiscate all 
property and redistribute it equally. Such accusations and machinations, according to 
Robespierre, were the work of aristocrats and monarchists who “dare[d] to impute the 
absurd project of the agrarian law to the friends of liberty.” His ideas were always limited 
enough to stay within the mainstream of the Jacobins and the Convention as a whole, 
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even before the purges of 1793 and 1794 eliminated moderate and then Girondin 
opposition. 
While Robespierre disdained the rich and feared the power inherent in great 
concentrations of wealth, he called the equality of wealth “a chimera” and something that 
was “essentially impossible in a civil society.” His hope was to see those with wealth use 
it to help the most destitute out of social responsibility and civic virtue. Though he 
threatened the nobility often, he would never use the power of the state to coerce 
landlords, businessmen, or any other good bourgeoisie, except when dealing with 
wartime rationing; for him economic justice was an issue of morality rather than legality, 
even if those two would co-mingle in the Terror.6 
To that end, the rump constitution of 1793, passed and then immediately 
suspended by the National Convention, guaranteed to each citizen the right to dispose of 
all property “as one sees fit.” At the same time, it defined “communal happiness” as the 
goal of society, and assured the poor of the right to work and to public assistance. One 
Montagnard, Pierre Philippeaux, noted that if poor families struggled to live on the daily 
labor of the father, then they would be supplemented from “the pocketbook of the rich” 
as a helping hand. Another Jacobin, Marc-Antoine Baudot, put it in Biblical terms: 
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We wished to apply to politics the equality that the Gospel accords to Christians. 
We did not on that account want the equality of property or the agrarien law, 
because nowhere does the Gospel say that one must share one’s wealth with one’s 
neighbor. But it does say everywhere that one must help one’s neighbor in his 
needs. 
 
This suggestion that those with means should help those without out of a sense of virtue, 
while never being codified into a national law, would later be applied as if it were by 
zealous Jacobins in several regions outside of Paris.7 
Outside of Lyons in the department of the Loire, représentant en mission Claude 
Javogues followed the party line almost to the word, and he was probably the most ultra-
revolutionary member of the government in the region. He felt that equality was the 
truest tenet of the Revolution, and that the government owed to all men a guarantee of 
bread and work. At the same time, he declared that the equality of wealth was an 
impossibility; those of extraordinary wealth were the enemy, not the propriétaires, but 
the gros propriétaires. Javogues’s ideal man was the small freeholder: “We sequestered a 
lot of property. By dividing it for sale, the people will be able to become property 
owners, and it will be only in our country we shall have the republic of name and effect.” 
He continued that the idea was “justice and impartiality: there is the condition of 
Republicans, humanity, beneficence, friendship, brotherhood, and the destruction of all 
the enemies of the patrie.”8 
                                                
7 Philippeaux and Baudot quoted in Ozouf, “Montagnards,” 387-389. 
 
8 Javogues quoted in Colin Lucas, The Structure of the Terror: The Example of Javogues 
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  298 
Such beliefs were part of a second redefinition of the rights of property beginning 
under the National Convention in 1793. After the Girondins had successfully made their 
argument for a social construction of property rights in order to disenfranchise the 
nobility, they realized that the rhetoric of equality might eventually lead to calls for the 
equalization of property. To that end, when they came to power, Jacobins and Girondins 
worked together to ensure property was protected. First, under a motion by Georges 
Danton, they declared that “all territorial properties would be maintained without 
exception.” This was later reaffirmed and strengthened by a second law that criminalized, 
under pain of death, the mere proposition of an agrarian law, even though serious 
discussions of expropriation were already rare even amongst Jacobins.9 
By April 1793, the Convention as a whole settled upon a new natural law 
construction of property rights, arguing that they were sacrosanct and untouchable so 
long as property was earned, exactly the definition which the Gironde had devised in the 
1770s. This re-redefinition, however, was accompanied by a demand for progressive 
income taxation in order to fund the state’s support of the destitute, something that before 
had been an anathema. For example, in the Department of the Loire, authorities ordered 
cities to draw up lists of the indigent and the extremely wealthy for a taxe révolutionaire. 
The wealth of married men over the first 100,000 livres and bachelors worth over 50,000 
livres was siphoned to provide for the poor in relation their capacity for work and 
according to their needs. In other words, there were remnants of the social construction of 
property rights within the neo-natural rights doctrine. It was an extremely rigid definition 
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of property rights that still left room for the social welfare state. The development and 
establishment of this free labor-informed construction of property rights in France would 
shape and guide the concurrent and future debates over land reform and redistribution.10 
 
In the United States, the idea of free labor, the central tenet of what would 
become Republican Party ideology, also developed based on the ideal of a self-made, 
independent freeholder. Republicans believed that a man should work under wage labor 
until he could afford to purchase his own plot, at which time he would become self-
sufficient, independent, and virtuous. Western lands guaranteed that all men could reach 
this level of freedom and become economically independent with time and hard work; 
this idea eventually developed into a larger concept known as Free Soil.11 This was set in 
contrast to what was seen as the aristocratic, unfree system of the South, where men 
worked hard until they could afford to buy slaves, at which point they themselves no 
longer labored. The free soil movement hoped to prohibit slavery in the western 
territories, so that free men could gain property and independence there, rather than allow 
it to become corrupt like the South. In free labor worldview, then, property rights played 
a central role as land ownership became the measure of a man and his road to true 
freedom. 
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Homesteading, a key idea of within Free Labor ideology, sought to provide those 
unable to progress within the traditional free labor system a chance to receive a western 
land grant in order to relieve the population burden in northern cities and ensure the 
cycling of wage earner to land owner would continue. While Congressman Bowie and 
others attacked it as a neo-Gracchian plot to pander to the rabble, free labor proponents 
defended it not as agrarianism, but true independence for those unable to find it in the 
east, where land prices were high and available tracts were few. Determined to correct the 
misconceptions of the plan, future Republicans went on the defensive, using strong 
language to counter the charges of men like Bowie. 
Newspaperman Horace Greeley condemned those who spoke of homesteading as 
a war on property, arguing that “Jacobin ravings…against the Rich, or the Banks [could 
not fix] the distress of the poor” but an opportunity for a fresh start in the West might be 
the key. Indiana Congressman George Julian, one of the most diehard supporters of 
homesteading, similarly defended the plan, saying it was “no leveling policy, designed to 
strip the rich of their possessions.” It was not “agrarianism” or “demagoguism,” but a 
measure to ensure that the earth would be worked by men who need it to survive, rather 
than given away to corporations and speculators who would use it to create a new land 
monopoly. Illinois Congressman Richard Yates continued, “the measure is not agrarian. 
It does not take your property and give it to me… It does not bring down the high, but it 
raises the low.” In other words, Republican ideology preserved property rights as 
sacrosanct, but public lands would become available for those in need, in order that they 
might raise themselves out of wage labor and into the independent middling classes. Free 
labor proponents saw their plan as creating a social welfare system to provide for the 
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destitute mired in wage labor, much like what the Jacobins had imagined in France, but 
that had never developed in the United States.12 
Though much of the moderate and conservative rhetoric in favor of homesteading 
was racist, its originators, many of whom would become the core of the Radical 
Republicans, argued that it was a system open to all, black and white alike. They believed 
it would form a counterbalance to slavery, showing Southerners that former slaves could 
earn their own way in freedom and independence. Voting their convictions on an 1854 
measure to restrict homesteading to whites, many future Radicals formally registered 
their dissent against the measure. In this group were Galusha A. Grow, the “father of the 
homestead law,” Elihu B. Washburne, Salmon P. Chase, William Henry Seward, Charles 
Sumner, Benjamin Wade, and Hannibal Hamlin. In 1857, even Lincoln supported the 
right to open economic advancement by blacks in the West, and, by 1860, most 
Republicans, despite the racism of many, agreed that blacks deserved equality of 
opportunity.13 
Another key component of American free labor ideology was its legal and 
constitutional framework. While many abolitionists derided the Constitution and its 
proscriptive rules regarding slavery, free soilers showed their bourgeois colors by 
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insisting on pursuing antislavery by legal and constitutional means. Men like Chase saw 
this legalism as one of the greatest distinctions between themselves and non-political 
abolitionists. Whether they supported the radical positions of early Liberty men like 
Gerrit Smith, William Goodell, and Alvan Stewart or tempered ideas based on antislavery 
constitutionalism and denationalization, those who became the core antislavery 
Republicans insisted on acting within the law, even if that meant re-interpreting long-
established norms. “Freedom national, slavery local” became their mantra, and they were 
determined to disentangle Southerners from their eighty-year grip on the federal 
government and interpretation of the Constitution. To this end, they emphasized the 
legally binding force of natural law, a Republican import from radical abolitionism, and it 
informed their entire antislavery constitutional debate; Radicals took the moral notion of 
“ought” and converted it into a legal “must.”14 
Eventually, a majority of Republicans agreed that the natural rights doctrines of 
the Enlightenment outweighed absolute property rights. They argued slaves were not 
property because they were human beings. Congressman Charles Francis Adams argued 
that “it is not a good sign when the tendency of public men is to set up property…above 
the higher sentiments of humanity.” Republicans came to believe property rights were the 
domain of politics and not completely sacrosanct. Rather, they followed Kentucky 
Senator Henry Clay’s 1839 dictum, “what the law declares to be property is property.” 
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Southerners, and even some of the more conservative Republicans, not surprisingly, saw 
such declarations as presaging the rise of a radical northern agrarianism.15 
Radical Republicans did not allay those fears, following the French 
Revolutionaries in declaring all property rights social and legal constructs. If the South 
could use the government to solidify their property in slaves, then Republican 
government could dismantle those rights just the same. They argued that there was no 
‘natural’ right to property because property rights were flexible and changeable at the 
whim of a democratic society, within moral constraints. Thus, in 1837, abolitionist Henry 
Stanton contended that property rights were not sacrosanct and society had always had 
the right to regulate property and transactions. He noted, “This has never been considered 
as any violation of private property.” Abolitionist author Richard Hildreth similarly 
suggested in 1840, “Property, it is to be recollected, is a thing established among men by 
mutual consent, and for mutual convenience.”16 
Like the Jacobins and Girondins before them, these men believed property rights 
were useful conventions created to stabilize society, and while economic betterment and 
growth was justification for one set of rules, “justice” could form the foundation for a 
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new definition. Thus, in the end, the Republican conception of property rights based on 
free labor was much like that of their French forbearers; property was guaranteed so long 
as it was not in conflict with justice or virtue. When there was a conflict, the benefit of 
the doubt, as in France, was granted on the side of justice. Thus, Lincoln contended that 
Republicans “are for both the man and the dollar, but in cases of conflict, the Man before 
the dollar.” Republican liberalism would bend as necessary to encompass the virtue of 
radicalism, but what exactly defined virtue or virtuously acquired property would be the 
debate that helped drive both the French and Americans in their attempts to adjust their 
definitions of property rights.17 
 
Agrarian Potential 
Confiscation and the Redefinition of Property Rights 
 
Confiscation began in France as a voluntary act. On the night of 4 August 1789, 
noble after noble walked to the podium in the newly created National Assembly and 
renounced their own seigneurial rights, gripped under the spell of “a kind of magic.” 
While these selfless renunciations of privilege were revolutionary in and of themselves, 
they did nothing to alleviate the debt burden inherited from the monarchy, the solvency 
of which the deputies had agreed to uphold. Between August and September, the 
mounting loan payments threatened to default the state, and forced a debate over how to 
ensure the finances of the government. From the beginning, the one proposal that 
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continued to emerge was the nationalization and sale of Catholic Church and royal 
holdings, the two largest concentrations of land in France.18 
On 10 October 1789, Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, nobleman and 
nominal Bishop of Autun, formally motioned that the state confiscate the lands of the 
Galician church. He reasoned that its lands were not held in the same sense as other 
private property. In reality, he continued, these were properties given to the clergy by the 
state for the performance of official functions and to pay for its officers. Because the 
Church was a mere steward to the wealth it controlled, its lands were subject to 
repossession for the necessity of the nation. One Assembly moderate, Antoine Barnave, 
seconded that the clergy “only exists for the service and utility of the nation…[they] exist 
by the nation, so the nation [if it so chooses] can destroy it.” The legality of such a move 
had much precedent, as Catholic Austrian Emperor Joseph II as well as Protestant 
German and Scandinavian princes and England’s Henry VIII had all taken such measures 
when their states were at fiscal risk.19 
Hoping to stave off fear of a general expropriation of private property by the state, 
Jacques Guillaume Thouret, a lawyer and Third Estate deputy from Rouen, argued that 
there existed a legal distinction between the Church and individuals. One, a corporation, 
                                                
18 Archives Parlementaires, 8:354-355, 8:369-370; Tacket, Becoming a Revolutionary, 
172, 180. 
 
19 Archives Parlementaires, 9:398-404, 423; Barnave quoted in Simon Schama, Citizens: 
A Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 489; Tacket, 
Becoming a Revolutionary, 204; Schama, Citizens, 483; François Furet, Revolutionary 
France 1770-1880, Translated by Antonia Nevill (Malden: Blackwell, 1995), 81. The 
second part of Talleyrand’s argument, on the official nature of the clergy, was strong 
because the French monarchy had long had a great role over the Catholic Church within 
its borders, including the right to appoint bishops. 
 
  306 
was a “fictive” person created specifically for use in legal transactions, while individuals 
were “real persons.” People “exist independent of the law.” While, “by contrast, 
corporations exist only by virtue of the law” which “has unlimited authority over all that 
pertains to them, indeed over their very existence.” He concluded that “the law, having 
created corporations, can also abolish them.” Thouret also suggested that “moral” 
corporations such as the Church were different from commercial enterprises, and doubly 
subject to governmental whim.20 
The Church confiscation measure was generally supported on the left and 
opposed on the right, and the bill avoided defeat only when deputies changed the 
language to state that Church lands “be placed at the disposal of the nation,” and that the 
provincial governments be given the right to control and oversee the process. On 2 
November 1789, the National Assembly passed the amended measure with neither side 
sure of victory. The rule on provincial governments had the potential to keep any lands 
from ever being confiscated and resold, and so the bill was largely meaningless. It did 
little to end the debate, or the problem, but it began a trend towards a more open and 
frank discussion of land confiscation.21 
By mid-November, the drastic level of the debt burden had become clearer, and 
within a month the debates on a new confiscation measure became frenzied, with 
virtually all deputies in Paris attending. The members of the nascent Jacobin Club, 
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quickly becoming associated with the radical left, spearheaded the movement for 
complete seizure of both crown and Church property, but opposition from many high 
ecclesiastics forced another compromise. Though the Assembly voted by a wide margin 
to approve the sale of 400 million livres of Church and royal lands and the issuance of 
promissory notes, assignats, tied to those sales, ambiguities remained that would require 
two more rounds of debate to solve. Finally, on 14 and 20 April 1790, the Jacobins 
spearheaded the passage of a bill fully nationalizing all Church lands and converting the 
assignats into legal tender. The assignats were later buoyed by government confiscations 
of precious metals to create a specie reserve to back up the notes in addition to landed 
property.22 
The moral and eminent domain arguments of the Gironde had swayed a majority, 
but many deputies soon realized an additional benefit: people who bought confiscated 
lands tied themselves to the Revolution itself because their purchases would most likely 
be invalidated with the return of the Old Regime. When assignats became legal tender, 
this benefit continued since even the enemies of the Revolution soon found their fortunes 
tied to the currency of that against which they were fighting. Assembly deputy Abbé de 
Montesquiou declared assignats “will form the link between all private interests and the 
general interest. Their adversaries will themselves become property owners and citizens 
by means of the Revolution and for the Revolution.”23 
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One year into the revolution, then, the national legislature had voted outright 
expropriation of Church property without compensation, through a legal process in which 
many of the highest leaders of the Galician Church participated. While revolutions rarely 
operate under normal legal conditions or judicial norms, the fact that the French were 
determined to appear within the realm of legality is significant. Their determination 
fundamentally stemmed from the majority’s legal background, which not only influenced 
the Assembly’s culture but its growing ideological bounds as well. The deputies of the 
National Assembly saw a pressing problem, the looming national debt, and a solution, the 
confiscation of Church property, and then found a way to justify it within legal strictures 
and their own ideology.  
As the Revolution progressed and despite the legalism of the deputies, many 
nobles began to fear for their wealth, especially after hearing the logic used by the 
Jacobins in the Church confiscation debates and the Girondins’ talk of socially 
constructed property rights. In 1791, the trickle of émigrés out of the country turned into 
a flood, and on 27 July 1792 the moderate Legislative Assembly attempted to punish 
those who fled France by decreeing émigré property subject to confiscation. This act was 
followed by others on the confiscation from those convicted under the Revolutionary 
Tribunal, condemnation of émigré’s relatives’ property in November 1793, and that of 
citizens of enemy nations in 1794. Eventually, when pre-trial suspects turned to suicide to 
escape the guillotine and allow their properties to pass to their heirs, such an act was 
legally defined as a tacit admission of guilt.24 
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In order to justify such actions in accordance with the protections of private 
property in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen as well as the 
reaffirmation of that sentiment passed at the inauguration of the Republic in September 
1792, Conventionnels returned to their legal and ideological hairsplitting. The solution, 
developed by Jacobin ideologue Saint-Just, was to strip counterrevolutionariesa 
category into which émigrés had already been placedof their citizenship, placing them 
outside of the body politic and the rights and protections it offered. This construction, 
first suggested on 13 November 1792 in order to justify the King’s execution without 
trial, gave the Revolutionaries a powerful weapon against traitors: those who acted 
against the Revolution were hidden aliens among the virtuous French people waiting to 
be discovered, and they therefore had never been true citizens and did not possess the 
rights inscribed therein. They had no protection from the government, no civil liberties or 
rights, and were denied even the right to trial. Such traitors at best had only the right to 
appear before the Revolutionary Tribunal before a swift execution and sale of their 
assets.25 
The new laws redefined property “of patriots” as the only type which was 
“inviolable and sacred,” thereby making property rights and patriotism interdependent. It 
was a method to universalize property ownership while freeing up the land of émigrés 
and counterrevolutionaries for sale and, simultaneously, allowing the landless to become 
freeholders and supporters of the Revolution through the purchase of national property. 
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At the same time, the Jacobins secured with unanimous consent among moderates and 
radicals a law banning any discussion of agrarianism. Approved 18 March 1793, the law 
provided the death penalty for “whoever proposes an agrarian law or any other law which 
subverts territorial, commercial or industrial property.” The idea was to secure 
revolutionary unity, undercut those who were betting on anarchy to improve their own 
lot, and, finally, provide absolute assurance to private property owners because without 
that, no one would buy into the biens nationaux.26 
Thus, by March 1793 the Jacobins had secured a redefinition of property rights. 
They absolutely guaranteed the rights of good, virtuous bourgeois citizens, while 
punishing those defined as rebels, creating a vast expanse of land into which citizens 
could buy, and destroying the land monopoly which had controlled real estate under the 
monarchy. Moreover, the sales of that land would provide a sustainable method of 
funding the revolutionary state and tie an entire generation to the future of the revolution 
itself. 
 
Like their French forbearers, Republicans in Congress in 1861 entered their crisis 
under a growing financial burden. While they followed numerous avenues in order to 
meet the needs of the state coffers, Radicals quickly saw the confiscation and sale of 
rebellious Southerners’ lands as a possible source of revenue as well as a just way to 
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punish them.27 Like Jacobins in France, however, Republicans were a legalistic, 
bourgeois group of men who were unwilling to expropriate property without justification 
or compensation. As the war progressed, they became more willing to acknowledge 
seizures as a viable, just punishment, but the legal framework they created was lengthy, 
complex, poorly enforced, and failed to progress as far as did that of their French 
counterparts as the end of the war ended their ability to lead the debate. 
When the war began, many Republicans saw it as the perfect opportunity to create 
the Free Labor world they had theorized in the 1840s and 1850s during the Free Soil 
movement. To that end, in May 1862 they passed the Homestead Act, providing freehold 
title on up to 160 acres of public land for anyone willing to travel west, except those who 
had “borne arms against the United States Government or given aid and comfort to its 
enemies.” Southerners thus disallowed, the law otherwise required a filed application and 
fee of ten dollars, improvements made upon and residency on the land for five years, and 
finally filing for a deed of title. While the Homestead Act was seen as the culmination of 
a major party plank and a chance for northern laborers and freedmen to begin their new 
lives, Radicals saw it as only a beginning. Their sights were already trained upon 
reformation of the South.28 
Radicals and their abolitionist supporters saw the war as an opening to destroy not 
only slavery but southern social, cultural, and political domination, to level the old ruling 
class and erect a new, democratic electorate. Almost immediately after the war began, 
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radical abolitionist William Goodell demanded Congress confiscate all rebel lands and 
redistribute them to freed slaves. Activist and Radical Republican sympathizer Wendell 
Phillips declared that “The whole system of the Gulf States [must] be taken to 
pieces.…The war can be ended only by annihilating that Oligarchy which formed and 
rules the South and makes the war—by annihilating a state of society.” For such men, 
one of the first places to start this revolution was to break the large landholding class by 
confiscating their property. At the end of the first year of the war, even the Democratic 
New York World demanded that two thirds of rebel plantations be confiscated and divided 
between blacks and soldiers.29 
Despite such growing calls for measures to punish the South, moderates forced 
Radicals to compromise from within the party. Led by Lincoln, moderates argued that the 
war was merely a police action; thus, rebels were still citizens with full civil and political 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution unless duly convicted of treason. The most a 
majority of Republicans would allow in the early stages of the war was the first 
Confiscation Act, approved 6 August 1861. It gave Lincoln the power to seize property 
used in direct aid of the rebellion and freed slaves employed directly either in arms or 
labor for the benefit of the Confederate government.30 Because the act limited seizure to 
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property used in direct action in support of the rebellion, most Confederate-owned land 
remained untouchable. For land that was taken, seizure was limited to the life of the rebel 
according to Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution, making the act virtually impotent. 
Like the early Church confiscation debate in France, however, events would force 
Congress to pass stronger and less ambiguous measures. 
At the same time this much heralded, yet nearly useless act was being pushed 
through Congress, another piece of legislation was approved, but which was largely 
overlooked. On 5 August 1861 and again on 7 June 1862, Congress levied a direct tax on 
all property in the United States, including the whole of the Confederate South. It 
required that each property owner pay a fee in proportion to their holdings directly to the 
federal government. If left unpaid, a federal court would grant a brief grace period before 
foreclosure and assessment of an absolute fee simple title to the government. Unlike the 
lands seized through confiscation, the titles were eternal and beyond repute. Its 
application, however, was restricted to locations occupied by the Union army as well as 
where federal courts were established or granted jurisdiction, since Southerners were 
unlikely to pay a tax to a government they considered foreign.31 
Despite the complex and lengthy legal process involved in gaining title, the direct 
tax was heavily applied in Alexandria, Virginia, and the South Carolina Sea Islands. The 
islands contained some of the most fertile and rich plantations of the South and in 1862 
the Treasury Department seized 76,775 acres of land there for non-payment of the tax.32 
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The direct tax would prove to be the government’s most effective tool for seizing 
Southern lands because even though it was underusedit accounted for less than ten 
percent of the land in federal hands at the end of the warit was unquestionably legal, 
whereas confiscation entered into many gray areas. 
Following the approval of the first confiscation measure and the direct tax, the 
notion began to sink in that the war would not be over quickly. Many Radicals reacted to 
this growing feeling by pushing for a more stringent and effective confiscation law, and 
by late 1861, a majority in Congress were willing to amend the Confiscation Act. By 
January 1862, no less than seven emancipation or confiscation bills were reported out of 
committee and became law by the following summer. The most important of these, the 
Second Confiscation Act, approved on 17 July 1862, enabled confiscation of the property 
of five different classes of persons found guilty of disloyalty to the Union, as well as 
declaring the slaves of persons who engaged in or gave aid to rebellion “forever free.” 
Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull justified these measures on the grounds that “we may 
treat [Southerners] as traitors and we may treat them as enemies, and we have the right of 
both, belligerent and sovereign.” At Lincoln’s insistence after he had registered his 
dislike for the measure with Congress, a caveat was added that for property other than 
slaves, seizures under the Act were still restricted to the life of the original owner. The 
Act also required a longer and more complex court process than even that of the direct 
tax. Thus, without a clean and clear title in perpetuity, the Second Confiscation Act 
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rendered impractical any future sales of real property and any motivation for the Treasury 
Department to pursue claims under it.33 
Even with these limitations, though, had Republicans ruthlessly enforced the Act, 
it would have freed almost every slave throughout the South and allowed for a thorough 
reorganization of southern society. In Julian’s estimation, “The war powers of the 
Government, as asserted and defined in the…Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, point to 
a remedy as sweeping as it is just, namely, the military seizure, condemnation, and sale of 
the real estate of traitors and their abbettors.” Even more importantly, in his 1863 
decision U.S. v. the Rights Title and Interest of Hugh Latham, Federal District Court 
Judge John C. Underwood vastly reinterpreted the Article III, Section 3 provision 
limiting seizure of property for conviction of treason to the life of the traitor that 
Congress added to the Act at Lincoln’s request. Underwood found that because execution 
for treason was allowed under the Constitution, in capital cases, where the ultimate 
seizure of a life is made, the government could also take a traitor’s property with “perfect 
title in the government” in perpetuity. He reasoned that if life can be taken, then returning 
property weeks after a swift execution would make such cases into farces. In other words, 
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only in non-capital cases, where the traitor is allowed to live, does the constitutional 
limitation of seizure of property attach.34 
Despite Underwood’s largely ignored ruling and regardless of how much they 
pushed and prodded for a vigorous enforcement, the 1862 Act lay relatively dormant and 
most outright confiscation continued to occur under the direct tax. Though Congress 
never managed to create a widespread, legal mechanism for confiscation, those actions 
they did take, when coupled with the increasingly antislavery tone of the war and cries to 
remove the “kid gloves,” helped push Lincoln to issue the preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation in the summer of 1862. While not effecting landed property, the final 
Proclamation on 1 January 1863 had the de jure result of instantly dissolving billions of 
dollars in southern capital—by far the greatest expropriation of the war.35 
The final and furthest action Congress took on the subject of confiscation, the 
Captured and Abandoned Property Act, approved 3 March 1863, was an attempt to 
compromise the need for a stronger weapon against rebels, while still trying to provide 
enough wiggle room to satisfy Republican legalistic predilections. It cleared the way for 
government sale of abandoned lands, a category which represented the vast majority of 
Southern property in the hands of the federal government. This category of property was 
generally defined as any land found without tenant and claimed by the army upon 
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occupation. The Act provided that any such land could be sold by the Treasury 
department at auction to the highest bidder, with full title. If, within two years, the 
original owner could prove his claim and swear an oath of absolute loyalty, he or she 
would be entitled to the proceeds of the sale, minus any government expenses.36 Like the 
Confiscation Acts, however, this measure was little enforced, and it was gutted by 
Johnson’s later proclamation that sales of abandoned lands be halted, giving Southerners 
a chance to claim their lands before sale. Radicals understandably remained unsatisfied 
by the pace of progress. 
In their inability to enact a real and functional confiscation law, Radical 
Republicans were not only hampered by a lack of a majority in Congress. Their greatest 
challenge, and that which was probably holding back many of their colleagues, was 
Lincoln’s conception of the war. The president insisted, for a variety of reasons, that the 
war was, in fact, not a war. Declaring the conflict a police action and denying secession 
allowed Lincoln to use the call to Union as a battle cry, but more importantly, under 
international law it denied foreign powers the right to take sides. Had the Confederacy 
been recognized as a legal belligerent, England or France might have intervened or at 
least openly supplied Southerners. Lincoln’s course, however, was rocky; his actions, 
including his initial blockade and then closing of Southern ports as well as his treatment 
of Union-occupied territory—where he had appointed governors—technically conferred 
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the status he was trying to deny. Lincoln attempted to walk a fine line, treating the South 
as a belligerent without admitting that secession was possible.37 
Thaddeus Stevens, on the other hand, weighed the benefits of granting 
belligerency with the downside of admitting southern separatism, and concluded that 
agreeing to the principle of secession was the lesser evil. This was the context in which 
his theory of conquered provinces evolved. This was a position that he had developed 
fully by 1861 and continued to argue in his doctrinaire manner well into Reconstruction; 
his ideology was virtually unchanged by the progression of the war.38 
Accepting Confederate arguments that the South was no longer part of the United 
States would legally allow the North to treat it as a foreign nation, revoking all Southern 
land titles and setting the legal groundwork for a thorough and complete Reconstruction 
as conquered territory. In such a scenario, gone were the constitutional prohibitions on 
federal interference with state governments or state law, including property rights. He 
declared that already by 2 August 1861 
 
the time had come when the laws of war were to govern our action; when 
constitutions, if they stood in the way of the laws of war in dealing with the 
enemy, had no right to intervene.…Who says the Constitution must come in, in 
bar of our action? It is the advocates of the rebels, of rebels who have sought to 
overthrow the Constitution and trample it in the dust.…When a country is at open 
war with an enemy, every publicist agrees that you have the right to use every 
means which will weaken him. 
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Stevens understood that the war must become a violent and revolutionary struggle, and to 
that end he also saw the necessity of granting the plausibility and legality of Southern 
secession in order to remove the anti-revolutionary constraints of the Constitution.39 
While Democrats as well as moderate and conservative Republicans accused 
Stevens of choosing to throw away the Constitution in order to revolutionize the South, 
Stevens was obsessed with legalities. In his construction of the conflict, the Constitution 
was not being violated because the war was outside and above its purview. The federal 
government could seize the property of rebels outright because they were no longer 
citizens under the protections of the Constitution. In his estimation, how could 
Southerners ever claim the protections of a document that they explicitly rejected as 
governing their persons. Stevens realized, however, that even though their property was 
forfeit by the right of military conquest, rebels themselves became personally immune 
under the rules of warfare. By admitting belligerent status to the Confederacy, as Stevens 
argued had been done, the North exonerated its leaders of treason because they were the 
citizens of a foreign, independent state. He even offered his legal services to Jefferson 
Davis and Clement C. Clay in any future treason trial; once in prison after the war, Davis 
publicly declined this offer, though, because he understood that while the argument 
Stevens was making was a good case for his innocence, it was a bad argument for the 
South.40 
                                                
39 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 1st Session, 414-415; Foner, Politics and 
Ideology in the Age of the Civil War, 128-129; Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens, 152-153. 
 
40 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 1st Session, 414; Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens, 209, 
214; William Ranulf Brock, An American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1865-
1867 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), 24. 
 
  320 
According to Stevens’ theory, in granting belligerency to the Confederacy, the 
lives of the white aristocracy would be spared, but not their society, culture, or livelihood. 
The South would be recognized de facto and de jure as a conquered province, and the 
victors would have the right to confiscate all property and deal with the subjugated 
population as they saw fit, short of capital punishment. Following the end of hostilities, 
he summed up his argument: “No reform can be effected in the Southern States if they 
have never left the Union.…But reformation must be effected….By treating and holding 
them as a conquered people. Then all things which we can desire to do follow with 
logical and legitimate authority.”41 True to the ideology of his party, even as a conqueror, 
Stevens was obsessed with legitimacy and legality. 
Stevens, moreover, was not alone in his radical views. He was also joined by New 
York political boss Thurlow Weed, who, on a visit to England, maintained that “we shall 
treat the South as William the Conqueror did England. We shall divide it into territories, 
make a military man the governor of each territory, give the estates to well-deserving 
officers and men.” Wendell Phillips also chimed in that “the war has given [us] the right 
to annihilate.”42 Others made similar remarks, but none argued the case with Stevens’s 
tenacity other than George Julian. 
If Stevens was the Robespierre of the Civil War, though, then Julian was its Saint-
Just. The Indiana Congressman derided Lincoln’s policy of acting “in such a manner as 
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shall occasion the least possible inconvenience” towards Southerners. He concluded, 
“The rebels have demanded a ‘reconstruction’ on the basis of slavery; let us give them a 
‘reconstruction’ on the basis of freedom.” He complained that Lincoln’s restrictions on 
the war and its effects on confiscation were an “anti-republican discrimination between 
real and personal property when the nation was struggling for its life against a rebellious 
aristocracy founded on the monopoly of land and the ownership of negroes.” Instead, he 
suggested that “the Government…should seize all property belonging to traitors.…It 
should deal with the rebels as having no rights under the Constitution, or by the laws of 
war, except the right to die.” The war was already far from the “domestic tumult” 
claimed by Lincoln, and any end must result in the confiscation of the property of the 
vanquished.43 
Stevens and Julian, then, along with their cohort, argued throughout the war and 
into Reconstruction that the conflict was outside of constitutional government and within 
an uncharted territory where only logic and ideology ruled. Those two facets, combined 
with their belief in Enlightenment ideals, guided their actions and required they deal 
justly with the enemy. Their conception of the war as a revolution was similar to that of 
Robespierre and Saint-Just under the Jacobin Republic of 1793-1794. And within that 
conception, their first step was the wholesale confiscation of all rebel lands, to be 
followed by redistribution to former slaves. 
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In their eyes, confiscation served the dual purpose of destroying the planter class 
and creating a new class of black and white yeoman farmers, destined to become the new 
political class of the South. Confiscation, in addition, would punish the rebels, help pay 
down the debt, ensure pensions for Union veterans, and repay loyal citizens whose 
property was damaged or destroyed during the war. Stevens, sounding like a free soiler 
and latter-day Jeffersonian, declared, 
 
Nothing is so likely to make a man a good citizen as to make him a freeholder. 
Nothing will so multiply the productions of the South as to divide it into small 
farms. Nothing will make men so industrious and moral as to let them feel that 
they are above want and are the owners of the soil which they till.…No people 
will ever be republican in spirit and practice where a few own immense manors 
and the masses are landless. Small independent landholders are the support and 
guardians of republican liberty. 
 
Wendell Phillips, convinced by Stevens and Julian of the need for land for freedmen by 
1866 in order to counterbalance the former rebels argued that “you cannot govern the 
South against its educated classes, with their social prestige. If they cannot be hung nor 
exiled, they must be flanked.”44 
Yet, unlike the Jacobins seventy years earlier, the Pennsylvania Congressman and 
his fellow Radicals were unable to convince a majority of their colleagues that 
expropriation en masse was the correct course to follow. Moderate and conservative 
Republicans agreed that confiscation was a legitimate war measure and legal as it was 
practiced. But, they felt that outright confiscation violated the sanctity of property rights 
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and feared it may lead to a class-war and an overly powerful federal government.45 Then 
again, had they not been constrained by Lincoln’s politically necessary conception of the 
war as a police action, many Republicans might have been swayed by the Radicals’ total 
war argument, especially in light of the methods used by Generals Ulysses S. Grant, 
William T. Sherman, and Philip H. Sheridan in the final stages of the war. By those 
standards, all Republicans might have seen the conflict as nothing short of brutal and 
revolutionary, and they might have then been willing to legitimize confiscation. 
In the end, while there was much rhetoric about confiscation of Confederate 
property, the government did not follow a determined course in its acquisition of southern 
property. Without a vast holding of land titled to the government and ready to be resold, 
redistribution could only go so far. Despite numerous laws and attempts, the war ended 
before Radicals like Stevens or Julian could ever persuade a majority in Congress to 
stand behind proposals similar to those created under the Jacobin Republic in France. 
Their failure on these points represented the larger failure of the social welfare ideal in 
Free Labor ideology in the United States. While a few managed to take advantage of the 
cobbled-together system such as it was, Republicans never managed to create the larger 
structure that they had imagined in the 1850s. It is not surprising, therefore, that soon 
after the war the Republican Party shifted away from its prewar rhetoric of virtue and 
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morality and instead entered a course on the rails of big business, industry, and 
capitalism.46 
 
The Hollow Ghost 
The Redistribution of Land in France and the United States 
 
Confiscation has always remained the more contentious stage of land reform on 
both sides of the Atlantic, but to the Jacobins, both American and French, who put faith 
in the ideology of free labor, redistribution was inseparable from it. In their minds, social 
justice and bourgeois liberalism together only demanded the taking of property from the 
disloyal or unworthy because it was necessary to acquire an abundant supply to fund the 
state and ensure that both the downtrodden were secured from poverty and the 
counterrevolutionary were no longer a threat. Despite this integral ideological link 
between the two phases of land reform, in both Paris and Washington many of the 
coalitions formed in support of confiscation broke apart over how to distribute seized 
lands. As the debate shifted from the taking to the giving, true-believers and pragmatists 
clashed over the repercussions of true land reform. In Europe, a more generous and 
lasting virtue-inspired system was established, while in North America the lack of 
outright confiscated property and the growing influence of liberal-led, laissez-faire 
capitalism prevented any real changes from ever taking place. 
In France, redistribution of the biens nationaux was a point of conflict for the 
Jacobins and Girondins of the Convention. As people came to see large holders of land as 
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tyrannical enemies keeping others in poverty, debates raged over land sales: should the 
state pursue the best financial course and sell high even if in large tracts, or should it fight 
for economic justice and guarantee loans on small tracts with limited auctions in order to 
benefit the small freeholder? Would small farms be able to produce the surpluses of large 
farms especially needed in a time when famine could strike any year?47 
Such financial questions plagued the deputies as they tried to find a middle 
ground. Early in the Revolution, the state’s coffers drastically needed to be filled with the 
revenue from sales, but leaders feared that open auctions might drive land prices 
prohibitively high for those who needed land the most. Despite these concerns, on 1 May 
1790 the National Assembly decreed that all sales would be by auction to the highest 
bidder, payable in twelve yearly installments. This was augmented on 2 September 1792 
with a preference for cash sales. Both of these laws had the effect of shutting out the 
destitute in favor of the highest financial benefit of the state, but this was at the time of 
the state’s most dire fiscal need.48 
When the Girondins and Montagnard Jacobins came to power in September 1792 
with the creation of the First Republic, they inherited a revolutionary state whose 
finances had stabilized thanks in large part to the early land policies. No longer 
encumbered by looming debt, they revived the free labor conception of land for the 
landless as a basis for independence and true freedom. Through a series of decrees 
promulgated in March 1793, the Convention moved towards establishing a policy of 
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expropriation from the unpatriotic and unvirtuous, who had been removed from the body 
politic, and appropriation for the virtuous but destitute. Saint-Just argued, 
 
Yes: the nature of things has perhaps led us to results we had not imagined. Many 
of the enemies of the Revolution live in opulence; needs make the people 
dependent on their enemies.…The Revolution has brought us to recognize this 
one principle, namely, that whoever has been an enemy of his country cannot own 
property in that place.49 
 
The following June, the Convention decreed all confiscated properties in the possession 
of the nation be sold in small parcels, favoring sales to the landless. For communal lands, 
a second June decree revoked all seizures of commons by nobles and gave each 
commune the right to vote, with one third needed to pass, on whether to divide 
permanently these lands equally to all adult residents, regardless of whether they owned 
land or paid taxes. These laws were extensions of a policy first proposed in April 1790, 
on the grounds that “property puts an end to poverty” and it finally settled the debate 
between speculators and homesteaders.50 
Following these actions, on 13 September 1793 the Convention announced that all 
citizens who neither owned land nor paid taxes, would receive a bond of 500 livres in lieu 
of an earlier rental policy. Valid for twenty years, the bond could be used towards the 
purchase of confiscated émigré property. This was possible because though the Church 
lands had been sold, the renewed confiscation measures continued to feed the system. On 
3 March 1794, on a motion by Saint-Just and in order to prolong the system even further, 
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the Convention decreed that the property of mere suspects would be subject to 
confiscation and redistribution to the poor. In other words, far from attacking the idea of 
property, Jacobins sought to make it a universal value, accessible to everyone as a 
guarantor of freedom, while keeping it from being hoarded by the wealthy and 
counterrevolutionary. In line with the original Girondin conception, though, the land was 
to be earned rather than given away for free; the bonds merely ensured that those without 
the means could make their first few payments. In this way, French policy was very 
analogous to the Homestead Act of 1862 in the United States.51 
While this new Jacobin redistribution structure went a long way to achieving the 
goal of making good bourgeoisie out of landless peasants, many of the confiscation and 
sale laws, no matter how strongly worded, were only haphazardly applied. In some 
districts, commissioners charged with sales refused to sell any lands or restricted their 
sales to non-Church property only; others disliked the restrictions on the size of lots, 
ignoring the relevant decrees outright. The 500 livres bond measure, which boded so well 
for the landless, only succeeded in driving prices up to the point that the bonds were 
meaningless to those without other funds. By early 1794, prices on small lots had risen 
nearly seven fold from their appraised value. For those in villages with communal lands, 
the rules regarding subdivisions were rarely clear and led to great confusion. In total, only 
ten to twenty percent of confiscated land actually changed hands.52 
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Though they did try to get land to as many people as possible, Montagnard 
Jacobins proved unwilling to strike aggressively at the embedded methods of agricultural 
production tied to large farms worked by tenants, and so small scale farming never 
managed to make an impact. The only real method to break up such 
preconceptualizations would have been wholesale confiscation and redistribution of all 
land, but as previously noted, this was well beyond what Jacobins were willing to 
consider. In other words, Jacobins found a way to confiscate land, but proved unable to 
implement fully their ideology because of the legal restrictions they themselves placed on 
the right of property.53 
Despite these setbacks, by Robespierre’s downfall and the end of Jacobin rule, 
many small farmers found success through their land sale policies and the influx of 
significantly more available land on the market. In the Beauce region, nobles bought up 
thirteen percent of the total confiscated biens nationaux offered for sale; rentier and 
commercial bourgeoisie took another fourteen and twenty-five percent of the land, 
respectively. In Chartres, sixty-four percent of the land was bought by town dwellers. 
Even though the rich did get richer, small freeholders were able to increase their station 
and many formerly landless people acquired a stake in the earth. Farmers purchased 
nearly twenty-five percent of the land in the Beauce, and one in ten landless peasants 
were able to acquire land. Many sharecroppers bought their plots outright, and some 
peasants combined assets to buy large former Church lands before splitting them up 
amongst themselves. The mills and factories purchased by the commercial classes led to 
new industry and helped raise the prospects of many townspeople. At the same time, the 
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breakup of concentrated, landed wealth in France allowed farmers to apply new, though 
not revolutionary, agricultural methods that noble and Church estates had prevented.54 
While the success was not as great as Robespierre and his compatriots might have 
wished, the confiscation and redistribution laws enacted during the French Revolution 
were a marked improvement over the land acquisition of the previous generation. With 
each sale, moreover, the purchaser tied himself to the revolution. As successive 
revolutionary governments vanquished much of Jacobin ideology, the legal structures of 
the land reforms were beyond repute. In fact, they were upheld and tentatively continued 
through Napoleon’s final defeat, at which time the first sales had been in place for near a 
quarter century. When he was replaced by a Bourbon in 1814, the new king, Louis XVIII, 
had no choice but to validate all transfers which had occurred during the revolution. The 
only battle to reverse land reform which he won was that all remaining, unsold bien 
nationaux were returned to their original owners or families. Two keys to the success of 
French Revolutionary land reform, then, were its legality and its persistence which 
prevented a counterrevolution against property.55 
 
In the United States, many of the same debates over redistribution that took place 
in France raged during the latter stages of the war and throughout Reconstruction. The 
reallocation of seized properties also similarly began with sales to the highest bidder. 
Confiscated plantations in the Sea Islands, as previously mentioned, were sold off in 
massive tracts to wealthy northern investors. Though some land was reserved for black 
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families and other tracts were used as experimental farms to teach free labor to the former 
slaves, most of these paled in comparison to money raised and success of the auction 
sales. Above alland unlike in FranceAmerican land reform never truly progressed to 
a system of free land patents in the South, even though the 1862 Homestead Act 
promised such a system in the West, a region that was all but impossible for most 
freedmen to reach. Thus, like the bond measure in France, Western homesteading 
remained untenable for those who needed it most. The plans for free Southern land, 
moreover, were virtually all subverted and dismantled before they were ever active; the 
same would happen to most schemes which guaranteed low prices for freedmen. 
The first official definition of Reconstruction, and first hint of how it would affect 
seized lands, came in December 1863 when Lincoln announced his “ten-percent” plan. 
He ordered that any rebel who repented by taking a loyalty oath and accepted 
emancipation would have all of their property returned, except slaves and “redistributed 
property.”56 While the strategy was designed as wartime enticement to sway Southerners 
back to the Union, its ramifications would haunt Radicals as Andrew Johnson would later 
continue it unmodified at the end of the war. 
Lincoln’s plan also tried to carve out a space for lands granted to freedmen by the 
army as it took control of Confederate territory. Congress finally formalized this program 
on 3 March 1865 by creating the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 
placed under the direction of the Secretary of War, and charged with helping freed 
peoples with the transition from slavery to freedom. By placing the Bureau under the 
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purview of the military, Congress signaled its belief that only troops could protect the 
freedom of former slaves. War Department placement, however, was also a way that 
moderates could portray the Bureau as a temporary war measure. In contrast, during their 
debates many Radicals argued that land was necessary to secure blacks’ freedom, and to 
that end, tried to include an amendment to the Second Confiscation Act to give the 
government permanent title to confiscated landsindicating their belief in the 
permanence of their actions. Unfortunately, this section of the bill was deleted before it 
became law.57 
The Bureau was authorized instead to divide abandoned and confiscated lands 
into forty acre plots assigned to each freedman or white refugee adult male head of 
household for rental and eventual sale with “such title thereto as the United States can 
convey.” The language emphasized the legal ambiguities surrounding much of the 
abandoned land, but it was clear that Congress, unsure of future title guarantees, did not 
want to promise what it could not deliver, since the Captured and Abandoned Property 
Act was so little used. Thus, it opted only for temporary use of rebel estates with the 
remote possibility of title and sale later.58 This was a significant caveat because, while 
the direct tax was the government’s most successful tool for taking legal title to southern 
land, the mass of property was taken instead through the various confiscation and 
abandoned property acts as the army progressed forward and occupied it as necessary. 
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When Lincoln was assassinated in April 1865, Andrew Johnson became 
president. The man who had once wished to make the punishment for treason odious and 
was the first to suggest the theory of territorialization responded to Radicals’ demands for 
a more rigorous Reconstruction policy by denying the power of the federal government to 
act. While Lincoln’s views of the South as a belligerent were at many times ambiguous 
for a variety of reasons, Johnson’s were clear cut: “there is no such thing as 
reconstruction. These states have not gone out of the Union, therefore reconstruction is 
unnecessary.”59 He had taken Lincoln’s definition of the war crafted for political 
purposes and imbued it with a legal force, unable to see the differences between wartime 
necessity and the needs of Reconstruction. 
In July, Johnson ordered that all confiscated and abandoned land still held by the 
War or Treasury Departments, which were in many cases actively redistributing it even if 
on a temporary basis to freedmen, be transferred to the control of the Freedmen’s Bureau. 
This order, however, was hollow because Johnson’s amnesty proclamations had been 
accompanied by orders to return all confiscated and abandoned land to those who took 
the loyalty oath. In all, the Freedman’s Bureau only ever controlled two tenths of one 
percent of the land in the South, and much of that evaporated as Johnson’s policies were 
carried out. For example, of the 62,528 acres controlled on 4 August 1865 by the Union 
army in Louisiana, only the 1,400 acre plantation of Richard Taylor in St. Charles Parish 
had actually been confiscated with title transferred to the government. Thus, the vast 
majority of the land upon which the Bureau was resettling freedmen was subject to 
restoration, no matter how much freedmen had improved it. In all, Bureau-controlled 
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lands dwindled from 850,000 acres in 1865 to 415,000 in April 1866 to 140,000 by 
August 1868.60 
In addition to the return of lands, beginning in late July, Attorney General James 
Speed restricted the enforcement of the Confiscation Acts, moving towards a 
government-wide policy of conciliation. In September, Speed acted again, stopping all 
ongoing confiscation-related legal proceedings in Virginia, and expanding this to the rest 
of the South by December. Moreover, he ruled that corporate property was not subject to 
the Act at all. When combined with Johnson’s amnesty and pardon policies, the halting of 
sales and the return of all unsold properties, Speed’s actions, taken under Johnson’s 
direction, greatly aided in destroying whatever hope their had been for a change in the 
balance of power in the South. Secretary of War Edwin Stanton wrote to Johnson, 
 
The abandoned as well as confiscated lands should have been given [to the 
freedmen] beyond recall, and that the Government, having freed the slaves, was 
bound to provide for the helpless and suffering among them, to the fullest extent 
to which the master was morally bound before emancipation. 
 
His point was moot because Stanton himself was ordered to suspend the sale of 
confiscated lands in June 1865. In the end, Johnson’s first six months as president 
virtually ensured the vast majority of freedmen would never see land of their own.61 
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Freedmen’s Bureau Chief General Oliver O. Howard did try to circumvent 
Johnson’s orders, but Johnson eventually trumped him. The president declared that “land 
will not be regarded as confiscated until it has been condemned and sold by decree of the 
United States Court for the district in which the property may be found, and the title there 
thus vested in the United States.” Nor did he stop there. On 7 September 1865, he ordered 
that the Treasury Department no longer turn over its funds from sales and rentals of 
confiscated and abandoned lands to the Bureau, crippling it financially since it had no 
other appropriation. By late 1865, Howard instructed his subordinates to stop settling 
abandoned lands and instead pushed for the direct tax commissioners to foreclose on as 
much land as they could and sell it to freedmen because they could convey title while the 
Bureau could not.62 
With Bureau lands in disarray, many reformers turned to the Sherman Grants as 
one of the last glimmers of hope for land redistribution and justice for freedmen. Created 
on the Georgia and South Carolina coasts under Special Field Order No. 15 in January 
1865 by Sherman after his March to the Sea, the grants provided forty acre plots and the 
use of surplus military animals and tools for former slaves. By June 1865, 40,000 
freemen were settled on 400,000 acres of land reserved under the order.63 
Three months later, however, pardoned rebels whose plantations made up the 
grants began demanding that their land be returned to them in accordance with Johnson’s 
orders. Republicans managed to include a three year guarantee of the possessory titles in 
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the Freedman’s Bureau renewal bill, but after Johnson’s veto this was stricken from the 
override for lack of support. When the military took over the direct administration of the 
grants, the commander, General James C. Beecher, ordered any plots with incomplete 
paperwork restored to their former owners. Those with valid and complete claims for 
grant lands were finally allowed to purchase other seized lands to which the government 
could convey full title, but those freedmen were obviously unable to take with them any 
improvements made to the land over the years. Though Howard and the Radicals in 
Congress could do little to save the Bureau or the grants in the face of Johnson’s grim 
determination to win southern support, their hopes were partially buoyed by the Southern 
Homestead Act.64 
Signed by Johnson on 21 June 1866, the Southern Homestead Act opened public 
lands in five southern states to the exclusive settlement of freedmen and loyal refugees 
until 1 January 1867. It restricted settlement to actual homesteading, and during the 
exclusive period the five dollar registration fee was payable at the end of the five year 
residency. In many cases, however, disorganization led to patents being turned down, and 
the majority of freemen were unable even to consider taking advantage of the act because 
most were either already under labor contracts or had leased and planted other plots. In 
some areas, land offices failed to open in anything resembling a timely manner; one 
office in Alabama surrounded by some of the best public lands did not open until 1869, 
well past the period of exclusivity, when the patent fees were due up front. In other 
places, the only available land was wild and unfit for agriculture. In Louisiana, whites 
conspired to keep blacks from registering their tracts altogether. Ultimately, only five 
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percent of the 8,800 total homestead applications were from black families, and, of those, 
only twenty percent received their final patents and titles.65 
By 1867, southern obstructionism in the face of Presidential Reconstruction had 
provided Stevens and his Radical Republican colleagues hope that more robust land 
reform could be pushed through Congress in spite of Johnson’s stubbornness, especially 
after their victory with the passage of the first Military Reconstruction Act, which 
established military districts in the South. Stevens was relying on a cycle that had 
persisted since the beginning of the warhe struck a position, and then watched as the 
party swayed towards him; however, on the issue of real land reform, the party did not 
come. As the New York Times noted at the time, Stevens’ theory of leftward momentum 
“presupposes the continuance during peace of a public opinion which acquired force 
under the excitement and perils of war.” The end of the war paused the justifications of 
radicalism for a moment. In that moment, Johnson managed to break finally and 
completely whatever momentum had been building for the Radical Republicans. His veto 
of the Freedmen’s Bureau bill, liberal pardon and amnesty policies, and attempts to 
forgive-and-forget former confederates gave political initiative to Southern whites. If 
they appeared suppliant for a short while, they hoped they would take the wind from the 
sails of Stevens and the Radicals. When everyone else realized Johnson’s folly a year 
later, it was too late, and momentum flowing out of the war had evaporated. All that was 
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left was to patch the situation as best as possible. Moreover, by 1867, Stevens was dying, 
too weak on many occasions to read his own speeches.66 
At about the same time as Johnson was stalling, party moderates, including 
William Pitt Fessenden in the Senate, began to question the ideological righteousness of 
legislation providing free land for one class of citizen while stripping it outright from 
another. In July 1867, the re-confiscation question came to the fore and Republicans were 
forced to take sides. Despite growing support for the drastic measure of expropriating 
leading Southerners of their real assets, a majority developed which could not move past 
the ideological conflict between the right to property and justice for the freedmen. The 
Nation admitted that free land raised serious issues, and declared that “no man in 
America has any right to anything which he has not honestly earned, or which the lawful 
owner has not thought proper to give him.” The New York Times suggested that if legal 
confiscation occurred in the South, it could easily be transplanted to the North, destroying 
any future for investment opportunities in the South. In the end, confiscation became 
simply an empty threat leveled at the South if it did not adhere to the Reconstruction Act. 
Redistributing land claimed by the Courts and the army under wartime exigencies was 
one thing, but re-confiscation of property returned to supposedly loyal citizens no longer 
engaged in rebellion simply went one step too far for moderates to support. In the case of 
Republicans, their liberalism beat out their sense of social justice.67 
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The end result of Republican attempts at land reform in the South was that, 
instead of a class of independent yeomen farmers, Reconstruction produced tenant 
sharecroppers and debt peonage that would doom many freedmen to poverty for 
generations. Though southern governments and the Freedmen’s Bureau provided some 
worker protections, they were either unwilling or unable to enact the one thing that might 
have broken the planter class and guaranteed economic independence: land reform. This, 
however, was not entirely their fault because in most states there were no reserves of 
public land upon which freed blacks could be settled. South Carolina tried to implement 
its own land reform policy, but in the end failed due to corruption and the wiles of state 
politics. Other public and private ventures similarly failed. Moreover, with the 
‘redemption’ of the state governments—Southerners retaking control from the largely 
black and carpetbagger Republican administrations—even the labor protections erected 
during Reconstruction were dismantled.68 
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While Lincoln’s restrained view of the war as well as Free Labor ideology writ 
large can be blamed for subverting any chance at an effective confiscation plan, Andrew 
Johnson almost single-handedly destroyed any hope of real land reform by granting 
pardons and returning land to all suppliant Southerners in the vain hope that a new 
political coalition would form around him. His position destroyed the momentum 
garnered from the war, and directly resulted in southern obstructionism against internal 
changes.69 
One northern man wrote to Johnson, “You have had a grand opportunity to settle 
the Negro question now and forever and we fear that you have missed it.” Senator 
Charles Sumner agreed, declaring, “Never was so great an opportunity lost, as our 
President has flung away.” Even Johnson’s military secretary chimed in: “We had the 
opportunity when Lee surrendered and…when Lincoln was assassinated to make our own 
terms.” Even Southerners saw the folly of Johnson’s policies; one later said that the 
South should have taken “a different course as to the negroes,” but Johnson, “held up 
before us the hope of a ‘white man’s government’ and…it was natural that we should 
yield to our old prejudices.” What would have been required for success against 
Southerners was a coercive, Radical reconstruction policy the moment the war ended, but 
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Lincoln’s assassination and Johnson’s first months destroyed whatever hopes there could 
have been for such a policy as the exigencies of war eroded.70 
In October 1865, Wendell Phillips wrote, “I think thus far and today, the South is 
victorious.” He heaped blame on Johnson for his generous amnesty and pardon policies 
that made him “three fourths rebel,” but at the same time derided moderate and 
conservative Republicans who argued giving Johnson leeway was the right thing to do 
out of respect for Lincoln. In Phillips view, Johnson’s plan was not an experiment, but “a 
fortification…the President has put a bayonet in front of every Southern claim, has spiked 
every Northern cannon.” By their acquiescence, Republicans in Congress had turned the 
party into “only a specter walking through the country in its shroud.” When confronted 
with the actions of Southerners returning to political power during Presidential 
Reconstruction, William W. Boyce declared that those men “like the Bourbons have 
learned nothing and forgotten nothing.”71 But, even the restored Bourbons were more 
accepting of the revolutionary changes in France than the Nabobs of the South after the 
Civil War. 
Though Johnson’s policies were eventually challenged and overruled, “Radical” 
Reconstruction was not a final solution to the problems of freedmen, but an attempt to put 
off the inevitable return of traditional Southern power as long as possible. By 1870, white 
Northern public opinion had shifted to one of complacency towards the movement of 
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land for former slaves. Many people thought that emancipation and suffrage was the only 
gift necessary for blacks to begin their new lives, and the question of land faded. 
Even though they lost the support of Northerners and plans for land reform 
ultimately failed, many freedmen did find a modicum of success after the end of slavery. 
In the first thirty-five years of freedom, 25 percent of black farmers in the South acquired 
some land, and urban blacks also managed arguably well; both groups were able to find 
their way through the mire of the post-war South on their own, despite numerous 
obstacles and dangers. While not as successful as in France where many more aspects of 
the Revolution remained after the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty, enough of the 
revolution that was the Civil War was engrained into Southern society that it guaranteed 
it would rear its head in the future. When the Civil Rights movement emerged nearly 100 
years later, they returned to both the legal and moral arguments of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction.72 
 
As the question of land reform came to the docket in France, it was in the midst of 
a revolutionary fiscal crisis which demanded immediate action. Because it was a 
revolution, though, the French were not restrained by a constitution, but only by an 
ideology formed from a bourgeois liberalism which guaranteed property rights and a 
radical belief in social justice and civic virtue. Even with a blank slate to dictate and 
redefine such rights, being the jurists that they were, Jacobins and their colleagues 
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struggled to find a legal and logical way to seize the assets of their enemies within 
France. Saint-Just provided the justification they sought by defining 
counterrevolutionaries and émigrés as outside the body politic and not eligible for the 
rights of citizenship because they were directly at war with the revolution which was 
being fought to protect those rights. In the end, they created a system that sought to ‘level 
up’ the lowest common denominator to a respectable level where a person could survive 
with dignity. 
On the other hand, during the American Civil War, the Constitution remained a 
bulwark against which any scheme of confiscation had to be measured. While the laws 
passed by Congress failed to provide an adequate solution to the problem of punishing 
rebels, Thaddeus Stevens suggested the most viable alternative: admitting the possibility 
of secession would legalize a thorough recreation of the South however the North saw fit. 
Stevens’s belligerency argument did not remove or go against the Constitution, which 
would have remained in effect in the North. Instead, his argument circumvented its 
provisions in the South by admitting that the Confederacy and its citizens had, through 
secession, voluntarily given up the rights, privileges, and immunities that the Constitution 
offered. While it might appear that the proposition gave Republicans free reign to do 
anything they pleased to the South, like the Jacobins, they were, in fact, restrained by 
their ideology. Such limitations forced Stevens to develop arguments as to which 
property was subject to confiscation, namely the large plantations of the Southern 
aristocracy, and not that of the middling white farmers. In the end, though, Stevens’s 
theory was a step too far for most Republicans and their belief in the unbreakable and 
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eternal nature of the Union. It was a tenet they were unwilling to bend to the breaking 
point as Stevens would have them do. 
In addition to the theories behind confiscation, calls for the equalization of 
property were virtually unheard. These were two groups of moderate bourgeoisie who 
upheld property rights as sacrosanct. They developed legal arguments for confiscation 
which acted through the court system rather than decreeing outright expropriation. They 
offered the landless low prices, restricted auctions, and generous lease terms rather than 
free land because both believed in the virtue of the self-made, economically independent 
man who worked his way to his status rather than by receiving handouts. 
In France, attempts to provide bonds to purchase lands quickly became valueless, 
and were not renewed. In the U.S., the closest the Republicans ever came to providing 
title to free land were the Sherman Grants along the Georgia and South Carolina coasts. 
Even in that case, however, Republicans could not muster enough support for 
expropriating the property of one class and giving it free of charge to another. When 
finally codified into law, Congress allowed those freed blacks with Sherman grants to 
buy tracts at a lowered price on government-held land that had been lawfully seized for 
non-payment of the direct tax. Lands which were not legally repossessed through the 
courts were all eventually returned to their former owners, regardless of their wartime 
records.73 
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At the same time, however, the laws passed during the French Revolution and 
American Civil War represent two of the greatest land confiscation schemes ever put into 
practice. In France, vast tracts of land were taken from the nobility, the Galician Church, 
and the crown, all without compensation, under a redefinition of property rights. In the 
United States, despite their reluctance to seize real estate, a similar redefinition of 
property rights evaporated overnight three billion dollars’ worth of southern property 
without compensation with the passage of the 13th Amendment. As in France, once the 
initial realignment of property rights from natural law to social right occurred, it became 
an uphill fight to change it further rather than keep it from morphing into a neo-natural 
law doctrine that incorporated the changes but outlawed all other modifications.74 
In other words, Jacobin and Republican ideology might have had their radical 
elements, but they also included preconceived notions regarding how far they were 
willing to modify the sacrosanctity of property rights. Their liberalism would bend to 
their radicalism, but only so far as necessary to establish a modicum of justice. Future 
Secretary of the Interior and participant in German revolutions of 1848, Carl Schurz, 
noted in 1864 that  
 
Revolutionary movements run in a certain determined direction; the point from 
which they start may be ascertained, but…you cannot tell beforehand how far 
they will go. The extent of their progress depends upon the strength of the 
opposition they meet; if the opposition is weak and short, the revolution will stop 
short also; but if the opposition is strong and stubborn, the movement will roll on 
until every opposing element in its path is trodden down and crushed.75 
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The war lasted long enough to see the end of slavery, the imposition of equal rights, and 
black suffrage, but the opposition from Southerners was not strong enough to see a real 
and true regeneration of the South in the form of a lasting land reform and making of 
amends for the subhuman conditions left upon the former slaves once the army withdrew. 
And, while this left Reconstruction a failure in ensuring a decent and equal life for former 
slaves, the wartime legislation did pass Congress laid the blueprints for a modern, 
industrialized state that would eventually return to the ideals of the Radicals. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
 
JACOBINS AND THE LONGUE DURÉE 
 
Short Term Failures and Long Term Successes 
 
 
 
French historian François Furet, taking a cue from Alexis de Tocqueville, argued 
we must see the longue durée—the long term—of the French Revolution, from its 
political and intellectual origins in the 1760s to the first peaceful transfer of power under 
republican government in 1886.1 The preceding work attempts to follow Furet’s idea, 
taking the long view of the American Civil War. Beginning with the intellectual origins 
of radical abolitionism in the aftermath of the French and Haitian Revolutions, it reaches 
the failure of Reconstruction and the rise of the Jim Crow South. This is not the end of 
the long view, however. The end would be to carry the story, like Furet, to the point at 
which the ideas and ideals of the revolutionary period are accepted peacefully. In that 
view, the proper ending would be the Civil Rights Era of the 1960s during which the 
federal government stepped up and stepped in to complete the reconstruction of the South 
begun when the Civil War erupted some 100 years before. 
In France, Maximilian Robespierre’s and the rest of the Jacobins’ downfall 
flowed directly from their successes. As many of the terrorists themselves began to fear 
for their own lives, the remnants of every faction formed an uneasy alliance. They 
condemned the ideologue to his own revolutionary machine and Thermidor marked the 
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end of the Jacobin reign in France, if not the end of the Revolution outright. Without the 
righteous moralist leading the revolution, liberty and equality were condemned to be 
suppressed by those who looked after their own power first. Within a few years, more 
traditional forms of rule reemerged, first as a Bonaparte then as a Bourbon. And, while 
the results of the Revolution were upheld, many of its lofty ideals were left behind. 
It would not be until 1887, after three additional revolutions and three additional 
dynasties, that republicans would regain control of France. The time until then was no 
less important though, as the ideals of 1789 slowly spread across France until that 
idealism was grounded in the minds not of Parisians, but of the men of the provinces. 
Furet described the trend as such: 
 
For the entire history of the nineteenth century France can be seen as a struggle 
between Revolution and Restoration…[but] only the victory of the republicans 
over the monarchists at the beginning of the Third Republic [in 1877] marked the 
definitive victory of the Revolution in the French countryside.…Integration of 
France’s villages and peasant culture into the republican nation on the basis of the 
principles of 1789 [took] at least a century.…Republican Jacobinism, dictated so 
long from Paris, won its victory only after it could count on the majority vote of 
rural France.2 
 
What allowed this shift to occur? The most important factor was universal 
education, which developed through the reformation of French society over the course of 
the nineteenth century, and even more greatly improved under the Third Republic. The 
peasants no longer viewed themselves as living in their own world, and they kept in touch 
with news and events from the entire country. Many of these social improvements were 
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enacted by Louis Napoleon during the ‘liberal’ phase of his Second Empire. Ironically, 
while trying to maintain a dictatorship, Napoleon III, through public education and 
cautious reform, created almost 100 years after the advent of the Revolution the very 
nation of republicans which Robespierre had tried to inspire by virtue, and force by 
Terror. 
In the United States, by 1870 all former Confederate states had been duly 
readmitted, but military occupation remained to provide backing for their Republican-led 
governments run by either transplanted northerners or southern Unionists—carpetbaggers 
and scalawags. Because of federal support, some 750,000 freedmen registered, voted, and 
had the opportunity to hold every office in their states except governor. Economic 
conditions, however, did not improve as quickly and in 1872 Republicans began to lose 
their majorities in both houses of Congress. 
As Southerners slowly reclaimed control of their states, former slaves became the 
targets of increasing racial violence; race riots, lynchings, and mob violence became a 
plague, descriptions of which belong in the worst narratives of the Terror in France. 
Republicans tried to quell the violent counterrevolution being led by the Ku Klux Klan 
but were unable to back new laws with sufficient force. As a final effort just months 
before they lost power and military occupation was ended in 1876, they ramrodded 
through a sweeping Civil Rights Act, designed by Charles Sumner to establish equality 
and further cement the gains enshrined in the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments. In the end, 
though, these efforts came too late and were the last ditch attempts of reform by a group 
that realized they would soon be out of power. 
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By 1877, Americans throughout the country had had enough conflict. For 
approaching twenty years they had been involved in an ideological battle with the South 
and unfortunately the former rebels, broken on the battlefield, held their ground on what 
parts of their society they could. The Republican coalition which had driven the war 
effort began to fall apart: class struggle sapped the strength of northern workers; women 
had either become professionals or were jaded by being ignored in the 15th Amendment; 
many people were disillusioned by the hypocrisy of the post-war southern governments; 
and finally, other issues besides the South came to the fore, such as pushes for small 
government, for prohibition, and against hunger. 
Without the military as protector, the black population became even more 
harassed and terrified by what can only be compared to the White Terror of Thermidor 
when French conservatives and moderates sought out and exacted revenge on Jacobins 
everywhere. Additionally, most of the laws concerning Reconstruction were avoided or 
repealed by the Democrats in control of Congress, who American historian James 
McPherson notes like the restored Bourbons in 1815, “seemed to have learned nothing 
and forgotten nothing from the experiences that had almost revolutionized them out of 
existence.” Congressional reaction was soon supplemented by a Supreme Court that 
created a legal foundation upon which segregationists and racists could rebuild the South. 
By the end of the century all that had been accomplished during Reconstruction was 
summarily dismantled, culminating in Plessy v. Ferguson and Williams v. Mississippi, 
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which de facto neutralized the 14th and 15th Amendments. Former slaves, while 
technically citizens, were only recognized as not being slaves in name.3 
Just as in France, however, the revolutionary ideology which the restored 
government tried to forget, spread slowly and was reinaugurated a century later. In the 
1950s and 1960s, the ideological sword was wielded again and this time had lasting 
success. A more educated society had developed over time and a new sense of equality 
and American idealism sprang from the horrors of World War II. The education plans for 
former slaves, moreover, had somehow eluded the destruction of the Republican program 
of equality, and created a lasting impact on southern society. By 1900, fifty-five percent 
of African Americans had some level of literacy; even though less than what it could 
have reached, it was an amazing leap from the virtual illiteracy of the former slave 
society.4 By the middle of the twentieth century, the federal courts, led by Chief Justice 
Earl Warren, began to attack segregation and the shaky theories upon which it rested. 
Equal protection was newly safeguarded, and the Bill of Rights was applied to the states 
through the 14th Amendment. Within twenty years—a century after the downfall of 
Reconstruction—Jim Crow was all but destroyed. 
Under this admittedly brief lens of the longue durée, then, the United States 
followed much the same course as France. The completion of ideological revolution did 
not involve war, but required time. Warren and his colleagues did judicially what Lincoln 
and the Radical Republicans had been unable to do in four years of brutal war. While it 
                                                
3 James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, 3rd Edition 
(Boston: McGraw Hill, 2001), 583; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Williams v. 
Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898). 
 
4 McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, 619. 
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was violent in some brief occurrences, it was nowhere near the level of 1794 in the 
Vendée or 1864 in the Shenandoah Valley at the height of revolutionary struggle. 
The question remains, however, if such peaceful ends could have been reached 
without the original revolutionary breaks and their ensuing cycles of violence. Many 
modern democratic societies have faced similar births by fire which marked dramatic 
ends to one form of society and the opening of a new era. Many of those which managed 
to avoid the bloodshed of civil war, moreover, transformed out of the revolutionary 
violence of a neighbor or through failure in war. In a world in which tribalism continues 
to inhibit the integration of geographic areas into cohesive nation-states, the wholly 
peaceful creation of democratic societies out of the remaining Old Regimes seems out of 
reach in the near term. All that can likely be hoped for is that the revolutionary break is 
short or curtailed and the beginning of the long hard struggle for modernity begins sooner 
rather than later. 
 
  352 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Newspapers 
 
 
Albany Patriot 
American and Foreign Antislavery Reporter 
American Freeman 
The Anglo-African Magazine 
The Anglo-African Weekly 
The Anti-Slavery Examiner 
Antislavery Standard 
Ashtabula Sentinel 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 
Boston Daily Republican 
Boston Evening Transcript 
Boston Atlas and Bee 
The Christian Recorder 
Cincinnati Enquirer 
Cincinnati Philanthropist 
The Colored American 
Douglass’ Monthly 
The Emancipationist 
The Emancipator 
Frederick Douglass’ Paper 
Freedom’s Journal 
The Friend of Man 
The Genius of Universal Emancipation 
Indianapolis Daily Journal 
The Liberator 
Liberty Press 
Massachusetts Abolitionist 
The Nation 
National Anti-Slavery Standard 
The National Era 
New Jersey Freeman 
New York Daily Times 
New York Evening Post 
New York Herald 
New York Times 
New York Tribune 
New York Sun 
New York World 
North Star 
Poughkeepsie Eagle 
  353 
Practical Christian 
The Provincial Freeman 
Radical Abolitionist 
Richmond Examiner 
Signal of Liberty 
Staunton Republican Vindicator 
Valley Spirit 
Western Citizen 
 
 
Collections 
 
 
Beman Papers. Beinecke Rare Book Library. Yale University. New Haven. 
 
Samuel J. May Anti-Slavery Collection. Cornell University Library. Ithaca. 
 
John Brown Russwurm Papers. Bowdoin College Library. Brunswick. 
 
The Gerrit Smith Broadside and Pamphlet Collection. Syracuse University Library. 
Syracuse. 
 
Gerrit Smith Papers. Syracuse University Library. Syracuse. 
 
 
Pamphlets, Books, and Articles 
 
 
Aaron. The Light and the Truth of Slavery. Springfield, 1845. Samuel J. May Anti-
Slavery Collection. Cornell University Library. Ithaca. 
 
Adams, Charles Francis. An Oration, Delivered Before the Municipal Authorities of the 
City of Fall River, July 4, 1860. Fall River: Almy & Milne, Daily News Steam 
Printing House, 1860. 
 
Adams, John. Diary and Autobiography of John Adams. Edited by L.H. Butterfield. 2 
Volumes. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1962. 
 
Beard, John R. The Life of Toussaint L'Ouverture, the Negro Patriot of Hayti: 
Comprising an Account of the Struggle for Liberty in the Island, and a Sketch of 
its History to the Present Period. London, 1853. Westport: Negro Universities 
Press, 1970. 
 
Birney, James G. “Can Congress, under the Constitution, Abolish Slavery in the States?” 
The Albany Patriot. 12, 19, 20, 22 May 1847. 
 
  354 
Bishop, Abraham. "The Rights of Black Men.” In “Abraham Bishop, ‘The Rights of 
Black Men,’ and the American Reaction to the Haitian Revolution.” Edited and 
with an Introduction by Tim Matthewson. Journal of Negro History 67 (Summer 
1982): 148-154. 
 
Blackstone, Sir William. Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books. Oxford, 
1765. 
 
Brown, William Wells. The Narrative of William W. Brown, a Fugitive Slave. And a 
Lecture Delivered Before the Female Anti-Slavery Society of Salem, 1847. 
Boston: The Anti-Slavery Officer, 1847. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1969. 
 
________. The Rising Son; or, The Antecedents and Advancement of the Colored Race. 
Miami: Mnemosyne Publishers, 1969. 
 
________. St. Domingo: Its Revolutions and Its Patriots; a lecture delivered before the 
Metropolitan Athenaeum, London, May 16, and at St. Thomas' Church, 
Philadelphia, December 20, 1854. Philadelphia: Rhistoric Publications, 1969. 
 
Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Edited by J.C.D. Clark. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. 
 
Chase, Salmon P. Speech of Salmon P. Chase, in the Case of the Colored Woman, 
Matilda, Who Was Brought before the Court of Common Pleas in Hamilton 
County, Ohio, by Writ of Habeas Corpus, March 11, 1837. Cincinnati: Pugh & 
Dodd, Printers, 1837. 
 
Child, David Lee. The Despotism of Freedom; Or, The Tyranny and Cruelty of American 
Republican Slave-Masters. Boston, 1833. Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 
1971. 
 
________. Oration in Honor of Universal Emancipation in the British Empire, Delivered 
at South Reading, August First, 1834, By David L. Child. Boston: Garrison and 
Knapp, 1834. Samuel J. May Anti-Slavery Collection. Cornell University Library. 
Ithaca. 
 
Clemenceau, Georges. American Reconstruction 1865-1870. Edited by Fernand 
Baldensperger. Translated by Margaret Mac Veagh. New York: Lincoln Mac 
Veagh, 1928. 
 
Coffin, Joshua. “An Account of Some of the Principal Slave Insurrections, and Others, 
Which Have Occurred, or Been Attempted in the United States and Elsewhere, 
During the Last Two Centuries, by J. Coffin.” New York: American Anti-Slavery 
Society, 1860. In Slave Insurrections: Selected Documents. Westport: Negro 
Universities Press, 1970. 1-36. 
  355 
 
Crowninshield, Maj. Benjamin W. “Sheridan at Winchester.” The Atlantic Monthly 42 
(December 1878): 683-691. 
 
Delany, Martin R. Blake; or, The Huts of America, A Novel. 1859; Boston: Beacon Press, 
1970. 
 
Dew, Thomas R. “Abolition of Negro Slavery.” In The Ideology of Slavery: Proslavery 
Thought in the Antebellum South, 1830-1860. Edited by Drew Gilpin Faust. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981. 
 
Dickinson, John. “The Letters of Fabius.” In Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United 
States. Edited by Paul L. Ford. 163-216. New York: DaCapo Press, 1968. 
 
Douglass, Frederick. The Frederick Douglass Papers. Edited by John W. Blassingame. 7 
Volumes. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979. 
 
________. Life and Times of Frederick Douglass, Written by Himself: His Early Life as a 
Slave, his Escape from Bondage, and his Complete History to the Present Time, 
Including his Connection with the Anti-Slavery Movement, With an Introduction 
by Mr. George L. Ruffin. Hartford: Park Publishing, 1881. 
 
________. The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass. 5 Volumes. Edited by Philip S. 
Foner. New York: International Publishers, 1950-1975. 
 
Dwight, Theodore. An Oration, Spoken Before “The Connecticut Society, for the 
Promotion of Freedom and the Relief of Persons Unlawfully Held in Bondage.” 
Hartford, 1794. 
 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo. The Emancipation of the Negroes in the British West Indies, An 
Address Delivered at Concord, Massachusetts on 1st August, 1844, by R.W. 
Emerson. London: John Chapman, 1844. Samuel J. May Anti-Slavery Collection. 
Cornell University Library. Ithaca. 
 
Equiano, Olaudah. The Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa the African, Written 
by Himself. 2 Volumes. London, 1789; Reprint: London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 
1969.  
 
Farrar, Timothy, LL.D. Manual of the Constitution of the United States of America. 
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1869. 
 
Garber, Michael C. “Reminiscences of the Burning of Columbia, South Carolina.” The 
Magazine of History XXII (January-June 1916): 177-191. 
 
Garfield, James A. The Works of James Abram Garfield. 2 Volumes. Edited by Burke A. 
Hinsdale. Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1882. 
  356 
 
Garnet, Henry Highland. “An Address to the Slaves of the United States of America.” In 
Walker’s Appeal, With a Brief Sketch of his Life, by Henry Highland Garnet, and 
also Garnet’s Address to the Slaves of the United States of America. New York: 
J.H. Tobitt, 1848. New York: Arno Press, 1969. 
 
________. “A Brief Sketch of the Life and Character of David Walker.” In Walker’s 
Appeal, With a Brief Sketch of his Life, by Henry Highland Garnet, and also 
Garnet’s Address to the Slaves of the United States of America. New York: J.H. 
Tobitt, 1848. New York: Arno Press, 1969. 
 
Garrison, Wendell Phillips and Francis Jackson Garrison. William Lloyd Garrison, 1805-
1879: The Story of his Life, Told by his Children. 4 Volumes. New York: The 
Century Co., 1885-1889. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969. 
 
Goodell, William. Address to the Macedon Convention, by William Goodell; and the 
Letters of Gerrit Smith. Albany: S.W. Green, 1847. 
 
________. Slavery and Anti-Slavery: A History of the Great Struggle in Both 
Hemispheres with a View of the Slavery Question in the United States. New York: 
William Harned, 1852. 
 
________. Views of American Constitutional Law in Its Bearing Upon American Slavery. 
Utica: Lawson and Chaplin, 1844. 
 
Grandy, Moses. Narrative of the Life of Moses Grandy, Late a Slave in the United States 
of America. London: Gilpin, 1843. 
 
Grant, Ulysses S. The Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. New York: Library of America, 
1990. 
 
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. Edited by 
Clinton Rossiter. New York: Mentor, 1999. 
 
Hamilton, James. “An Account of the Late Intended Insurrection Among a Portion of the 
Blacks of this City, Published by the Authority of the Corporation of Charleston.” 
Charleston: A.E. Miller, 1822. In Slave Insurrections: Selected Documents. 
Westport: Negro Universities Press, 1970. 1-48. 
 
Higginson, Thomas Wentworth. Black Rebellion: Five Slave Revolts. Excerpted from 
Travelers and Outlaws. With an Introduction by James McPherson. Boston, 1889. 
Reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1969. Reprint, Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1998. 
 
Hildreth, Richard. Despotism in America; or, An Inquiry into the Nature and Results of 
the Slave-holding System in the United States. Boston: Whipple and Damrell, 
1840. 
  357 
 
Holland, Edwin C. A Refutation of the Calumnies Circulated Against the Southern & 
Western States, Respecting the Institution and Existence of Slavery among Them, 
To which Is Added, a Minute and Particular Account of the Actual State and 
Condition of Their Negro Population, Together with Historical Notices of All the 
Insurrections That Have Taken Place Since the Settlement of the Country, by a 
South-Carolinian. Charleston: A.E. Miller, 1822. New York: Negro Universities 
Press, 1969. 
 
Holly, James Theodore. “A Vindication of the Capacity of the Negro Race for Self-
Government, and Civilized Progress, as Demonstrated by Historical Events of the 
Haytian Revolution: and the Subsequent Acts of That People Since Their National 
Independence, a Lecture by Rev. Jas. Theo. Holly.” New Haven: William H. 
Stanley, printer, 1857. In Black Separatism and the Caribbean, 1860. Edited by 
Howard H. Bell. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1970. 
 
Jefferson, Thomas. The Portable Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Merrill D. Peterson. New 
York: Penguin Books, 1977. 
 
Julian, George Washington. Political Recollections, 1840 to 1872. Chicago: Jansen, 
McClurg, and Company, 1884. 
 
“Liberty.” The Image and Superscription on Every Coin Issued by the United States of 
America. 1839. Samuel J. May Anti-Slavery Collection. Cornell University 
Library. Ithaca. 
 
Lincoln, Abraham. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. Edited by Roy C. Basler. 9 
Volumes. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953-1955. 
 
________. The Recollected Words of Abraham Lincoln. Edited by Don E. Fehrenbacher 
and Virginia Fehrenbacher. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. 
 
May, Samuel J. “Slavery and the Constitution [Part 1].” Quarterly Anti-Slavery Magazine 
2 (October 1836): 73-90. 
 
________. “Slavery and the Constitution [Part 2].” Quarterly Anti-Slavery Magazine 2 
(April 1837): 226-238. 
 
Melbourne, Julius [Jabez Delano Hammond]. Life and Opinions of Julius Melbourne; 
with Sketches of the Lives and Characters of Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy 
Adams, John Randolph, and Several Other Eminent American Statesmen. Edited 
by Jabez Delano Hammond. Syracuse: Hall and Dickson, 1847. 
 
Merritt, Wesley. “Sheridan in the Shenandoah.” In Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 
Volume 4. Edited by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel. 
New York: The Century Company, 1888. 
  358 
 
Nero. “Letter.” In “After Nat Turner: A Letter from the North.” Edited and with an 
Introduction by Ira Berlin. Journal of Negro History 55 (1970): 145-151. 
 
P. My Odyssey: Experiences of a Young Refugee from Two Revolutions, by a Creole of 
Saint Domingue. Translated and Edited by Althéa de Puech Parham. Introduction 
by Selden Rodman. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959. 
 
Paine, Thomas. “Common Sense.” In Major Problems in the Era of the American 
Revolution: Documents and Essays. Edited by Richard D. Brown. 148-166. 
Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1992. 
 
Parker, Theodore. The Present Aspect of Slavery in America and the Immediate Duty of 
the North. Boston: Bela Marsh,1858. 
 
________. The Slave Power. Edited by James K. Hosmer. Boston: American Unitarian 
Association, 1910. Reprint: New York: Arno Press, 1969. 
 
Phelps, Amos A. Lectures on Slavery and Its Remedy. St. Clair Shores: Scholarly Press, 
1970.  
 
Phillips, Wendell. “The Hero of Hayti.” In Library of the World's Best Literature, 
Ancient and Modern. Edited by Charles Dudley Warner, et al. New York: 
International Society, 1897. 
 
________. “Toussaint L’Ouverture.” In Wendell Phillips on Civil Rights and Freedom. 
Edited by Louis Filler. New York: Hill and Wang, 1965. 163-184. 
 
Pinckney, Thomas. “Reflections, Occasioned by the Late Disturbances in Charleston, by 
T. Pinckney.” Charleston: A.E. Miller, 1822. In Slave Insurrections: Selected 
Documents. Westport: Negro Universities Press, 1970. 1-30. 
 
Pollard, Edward Albert. Southern History of the War. Richmond: The Fairfax Press, 
1866. 
 
Pond, George. The Shenandoah Valley in 1864. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1883. 
 
Realf, Richard. Mason Report, “Testimony of John Brown.” 
 
Redpath, James, Ed. Echoes of Harper's Ferry. Boston, 1860; Reprint: New York: Arno 
Press, 1969. 
 
________, Ed. A Guide to Hayti. Boston: Haytian Bureau of Emigration, 1861. 
 
  359 
________. The Public Life of Capt. John Brown. With an Auto-Biography of his 
Childhood and Youth. Boston: Thayer and Eldridge, 1860. 
 
________. The Roving Editor, or, Talks with Slaves in the Southern States. Edited by 
John R. McKivigan. New York: A.B. Burdick, 1859. University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996. 
 
Robespierre, Maximilien. Œuvres complètes. 10 volumes. Paris, 1903-1968. 
 
Rogers, Nathaniel P. “The Constitution.” Quarterly Anti-Slavery Magazine 2 (January 
1837): 145-153. 
 
Saint-Just, Louis Antoine de. Œuvres complètes. Edited by Michèle Duval. Paris: G. 
Lebovici, 1984. 
 
Sanborn, F.B., Ed. The Life and Letters of John Brown, Liberator of Kansas, and Martyr 
of Virginia. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1891. 
 
Saunders, Prince. Haytian Papers, A Collection of the Very Interesting Proclamations 
and Other Official Documents, Together with Some Account of the Rise, Progress, 
and Present State of the Kingdom of Hayti. An Address, Delivered at Bethel 
Church, Philadelphia, on the 30th of September, 1818, Before the Pennsylvania 
Augustine Society, for the Education of People of Colour. Memoir, Presented to 
the American Convention for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and Improving 
the Condition of the African Race. Boston: Caleb Bingham and Co., 1818. 
Philadelphia: Rhistoric Publications, 1969. 
 
Savary, Jean-Julien. Guerres des Vendéens et des Chouans contra la Républic Française, 
ou, Annales des départemens de l'Ouest pendent ces guerres par un officier 
supérieur de la République. 6 Volumes. Collection des mémoirs relatifs a la 
Révolution Française. Paris: Baudouin Frères, 1824-1827. 
 
Schade, Louis. A Book for the “Impending Crisis!” Appeal to the Common Sense and 
Patriotism of the People of the United States. “Helperism” Annihilated! The 
“Irrepressible Conflict” and its Consequences! by Louis Schade, Of Iowa. 
Washington, D.C.: Little, Morris, & Co., 1860. Samuel J. May Anti-Slavery 
Collection. Cornell University Library. Ithaca. 
 
Seward, William Henry. The Works of William H. Seward. Edited by George E. Baker. 5 
Volumes. New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company, 1884. 
 
Sheridan, Philip H. The Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan: General United States 
Army. New York: C.L. Webster, 1888. Reprint, Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1992. 
 
Sherman, William Tecumseh. Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman. New York: Library of 
America, 1990. 
  360 
 
Sherman, William T. and John Sherman. The Sherman Letters: Correspondence between 
General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891. Edited by Rachel Sherman 
Thorndike. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1894. 
 
Smith, Gerrit. Gerrit Smith's Constitutional Argument, Against American Slavery. Utica: 
Jackson & Chaplin, 1844. 
 
Smith, James McCune. A Lecture on the Haytien Revolutions; with a Sketch of the 
Character of Toussaint L’Ouverture. Delivered at the Stuyvesant Institute, (For 
the Benefit of the Colored Orphan Asylum,) February 26, 1841. by James 
McCune Smith, M.A., M.D. New York: Daniel Fanshaw, 1841. Samuel J. May 
Anti-Slavery Collection. Cornell University Library. Ithaca. 
 
Spooner, Lysander. The Unconstitutionality of Slavery. Boston: Dow & Jackson’s Anti-
Slavery Press, 1845. 
 
Stanton, Henry. Remarks of Henry B. Stanton, in the Representatives’ Hall, on the 23rd 
and 24th of February, 1837…on the Subject of Slavery. 5th Edition. Boston: Isaac 
Knapp, 1837. 
 
Stearns, George L. The Equality of All Men before the Law: Claimed and Defended in 
Speeches by Hon. William D. Kelley, Wendell Phillips, and Frederick Douglass, 
and Letters from Elizur Wright and Wm. Heighton. Boston: Press of Geo. C. Rand 
& Avery, 1865. 
 
Stewart, Alvan. “Argument, On the Questions Whether the New Constitution of 1844 
Abolished Slavery in New Jersey.” In Writing and Speeches of Alvan Stewart On 
Slavery. Edited by Luther R. Marsh. New York: A.B. Burdick, 1860. 272-351. 
 
________. “A Constitutional Argument on the Subject of Slavery.” Utica Friend of Man. 
18 October 1837. 
 
Stevens, Thaddeus. The Selected Papers of Thaddeus Stevens. Edited by Beverly Wilson 
Palmer and Holly Byers Ochoa. 2 Volumes. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1997-1998. 
 
Sumner, Charles. “Our Domestic Relations; Or, How to Treat the Rebel States.” The 
Atlantic Monthly 71 (September 1863): 507-529. 
 
________. The Works of Charles Sumner. 15 Volumes. Boston: Lee and Shephard, 1870-
1883. 
 
Tracy, Joseph. Natural Equality: A Sermon Before the Vermont Colonization Society, at 
Montpelier, October 17, 1833. Windsor, VT: Chronicle Press, 1833. 
 
  361 
Turreau, Louis-Marie. Mémoires pour servir a l’histoire de la guerre de la Vendée par le 
Général Turreau. Collection des mémoirs relatifs a la Révolution Française. 
Paris: Baudouin Frères, 1824. 
 
Walker, David. Walker’s Appeal, in Four Articles, Together with a Preamble, to the 
Coloured Citizens of the World, But in Particular, and Very Expressly, to Those 
of the United States of America, Written in Boston, State of Massachusetts, 
September 28, 1829. Edited, Annotated, and with an Introduction by Peter Hinks. 
University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. 
 
Weld, Theodore Dwight. “The Power of Congress over Slavery in the District of 
Columbia.” The Anti-Slavery Examiner 5 (1838): 3-56. 
 
Whiting, William. The War Powers of the President and the Legislative Powers of 
Congress in Relation to Rebellion, Treason and Slavery. Boston: John L. Shorey, 
1862. 
 
Whitman, Walt. Complete Prose Works. Philadelphia: David McKay, 1892. 
 
Wright, Henry C. The Natick Resolution; or, Resistance to Slaveholders the Right and 
Duty of Southern Slaves and Northern Freemen. Boston, 1859. 
 
 
Proceedings, Reports, and Government Documents 
 
 
American Anti-Slavery Society. The Constitution of the American Anti-Slavery Society: 
With the Declaration of the National Anti-Slavery Convention at Philadelphia, 
December, 1833, and the Address to the Public. Boston: American Anti-Slavery 
Society, 1838. 
 
________. Fourth Annual Report of the American Anti-Slavery Society: with the 
Speeches Delivered at the Anniversary Meeting Held in the City of New York, on 
the 9th May, 1837: And the Minutes of the Meetings of the Society for Business. 
New York: American Anti-Slavery Society, 1837. 
 
Assemblée Générale de France. Deputies from Saint Domingue. A particular account of 
the commencement and progress of the insurrection of the Negroes in St. 
Domingo which began in August, 1791: being a translation of the speech made to 
the National Assembly, the 3d of November, 1791, by the deputies from the 
General Assembly of the French part of St. Domingo. London: J. Sewell, 1792. 
 
Assemblée Nationale de France. Archives Parlementaires. 
 
Calendar of Virginia State Papers. Edited by Palmer, McRae, and Flournoy. Richmond, 
1890. 
  362 
 
Convention of the Colored Men of Ohio. Proceedings of a Convention of the Colored 
Men of Ohio, Held in the City of Cincinnati, on the 23d, 24th, 25th and 26th days 
of November, 1858. Cincinnati: Moore, Wilstach, Keys & Co., Printers, 1858. 
 
Courtois, E.B. Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée de l’examen des papiers 
trouvés chez Robespierre et ses complices. Paris, 1795. 
 
“Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.” In Readings in Western 
Civilization. Edited by John Boyer and Julius Kirshner. Vol. 7. The Old Regime 
and the French Revolution. Edited and Translated by Keith Michael Baker. 237-
239. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
 
Garran de Coulon, Jean-Philippe. Rapport sur les troubles de Saint-Domingue, fait au 
nom de la Commission des colonies, des Comités de salut public, de législation et 
de marine, 7réunis, par J. Ph. Garran, député par le département du Loiret. 
Imprimé par ordre de la Convention nationale, et distribué au Corps législatif. 4 
Volumes. Paris: l'Imprimerie Nationale, 1797-1799. 
 
National Convention of Colored Citizens. Minutes of the National Convention of Colored 
Citizens. Piercy and Reed, 1843. 
 
New England Anti-Slavery Convention. Proceedings of the New England Anti-Slavery 
Convention: Held in Boston, May 24, 25, 26, 1836. Boston: Issac Knapp, 1836. 
 
Parliament of the United Kingdom. English Reports. 178 Volumes. London: Stevens & 
Sons, 1900-1932. 
 
Radical Political Abolitionists. Proceedings of the convention of Radical Political 
Abolitionists held at Syracuse, N.Y., June 26th, 27th and 28th, 1855. New York: 
Central Abolition Board, 1855. 
 
“Summary of Trial Proceedings of Those Accused of Participating in the Slave Uprising 
of January 9, 1811.” Louisiana, St. Charles Parish, Original Acts, Book 41, 1811, 
Number 2, 17-20. Reprint: Louisiana History XVIII (Fall 1977): 472-473. 
 
United States Congress. Annals of Congress. 42 Volumes. Washington: Gales and 
Seaton, 1834-1856. 
 
________. Bills and Resolutions of the House and Senate. Washington, 1847-. 
 
________. Congressional Globe. 46 Volumes. Washington: Blair & Rives, 1834-1873. 
 
________. Congressional Serial Set. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1817-. 
 
________. Register of Debates. 14 Volumes. Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1825-1837. 
  363 
 
________. Statutes at Large. 18 Volumes. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1845-
1874. 
 
United States War Department. The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 128 Volumes. Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1880-1901. 
 
 
Document Collections 
 
 
Aptheker, Herbert, Ed. A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States. 
Prefaced by W.E.B. Du Bois. New York: Citadel Press, 1951. 
 
Brown, John. John Brown: The Making of a Revolutionary; The Story of John Brown in 
his Own Words and in the Words of Those Who Knew Him. Edited by Louis 
Ruchames. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1969. 
 
Cain, William E. William Lloyd Garrison and the Fight Against Slavery: Selections from 
The Liberator. Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1995. 
 
Chassin, Charles-Louis. Études documentaires sur la Vendée et la Chouannerie. 3 
Volumes. Paris: Paul Dupont, 1900. 
 
Foner, Eric, Ed. Nat Turner. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 
 
Hyman, Harold Melvin, Ed. The Radical Republicans and Reconstruction, 1861-1870. 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967. 
 
Jefferson, Thomas. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Paul L. Ford. 10 
Volumes. New York: G.P. Putnam's Son, 1892-1899. 
 
Newman, Richard S., Patrick Rael, and Phillip Lapsansky, Eds. Pamphlets of Protest: An 
Anthology of Early African-American Protest Literature, 1790-1860. New York: 
Routledge, 2001. 
 
Trefousse, Hans L., Ed. Background for Radical Reconstruction. Boston: Little, Brown, 
and Company, 1970. 
 
Tyson, George F., Ed. Toussaint L’Ouverture. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973. 
 
Woodson, Carter G. Negro Orators and Their Orations. Washington, D.C., 1925. New 
York, Russell & Russell, 1969. 
 
 
  364 
Secondary Sources 
 
 
Abbot, Martin. “Free Land, Free Labor, and the Freedman’s Bureau.” Agricultural 
History 30 (1956). 150-156. 
 
Abbot, Richard H. For Free Press and Equal Rights: Republican Newspapers in the 
Reconstruction South. Edited by John W. Quist. Athens: The University of 
Georgia Press, 2004. 
 
________. The Republican Party and the South, 1855-1877: The First Southern Strategy. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986. 
 
Alderson, Robert. “Charleston’s Rumored Slave Revolt of 1793.” In The Impact of the 
Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World. Edited by David Patrick Geggus. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001. 93-111. 
 
Anbinder, Tyler. Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of 
the 1850's. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
Aptheker, Herbert. Abolitionism: A Revolutionary Movement. Boston: Twayne 
Publishers, 1989. 
 
________. American Negro Slave Revolts. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943; 
New York: International Publishers, 1993. 
 
________. To Be Free. 1948; New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1991. 
 
Arendt, Hannah. Between Past and Future. New York: Penguin Books, 1968. 
 
________. On Revolution. New York: Penguin Books, 1965. 
 
Armitage, David. “The Declaration of Independence and International Law.” William and 
Mary Quarterly 59 (January 2002): 39-64. 
 
Aron, Raymond. Main Currents in Sociological Thought: Montesquieu, Comte, Marx, dé 
Tocqueville. Sociologists and the Revolution of 1848. Volume 1. New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 1998. 
 
Ayers, Edward L. In the Presence of Mine Enemies: War in the Heart of America, 1859-
1863. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2003. 
 
  365 
Baczko, Bronislaw. “The Terror before the Terror? Conditions of Possibility, Logic of 
Realization.” In The Terror. Edited by Keith Michael Baker. Volume 4. The 
French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture. 4 Volumes. 
Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin Lucas, François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. 
New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 19-38. 
 
Baker, Keith Michael. Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political 
Culture in the Eighteenth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
 
________, Ed. The Terror. Volume 4. The French Revolution and the Creation of 
Modern Political Culture. 4 Volumes. Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin 
Lucas, François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 
 
Bell, Caryn Cossé. Revolution, Romanticism, and the Afro-Creole Protest Tradition in 
Louisiana, 1718-1868. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997. 
 
Bell, David. “Violence, Terror, and War: A Comment on Arno Mayer’s The Furies.” In 
“Forum: Comparing Revolutions.” French Historical Studies 24 (Fall 2001): 559-
567. 
 
Belz, Herman. A New Birth of Freedom: The Republican Party and Freedmen's Rights, 
1861 to 1866. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976. 
 
________. Reconstructing the Union: Theory and Policy during the Civil War. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1969. 
 
Benedict, Michael Les. A Compromise of Principle: Congressional Republicans and 
Reconstruction, 1863-1869. New York: Norton, 1974. 
 
________. The Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson. New York, Norton, 1973. 
 
Benoit, Bruno. “Violence et répression urbaines: l’ememple lyonnais (1786-1849).” In 
Guerre et repression: La Vendée et le monde. Edited by Jean-Clément Martin. 
Nantes: Ouest Editions, 1993. 101-110. 
 
Bénot, Yves. La révolution française et la fin des colonies: essai. Paris: La Découverte, 
1988. 
 
Bergeron, Louis. “National Properties.” In A Critical Dictionary of the French 
Revolution. Edited by François Furet and Mona Ozouf. Translated by Arthur 
Goldhammer. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1989. 511-518. 
 
Beringer, Richard E., Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, William N. Still, Jr., Eds. Why the 
South Lost the Civil War. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986. 
 
  366 
Berlin, Ira. Slaves Without Masters: The Free Negro in the Antebellum South. New York: 
New Press, 1992. 
 
Bertaud, Jean-Paul. “An Open File: The Press under the Terror.” In The Terror. Edited by 
Keith Michael Baker. Volume 4. The French Revolution and the Creation of 
Modern Political Culture. 4 Volumes. Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin 
Lucas, François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 297-
308. 
 
Bien, David D. “François Furet, the Terror, and 1789.” In “Forum: François Furet’s 
Interpretation of the French Revolution.” French Historical Studies 16 (Fall 
1990): 777-783. 
 
Blackburn, Robin. “The Force of Example.” In The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in 
the Atlantic World. Edited by David Patrick Geggus. Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 2001. 15-20. 
 
________. The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848. New York: Verso, 1988.  
 
Bleser, Carol K. Rothrock. The Promised Land: The History of the South Carolina Land 
Commission, 1869-1890. Columbia: Published for the South Carolina 
Tricentennial Commission by the University of South Carolina Press, 1969. 
 
Blight, David W. Frederick Douglass' Civil War: Keeping Faith in Jubilee. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989. 
 
________. Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory. Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 2001. 
 
Blight, David W. and Brooks D. Simpson, Eds. Union and Emancipation: Essays on 
Politics and Race in the Civil War Era. Kent: The Kent State University Press, 
1997. 
 
Bois, Jean Pierre. “Stratégie et guerre de Vendée, entre petite guerre et grande guerre.” In 
Guerre et repression: La Vendée et le monde. Edited by Jean-Clément Martin. 
Nantes: Ouest Editions, 1993. 21-33. 
 
Bolster, W. Jeffery. Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. 
 
Bonekemper, Edward H. A Victor, Not a Butcher: Ulysses S. Grant’s Overlooked 
Military Genius. Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2004. 
 
Boyer, Richard O. The Legend of John Brown: A Biography and a History. New York: 
Knopf, 1973. 
 
  367 
Branson, Susan and Leslie Patrick. “Étranges dans un Pays Étrange: Saint-Domingan 
Refugees of Color in Philadelphia.” In The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in 
the Atlantic World. Edited by David Patrick Geggus. Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 2001. 193-208. 
 
Brinton, Crane. The Anatomy of Revolution. New York: Vintage Books, 1952. 
 
Brock, William Ranulf. An American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1865-1867. 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963. 
 
Brodie, Fawn M. Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge of the South. New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 1959. 
 
Bruguière, Michele. “Assignats.” In A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution. 
Edited by François Furet and Mona Ozouf. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. 
Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1989. 426-436. 
 
Buchanan, Thomas C. The Slave Mississippi: African-American Steamboat Workers, 
Networks of Resistance, and the Commercial World of the Western Rivers, 1811-
1880. Ph.D. Dissertation, Carnegie Mellon University, 1998. 
 
Burstin, Haim. “Problems of Work during the Terror.” In The Terror. Edited by Keith 
Michael Baker. Volume 4. The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern 
Political Culture. 4 Volumes. Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin Lucas, 
François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 271-293. 
 
Carter, Dan T. When the War Was Over: The Failure of Self-Reconstruction in the South, 
1865-1867. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985. 
 
Cecelski, David S. The Waterman’s Song: Slavery and Freedom in Maritime North 
Carolina. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 
 
Cook, James S. “Fighting with Breath, Not Blows: Frederick Douglass and Antislavery 
Violence.” In Antislavery Violence: Sectional, Racial, and Cultural Conflict in 
Antebellum America. Edited by John R. McKivigan and Stanley Harrold. 
Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1999. 128-165. 
 
Connor, William P. “Reconstruction Rebels: The New Orleans Tribune in Post-War 
Louisiana.” Louisiana History 21 (Spring 1980): 159-181. 
 
Cox, LaWanda. Lincoln and Black Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981. 
 
Cumbler, John T. From Abolition to Rights for All: The Making of a Reform Community 
in the Nineteenth Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. 
 
  368 
Curry, Leonard P. Blueprint for Modern America: Nonmilitary Legislation of the First 
Civil War Congress. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968. 
 
Curtain, Philip D. “The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in Saint-
Domingue.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 30 (May 1950): 157-175. 
 
Dain, Bruce. A Hideous Monster of the Mind: American Race Theory in the Early 
Republic. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
 
Davis, Burke. Sherman's March. New York: Random House, 1980. 
 
Davis, Davis Brion. Challenging the Boundaries of Slavery. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003. 
 
________. “The Impact of the French and Haitian Revolutions.” In The Impact of the 
Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World. Edited by David Patrick Geggus. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001. 1-9. 
 
________. The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1975. 
 
________. The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1966; New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.  
 
________. Revolutions: Reflections on American Equality and Foreign Liberations. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990. 
 
Davis, Thomas J. “Conspiracy and Credibility: Look Who’s Talking, about What- Law 
Talk and Loose Talk.” In “Forum: The Making of a Slave Conspiracy, Part 2.” 
William and Mary Quarterly 59 (January 2002): 159-178. 
 
Dew, Charles B. Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and the 
Causes of the Civil War. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001. 
  
Dillon, Merton Lynn. Slavery Attacked: Southern Slaves and Their Allies, 1619-1865. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990. 
 
Donald, David H. Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War. New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1960. 
 
________. Why the North Won the Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1960. 
 
Dorigny, Marcel. “Les girondins et le droit de propriété.” In Bulletin d’histoire 
economique et sociale de la revolution française. Paris: C.T.H.S., 1980. 15-31. 
 
  369 
Dormon, James H. “The Persistent Spectre: Slave Rebellion in Territorial Louisiana.” 
Louisiana History XVIII (Fall 1977): 389-404. 
 
Dorris, Jonathan Truman. Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln and Johnson: The 
Restoration of the Confederates to Their Rights and Privileges, 1861-1898. 
Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1953. 
 
Drescher, Seymour. “The Limits of Example.” In The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in 
the Atlantic World. Edited by David Patrick Geggus. Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 2001. 10-14. 
 
________. “Servile Insurrection and John Brown’s Body in Europe.” In His Soul Goes 
Marching On: Responses to John Brown and the Harper’s Ferry Raid. Edited by 
Paul Finkelman. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995. 253-295. 
 
Dubois, Laurent. Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution. 
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004. 
 
________. A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French 
Caribbean, 1787-1804. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2005. 
 
________. A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French 
Caribbean, 1789-1802. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1998. 
 
________. “’Our Three Colors:’ The King, the Republic, and the Political Culture of 
Slave Revolution in Saint-Domingue.” Historical Reflections/ Reflexions 
Historiques 29 (Spring 2003): 83-102. 
 
________. “Troubled Water: Rebellion and Republicanism in the Revolutionary French 
Caribbean.” In The Revolution of 1800: Democracy, Race, and the New Republic. 
Edited by James Horn, Jan Ellen Lewis, and Peter S. Onuf. Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2002. 291-308. 
 
Egerton, Douglas R. “The Empire of Liberty Reconsidered.” In The Revolution of 1800: 
Democracy, Race, and the New Republic. Edited by James Horn, Jan Ellen Lewis, 
and Peter S. Onuf. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002. 309-330. 
 
________. “Forgetting Denmark Vesey; Or, Oliver Stone Meets Richard Wade.” In 
“Forum: The Making of a Slave Conspiracy, Part 2.” William and Mary Quarterly 
59 (January 2002): 143-152. 
 
________. Gabriel’s Rebellion: The Virginia Slave Conspiracies of 1800 and 1802. 
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1993. 
 
  370 
________. He Shall Go Out Free: The Lives of Denmark Vesey. Madison: Madison 
House, 1999. 
 
________. “The Scenes Which Are Acted in St. Domingue: The Legacy of Revolutionary 
Violence in Early National Virginia.” In Antislavery Violence: Sectional, Racial, 
and Cultural Conflict in Antebellum America. Edited by John R. McKivigan and 
Stanley Harrold. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1999. 41-64. 
 
Einhorn, Robin L. American Taxation, American Slavery. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006. 
 
Engs, Robert Francis. Freedom's First Generation: Black Hampton, Virginia, 1861-1890. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979. 
 
Ernst, Daniel R. “Legal Positivism, Abolitionist Litigation, and the New Jersey Slave 
Case of 1845.” Law and History Review 4 (Autumn 1986): 337-365. 
 
Farber, Daniel A. Lincoln's Constitution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 
 
Faust, Drew Gilpin. This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008. 
 
Fehrenbacher, Don E. Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850's. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1962. 
 
________. The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s 
Relations to Slavery. Completed and Edited by Ward M. McAfee. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Fellman, Michael. Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri during the American 
Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
 
Fick, Carolyn. “The French Revolution in Saint Domingue: A Triumph or a Failure?” In 
A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean. Edited by 
David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus. Blacks and the Diaspora. Edited 
By Darlene Clark Hine, et al. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997. 51-77. 
 
________. The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution From Below. 
Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990. 
 
Field, Phyllis F. “Party Politics and Antislavery Idealism: The Republican Approach to 
Radical Change in New York, 1855-1860.” In Crusaders and Compromisers: 
Essays on the Relationship of the Antislavery Struggle to the Antebellum Party 
System. Edited by Alan M. Kraut. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983. 123-139. 
 
  371 
Fine, Gary Alan. “John Brown's Body: Elites, Heroic Embodiment, and the Legitimation 
of Political Violence.” Social Problems 46 (May 1999): 225-249. 
 
Fitzgerald, Michael W. The Union League Movement in the Deep South: Politics and 
Agricultural Change During Reconstruction. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1989. 
 
________. Urban Emancipation: Popular Politics in Reconstruction Mobile, 1860-1890. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002. 
 
Fleche, Andre M. “Uncivilized War: The Shenandoah Valley Campaign, the Northern 
Democratic Press, and the Election of 1864.” In The Shenandoah Valley 
Campaign of 1864. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006. 200-221. 
 
Foner, Eric. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party 
Before the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 
 
________. Nothing but Freedom: Emancipation and its Legacy. Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1983. 
 
________. Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1980. 
 
________. Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877. New York: 
Harper and Row, 1989. 
 
Fordham, Monroe. “Nineteenth-Century Black Thought in the United States: Some 
Influences of the Santo Domingan Revolution.” Journal of Black Studies 6 
(1975): 115-126. 
 
Forrest, Alan. “The Local Politics of Repression.” In The Terror. Edited by Keith 
Michael Baker. Volume 4. The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern 
Political Culture. 4 Volumes. Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin Lucas, 
François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 81-98. 
 
Fournier, Elie. Turreau et la colonnes infernales, ou l’échec de la violence. Paris: Albin 
Michel, 1985. 
 
Frayssé, Olivier. Lincoln, Land, and Labor, 1809-60. Translated by Sylvia Neely. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994. 
 
Frey, Sylvia R. Water From the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. 
 
  372 
Friedman, Lawrence J. Gregarious Saints: Self and Community in American 
Abolitionism, 1830-1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
 
Frye, Dennis E. “‘I resolved to Play a Bold Game:’ John S. Mosby as a Factor in the 
1864 Valley Campaign.” In Struggle for the Shenandoah: Essays on the 1864 
Valley Campaign. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Kent: The Kent State University 
Press, 1991. 107-126. 
 
Furet, François. “A Commentary.” In “Forum: François Furet’s Interpretation of the 
French Revolution.” French Historical Studies 16 (Fall 1990): 792-802. 
 
________. Penser la Révolution française. Paris: Gallimard, 1978. Translated by Elborg 
Forster as Interpreting the French Revolution. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981. 
 
________. Revolutionary France 1770-1880. Translated by Antonia Nevill. Malden: 
Blackwell, 1995. 
 
________. “Terror.” “Vendée.” “Revolutionary Government.” “Jacobinism.” “Marx.” 
“Tocqueville.” In A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution. Edited by 
François Furet and Mona Ozouf. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 1989. 137-150. 165-175. 548-559. 704-715. 972-979. 1021-1032. 
 
Furet, François and Mona Ozouf, Eds. A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution. 
Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1989. 
 
Gallagher, Gary W., Ed. The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864. Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006. 
 
________. “The Shenandoah Valley in 1864.” In Struggle for the Shenandoah: Essays on 
the 1864 Valley Campaign. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Kent: The Kent State 
University Press, 1991. VII-X, 1-18. 
 
________., Ed. Struggle for the Shenandoah: Essays on the 1864 Valley Campaign. 
Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1991. 
 
________. “Two Generals and a Valley: Philip H. Sheridan and Jubal A. Early in the 
Shenandoah.” In The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864. Edited by Gary W. 
Gallagher. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006. 3-33. 
 
Gaspar, David Barry and David Patrick Geggus, Eds. A Turbulent Time: The French 
Revolution and the Greater Caribbean. Blacks and the Diaspora. Edited By 
Darlene Clark Hine, et al. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997. 
 
Gates, Paul Wallace. Agriculture and the Civil War. New York: Knopf, 1965. 
 
  373 
Geggus, David Patrick. “The French and Haitian Revolutions, and Resistance to Slavery 
in the Americas: An Overview.” Revue Française d’Histoire d’Outre-Mer: 
Explorations, Colonisations, Indépendances 76 (1989): 107-124. 
 
________. Haitian Revolutionary Studies. Blacks and the Diaspora, Edited By Darlene 
Clark Hine, et al. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002. 
 
________, Ed. The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World. Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2001. 
 
________. Slavery, War, and Revolution: The British Occupation of Saint Domingue, 
1793-1798. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
 
________. “Slavery, War, and Revolution in the Greater Caribbean, 1789-1815.” In A 
Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean. Edited by 
David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus. Blacks and the Diaspora, Edited 
By Darlene Clark Hine, et al. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997. 1-50. 
 
Genovese, Eugene D. From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the 
Making of the New World. New York: Vintage Books, 1979. 
 
________. Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made. New York: Vintage Books, 
1972. 
 
Gerteis, Louis S. From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Towards Southern 
Blacks, 1861-1865. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973. 
 
Glatthaar, Joseph T. The March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman's Troops in the 
Savannah and Carolinas Campaigns. New York: New York University Press, 
1985. 
 
Glickstein, Jonathan A. Concepts of Free Labor in Antebellum America. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1991. 
 
Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln. New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2005. 
 
Gordon, Daniel. “Democracy and the Deferral of Justice in France and the United 
States.” Yale French Studies 100 (2001): 65-87. 
 
Greenberg, Kenneth S., Ed. Nat Turner: A Slave Rebellion in History and Memory. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
 
Greene, A. Wilson. “Union Generalship in the 1864 Valley Campaign.” In Struggle for 
the Shenandoah: Essays on the 1864 Valley Campaign. Edited by Gary W. 
Gallagher. Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1991. 41-76. 
  374 
 
Grimsley, Mark. The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Towards Southern 
Civilians, 1861-1865. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
 
Gross, Robert A. “Introduction.” In “Forum: The Making of a Slave Conspiracy, Part 1.” 
William and Mary Quarterly 58 (October 2001): 913-914. 
 
________. “Introduction.” In “Forum: The Making of a Slave Conspiracy, Part 2.” 
William and Mary Quarterly 59 (January 2002): 135-136. 
 
Gueniffey, Patrice. “Robespierre.” In A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution. 
Edited by François Furet and Mona Ozouf. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. 
Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1989. 298-312. 
 
Guilhaumou, Jacques. “Fragments of a Discourse of Denunciation (1789-1794).” In The 
Terror. Edited by Keith Michael Baker. Volume 4. The French Revolution and 
the Creation of Modern Political Culture. 4 Volumes. Edited by Keith Michael 
Baker, Colin Lucas, François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1994. 139-155. 
 
Hall, Gwendolyn Midlo. Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-
Creole Culture in the Eighteenth Century. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1992. 
 
Hanger, Kimberly S. Bounded Lives, Bounded Places: Free Black Society in Colonial 
New Orleans, 1769-1803. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997. 
 
Harrold, Stanley. The Abolitionists and the South, 1831-1861. Lexington: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1995. 
 
________. The Rise of Aggressive Abolitionism: Addresses to the Slaves. Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2004. 
 
________. “Romanticizing Slave Revolt: Madison Washington, the Creole Mutiny, and 
Abolitionist Celebration of Violent Means.” In Antislavery Violence: Sectional, 
Racial, and Cultural Conflict in Antebellum America. Edited by John R. 
McKivigan and Stanley Harrold. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1999. 
89-107. 
 
Heatwole, John L. The Burning: Sheridan’s Devastation of the Shenandoah Valley. 
Charlottesville: Rockbridge Publishing, 1998. 
 
Hendrick, George and Willene Hendrick. The Creole Mutiny: A Tale of Revolt Aboard a 
Slave Ship. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003. 
 
  375 
Hermann, Janet Sharp. The Pursuit of a Dream. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1981. 
 
Herriot, Edouard. Lyon n’est plus. 4 Volumes. Paris, 1937-1940. 
 
Higonnet, Patrice. Goodness beyond Virtue: Jacobins during the French Revolution. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
 
________. “The Harmonization of the Spheres: Goodness and Dysfunction in the 
Provincial Clubs.” In The Terror. Edited by Keith Michael Baker. Volume 4. The 
French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture. 4 Volumes. 
Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin Lucas, François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. 
New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 117-137. 
 
________. Sister Republics: The Origins of French and American Republicanism. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
 
Hinks, Peter P. To Awaken My Afflicted Brethren: David Walker and the Problem of 
Antebellum Slave Resistance. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1997. 
 
Hirsch, Jean-Pierre. “Terror and Property.” In The Terror. Edited by Keith Michael 
Baker. Volume 4. The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political 
Culture. 4 Volumes. Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin Lucas, François Furet, 
and Mona Ozouf. New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 211-222. 
 
Holmes, Jack D.L. “The Abortive Slaves Revolt at Point Coupée, Louisiana, 1795.” 
Louisiana History XI (Fall 1970): 341-362. 
 
Horn, James, Jan Ellen Lewis, and Peter S. Onuf, Eds. The Revolution of 1800: 
Democracy, Race, and the New Republic. Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 2002. 
 
Horton, James Oliver and Lois E. Horton. In Hope of Liberty: Culture, Community, and 
Protest Among Northern Free Blacks, 1700-1860. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997.  
 
Hunt, Alfred N. Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America: Slumbering Volcano in the 
Caribbean. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988. 
 
Hunt, Lynn. Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution. Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1984. 
 
Huston, James L. Calculating the Value of Union: Slavery, Property Rights, and the 
Economic Origins of the Civil War. Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003. 
  376 
 
________. Securing the Fruits of Labor: The American Concept of Wealth Distribution, 
1765-1900. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998. 
 
Hyman, Harold Melvin. A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction on the Constitution. New York: Knopf, 1973. 
 
________. American Singularity: The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, the 1862 Homestead 
and Morrill Acts, and the 1944 G.I. Bill. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
1986. 
 
________. The Reconstruction Justice of Salmon P. Chase: In Re Turner and Texas v. 
White. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997. 
 
Hyman, Harold Melvin and William M. Wiecek. Equal Justice under Law: 
Constitutional Development, 1835-1875. New York: Harper & Row, 1982. 
 
James, C.L.R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo 
Revolution. Revised Second Edition. New York: Vintage Books, 1963. 
 
________. On the Negro Question. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1996. 
 
Jeffrey, Julie Roy. The Great Silent Army of Abolition: Ordinary Women in the 
Antislavery Movement. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1998. 
 
Jessenne, Jean-Pierre. “The Land: Redefinition of Rural Community.” In The Terror. 
Edited by Keith Michael Baker. Volume 4. The French Revolution and the 
Creation of Modern Political Culture. 4 Volumes. Edited by Keith Michael 
Baker, Colin Lucas, François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1994. 223-247. 
 
Johnson, Michael P. “Denmark Vesey and His Co-Conspirators.” In “Forum: The 
Making of a Slave Conspiracy, Part 1.” William and Mary Quarterly 58 (October 
2001): 915-976. 
 
________. “Reading Evidence.” In “Forum: The Making of a Slave Conspiracy, Part 2.” 
William and Mary Quarterly 59 (January 2002): 193-202. 
 
Jonas, Raymond. “La colonne Sherman, la guerre de Sécession, et l’image de la Vendée 
dans l’imaginaire americain.” In Guerre et repression: La Vendée et le monde. 
Edited by Jean Clément Martin. Nantes: Ouest Editions, 1993. 139-147. 
 
________. “Le Prix de la paix: un regard vendéen sur la guerre de Sécession.” Annales de 
Bretagne des Pays de l’Ouest 104 (1997): 89-98. 
 
  377 
Jones, Howard. Mutiny on the Amistad: The Saga of a Slave Revolt and Its Impact on 
American Abolition, Law, and Diplomacy. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987. 
 
Jordan, David P. The Revolutionary Career of Maximilien Robespierre. New York: The 
Free Press, 1985. 
 
Jordan, Winthrop D. Tumult and Silence at Second Creek: An Inquiry into a Civil War 
Slave Conspiracy. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993. 
 
Katz, Philip Mark. Americanizing the Paris Commune, 1861-1877. Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Princeton University, 1994. 
 
Kennedy, Roger G. Orders from France: The Americans and the French in a 
Revolutionary World, 1780-1820. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989. 
 
Kennett, Lee B. Sherman: A Soldier's Life. New York: HarperCollins, 2001. 
 
Kenzer, Robert C. Enterprising Southerners: Black Economic Success in North Carolina, 
1865-1915. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1997. 
 
Knight, Franklin W. “AHR Forum: The Haitian Revolution.” The American Historical 
Review 105 (2000): 103-115. 
 
Kolchin, Peter. A Sphinx on the American Land: The Nineteenth Century South in a 
Comparative Perspective. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003. 
 
Kraditor, Aileen S. Means and Ends in American Abolitionism: Garrison and His Critics 
on Strategy and Tactics, 1834-1850. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969. 
 
Kraut, Alan M., Ed. Crusaders and Compromisers: Essays on the Relationship of the 
Antislavery Struggle to the Antebellum Party System. Westport: Greenwood Press, 
1983. 
 
________. “Partisanship and Principles: The Liberty Party in Antebellum Political 
Culture.” In Crusaders and Compromisers: Essays on the Relationship of the 
Antislavery Struggle to the Antebellum Party System. Edited by Alan M. Kraut. 
Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983. 71-99. 
 
Lachance, Paul. “Repercussions of the Haitian Revolution in Louisiana,” In The Impact 
of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World. Edited by David Patrick Geggus. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001. 209-230. 
 
Langley, Lester. The Americas in the Age of Revolution 1750-1850. New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1996. 
 
  378 
Langlois, Claude. “Furet’s Revolution.” In “Forum: François Furet’s Interpretation of the 
French Revolution.” French Historical Studies 16 (Fall 1990): 766-776. 
 
Lasso, Marixa. “Haiti as an Image of Popular Republicanism in Caribbean Colombia: 
Cartagena Province (1811-1828).” In The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the 
Atlantic World. Edited by David Patrick Geggus. Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2001. 176-192. 
 
________. Race and Republicanism in the Age of Revolution, Cartagena, 1795-1831. 
Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Florida, 2002. 
 
________. “A Republican Myth of Racial Harmony: Race and Patriotism in Colombia, 
1810-1812.” Historical Reflections/ Reflexions Historiques 29 (Spring 2003): 43-
63. 
 
Laurie, Bruce. Beyond Garrison: Antislavery and Social Reform. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
 
Leclercq, Patrice. “Turreau en Vendée: tactique et violence.” In Guerre et repression: La 
Vendée et le monde. Edited by Jean-Clément Martin. Nantes: Ouest Editions, 
1993. 75-83. 
 
Lepa, Jack H. The Shenandoah Valley Campaign in 1864. Jefferson: McFarland & 
Company, 2003. 
 
Lewis, Lloyd. Sherman: Fighting Prophet. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 
1932. Reprint: Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993. 
 
Linebaugh, Peter and Marcus Rediker. The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, 
Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2000. 
 
Link, William A. Roots of Secession: Slavery and Politics in Antebellum Virginia. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 
 
Liss, Peggy K. Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution, 1713-1826. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. 
 
Litwack, Leon F. Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery. New York: 
Knopf, 1979. 
 
Lucas, Colin. “Revolutionary Violence, the People and the Terror.” In The Terror. Edited 
by Keith Michael Baker. Volume 4. The French Revolution and the Creation of 
Modern Political Culture. 4 Volumes. Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin 
Lucas, François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 57-
79. 
  379 
 
________. The Structure of the Terror: The Example of Javogues in the Loire. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 
 
Magdol, Edward. A Right to the Land: Essays on the Freedmen's Community. Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1977. 
 
Martin, Jean-Clément. La Vendée et la France. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1987. 
 
________, Ed. Guerre et repression: La Vendée et le monde. Nantes: Ouest Editions, 
1993. 
 
________. “Massacres en Vendée au XVIIIe siècle, pendant le Deuxième Guerre 
mondiale, en Amérique latine au XXe.” In Guerre et repression: La Vendée et le 
monde. Edited by Jean-Clément Martin. Nantes: Ouest Editions, 1993. 11-19. 
 
Matthewson, Tim. “Abraham Bishop, “The Rights of Black Men,” and the American 
Reaction to the Haitian Revolution.” The Journal of Negro History 67 (Summer 
1982):148-154. 
 
May, Robert E. Manifest Destiny's Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. 
 
Mayer, Arno. The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
 
________. “Response.” In “Forum: Comparing Revolutions.” French Historical Studies 
24 (Fall 2001): 589-600. 
 
Mayer, Henry. All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1998. 
 
McDonald, Forrest. Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution. 
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1985. 
 
McFeely, William S. Grant: A Biography. New York: Norton, 1982. 
 
McKivigan, John R. “His Soul Goes Marching On: The Story of John Brown’s Followers 
after the Harper’s Ferry Raid.” In Antislavery Violence: Sectional, Racial, and 
Cultural Conflict in Antebellum America. Edited by John R. McKivigan and 
Stanley Harrold. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1999. 274-297. 
 
________. “James Redpath, John Brown, and the Advocacy of Slave Insurrection.” Civil 
War History 37 (December 1991): 293-313. 
 
  380 
________. “Vote as You Pray and Pray as You Vote: Church-Oriented Abolitionism and 
Antislavery Politics.” In Crusaders and Compromisers: Essays on the 
Relationship of the Antislavery Struggle to the Antebellum Party System. Edited 
by Alan M. Kraut. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983. 179-203. 
 
McKivigan, John R. and Stanley Harrold, Eds. Antislavery Violence: Sectional, Racial, 
and Cultural Conflict in Antebellum America. Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1999. 
 
McPherson, James M. Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
 
________. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1988. 
 
________. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
________. For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997. 
 
________. Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction. 3rd Edition. Boston: 
McGraw Hill, 2001. 
 
________. The Struggle for Equality: Abolitionists and the Negro in the Civil War and 
Reconstruction. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. 
 
________. This Mighty Scourge: Perspectives on the Civil War. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
 
________. What They Fought For, 1861-1865. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1994. 
 
Messner, William F. Freedmen and the Ideology of Free Labor: Louisiana 1862-1865. 
Lafayette: Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 
1978. 
 
Miller, William J. “Never Has There Been a More Complete Victory: The Cavalry 
Engagement at Tom’s Brook, October 9, 1864.” In The Shenandoah Valley 
Campaign of 1864. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006. 134-160. 
 
Morgan, Philip D. “Conspiracy Scares.” In “Forum: The Making of a Slave Conspiracy, 
Part 2.” William and Mary Quarterly 59 (January 2002): 159-166. 
 
Moore, Barrington, Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant 
in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. 
  381 
 
Nash, Gary B. Forging Freedom: The Formation of Philadelphia’s Black Community. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988. 
 
Neely, Mark E. The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007. 
 
________. Confederate Bastille: Jefferson Davis and Civil Liberties. Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 1993. 
 
________. The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991. 
 
________. The Last Best Hope of Earth: Abraham Lincoln and the Promise of America. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. 
 
________. The Union Divided: Party Conflict in the Civil War North. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2002. 
 
________. “Was the Civil War a Total War?” Civil War History 50 (December 2004): 
434-458. 
 
Newman, Richard S. The Transformation of American Abolitionism: Fighting Slavery in 
the Early Republic. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. 
 
Niven, John. Salmon P. Chase: A Biography. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
 
Nolan, Mary. “Ideology, Mobilization, and Comparison: Explaining Violence in The 
Furies.” In “Forum: Comparing Revolutions.” French Historical Studies 24 (Fall 
2001): 549-557. 
 
Oakes, James. The Radical and the Republican: Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, 
and the Triumph of Antislavery Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007. 
 
Oates, Stephen B. To Purge This Land with Blood: A Biography of John Brown. New 
York: Harper and Row, 1970. 
 
________. With Malice Towards None: The Life of Abraham Lincoln. New York: 
Mentor, 1977. 
 
Ott, Thomas O. The Haitian Revolution, 1789-1804. Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1973. 
 
Oubre, Claude F. Forty Acres and a Mule: The Freedmen's Bureau and Black Land 
Ownership. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978. 
 
  382 
Ozouf, Mona. “De-christianization.” “Marat.” “Revolutionary Calendar.” “Revolutionary 
Religion.” “Equality.” “Regeneration.” “Revolution.” In A Critical Dictionary of 
the French Revolution. Edited by François Furet and Mona Ozouf. Translated by 
Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1989. 20-32. 244-251. 538-547. 
560-570. 669-683. 781-791. 806-817. 
 
________. “The Terror after the Terror: An Immediate History.” In The Terror. Edited by 
Keith Michael Baker. Volume 4. The French Revolution and the Creation of 
Modern Political Culture. 4 Volumes. Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin 
Lucas, François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 3-18. 
 
Padgett, Chris. “Comeouterism and Antislavery Violence in Ohio’s Western Reserve.” In 
Antislavery Violence: Sectional, Racial, and Cultural Conflict in Antebellum 
America. Edited by John R. McKivigan and Stanley Harrold. Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1999. 193-214. 
 
Paquette, Robert L. “Jacobins of the Lowcountry: The Vesey Plot on Trial.” In “Forum: 
The Making of a Slave Conspiracy, Part 2.” William and Mary Quarterly 59 
(January 2002): 185-192. 
 
Pearson, Edward P. “Trials and Errors: Denmark Vesey and His Historians.” In “Forum: 
The Making of a Slave Conspiracy, Part 2.” William and Mary Quarterly 59 
(January 2002): 137-142. 
 
Pease, William H. and Jane H. Pease. Black Utopia: Negro Communal Experiments in 
America. Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1963. 
 
________. They Who Would Be Free: Blacks' Search for Freedom, 1830-1861. New 
York: Atheneum, 1974. 
 
Perkal, M. Leon. “American Abolition Society: A Viable Alternative to the Republican 
Party?” The Journal of Negro History 65 (Winter 1980): 57-71. 
 
Perman, Michael. Reunion without Compromise: The South and Reconstruction: 1865-
1868. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. 
 
Pérotin-Dumon, Anne. “Les Jacobins des Antilles ou L’Esprit de Liberté dans les Iles-du-
Vent.” Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine 35 (1988): 275-304. 
 
Perry, Lewis. Radical Abolitionism: Anarchy and the Government of God in Antislavery 
Thought. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973. 
 
Peterson, Merrill D. John Brown: The Legend Revisited. Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2002. 
 
  383 
Potter, David Morris. The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861. Completed and Edited by Don 
E. Fehrenbacher. New York: Harper & Row, 1976. 
 
Quarles, Benjamin. Allies for Freedom: Blacks and John Brown. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1974.  
 
________. Black Abolitionists. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. 
 
Quigley, David. Second Founding: New York City, Reconstruction, and the Making of 
American Democracy. New York Hill and Wang, 2004. 
 
Quill, J. Michael. Prelude to the Radicals: The North and Reconstruction during 1865. 
Washington: University Press of America, 1980. 
 
Rable, George C. But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of 
Reconstruction. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1984. 
 
Rael, Patrick. Black Identity and Black Protest in the Antebellum North. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002. 
 
Renehan, Edward. The Secret Six: The True Tale of the Men Who Conspired with John 
Brown. New York: Crown Publishers, 1995. 
 
Richards, Leonard L. The Life and Times of Congressman John Quincy Adams. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
 
________. The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. 
 
Richardson, Heather Cox. The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, and Politics in the 
Post-Civil War North, 1865-1901. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
 
________. The Greatest Nation on Earth: Republican Economic Policies during the Civil 
War. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. 
 
Riddleberger, Patrick W. George Washington Julian, Radical Republican: A Study in 
Nineteenth-Century Politics and Reform. Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 
1966.  
 
Robertson, David. “Inconsistent Contextualism: The Hermeneutics of Michael Johnson.” 
In “Forum: The Making of a Slave Conspiracy, Part 2.” William and Mary 
Quarterly 59 (January 2002): 153-158. 
 
  384 
Rodriguez, Junius. “Rebellion on the River Road: The Ideology and Influence of 
Louisiana’s German Coast Slave Insurrection of 1811.” In Antislavery Violence: 
Sectional, Racial, and Cultural Conflict in Antebellum America. Edited by John 
R. McKivigan and Stanley Harrold. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 
1999. 65-88. 
 
Rose, Willie Lee. Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment. 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964. 
 
Ross, Steven J. “Freed Soil, Freed Labor, Freed Men: John Eaton and the Davis Bend 
Experiment.” Journal of Southern History 44 (May 1978): 213-232. 
 
Rossbach, Jeffery S. Ambivalent Conspirators: John Brown, the Secret Six, and a Theory 
of Slave Violence. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982. 
 
Rudé, George. Robespierre: Portrait of a Revolutionary Democrat. New York: The 
Viking Press, 1976. 
 
Rugemer, Edward Bartlett. The Problem of Emancipation: The Caribbean Roots of the 
American Civil War. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008. 
 
Sa’adah, Anne. The Shaping of Liberal Politics in Revolutionary France: A Comparative 
Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.  
 
Schama, Simon. Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution. New York: Vintage 
Books, 1989. 
 
Schor, Joel. Henry Highland Garnet: A Voice of Black Radicalism in the Nineteenth 
Century. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1977. 
 
Schweninger, Loren. Black Property Owners in the South, 1790-1915. Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1990. 
 
Scott, Julius S. “Afro-American Sailors and the International Communications Network: 
The Case of Newport Bowers.” In Jack Tar in History: Essays in the History of 
Maritime Life and Labour. Edited by Colin Howell and Richard Twomey. 
Fredericton: Acadiensis Press 1991. 37-52. 
 
________. The Common Wind: Currents of Afro-American Communication in the Era of 
the Haitian Revolution. Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1986. 
 
________. “Crisscrossing Empires: Ships, Sailors, and Resistance in the Lesser Antilles 
in the Eighteenth Century.” In The Lesser Antilles in the Age of European 
Expansion. Edited by Robert Paquette and Stanley Engerman. Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 1996. 128-46. 
 
  385 
________. Julius Scott on John Brown Russwurm and the Haitian Revolution. Boston: 
WGBH Educational Foundation for PBS Online, 1998. World Wide Web. 
Available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part3/3i3131.html. 
 
Scurr, Ruth. Fatal Purity: Robespierre and the French Revolution. New York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2006. 
 
Secher, Reynald. Le génocide franco-française: La Vendée-Vengé. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1986. Translated by George Holoch as A French 
Genocide: The Vendée. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003. 
 
Sewell, Richard H. Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States, 1837-
1860. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
 
________. “Slavery, Race, and the Free Soil Party.” In Crusaders and Compromisers: 
Essays on the Relationship of the Antislavery Struggle to the Antebellum Party 
System. Edited by Alan M. Kraut. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983. 101-124. 
 
Sewell, William H. “Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case.” 
The Journal of Modern History 57, No. 1 (1985): 57-85. 
 
________. “The Sans-Culotte Rhetoric of Subsistence.” In The Terror. Edited by Keith 
Michael Baker. Volume 4. The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern 
Political Culture. 4 Volumes. Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin Lucas, 
François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 249-269. 
 
Sheehan-Dean, Aaron. “Success Is So Blended with Defeat: Virginia Soldiers in the 
Shenandoah Valley.” In The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864. Edited by 
Gary W. Gallagher. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006. 
257-298. 
 
Shortreed, Margaret. “The Anti-Slavery Radicals: From Crusade to Revolution, 1840-
1868.” Past and Present 16 (Nov 1959): 65-87. 
 
Sidbury, James. “Plausible Stories and Varnished Truths.” In “Forum: The Making of a 
Slave Conspiracy, Part 2.” William and Mary Quarterly 59 (January 2002): 179-
184. 
 
________. Plowshares into Swords: Race, Rebellion, and Identity in Gabriel’s Virginia, 
1730-1810. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
________. “Saint Domingue in Virginia: Ideology, Local Meanings, and Resistance to 
Slavery, 1790-1800.” Journal of Southern History 63 (1997): 531-552. 
 
  386 
________. “Thomas Jefferson in Gabriel’s Virginia.” In The Revolution of 1800: 
Democracy, Race, and the New Republic. Edited by James Horn, Jan Ellen Lewis, 
and Peter S. Onuf. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002. 199-219. 
 
Simpson, Brooks D. Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War and 
Reconstruction, 1861-1868. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1991. 
 
________. Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph over Adversity, 1822-1865. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2000. 
 
________. The Reconstruction Presidents. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. 
 
Sinha, Manisha. “The Caning of Charles Sumner: Slavery, Race, and Ideology in the Age 
of the Civil War.” Journal of the Early Republic 23 (Summer 2003): 233-262. 
 
________. The Counterrevolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in Antebellum South 
Carolina. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 
 
________. “‘His Truth is Marching On’: John Brown and the Fight for Racial Justice.” 
Civil War History 52 (2006): 161-169. 
 
Skocpol, Theda. “Cultural Idioms and Political Ideologies in the Revolutionary 
Reconstruction of State Power: A Rejoinder to Sewell.” The Journal of Modern 
History 57, No. 1 (1985): 86-96. 
 
________. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and 
China. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
 
Smith, Jean Edward. Grant. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001. 
 
Stauffer, John. “Advent Among the Indians: The Revolutionary Ethos of Gerrit Smith, 
James McCune Smith, Frederick Douglass, and John Brown.” In Antislavery 
Violence: Sectional, Racial, and Cultural Conflict in Antebellum America. Edited 
by John R. McKivigan and Stanley Harrold. Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1999. 236-273. 
 
________. The Black Hearts of Men: Radical Abolitionists and the Transformation of 
Race. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
 
Stein, Robert L. Léger Félicité Sonthonax: The Lost Sentinel of the Republic. London: 
Associated University Presses, 1985.  
 
Stewart, James Brewer. Abolitionist Politics and the Coming of the Civil War. Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2008. 
 
  387 
________. “Joshua Giddings, Antislavery Violence, and Congressional Politics of 
Honor.” In Antislavery Violence: Sectional, Racial, and Cultural Conflict in 
Antebellum America. Edited by John R. McKivigan and Stanley Harrold. 
Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1999. 167-192. 
 
________. Wendell Phillips: Liberty’s Hero. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press. 1986. 
 
Striner, Richard. Father Abraham: Lincoln’s Relentless Struggle to End Slavery. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Sundquist, Eric J. To Wake the Nations: Race in the Making of American Literature. 
Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1994. 
 
Sutherland, Daniel E., Ed. Guerrillas, Unionists, and Violence on the Confederate Home 
Front. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1999. 
 
Sutherland, Donald M.G. “An Assessment of the Writing of François Furet.” In “Forum: 
François Furet’s Interpretation of the French Revolution.” French Historical 
Studies 16 (Fall 1990): 785-791. 
 
________. France 1789-1815: Revolution and Counterrevolution. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986. 
 
________. “The Vendée: Unique or Emblematic?” In The Terror. Edited by Keith 
Michael Baker. Volume 4. The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern 
Political Culture. 4 Volumes. Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin Lucas, 
François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 99-114. 
 
Tacket, Timothy. Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National 
Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790). Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996. 
 
________. “The Constituent Assembly and the Terror.” In The Terror. Edited by Keith 
Michael Baker. Volume 4. The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern 
Political Culture. 4 Volumes. Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin Lucas, 
François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 39-54. 
 
________. “Interpreting the Terror.” In “Forum: Comparing Revolutions.” French 
Historical Studies 24 (Fall 2001): 569-578. 
 
Taylor, John M. William Henry Seward: Lincoln's Right Hand. New York: 
HarperCollins, 1991. 
 
tenBroek, Jacobus. Equal Under Law: The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. New York: Collier Books, 1965. 
  388 
 
Thomas, William G. “Nothing Ought to Astonish Us: Confederate Civilians in the 1864 
Shenandoah Valley Campaign.” In The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864. 
Edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2006. 222-256. 
 
Tilly, Charles. The Vendée. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. 
 
Trefousse, Hans Louis. The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard for Racial Justice. 
New York: Knopf, 1969. 
 
Trelease, Allen W. White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern 
Reconstruction. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 
 
de Tocqueville, Alexis. The Old Regime and the French Revolution. Translated by Stuart 
Gilbert. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955. 
 
Tunnell, Ted. Crucible of Reconstruction: War, Radicalism, and Race in Louisiana, 
1862-1877. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984. 
 
Van Deusen, Glyndon G. William Henry Seward. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1967. 
 
Vorenberg, Michael. Final Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
 
Walters, John Bennett. “General William T. Sherman and Total War.” Journal of 
Southern History 14 (1948): 447-480. 
 
Wang, Xi. The Trial of Democracy: Black Suffrage and Northern Republicans, 1860-
1910. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997. 
 
Wert, Jeffry D. From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864. 
Carlisle: South Mountain Press, 1987. 
 
White, Ashli. “The Politics of ‘French Negroes’ in the United States.” Historical 
Reflections/Reflexions Historiques 29 (Spring 2003): 103-121. 
 
Wiecek, William M. The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1972. 
 
________. The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1977. 
 
Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and his Generals. New York: Vintage Books, 1952. 
 
  389 
________. Lincoln and the Radicals. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1941. 
 
Williamson, Joel. After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina during Reconstruction, 
1861-1877. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965. 
 
Wills, Garry. Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America. New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1992. 
 
________. "Negro President": Jefferson and the Slave Power. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
2003. 
 
Winch, Julie. Philadelphia’s Black Elite: Activism, Accommodation, and the Struggle for 
Autonomy, 1787-1848. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988. 
 
Woloch, Isser. “The Contraction and Expansion of Democratic Space during the Period 
of the Terror.” In The Terror. Edited by Keith Michael Baker. Volume 4. The 
French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture. 4 Volumes. 
Edited by Keith Michael Baker, Colin Lucas, François Furet, and Mona Ozouf. 
New York: Pergamon Press, 1994. 309-325. 
 
Wood, Gordon. The Radicalism of the American Revolution. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1992. 
 
